Brown v. International Asset Group, LLC

Filing 9

ORDER AND ENTRY GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT (Doc. 8 ). Signed by Judge Timothy S. Black on 11/30/2012. (mr1)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION
KAITLIN C. BROWN,

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:
Plaintiff,
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vs.
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INTERNATIONAL ASSET GROUP, LLC, :
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Defendant.
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Case No. 3:12-cv-256
Judge Timothy S. Black

ORDER AND ENTRY GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S
MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT (Doc. 8)
This civil case is before the Court on Plaintiff Kaitlin C. Brown’s Motion for
Default Judgment. (Doc. 8). Defendant did not file a response to Plaintiff’s Motion and
the time for doing so has expired. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion is ripe.
I. FACTS ALLEGED
Plaintiff, a resident of Piqua, Ohio, conducted a web search for free legal aid
services in March 2012, and logged on to the website of Legal Service Corporation
(“LSC”) at the web address www.lsc.gov. LSC states on its website that it is “the single
largest funder of civil legal aid for low-income Americans in the nation.” Plaintiff called
a telephone number obtained through the LSC website and left a voice message
requesting free legal advice relating to debt collector practices. Plaintiff was informed a
representative would return her call.
On or about the afternoon of March 7, 2012, an agent-employee of Defendant,
identifying himself as Dave Segal, placed a call to Plaintiff. Segal stated that he was

calling regarding the Plaintiff’s earlier telephone request for attorney assistance with debt
collector practices. Segal claimed that he was an attorney from a free legal aid service
and requested personal identifying information from Plaintiff, including her social
security number and her husband’s employment information. Believing that Segal was an
attorney from a legal aid service, Plaintiff provided this information to Segal.
Segal then asked about an account of Plaintiff’s that was allegedly due and owing
from H.H. Gregg. Believing Segal to be an attorney from a legal aid service, Plaintiff
discussed this account with Segal and he provided her with certain claimed legal opinions
about the account, its status and handling.
At the end of the telephone conversation, Segal revealed that he was, in fact, a debt
collector of Defendant, that Defendant was hired to collect the allegedly owed H.H.
Gregg account, and, while laughing, told Plaintiff she should not have provided Segal
with her husband’s employment information. Segal then informed Plaintiff that she must
make arrangements to pay on the debt on or before March 27, 2012, or that a judgment
would be placed against her. During a later telephone conversation, Segal and/or his
superior, identifying himself as Joseph Lane, claimed that they worked for a company
identified as Legal Outsourcing.
Defendant impersonated, implied, and held itself out as attorneys affiliated with a
government legal aid service, when, in fact, Defendant was not a law firm and was
engaged in the practice of consumer debt collection. Defendant failed to immediately

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provide Plaintiff with lawfully required warnings that she was speaking with a debt
collector and that any information obtained would be used in collection of a debt.
Defendant’s conduct, and that of its employees, was undertaken with the intent of
harassing, annoying and misleading Plaintiff in connection with Defendant’s attempts to
coerce payment on the alleged consumer debt.
Plaintiff now brings suit alleging violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices
Act (“FDCPA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1692, et seq. Namely, Plaintiff contends that Defendant
violated: (1) §1692d by engaging in conduct the natural consequence of which is to
harass, oppress, or abuse any person in connection with the collection of a debt;
(2) §1692d(6) by placing telephone calls without meaningful disclosure of the caller’s
identity; (3) §1692e by using any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means
in connection with the collection of a debt; (4) §1692e(3) by the false representation or
implication that an individual is an attorney or that a communication is from an attorney;
(5) §1692e(10) by the use of any false representation or deceptive means to collect or
attempt to collect a debt or obtain information concerning a consumer; (6) §1692e(11) by
failing to disclose in the initial communication with the consumer that the debt collector
is attempting to collect a debt and that any information obtained will be used for that
purpose; (7) §1692e(14) by the use of any business, company, or organization name other
than the true name of Defendant’s business; and (8) §1692f by using any unfair or
unconscionable means to collect or attempt to collect a debt.

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Plaintiff filed the Complaint in this case on July 30, 2012. (Doc. 1). The Court’s
docket reflects that Defendant was served by certified mail on August 13, 2012. (Doc. 3)
Pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Defendant was required to answer on or
before September 4, 2012. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(a)(1)(A)(i). Defendant failed to answer
and Plaintiff moved for an entry of default, which was docketed by the Clerk on October
9, 2012. (Doc. 7). Plaintiff now moves for default judgment.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Applications for default judgment are governed by Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2).
Following the clerk’s entry of default pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a) and the party’s
application for default under Rule 55(b), “the complaint’s factual allegations regarding
liability are taken as true, while allegations regarding the amount of damages must be
proven.” Morisaki v. Davenport, Allen & Malone, Inc., No. 2:09-cv-0298, 2010 WL
3341566, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 23, 2010) (citing Dundee Cement Co. v. Howard Pipe &
Concrete Products, 722 F.2d 1319, 1323 (7th Cir.1983) (further citations omitted).
In other words, while liability may be shown by well-pleaded allegations, “[t]he
district court must . . . conduct an inquiry in order to ascertain the amount of damages
with reasonable certainty.” Osbeck v. Golfside Auto Sales, Inc., No. 07-14004, 2010 WL
2572713, at *5 (E.D. Mich. Jun. 23, 2010). To ascertain damages where there is a sum
uncertain, Rule 55(b)(2) “allows but does not require the district court to conduct an
evidentiary hearing.” Vesligaj v. Peterson, 331 Fed. Appx. 351, 354-55 (6th Cir. 2009).

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Instead, the court may rely on affidavits submitted on the issue of damages. See Schilling
v. Interim Healthcare of Upper Ohio Valley, Inc., No. CIV A 206-CV-487, 2007 WL
152130, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 16, 2007); see also LaFarge North America Inc. v. Wells
Group, Inc., No. 4:08-cv-95, 2009 WL 2601854, at *4 (E.D. Tenn. Aug. 24, 2009);
Frazier v. Absolute Collection Serv., Inc., 767 F.Supp.2d 1354 (N.D. Ga. 2011) (stating
that certain courts note “that an evidentiary hearing is not necessary where the moving
party has provided supporting affidavits as to the issue of damages”).
III. ANALYSIS
Based on the allegations in the Complaint, which the Court accepts as true by
virtue of Defendant’s default, the Court finds that Defendant violated the aforementioned
provisions of the FDCPA. With regard to damages, the FDCPA, provides that:
any debt collector who fails to comply with any provision of . . . [the
FDCPA] with respect to any person is liable to such person in an amount
equal to the sum of - (1) any actual damage sustained by such person as a result of such
failure;
(2)(A) in the case of any action by an individual, such additional
damages as the court may allow, but not exceeding $1,000; . . . and
(3) in the case of any successful action to enforce the foregoing liability,
the costs of the action, together with a reasonable attorney’s fee as
determined by the court.
15 U.S.C. § 1692k. Here, Plaintiff seeks statutory damages, attorney’s fees and costs. In
seeking default judgment, Plaintiff sufficiently supports her Motion with documentation,
and, therefore, a hearing is unnecessary.
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Plaintiff first seeks statutory damages in the amount of $1,000. In awarding
statutory damages under § 1692k(a)(2)(A), “the court shall consider . . . the frequency and
persistence of noncompliance by the debt collector, the nature of such noncompliance,
and the extent to which such noncompliance was intentional.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692(b)(1).
Here, Defendant committed numerous violations of the FDCPA and given the truly
egregious and unconscionable nature of Defendant’s conduct, the Court concludes that
Plaintiff is entitled to full extent of $1,000 in statutory damages.
Next, Plaintiff also seeks attorney’s fees and costs. An award of “‘a reasonable
attorney’s fee’ and costs to a prevailing party” are mandatory. Dowling v. Litton Loan
Servicing LP, 320 Fed. Appx. 442, 446 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(3);
Lee v. Thomas & Thomas, 109 F.3d 302, 307 (6th Cir.1997)). “A reasonable fee is one
that is ‘adequately compensatory to attract competent counsel yet which avoids producing
a windfall for lawyers.’” Id. (citing Geier v. Sundquist, 372 F.3d 784, 791 (6th Cir.2004);
Reed v. Rhodes, 179 F.3d 453 (6th Cir. 1999)). To determine reasonable attorney’s fees,
courts begin multiplying “a reasonable hourly rate” with “the number of hours reasonably
expended on the litigation” to obtain what is “known as the ‘lodestar.’” Id. (citations
omitted). Courts “indulge a ‘strong presumption’ that the lodestar ‘represents a
‘reasonable’ fee.’” Id. (citation omitted).
Here, Plaintiff evidences $2,040 in attorney’s fees and $350 in costs. The Court,
upon reviewing the billing statement submitted by Plaintiff, concludes that the average

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hourly rate charged ($188.89) is reasonable and that the total number of hours expended
(10.8 hours) is reasonable. Accordingly, Plaintiff is entitled to recover $2,040 in
attorney’s fees and $350 in costs.
IV. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff’s Motion for Default Judgment (Doc. 8) is
GRANTED. Judgment shall be entered in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendant in the
following amounts: (1) statutory damages in the amount of $1,000.00; (2) attorney’s fees
in the amount of $2,040.00; and (3) costs in the amount of $350.00.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

s/ Timothy S. Black
Timothy S. Black
United States District Judge

Date: 11/30/12

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