Easterling v. State of Ohio

Filing 19

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS - re 15 - Having reconsidered the Original Report in the light of Mr. Easterling's Objections, the Magistrate Judge again concludes district court jurisdiction of this case is precluded by the Rooker-Fel dman Doctrine and by Ohio's immunity from suit in federal court under the Eleventh Amendment. It is therefore again respectfully recommended that this case be dismissed without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Objections to R&R due by 5/6/2013. Signed by Magistrate Judge Michael R Merz on 4/17/13. (kje1)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION AT DAYTON
WARREN EASTERLING,
Petitioner,

:

Case No. 3:13-cv-024
District Judge Timothy S. Black
Magistrate Judge Michael R. Merz

-vs:
STATE OF OHIO,
Respondent.

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS
This case is before the Court on Petitioner=s Objections (Doc. No. 16) to the Magistrate
Judge’s Report and Recommendations (the “Original Report,” Doc. No. 15). As permitted by
Fed. R. Civ. P. 72, the Petitioner has filed a Response to those Objections (Doc. No. 17). Judge
Black has recommitted the case to the Magistrate Judge for a supplemental report and
recommendations (Doc. No. 18).
In the Original Report, the Magistrate Judge recommended granting the State of Ohio’s
Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 12) on the ground that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction
over the case. The State sought dismissal on the basis of Eleventh Amendment sovereign
immunity and the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine. The Magistrate Judge recommended granting that
relief because the same issues had been raised and decided against Mr. Easterling in Easterling v.
Ohio, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 364 (S.D. Ohio 2013).
Easterling begins by claiming that the decision in the prior case was an “invalid
judgment” and that “no final appealable order” was entered in that case (Objections, Doc. No.
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21, PageID 107). He cites no legal basis for those claims. In fact, District Judge Black adopted
the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation to dismiss the prior case without prejudice for lack of
jurisdiction on December 4, 2012, and the Clerk entered a judgment to that effect the same day
(Doc. Nos. 13, 14). Although Easterling moved for relief from the judgment, District Judge
Black denied that request and Easterling never filed any appeal in that case, either from the
Judgment or from denial of relief from judgment. Both the judgment and the denial of relief
from judgment are appealable orders under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Since the time for appeal has
expired, those orders are now final (i.e., no longer appealable). If Easterling wanted to establish
that either of those two orders was invalid, it was incumbent upon him to appeal to the Sixth
Circuit, which he has not done.
The Objections argue two basic points, that the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine does not bar a
decision on the merits of Plaintiff’s claim that Ohio Revised Code § 2323.52 is unconstitutional
and that Congress has abrogated the sovereign immunity of Ohio. Those two arguments are
interwoven, but are analytically separate and are treated separately here.

Rooker-Feldman

Easterling argues that the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine is not “an actual law” by which he
seems to mean it is not a statute or part of the Constitution (Objections, Doc. No. 16, PageID
107-108). He defines doctrine as “a principle of law established through past decisions.” Id. at
107. Because, Easterling says, the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine conflicts with statutes (e.g. 28
U.S.C. § 1331) and constitutional provisions such as “the law of due process,” it is
unconstitutional under the Supremacy Clause. Id. at PageID 108.

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This argument misunderstands some fundamentals of American jurisprudence. Without
doubt, the Constitution is the supreme law of the land. Art. VI, § 2. Very early in the history of
the Republic, the Supreme Court accepted the principle that the Constitution was law, that it was
the province of the courts and ultimately the Supreme Court to say what the Constitution means,
and that other “laws,” including statutes adopted by Congress, were invalid if they conflicted
with what the Supreme Court decides the Constitution means. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137,
2 L. Ed. 60 (1803).
Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S.413 (1923), and Dist. Columbia Ct. of Appeals v.
Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983), are decisions of the United States Supreme Court about what the
Constitution, and particularly Article III, means in the context of claims such as those raised by
Mr. Easterling. Judicial authority in the federal system is hierarchical and lower courts must
follow the law as established by the Supreme Court. Trial courts such as this one are obliged to
follow precedent set by Supreme Court. "Unless we wish anarchy to prevail within the federal
judicial system, a precedent of this Court must be followed by the lower federal courts no matter
how misguided the judges of those courts may think it to be." Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 375
(1982). Thus to argue to this Court that the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine is unconstitutional only
has meaning insofar as Easterling wants to preserve that argument to make on appeal some day
to the United States Supreme Court. Until that Court says Rooker-Feldman is unconstitutional
(and must be “buried immediately” in Easterling’s phrase), this Court is bound to obey those
decisions.
Rooker was decided in 1923, long before the codification of 28 U.S.C. § 1331 in 1948.
However, the same principle was involved: the plaintiff sought a district court invalidation of a
state court judgment and the Supreme Court determined that the district court did not have

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jurisdiction to hear the case. In Feldman, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals had denied,
in a judicial proceeding, Feldman’s right to be admitted to the D.C. Bar over a claim by Feldman
that the relevant D.C. Bar rule was unconstitutional. Claiming jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §
1331, the same statute relied on by Easterling, Feldman sought to have that judgment of the D.C.
Circuit Court of Appeals overturned, but the Supreme Court held there was no district court
jurisdiction.
Easterling relies at several points on Edgar v. Mite Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982)(See
Objections, Doc. No. 16, PageID 110, 112). That case nowhere involved the question of district
court subject matter jurisdiction over state court judgments alleged to be unconstitutional.
In addition to arguing that Rooker-Feldman is unconstitutional, Easterling also argues it
does not apply here because he is making a general claim that Ohio Revised Code § 2323.52, the
Ohio vexatious litigator statute, is unconstitutional. (Objections, Doc. No. 16, PageID 113-114).
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars relitigation of claims actually raised in state-court
proceedings as well as claims that are inextricably intertwined with claims asserted in those
proceedings. Catz v. Chalker, 142 F.3d 279, 293 (6th Cir. 1998). In practice this means that
when granting relief on the federal claim would imply that the state-court judgment on the other
issues was incorrect, federal courts do not have jurisdiction. Pieper v. American Arbitration
Assn., Inc., 336 F.3d 458, 460 (6th Cir. 2003)(Moore, J.), quoting Catz: “Where federal relief can
only be predicated upon a conviction that the state court was wrong, it is difficult to conceive the
federal proceeding as, in substance, anything other than a prohibited appeal of the state-court
judgment.”

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine, however, does not bar jurisdiction when the

plaintiff’s claim is merely “a general challenge of the state law applied in the state action,” rather
than a challenge to the law’s application in a particular state case.” Id., quoting Tropf v. Fidelity

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Nat’l Title Ins. Co., 289 F.3d 929, 937 (6th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 887 (2003); see
also Hood v. Keller, 341 F.3d 593 (6th Cir. 2003). Without question, Easterling was a party to
the underlying state case in which he was adjudged to be a vexatious litigator and his Motion for
Temporary Restraining Order in this case asks this Court to enjoin “any and all orders requiring
the petitioner seek leave of court pursuant to 2323.52 of the Ohio Revised Code on the basis of
the statute . . .” (Motion, Doc. No. 4, PageID 30).
Easterling relies on Exxon Mobil v. Saudi Basic Industries, Corp., 544 U.S. 280 (2005).
There a unanimous Supreme Court decided that Rooker-Feldman should not be expanded to a
case where there was parallel state and federal litigation, but the state court reached judgment
first. The Sixth Circuit explained in McCormick v. Braverman, 451 F.3d 382 (6th Cir. 2006), that
for Rooker-Feldman to apply, in light of Exxon Mobile, the harm to plaintiff must flow from the
state court judgment, not from actions of others in obtaining that judgment. Todd v. Weltman,
Weinberg, & Reis Co., L.P.A., 434 F.3d 432 (6th Cir. 2006)(Rooker-Feldman does not apply
where harm flows not from the state court judgment, but from filing a false affidavit in the state
court proceeding.) Easterling asserts that the issue in the state court litigation was only whether
he was a vexatious litigator, not whether the statute permitting him (or anyone else) to be
declared a vexatious litigator was constitutional. But the fact that Easterling did not defend
against the vexatious litigator judgment by claiming that the statute was unconstitutional does
not mean he can reserve that question for separate litigation in district court. Here he seeks not
only a general declaration that the statute is unconstitutional, but injunctive relief to prevent
application to himself of an existing state court judgment finding him to be a vexatious litigator.
The state court judgment that he is covered by that statute is “inextricably intertwined” with the
question whether that statute can be constitutionally applied to anyone. Moreover, we do not

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here have parallel state and federal litigation as in Exxon Mobile. Rather, the state court
litigation was final well before the present case was filed.1
Easterling seeks the benefit of law to the effect that the federal court can exercise
jurisdiction to adjudicate whether the state court judgment was obtained corruptly (Objections,
Doc. No. 16, PageID 114). However, Easterling’s notion of “corruption” is that the state court
judgment is corrupt because it relies on an unconstitutional statute. If the exception to RookerFeldman for corrupted state court judgments were broad enough to encompass that idea, it would
be broad enough to swallow the Feldman decision itself.

Eleventh Amendment Immunity

The State also sought dismissal on grounds it is immune from suit under the Eleventh
Amendment (Motion, Doc. No. 12) and the Magistrate Judge recommended dismissal on that
basis as well (Original Report, Doc. No. 15). Easterling objects on the grounds that Congress has
abrogated Ohio’s sovereign immunity by adopting 28 U.S.C. § 1331. (Objections, Doc. No. 16,
PageID 108, 110-112.)
Easterling is correct that Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, because it was passed
after the Eleventh Amendment, empowers Congress to abrogate state sovereign immunity.
Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976).

However, Congressional abrogation of state

immunity under the Eleventh Amendment must be by unequivocal statement.

Green v.

Mansour, 474 U.S. 64 (1985); Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775 (1991).

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Whether Easterling is barred by res judicata from raising the claim in this Court is beyond the issues presented,
since the State seeks dismissal on jurisdictional grounds only. Contrary to Easterling’s assertion that “[t]he State is
attempting to argue res judicata. . .”(Objections, Doc. No. 16, PageID 114), the State made no such argument in its
Motion to Dismiss.

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Easterling relies on 28 U.S.C. § 1331, but that statute nowhere talks about abrogating Eleventh
Amendment immunity. There are many examples of cases raising federal questions over which
district courts have jurisdiction under § 1331, for example, suits to recover money damages or
injunctive relief for state violation of federal constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
However, the Supreme Court has held that Congress has not abrogated state sovereign immunity
in suits under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Cowan v. University of Louisville School of Medicine, 900 F.2d
936, 940-41 (6th Cir. 1990), citing Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 at 341 (1979)). Easterling
points to no language in any federal statute which says, unequivocally or not, that Congress is
abrogating state sovereign immunity for the sorts of claims Easterling raises here. In sum, while
Congress may have the power to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity for this kind of case,
it has not done so.

Conclusion

Having reconsidered the Original Report in the light of Mr. Easterling’s Objections, the
Magistrate Judge again concludes district court jurisdiction of this case is precluded by the
Rooker-Feldman Doctrine and by Ohio’s immunity from suit in federal court under the Eleventh
Amendment. It is therefore again respectfully recommended that this case be dismissed without
prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
April 17, 2013.
s/ Michael R. Merz
United States Magistrate Judge

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NOTICE REGARDING OBJECTIONS
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), any party may serve and file specific, written objections to the
proposed findings and recommendations within fourteen days after being served with this Report
and Recommendations. Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(d), this period is extended to seventeen
days because this Report is being served by one of the methods of service listed in Fed. R. Civ.
P. 5(b)(2)(C), (D), (E), or (F). Such objections shall specify the portions of the Report objected
to and shall be accompanied by a memorandum of law in support of the objections. If the Report
and Recommendations are based in whole or in part upon matters occurring of record at an oral
hearing, the objecting party shall promptly arrange for the transcription of the record, or such
portions of it as all parties may agree upon or the Magistrate Judge deems sufficient, unless the
assigned District Judge otherwise directs. A party may respond to another party=s objections
within fourteen days after being served with a copy thereof. Failure to make objections in
accordance with this procedure may forfeit rights on appeal. See United States v. Walters, 638
F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985).

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