Easterling v. Crawford

Filing 31

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON MOTION FOR RECUSAL - It is therefore again respectfully recommended that the Motion to Recuse be DENIED. Objections to R&R due by 12/18/2014. Signed by Magistrate Judge Michael R Merz on 12/1/2014. (kpf1)(This document has been sent by the Clerks Office by regular mail to the party(ies) listed in the NEF that did not receive electronic notification.)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION AT DAYTON
WARREN EASTERLING,
Plaintiff,

:

Case No. 3:14-cv-226
District Judge Walter H. Rice
Magistrate Judge Michael R. Merz

-vs:
JUDGE DALE CRAWFORD,

Defendant.

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON
MOTION FOR RECUSAL
This case is before the Court upon Plaintiff’s Objections (Doc. No. 29) to the Magistrate
Judge’s Report and Recommendations on Recusal (the “Report,” Doc. No. 28). District Judge
Rice has recommitted the matter for reconsideration in light of the Objections (Doc. No. 30).
The Report found the sole basis for Easterling’s Motion to Recuse was Judge Rice’s
August 1, 2014, Entry Barring Warren Easterling from the United States Courthouse and Federal
Building at 200 West Second Street, Dayton, Ohio. (In re Warren Easterling Litigation, Case
No. 3:14-mc-11)(“Entry.”) Easterling does not dispute that analysis and focuses his Objections
on alleged deficiencies of the Entry.
In the Motion to Recuse, Easterling never disputed the truth of any of Judge Rice’s
factual findings in the Entry. The Report noted that fact and Easterling still has raised no factual
disputes in his Objections. Instead, he objects to the process which led to the Entry: there was
no hearing, Judge Rice acted on hearsay, Judge Rice had no jurisdiction to file the Entry,
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Easterling is entitled to a presumption of innocence on the accusations made against him, etc.
The premise of Easterling’s argument is that a litigant can engage in hostile, disruptive,
belligerent behavior which comes close to a physical altercation and the court sitting in the same
building can do nothing to stop the behavior without initiation of formal proceedings.
The conduct which court security personnel reported to Judge Rice would have been
sufficient to establish probable cause for Easterling’s arrest for disorderly conduct. If court
security officials had decided to proceed in that way rather than asking for a restraining order,
Easterling could have been arrested on their hearsay statements. Instead, Judge Rice decided to
proceed civilly.
Easterling has never challenged the Entry in the manner provided by law by appealing to
the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals. Instead he reportedly challenged the Entry by defying it as is
charged in the Information in United States v. Easterling, Case No. 3:14-po-49.
The Report recites the governing standard that recusal must almost always be based on
extrajudicial conduct. Easterling does not dispute that standard nor point to any extrajudicial
facts warranting recusal, except insofar as he asserts Judge Rice acted without jurisdiction, an
assertion inconsistent with the Court’s inherent power to maintain order.
The inherent power of courts, including the federal courts, to maintain order as a
necessary condition for the fair administration of justice has been recognized since the earliest
days of the Republic. United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812).
The Supreme Court has expressly recognized that this power extends to barring a disruptive
criminal defendant from the courtroom even in the trial of his own case. Chambers v. NASCO,
Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 44 (1991), citing Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970). The Sixth Circuit has
recognized the power extends to barring a vexatious litigant from filing new cases related to

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prior actions. Mitan v. Int’l Fid. Ins. Co., 23 Fed. Appx. 292 (6th Cir. 2001). Judge Rice filed
the Entry in this case after reports from the Court Security Officers of increasing belligerence by
Easterling. Use of the inherent power is, of course, subject to review for abuse of discretion.
Mitan, supra. But nothing about a court’s exercise of its inherent power to keep order in the
courthouse implies that a judge entering an order to that effect is biased.
It is therefore again respectfully recommended that the Motion to Recuse be DENIED.

December 1, 2014.
s/ Michael R. Merz
United States Magistrate Judge

NOTICE REGARDING OBJECTIONS
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), any party may serve and file specific, written objections to the
proposed findings and recommendations within fourteen days after being served with this Report
and Recommendations. Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(d), this period is extended to seventeen
days because this Report is being served by one of the methods of service listed in Fed. R. Civ.
P. 5(b)(2)(C), (D), (E), or (F). Such objections shall specify the portions of the Report objected
to and shall be accompanied by a memorandum of law in support of the objections. If the Report
and Recommendations are based in whole or in part upon matters occurring of record at an oral
hearing, the objecting party shall promptly arrange for the transcription of the record, or such
portions of it as all parties may agree upon or the Magistrate Judge deems sufficient, unless the
assigned District Judge otherwise directs. A party may respond to another party=s objections
within fourteen days after being served with a copy thereof. Failure to make objections in
accordance with this procedure may forfeit rights on appeal. See United States v. Walters, 638
F.2d 947, 949-50 (6th Cir. 1981); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 153-55 (1985).

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