Dennis Baglama et al v. MWV Consumer and Office Products et al
Filing
55
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS MOTION TO TRANSFER VENUE 48 Motion to Change Venue - IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED THAT: 1. Plaintiffs Motion to Transfer Venue to the Central District of California, Southern Division at Santa Ana (doc. 48), is DENIED; and 2. This matter REMAIN in the Southern District of Ohio, Western Division at Dayton. Signed by Magistrate Judge Michael J Newman on 07/31/14. (pb1)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION AT DAYTON
DENNIS BAGLAMA, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
Case No.: 3:13-CV-276
vs.
MWV CONSUMER AND
OFFICE PRODUCTS, et al.,
District Judge Thomas M. Rose
Magistrate Judge Michael J. Newman
Defendants.
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION TO TRANSFER VENUE
This case is before the Court on Plaintiffs’ motion to transfer (doc. 48), Defendants’
memorandum in opposition (doc. 51), and Plaintiffs’ reply (doc. 53). Plaintiffs move this Court
-- under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) and on forum non conveniens grounds -- to transfer this case to the
United States District Court for the Central District of California, Southern Division at Santa
Ana, where this case originated prior to being transferred to this Court in August 2013. For the
reasons that follow, Plaintiffs’ motion is denied.1
I.
Plaintiffs Dennis Baglama and Coto Enterprises, LLC (hereinafter collectively referred to
as “Plaintiffs”) allege that Defendants MWV Consumer & Office Products and ACCO Brands
Corporation (collectively “Defendants”) impermissibly used their product designs to
manufacture and sell office planning and organization products. Doc. 1 at PageID 5. On
February 24, 2012, Defendants commenced an action in this Court, Case No. 3:12-cv-060 (“the
Ohio Action”), seeking declaratory relief “that [Defendants are] not liable to [Plaintiffs] for
“A motion to transfer venue is a non-dispositive motion[.]” Siegler v. City of Columbus, No.
2:12-cv-472, 2014 WL 1096159, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 19, 2014) (citations omitted).
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(1) breach of express contract, (2) breach of implied [contract], or (3) misappropriation of
intellectual property.” Ohio Complaint at ¶ 1. On July 25, 2012, Plaintiffs commenced this
separate action in the United States District Court for the Central District of California (“the
California Action”), alleging breach of contract and other related claims. On August 19, 2013,
the California Court granted Defendants’ motion to transfer the California Action to this Court.
Doc. 25. Approximately one week later, the parties jointly moved to dismiss the Ohio Action
with prejudice -- a request the Court granted. Thereafter, the parties continued litigating this
case, and proceeded to engage in discovery. Defendants moved for summary judgment on April
17, 2014. Doc. 37. In response, Plaintiffs filed the instant motion to transfer this case back to
the Central District of California on May 19, 2014. Doc. 48.
II. Discussion
A. Venue
Plaintiffs argue that the factors enumerated in 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) weigh in favor of
transferring this case back to the California Court.2 Section 1404(a) provides that “[f]or the
convenience of the parties and witnesses [and] in the interest of justice, a [D]istrict [C]ourt may
transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought.” 28
U.S.C. § 1404(a). Courts considering a transfer under § 1404(a) must determine whether: (1) the
action might have been brought in the proposed transferee court; and (2) whether “transfer is
justified for the convenience of parties and witnesses and in the interest of justice.” Kay v. Nat'l
2
Defendants argue that Plaintiffs seek transfer pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) rather than
§ 1404(a). Transfer pursuant to § 1406(a) is appropriate if the district in which the action is brought is an
improper venue under 28 U.S.C. § 1391 -- the “wrong court” argument. See, e.g., Nationwide Life and
Annuity Ins. Co. v. Golden, No. 2:12-cv-213, 2013 WL 97718, at *10 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 7, 2013). Plaintiffs
clarify and concede that they “do not seek transfer under 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a)” and that “[§] 1406(a) does
not apply because this case originally could have been venued here.” Doc. 53 at PageID 732.
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City Mortg. Co., 494 F. Supp. 2d 845, 849-50 (S. D. Ohio 2007) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
B. Section 1404(a) Threshold Inquiry
Courts interpreting § 1404(a) must engage in a two-step analysis. The first step involves
the question as to “whether the action ‘might have been brought’ in the transferee court.” Kay,
494 F.Supp.2d at 849. “An action ‘might have been brought’ in a transferee court if: (1) the
court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action; (2) venue is proper there; and (3) the
defendant is amenable to process issuing out of the transferee court.” Sky Techs. Partners, LLC
v. Midwest Research Inst., 125 F. Supp. 2d 286, 291 (S. D. Ohio 2000) (citations omitted). If “a
case could have been brought in the transferee court, the issue becomes whether the transfer is
justified under the balance of the language of Section 1404(a).” Jamhour v. Scottsdale Ins. Co.,
211 F. Supp. 2d 941, 945 (S.D. Ohio 2002).
Plaintiffs fail to address this threshold question in their motion. See doc. 48. The
California Court, through its unchallenged Transfer Order (doc. 25),3 found that it lacked
jurisdiction over this case because:
Plaintiffs fail to establish that a “substantial part of the events or omissions giving
rise to the claim[s] occurred” in [the Central District of California]. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1391(b)(2)4 . . . . [T]he Complaint is silent as to where the events giving rise to
this action took place . . . . Indeed, [P]laintiffs don’t even allege that their work
took place in the Central District of California . . . . In short, the [C]ourt concludes
3
Following the California Court’s transfer of this case to this Court in August 2013, Plaintiffs did
not seek a stay of the Transfer Order, move the California Court for reconsideration, or appeal to the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. In sum, Plaintiffs failed to challenge that decision until the filing of the
instant motion.
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Under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), venue is proper in: “(1) a judicial district in which any defendant
resides, if all defendants are residents of the State in which the district is located; (2) a judicial district in
which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part
of property that is the subject of the action is situated; or (3) if there is no district in which an action may
otherwise be brought as provided in this section, any judicial district in which any defendant is subject to
the court's personal jurisdiction with respect to such action.”
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that venue is improper in the Central District of California . . . . Plaintiffs have not
shown that the events giving rise to their claims occurred in this District, nor that
defendants are subject to personal jurisdiction here.
Doc. 25 at PageID 302 (footnote added). Plaintiffs present no new factual allegations regarding
this issue or any additional arguments. Accordingly, the Court declines to revisit the California
Court’s unchallenged ruling on this matter and defers to its reasoned conclusion.
C. Section 1404(a) Balancing Factors
Assuming arguendo, that Plaintiffs could satisfy the threshold inquiry at step one of the
§ 1404(a) analysis, they must also demonstrate that “transfer is justified for the convenience of
parties and witnesses and in the interest of justice.” Kay, 494 F.Supp.2d at 849-50; see also
Dayton Superior Corp. v. Yan, 288 F.R.D. 151, 165 (S.D. Ohio 2012) (Rose, J.). In conducting
this analysis, the Court considers the interests of the parties to the case; specifically the “relative
ease of access to sources of proof, availability of compulsory process for attendance of unwilling
[witnesses], and the cost of obtaining attendance of willing witnesses . . . and all other practical
problems that make trial of the case easy, expeditious and inexpensive.” Jamhour, 211 F. Supp.
2d at 945. In addition to the interests of the parties, the Court also balances and considers
“docket congestion, the burden of trial to a jurisdiction with no relation to the cause of action, the
value of holding a trial in a community where the public affected live, and the familiarity of the
court with the controlling law.” Id.
Plaintiffs argue that “[t]he California forum would be more convenient for Plaintiffs,
given that Plaintiffs are located in California . . . [and] they originally chose that forum to
institute their suit.” Doc. 48 at PageID 484. Additionally, they state that Defendants are much
larger than Plaintiff Coto, and thus can “more easily bear the expense of conducting litigation in
another state.” Id. Regarding convenience of witnesses, Plaintiffs argue that their “principal
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witnesses are located in California” whereas Defendants’ witnesses are mainly located in New
York and, therefore, Defendants would be no more inconvenienced in California than Ohio. Id.
The Court finds Plaintiffs’ arguments in this regard unpersuasive. Plaintiffs essentially
argue that their convenience should be given preference. A transfer is not proper “if that transfer
would only shift the inconvenience from one party to another.” United States ex rel. Roby v.
Boeing Co., No. 1:95-cv-375, 1998 WL 54976, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 21, 1998); see also Lassak
v. Am. Def. Sys., No. 2:06-cv-1021, 2007 WL 1469408, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 28, 2011) (finding
“some inconvenience to one or more parties will exist no matter which forum is chosen” and,
therefore, “if a change of venue serves merely to shift the inconvenience from the plaintiff to the
defendant, a change of venue is improper”).
Additionally, Plaintiffs fail to identify any witnesses located in California and ignore the
fact that six out of Defendants’ twelve witnesses -- identified as essential to this case -- reside in
Dayton. Doc. 10 at PageID 49. See Bacik v. Peek, 888 F. Supp. 1405, 1409 (N.D. Ohio 1993)
(finding that “[i]f a party has merely made a general allegation that witnesses will be necessary,
without identifying them and indicating what their testimony will be[,] the application for
transfer will be denied”).
Additionally, consideration of the “interest of justice” factors strongly favors denial of
the request to transfer. These include consideration of “the forum the case can be tried more
inexpensively and expeditiously . . . whether transfer is in the “interest of justice” . . . and
judicial economy.” Betco Corp. v. Peacock, No. 3:12-cv-1045, 2014 WL 809211, at *9 (N.D.
Ohio Feb. 28, 2014) (citation omitted). This case has proceeded in this Court for nearly twelve
months and both sides have engaged in extensive discovery here. See, e.g., docs. 32, 36, 50.
Moreover, discovery is now concluded and Defendants have moved for summary judgment in
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this Court. Doc. 37. Accordingly, the interests of justice strongly weigh in favor of denying
transfer.5
III.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED THAT:
1.
Plaintiffs’ Motion to Transfer Venue to the Central District of California,
Southern Division at Santa Ana (doc. 48), is DENIED; and
2.
This matter REMAIN in the Southern District of Ohio, Western Division
at Dayton.
July 31, 2014
s/ Michael J. Newman
United States Magistrate Judge
5
In Defendants’ opposition memorandum, they argue that, if a transfer is to occur here, this case
should be transferred to the Northern District of New York at Binghamton. Doc. 51 at PageID 506. No
such motion is before the Court, and thus the Court need not address this issue. Moreover, Defendants
already transferred this case to the Southern District of Ohio in August 2013. Defendants had the option
of choosing to transfer to the New York forum at that time and declined to do so.
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