Dixon v. Commissioner of Social Security

Filing 13

ORDER THAT: (1) THE ALJ'S NON-DISABILITY FINDING IS FOUND SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE, AND AFFIRMED; AND (2) THIS CASE IS CLOSED. Signed by Judge Timothy S. Black on 11/12/2013. (mr1)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION
RUTH DIXON,
Plaintiff,
vs.
COMMISSIONER OF
SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.

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Case No. 3:12-cv-404
Judge Timothy S. Black

ORDER THAT: (1) THE ALJ’S NON-DISABILITY FINDING IS FOUND
SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE, AND AFFIRMED;
AND (2) THIS CASE IS CLOSED
This is a Social Security disability benefits appeal. At issue is whether the
administrative law judge (“ALJ”) erred in finding the Plaintiff “not disabled” and
therefore unentitled to disability insurance benefits (“DIB”) and supplemental security
income (“SSI”). (See Administrative Transcript (“PageID”) (PageID 66-80) (ALJ’s
decision)).
I.
On November 17, 2008, Plaintiff filed applications for DIB and SSI, alleging an
onset date of March 1, 2007 1 due to arthritis of her lumbar spine, bursitis 2 in her arm,
problems with balance, headaches, asthma, cholesterol, and thyroid issues. (PageID 217-

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Plaintiff’s insured status expired on March 31, 2009. (PageID 228).

Bursitis is the inflammation of one or more bursae (small sacs) of synovial fluid in the body.
When bursitis occurs, movement relying upon the inflamed bursa becomes difficult and painful.
2

22, 253). 3 She also alleged problems with memory and concentration. (PageID 253).
Plaintiff’s claims were denied initially and upon reconsideration. (PageID 153-59, 16469). After an administrative hearing, an administrative law judge (“ALJ”) issued a
decision finding Plaintiff not disabled. (PageID 66-80). The Appeals Council denied
Plaintiff’s request for review, making the ALJ’s decision the final decision of the
Commissioner. (PageID 47-49). Plaintiff seeks judicial review of the decision under
42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3).
Plaintiff was 51 years old at the time of the hearing. (PageID 217). Plaintiff
dropped out of school in the ninth grade to babysit her sister’s children. (PageID 426).
She received her GED in 1978. (PageID 258). Her past relevant work consisted of sales
clerk, taxi driver, taxi dispatcher, head housekeeper, motel maid, and laundromat
manager. (PageID 117-118). She last worked as a sales associate for two months in
April 2007. (Id.)
The ALJ’s “Findings,” which represent the rationale of his decision, were as
follows:
1. The claimant met the insured status requirements of the Social Security Act
through March 31, 2009.
2. The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since March 1,
2007, the alleged disability onset date (20 CFR 404.1571 et seq., and 416.971
et seq.).

Prior to her onset date, Plaintiff filed an earlier application. Specifically, there is an ALJ’s
decision dated 2003, in which the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the residual functional capacity to
perform medium exertional work activity. (PageID 128-139, 283).

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2

3. The claimant has the following severe impairments: 1) chronic low back pain;
2) a history of joint pain; 3) obesity; 4) a history of depression and anxiety;
5) and a history of alcohol-and cannabis-related disorders (20 CFR
404.1520(c) and 416.920(c)).
4. The claimant does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that
meets or medically equals one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404,
Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 CFR 404.1520(d), 404.1525, 404.1526, 416.920(d),
416.925 and 416.926).
5. After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned finds that the
claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform medium work as
defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(c) and 416.967(c) except: 1) no climbing of
ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; 2) occasional stopping and crouching; 3) no more
than frequent exposure to irritants; 4) no work on uneven surfaces; and
5) simple routine tasks.
6. The claimant is unable to perform any past relevant work (20 CFR 404.1565
and 416.965).
7. The claimant was born on July 8, 1955 and was 51 years old, which is defined
as an individual “closely approaching advanced age,” on the alleged disability
onset date. The claimant subsequently changed age category to “advanced
age” (20 CFR 404.1563 and 416.963).
8. The claimant has at least a high school education and is able to communicate in
English (20 CFR 404.1564 and 416.964).
9. Transferability of job skills is not material to the determination of disability
because using the Medical-Vocational Rules as a framework supports a finding
that the claimant is “not disabled,” whether or not she has transferable job
skills (See SSR 82-41 and 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 2).
10. Considering her age, education, work experience, and residual functional
capacity, there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national
economy that the claimant can perform (20 CFR 404.1569, 404.1569(a),
416.969, and 416.969(a)).
11. The claimant has not been under a disability, as defined in the Social Security
Act, from March 1, 2007, through the date of this decision (20 CFR
404.1520(g) and 416.920(g)).
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(PageID 68-79).
In sum, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was not under a disability as defined by
the Social Security Regulations, and was therefore not entitled to DIB or SSI. (PageID
79).
On appeal, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in ignoring the relevance of the
results of her April 2010 lumbar MRI on her ability to perform work activity.
II.
The Court’s inquiry on appeal is to determine whether the ALJ’s non-disability
finding is supported by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Substantial evidence is
“such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). In performing this
review, the Court considers the record as a whole. Hephner v. Mathews, 574 F.2d 359,
362 (6th Cir. 1978). If substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s denial of benefits, that
finding must be affirmed, even if substantial evidence also exists in the record upon
which the ALJ could have found plaintiff disabled. As the Sixth Circuit has explained:
“The Commissioner’s findings are not subject to reversal
merely because substantial evidence exists in the record to
support a different conclusion. The substantial evidence
standard presupposes that there is a “zone of choice” within
which the Commissioner may proceed without interference
from the courts. If the Commissioner’s decision is
supported by substantial evidence, a reviewing court must
affirm.”
Felisky v. Bowen, 35 F.3d 1027, 1035 (6th Cir. 1994).
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The claimant bears the ultimate burden to prove by sufficient evidence that she is
entitled to disability benefits. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1512(a). That is, she must present
sufficient evidence to show that, during the relevant time period, she suffered an
impairment, or combination of impairments, expected to last at least twelve months, that
left her unable to perform any job in the national economy. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A).
A.
The record reflects that:
Plaintiff was evaluated on April 10, 2008 by Dr. William Padamadan from TriState Occupational Medicine, Inc., at the request of the State agency. (PageID 346).
Her examination was normal. (PageID 347-348). Lumbar spine x-rays revealed some
minimal narrowing at L-5 through S-1 and some right convex scoliosis of her upper
spine. (PageID 353).
Plaintiff underwent a second exam on February 17, 2009 by Dr. Judith Brown,
at Tri-State Occupational Medicine, Inc. On exam, Plaintiff had painful crepitus and
tenderness at her knees bilaterally, trace edema of her mid-calf bilaterally, tenderness
over L5, problems arising from a squat, and decreased range of motion of her
dorsolumbar spine. (PageID 357-358, 361). Dr. Brown’s impression was chronic lower
back pain and joint pain. She opined that Plaintiff’s ability to perform the physical
requirements of work was mildly impaired. (PageID 358).
Plaintiff was treated at Rocking Horse Community Health Center beginning on
June 28, 2006. She was treated for a thyroid condition, asthma, allergic rhinitis,
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depression, and chronic low back pain. (PageID 363-364, 366, 368-371). Her treating
nurse practitioner, Sue Carter, completed a Basic Medical Form on December 4, 2008.
Plaintiff was treated for chronic low back pain, hypothyroidism, depression,
hyperlipidemia, and nicotine addiction. She was in good and stable condition. (PageID
384). Plaintiff could stand/walk for less than one hour out of eight and uninterrupted for
less than one hour and sit for one to two hours out of eight and uninterrupted for less than
one hour. She could lift/carry frequently and occasionally up to five pounds. She was
moderately limited in her ability to push/pull, bend, and handle. Nurse Carter opined that
Plaintiff was unemployable for twelve months or more. (PageID 385).
Dr. Gerald Klyop, a non-examining physician, reviewed the record on March 31,
2009, at the request of the State agency. He opined that Plaintiff could occasionally
lift/carry up to fifty pounds and frequently lift/carry up to twenty five pounds. Based on
AR 98-4 (the Drummond Ruling), he adopted the previous ALJ’s RFC finding. (PageID
417). Plaintiff was never to climb ladders, ropes, and scaffolds, but she could
occasionally kneel and crouch. (PageID 418).
Dr. George Schulz, a psychologist, evaluated Plaintiff on June 3, 2009, at the
request of the State agency. (PageID 424). Plaintiff was raised by both parents and was
the youngest of ten siblings. She denied any abuse as a child. She married at age
seventeen and had been married three times. Her first husband was controlling, her
second husband was physically and mentally abusive, and her third husband was an
alcoholic. She had five grown children. She was diagnosed with chronic back pain in
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1999, asthma in 2002, and hypothyroidism in 2004. She also had complaints of vertigo.
(PageID 425).
Plaintiff was seen for one session by a mental health therapist, Ms. Shelly Lopez,
in January 2009, but she could not afford to return. She related that she had been struck
in her head numerous times by her abusive husband but he had not allowed her to seek
treatment. She was treated in the early 1990s for drug and alcohol abuse as an outpatient.
She had last had alcohol the night prior to the evaluation when she had three shots of
whisky and she last used marijuana two weeks prior to the evaluation. Plaintiff watched
TV, read, washed dishes, cleaned the house, cooked, and did the grocery shopping. She
visited with her family twice a year. She was currently living with a friend. Her gait was
slow and she engaged in moderate eye contact and was cooperative. Plaintiff exhibited
no speech abnormalities. (PageID 428). Her memory and concentration were adequate
and her knowledge was in the low average range, as was her abstract reasoning ability.
(Id.) Ms. Lopez diagnosed depressive disorder, anxiety disorder, alcohol-related
disorder, and cannabis-related disorder. Plaintiff’s GAF score was 56. 4 (PageID 429).
Her ability to relate to others was mildly impaired and her ability to understand,
remember, and carry out instructions was not impaired. Plaintiff’s ability to maintain

The Global Assessment of Functioning (“GAF”) is a numeric scale (0 through 100) used by
mental health clinicians and physicians to rate subjectively the social, occupational, and
psychological functioning of adults, e.g., how well or adaptively one is meeting various
problems-in-living. A GAF score of 51-60 indicates moderate symptoms (e.g., flat affect and
circumstantial speech, occasional panic attacks) or moderate difficulty in social, occupational, or
school functioning (e.g., few friends, conflicts with peers or co-workers).
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attention and concentration to perform simple repetitive tasks was mildly impaired, and
her ability to deal with work stress was mildly impaired. (PageID 430).
Dr. Cynthia Waggoner, a non-examining psychologist, reviewed the record on
June 15, 2009, at the request of the State agency. She opined that Plaintiff did not have a
severe mental impairment. (PageID 435). Dr. Leslie Green, another non-examining
psychologist, reviewed the record on July 5, 2009, at the request of the State agency, and
affirmed the previous assessment. (PageID 434)
Plaintiff was seen in the ER on September 10, 2009. She had acute bronchitis.
(PageID 496).
Plaintiff continued treatment at Rocking Horse Community Health Center. Dr.
Uddin and Ms. Hale completed a Basic Medical on February 27, 2009. Plaintiff was
treated for chronic low back pain, rhinitis, hypothyroidism, depression, hyperlipidemia,
and nicotine addiction. She was in good and stable condition. (PageID 488). Plaintiff
could stand/walk for four hours out of eight and uninterrupted for three hours, sit for four
hours out of eight and uninterrupted for three hours, and occasionally and frequently
lift/carry up to five pounds. Plaintiff was moderately limited in her ability to push/pull,
bend, and handle. Dr. Uddin and Ms. Hale opined that Plaintiff was unemployable for
twelve months or more. (PageID 489).
Plaintiff was diagnosed with vertigo in 2009. (PageID 475). On October 14,
2009, she was diagnosed and treated for arthritis in her hips, knees, and right thumb.
(PageID 474). On March 22, 2010, Ms. Carter completed another Basic Medical form.
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Ms. Carter opined that Plaintiff could stand/walk for three to four hours and uninterrupted
for two and one half hours, sit for three to four hours out of eight and uninterrupted for
less than half an hour, and frequently and occasionally lift/carry up to five pounds.
Plaintiff was moderately limited in her ability to push/pull, bend, and reach. Ms. Carter
opined that Plaintiff was unemployable for twelve months or more. (PageID 472).
Ms. Carter completed interrogatories on March 11, 2010. She had treated Plaintiff
since February 27, 2008. (PageID 451). Plaintiff’s diagnoses were chronic low back
pain, depression, B23 deficiency, nicotine addiction, hypothyroidism, and
hyperlipidemia. (PageID 452). Ms. Carter stated that Plaintiff’s combination of physical
and mental impairments restricted her more than the sum of the parts. (Id.) Her
psychological impairments decreased her ability to cope. (PageID 453). Plaintiff was
unable to sustain attention and concentration on her work to meet normal standards of
work productivity and work accuracy. (PageID 455). She had only a slight restriction in
her daily activities. (PageID 459). Ms. Carter opined that Plaintiff could only lift/carry
occasionally and frequently up to five pounds, stand/walk for only four hours out of eight
and uninterrupted for three hours, and sit for only four hours out of eight and
uninterrupted for three hours. (PageID 462). Plaintiff was never to climb, kneel, and
crawl and she had restrictions in handling, fingering, and pushing/pulling. (PageID 463).
She could perform sedentary work activity, but not light work activity. (PageID 465).
Treatment records show that Plaintiff had knee x-rays taken on November 18,
2005. They were normal. (PageID 550). She was treated for arthralgias and told to
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exercise as tolerated. (PageID 555). Plaintiff was seen for her left knee and left hip.
(PageID 566). She also had muscle spasms under her right breast. (PageID 569). She
underwent a lumbar MRI on April 19, 2010, which revealed that she had “mild to
moderate disc height loss and associated anterior spurring at L2-L3 and L1-L2.” (PageID
563). It also revealed a small central disc protrusion at T11-T12 and a small left
paracentral disc protrusion at T12-L1. (Id.) There was also “a broad-based disc
protrusion and mild facet arthropathy” at L2-L3 and “a broad-based disc protrusion at
L4-L5” that “effaces the thecal sac and nearly abuts the traversing L5 nerve roots.”
(PageID 562). It also showed “[a] small broad-based disc protrusion at L5-S1….” (Id.)
An April 22, 2010 EMG of Plaintiff’s hands was normal. (PageID 558).
Plaintiff underwent a mental health evaluation on January 7, 2009 at Citi Lookout.
(PageID 493). The diagnosis was major depression and anxiety disorder. Plaintiff’s
GAF score was 61. 5 (PageID 494). On a depression questionnaire, she endorsed “a high
degree of depression and anxiety which at the present time are not being treated with
medication or therapy.” (PageID 491). Ms. Lopez also stated, “As Ms. Dixon talked
with the undersigned it was also apparent that there are many unresolved relational and
emotional issues in her life.” (PageID 492). It was recommended that Ms. Dixon have a
psychiatric evaluation. (Id.)

A GAF score of 61-70 indicates some mild symptoms (e.g., depressed mood and mild
insomnia) or some difficulty in social, occupational, or school functioning (e.g., occasional
truancy, or theft within the household), but generally functioning pretty well, has some
meaningful interpersonal relationships.
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On February 24, 2010, Ms. Penny Zimmerman, Plaintiff’s treating mental health

therapist, noted that she had treated Plaintiff four times in September and November
2009. Ms. Zimmerman found that Plaintiff’s chronic back pain contributed to her
depression. The diagnosis was dysthymic disorder, 6 late onset. Plaintiff’s GAF score
was 40. 7 (PageID 450, 512). During her initial evaluation, Plaintiff had very little eye
contact and took a long time to respond to questions. She had slow to retarded energy
level, her facial expressions were inappropriate or incongruent, her attitude was guarded,
her affect was flat and defensive, her mood was depressed, and she had an impaired
memory. (PageID 503, 508). Plaintiff had missed appointments and she did not progress
because of the lack of attendance. She had transportation and money problems. (PageID
450, 497-498, 500-501).
B.
Plaintiff alleges that the ALJ erred in ignoring the relevance of the results of her
April 2010 lumbar MRI on her ability to perform work activity.
Plaintiff acknowledges that the ALJ mentioned the findings from her 2010 MRI,
but she argues that the ALJ failed to explain why the diagnostic test did not show that
Plaintiff’s condition was disabling.
Dysthymic disorder is a mood disorder consisting of the same cognitive and physical problems
in depression, with less severe but longer-lasting symptoms.
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A GAF score of 31-40 indicates some impairment in reality testing or communication (e.g.,
speech is at times illogical, obscure, or irrelevant) or major impairment in several areas, such as
work or school, family relations, judgment, thinking, or mood (e.g., depressed adult avoids
friends, neglects family, and is unable to work; child frequently beats up younger children, is
defiant at home, and is failing at school).
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The ALJ explained that Plaintiff’s lumbar x-rays were described as “minimal” and
“mild” (PageID 77 referring to PageID 353, 561-63). The ALJ was not interpreting raw
data. Instead, the ALJ was summarizing the findings of the radiologists who interpreted
the diagnostic reports. (PageID 69, citing PageID 562). For instance, the ALJ explained
that Plaintiff’s MRI of the lumbar spine showed that there was “mild” central narrowing,
“mild” facet arthropathy, “no significant” foraminal stenosis and “mild” facet
arthropathy. (PageID 69 citing PageID 562). All of these findings were contained in the
radiologist’s report. (PageID 562). The MRI also confirms that, although there was
evidence of protrusions and discogenic changes, there was no foraminal stenosis, no
acute bony abnormality, and the theca sac only “nearly” abutted the nerve root. (PageID
562). Accordingly, it was reasonable for the ALJ to conclude that Plaintiff’s MRI was
not per se evidence of disability. Contrary to Plaintiff’s arguments, it was appropriate for
the ALJ to summarize the findings of the radiologist that interpreted Plaintiff’s MRI.
Plaintiff maintains that the ALJ “clearly” and erroneously “substituted” his
opinion for that of a competent medical source by interpreting the results of the April
2010 MRI. However, the ALJ did not interpret the MRI results, he merely summarized
the radiologist’s findings. Even more significant, however, Plaintiff has not pointed to
any medical source that endorsed her conclusion that the MRI abnormalities rendered her
totally disabled. In fact, the only evidence Plaintiff provides is a citation to the online
Merck Manual that explains that crepitus is an indication of worsening osteoarthritis.
There is no evidence that Plaintiff was diagnosed with osteoarthritis during the relevant
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period. Even if the MRI had showed that Plaintiff had osteoarthritis, the diagnosis alone
would not be dispositive of whether Plaintiff was disabled. The Sixth Circuit has
explained that the mere diagnosis of an impairment says nothing about the severity of the
impairment. Foster v. Bowen, 853 F.2d 483, 489 (6th Cir. 1988). Plaintiff would still be
required to show that the condition was severe enough to prevent her from working.
Plaintiff’s argument that her MRI abnormalities are per se evidence of disability, lacks
both legal and medical support. Accordingly, the ALJ properly evaluated the record
evidence, and reasonably determined that Plaintiff was capable of performing medium
work. (PageID 73).
Next, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in rejecting the opinion of her treating
nurse practitioner, Ms. Carter. In March 2010, Ms. Carter completed forms at the request
of Plaintiff’s attorney. (PageID 462). Ms. Carter stated that Plaintiff could stand and
walk for four hours in an eight-hour day and sit for four hours in an eight-hour say, for up
to three hours without interruption. (PageID 462). She opined that Plaintiff had the
ability to perform the lifting and carrying requirements of sedentary work activity.
(PageID 462). Two weeks later, Ms. Carter completed another medical form. (PageID
472). On the second form, Ms. Carter indicated that Plaintiff could stand, walk, and sit
for three to four hours but for only one-half hour at a time without interruption. (PageID
472). Without explaining why she changed her opinion regarding Plaintiff’s ability to sit,
Ms. Carter opined that Plaintiff was “unemployable.” (PageID 472).

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First, Ms. Carter is not an acceptable treating source, so her assessments are not
entitled to any special weight. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1513(d); Shumaker v. Comm’r of Soc.
Sec., No. 1:11cv2801, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14698, at *36 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 15,
2013)(because Nurse Rusterholz is not an acceptable medical source, the ALJ was not
required to provide good reasons for the weight given to his opinion under 404.1527(c)).
More importantly, Ms. Carter’s assessments of Plaintiff’s physical abilities varied
considerably, and she did not provide any explanation for the changed findings. In
March 2010, Ms. Carter opined that Plaintiff could stand, walk, and sit for up to three
hours without interruption (PageID 462), but two weeks later, Ms. Carter noted that
Plaintiff could only stand, walk and sit for a half hour without interruption. (PageID
472). Despite the significant differences in her opinion regarding Plaintiff’s ability to
stand, walk, and sit, Ms. Carter did not offer any explanation for the increased
limtiations. This inconsistency alone supports the ALJ’s decision to reject Ms. Carter’s
opinions. (PageID 70). Stanley v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 39 F.3d 115, 118
(6th Cir. 1994) (“the ALJ did not err in declining to refer to [the treating physician’s]
opinion because [the treating physician] originally opined that claimant could perform
sedentary work and did not provide any objective medical evidence to support his change
of heart.”).
However, it is clear from the record that the ALJ did not reject Ms. Carter’s
assessments solely because she was not an acceptable medical source, nor because there
were inconsistencies in her opinion. The ALJ also noted that the medical evidence did
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not support her limitations. (PageID 70). Although Ms. Carter opined that Plaintiff was
“unemployable,” the ALJ noted that Plaintiff’s lumbar x-rays were mild, her hip x-rays
were unremarkable, her EMG studies were essentially normal and her x-ray of the right
knee only revealed a small suprapatellar joint effusion. (PageID 74, 77 citing PageID
353, 466, 467, 558-59). Similarly, the ALJ also noted that Plaintiff’s examinations at
most revealed mild findings. (PageID 69). In fact, in January 2008, consultative
examiner Dr. Padamadan noted that Plaintiff’s physical examination was normal.
(PageID 348). Based on his findings, Dr. Padamadan concluded that there was no
evidence that Plaintiff had any limitations. (PageID 348). In February 2009, consultative
examiner Dr. Brown noted that Plaintiff had some tenderness, crepitus and decreased
range of motion, but no significant joint effusions, rheumatoid nodules, or range of
motion abnormalities. (PageID 358). Dr. Brown concluded that Plaintiff’s ability to
perform work-related activities was only mildly impaired. (PageID 358). Given the
minimal examination findings and mild diagnostic tests, it was reasonable for the ALJ to
conclude that Ms. Carter must have relied almost exclusively on the Plaintiff’s
unsubstantiated subjective complaints. (PageID 70).
Plaintiff further argues that the ALJ should have adopted Ms. Carter’s assessment
because it was supported by her MRI of the lumbar spine and Dr. Brown’s findings. As
previously stated, Plaintiff’s MRI only noted several “mild” findings. (PageID 562).
With respect to Dr. Brown, although Dr. Brown noted that Plaintiff had painful crepitus,
tenderness in the knees, edema, and decreased range of motion, she explicitly concluded
15

that Plaintiff’s ability to perform work-related activities was only mildly impaired.
(PageID 358). Although Plaintiff argues that crepitus is an indication of worsening
osteoarthritis, there is no evidence that she was diagnosed or treated for osteoarthritis
during the relevant time. In fact, the only time that Plaintiff was examined for
osteoarthritis the doctor noted that there were “no clinical indications of…nodular
osteoarthritis in the distal joints.” (PageID 296). While Plaintiff may believe that she has
osteoarthritis, the ALJ was not permitted to find that it was a medically determinable
impairment or assess functional limitations without diagnostic evidence of the
impairment. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1508, 404.1513, 404.1528, 404.1529 (explaining that an
impairment is a “medically determinable” impairment if it is proven to exist using
“acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques.”). Plaintiff has not shown that
she had a knee impairment that significantly limited her ability to perform the standing
and walking requirements of medium work.
Plaintiff also criticizes the ALJ for crediting the opinion of the non-examining
state agency physicians because they did not have access to the April 2010 MRI.
However, the ALJ reviewed the entire record, including the MRI, and concluded that
Plaintiff was not disabled. Based on the record evidence, including the MRI findings, the
ALJ found that the opinions of Drs. Klyop and Green were still warranted to significant
weight. (PageID 70).
Next, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ violated Drummond v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,
126 F.3d 837, 842 (6th Cir. 1997), because he found that the Drummond rationale did not
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apply, but gave great weight to the opinions of the state agency physicians who adopted
Drummond. (PageID 66). However, even though the ALJ concluded that the opinions of
the state agency physicians were entitled to great weight, he explained that he was
making “some minor adjustments.” (PageID 70). Specifically, the ALJ concluded that
Plaintiff had environment limitations that the state agency physicians did not address.
(PageID 420, 434).
Finally, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ impermissibly relied on her activities,
because they did not show what she could do over a sustained period. Specifically, the
ALJ noted that while Plaintiff claimed that she could only sit for 30 to 45 minutes and
stand and walk for 15 to 20 minutes (PageID 253), she cleaned the house, cooked, and
did the grocery shopping. (PageID 427). These activities are inconsistent with Plaintiff’s
allegations of total disability. At the hearing Plaintiff testified that she did not cook, do
laundry, or make her bed, and only rarely did household chores. (PageID 103). She
further testified that she “stopped shopping about 10 years go” (PageID 104), but she told
Dr. Schulz in June 2009 that she “regularly” did the grocery shopping. Plaintiff’s
inconsistent statements combined with the lack of objective medical evidence supports

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the ALJ’s adverse credibility determination. 8
Accordingly, the ALJ properly found that Plaintiff was not disabled. Her v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 203 F.3d 388, 389-90 (6th Cir. 1999) (“Even if the evidence could
also support another conclusions, the decision of the Administrative Law Judge must
stand if there evidence could reasonably support the conclusion reached.”). .
III.
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s assignments of error are unavailing. The
ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial evidence and is affirmed.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED THAT the decision of the Commissioner, that
Ruth Dixon was not entitled to disability insurance benefits or supplemental security
income is found SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE, and AFFIRMED;
and, as no further matters remain pending for the Court’s review, this case is CLOSED.

Date: 11/12/13

s/ Timothy S. Black
Timothy S. Black
United States District Judge

The ALJ also identified several additional reasons why Plaintiff was not credible. (PageID
77). Specifically, at the hearing Plaintiff testified that she stopped using alcohol 25 years ago
and stopped using drugs 15 years ago. (PageID 106). However, in June 2009, she told Dr.
Schulz that she smoked marijuana two times per month and drank shots of whiskey the night
before her examination. (PageID 426). When reminded of these statements, Plaintiff admitted
that she still drank beer occasionally. (PageID 108). Plaintiff denied telling Dr. Schulz that she
smoked marijuana (PageID 106-107), but Dr. Schulz’s treatment notes indicate that “[t]he last
time she used marijuana was two weeks ago when she reported smoking one joint. She reported
that she “normally smokes one or two joints each month.” (PageID 426). Given the specificity
in Dr. Schulz’s treatment records, it was reasonable for the ALJ to conclude that Plaintiff was
less-than-credible.
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