Marshall v. Commissioner of Social Security
Filing
12
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION THAT: (1) THE ALJS NON-DISABILITY FINDING BE FOUND UNSUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE, AND REVERSED; (2) THIS MATTER BE REMANDED TO THE COMMISSIONER UNDER THE FOURTH SENTENCE OF 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) FOR PROCEEDINGS CONSI STENT WITH THIS OPINION; AND (3) THIS CASE BE CLOSED - re 3 Complaint filed by Jerry Marshall Objections to R&R due by 12/7/2015. Signed by Magistrate Judge Michael J. Newman on 11/17/2015. (srb) Modified on 11/18/2015 to correct objections due date. NEF regenerated (jg).
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION AT DAYTON
JERRY MARSHALL,
Plaintiff,
Case No. 3:14-cv-465
vs.
COMMISSIONER OF
SOCIAL SECURITY,
District Judge Walter H. Rice
Magistrate Judge Michael J. Newman
Defendant.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION1 THAT: (1) THE ALJ’S NON-DISABILITY
FINDING BE FOUND UNSUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE, AND
REVERSED; (2) THIS MATTER BE REMANDED TO THE COMMISSIONER UNDER
THE FOURTH SENTENCE OF 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) FOR PROCEEDINGS CONSISTENT
WITH THIS OPINION; AND (3) THIS CASE BE CLOSED
This is a Social Security disability benefits appeal.
At issue is whether the
Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) erred in finding Plaintiff not “disabled” and therefore
unentitled to Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) and/or Supplemental Security Income
(“SSI”).2
This case is before the Court upon Plaintiff’s Statement of Errors (doc. 9), the
Commissioner’s memorandum in opposition (doc. 10), Plaintiff’s reply (doc. 11), the
administrative record (doc. 7),3 and the record as a whole.
1
Attached hereto is a NOTICE to the parties regarding objections to this Report and
Recommendation.
2
“The Commissioner’s regulations governing the evaluation of disability for DIB and SSI are
identical . . . and are found at 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520, and 20 C.F.R. § 416.920 respectively.” Colvin v.
Barnhart, 475 F.3d 727, 730 (6th Cir. 2007). Citations in this Report and Recommendation to DIB
regulations are made with full knowledge of the corresponding SSI regulations, and vice versa.
3
Hereafter, citations to the electronically-filed administrative record will refer only to the PageID
number.
I.
A.
Procedural History
Plaintiff filed for DIB and SSI alleging a disability onset date of September 5, 2008.
PageID 285-89. Plaintiff suffers from a number of impairments including, among others, low
back disorder, respiratory disorder, affective disorder, and an anxiety disorder. PageID 51.
After initial denial of his claims, Plaintiff received a hearing before ALJ Christopher L.
Dillon on April 10, 2013. PageID 73-106. The ALJ issued a written decision on June 10, 2013,
finding Plaintiff not “disabled.”
PageID 49-64.
Specifically, the ALJ’s findings were as
follows:
1.
The claimant meets the insured status requirements of the Social Security
Act through December 31, 2013;
2.
The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since
September 5, 2008, the alleged onset date (20 CFR 404.1571 et seq. and
416.971 et seq.);
3.
The claimant has the following severe impairments: low back disorder,
respiratory disorder, affective disorder, and an anxiety related disorder (20
CFR 404.1520(c) and 416.920(c));
4.
The claimant does not have an impairment or combination of impairments
that meets or medically equals the severity of one of the listed
impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 CFR
404.1520(d), 404.1525, 404.1526, 416.920(d), 416.925 and 416.926);
5.
After careful consideration of the entire record, I find that the claimant
retains the [residual] functional capacity [“RFC”] for work that involves
lifting no more than 10 pounds at a time with frequent lifting or carrying
of objects weighing up to 10 pounds; pushing or pulling similar amounts;
standing, walking, and sitting for 6 hours each; no climbing of any kind;
no more than occasional ability to perform all other postural activity; no
foot pedal operation with the right lower extremity; no more than
occasional interaction with supervisors, coworkers, and the public; no
more than simple, routine, repetitive tasks performed with adequate
persistence that only requires regularly scheduled breaks and with a pace
that would allow for production quotas.
2
6.
The claimant is unable to perform any past relevant work (20 CFR
404.1565 and 416.965).
7.
The claimant was born [in] 1977, and was 30 years old, which is defined
as a younger individual age 18-49, on the alleged disability onset date (20
CFR 404.1563 and 416.963).
8.
The claimant has at least a high school education and is able to
communicate in English (20 CFR 404.1564 and 416.964).
9.
Transferability of job skills is not material to the determination of
disability because using the Medical-Vocational Rules as a framework
supports a finding that the claimant is “not disabled,” whether or not the
claimant has transferable job skills (See SSR 82-41 and 20 CFR Part 404,
Subpart P, Appendix 2).
10.
Considering the claimant’s age, education, work experience, and [RFC],
there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy
that the claimant can perform (20 CFR 404.1569, 404.1569(a), 416.969,
and 416.969(a)).
11.
The claimant has not been under a disability, as defined in the Social
Security Act, from September 5, 2008, through the date of this decision
(20 CFR 404.1520(g) and 416.920(g)).
PageID 51-64.
Thereafter, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review, making the ALJ’s
non-disability finding the final administrative decision of the Commissioner. PageID 38-45,
472-74. Plaintiff then filed this timely appeal. Cook v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 480 F.3d 432, 435
(6th Cir. 2007) (noting that, “[u]nder the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, [claimant] had
60 days from the Appeals Council’s notice of denial in which to file his appeal”).
B.
Evidence of Record
Plaintiff, in his Statement of Errors, sets forth an extensive summary of the medical
evidence. Doc. 9 at PageID 1325-33. The Commissioner defers to the statement of evidence set
forth by the ALJ and offers no specific objection to Plaintiff’s recitation of relevant evidence.
Doc. 10 at PageID 1345.
Accordingly, except as otherwise noted in this Report and
3
Recommendation, the undersigned incorporates Plaintiff’s undisputed summary of the
evidentiary record. Where applicable, the Court will identify the medical evidence relevant to
this decision.
II.
A. Standard of Review
The Court’s inquiry on a Social Security appeal is to determine (1) whether the ALJ’s
non-disability finding is supported by substantial evidence, and (2) whether the ALJ employed
the correct legal criteria. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Bowen v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 478 F.3d 742, 74546 (6th Cir. 2007). In performing this review, the Court must consider the record as a whole.
Hephner v. Mathews, 574 F.2d 359, 362 (6th Cir. 1978).
Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). When
substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s denial of benefits, that finding must be affirmed, even if
substantial evidence also exists in the record upon which the ALJ could have found Plaintiff
disabled. Buxton v. Halter, 246 F.3d 762, 772 (6th Cir. 2001). Thus, the ALJ has a “‘zone of
choice’ within which he [or she] can act without the fear of court interference.” Id. at 773.
The second judicial inquiry -- reviewing the correctness of the ALJ’s legal analysis -may result in reversal even if the ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial evidence in the
record. Rabbers v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 582 F.3d 647, 651 (6th Cir. 2009). “[A] decision of the
Commissioner will not be upheld where the [Social Security Administration] fails to follow its
own regulations and where that error prejudices a claimant on the merits or deprives the claimant
of a substantial right.” Bowen, 478 F.3d at 746.
4
B.
“Disability” Defined
To be eligible for disability benefits, a claimant must be under a “disability” as defined
by the Social Security Act. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). Narrowed to its statutory meaning, a
“disability” includes physical and/or mental impairments that are both “medically determinable”
and severe enough to prevent a claimant from (1) performing his or her past job and (2) engaging
in “substantial gainful activity” that is available in the regional or national economies. Id.
Administrative regulations require a five-step sequential evaluation for disability
determinations. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4). Although a dispositive finding at any step ends the
ALJ’s review, see Colvin, 475 F.3d at 730, the complete sequential review poses five questions:
1.
Has the claimant engaged in substantial gainful activity?
2.
Does the claimant suffer from one or more severe impairments?
3.
Do the claimant’s severe impairments, alone or in combination, meet or
equal the criteria of an impairment set forth in the Commissioner’s Listing
of Impairments (the “Listings”), 20 C.F.R. Subpart P, Appendix 1?
4.
Considering the claimant’s RFC, can he or she perform his or her past
relevant work?
5.
Assuming the claimant can no longer perform his or her past relevant
work -- and also considering the claimant’s age, education, past work
experience, and RFC -- do significant numbers of other jobs exist in the
national economy which the claimant can perform?
20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4); see also Miller v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 181 F.Supp.2d 816, 818
(S.D. Ohio 2001). A claimant bears the ultimate burden of establishing that he or she is disabled
under the Social Security Act’s definition. Key v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 109 F.3d 270, 274 (6th
Cir. 1997).
5
III.
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by: (1) failing to recognize Phillip Whitecar, M.D. as
a treating physician and, thus, not weighing his opinion as such according to applicable
regulations; (2) omitting, without explanation, the functional restrictions opined by medical
sources upon which he relies in forming Plaintiff’s RFC; (3) not giving weight to the opinion of
treating Nurse Bobbie Fussichen; and (4) improperly assessing Plaintiff’s credibility. Doc. 9 at
PageID 1333-42.
A.
Treating Source
Plaintiff first argues that the ALJ erred in finding that the record does not “demonstrate
that [Dr. Whitecar] is a treating or examining source.” See PageID 62; see also doc. 9 at PageID
1334-37. The Commissioner does not oppose Plaintiff’s contention in this regard and appears to
concede such error by arguing only that the ALJ’s characterization of Dr. Whitecar as a nontreating, non-examining source is of no consequence. Doc. 10 at PageID 1346.
Social Security regulations define a “treating physician” as the claimant’s “own
physician, psychologist, or other acceptable medical source who provides . . . or has provided . . .
medical treatment or evaluation and who has, or has had, an ongoing treatment relationship with”
the claimant. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1502. A claimant has “an ongoing treatment relationship with an
acceptable medical source when the medical evidence establishes that” the claimant currently
sees, or previously saw, “the source with a frequency consistent with accepted medical practice
for the type of treatment and/or evaluation required for [the claimant’s] medical condition(s).”
Id. A doctor treating or evaluating a claimant “only a few times or only after long intervals” may
be considered a “treating source if the nature and frequency of the treatment or evaluation is
typical for [the claimant’s] condition(s).” Id.
6
Plaintiff saw Dr. Whitecar in 2007, and then from November 2009 through March 2011.
PageID 668-89, 853-72. Thus, evidence in the record supports Plaintiff’s contention that Dr.
Whitecar is, in fact, a treating physician. Again, the Commissioner presents no argument in
opposition to Plaintiff’s contention, and the undersigned finds the Commissioner’s silence in this
regard to be a concession of the fact that Dr. Whitecar is a treating physician, as defined by the
regulations.
“[T]he Commissioner’s regulations establish a hierarchy of acceptable medical source
opinions[.]” Snell v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 3:12-cv-119, 2013 WL 372032, at *9 (S.D. Ohio
Jan. 30, 2013). Treating physicians and psychologists top the hierarchy. Id. “Next in the
hierarchy are examining physicians and psychologists, who often see and examine claimants
only once.” Id. “[N]on-examining physicians’ opinions are on the lowest rung of the hierarchy
of medical source opinions.” Id. “The regulations provide progressively more rigorous tests for
weighing opinions as the ties between the source of the opinion and the individual [claimant]
become weaker.” Id. (citing SSR 96-6p, 1996 WL 374180, at *2 (July 2, 1996)).
“An ALJ is required to give controlling weight to ‘a treating source’s opinion on the
issue(s) of the nature and severity of [the claimant’s] impairment(s)’ if the opinion ‘is wellsupported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not
inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in [the] case record.’” LaRiccia v. Comm’r of
Soc. Sec., 549 F. App’x 377, 385 (6th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted) (alterations in original). This
requirement is known as the “treating physician” rule.
Blakely, 581 F.3d at 406 (citation
omitted). Greater deference is given to treating source opinions “since these sources are likely to
be the medical professionals most able to provide a detailed, longitudinal picture of your medical
impairment(s) and may bring a unique perspective to the medical evidence that cannot be
7
obtained from the objective medical findings alone or from reports of individual
examinations[.]” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2); see also Blakely, 581 F.3d at 406. Thus, an ALJ
must give controlling weight to a treating source if the ALJ finds the treating physician’s opinion
well-supported by medically acceptable evidence and not inconsistent with other substantial
evidence in the record. Wilson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 378 F.3d 541, 544 (6th Cir. 2004).
Closely associated with the treating physician rule is the “good reasons rule,” which
“require[s] the ALJ to always give good reasons in [the] notice of determination or decision for
the weight given to the claimant’s treating source’s opinion.” Blakely, 581 F.3d at 406-07.
“Those good reasons must be ‘supported by the evidence in the case record, and must be
sufficiently specific to make clear to any subsequent reviewers the weight the adjudicator gave to
the treating source’s medical opinion and the reasons for that weight.’” Id.
Thus, when the ALJ declines to give controlling weight to a treating physician’s
assessment, “the ALJ must still determine how much weight is appropriate by considering a
number of factors, including the length of treatment relationship and the frequency of
examination, the nature and extent of the treatment relationship, supportability of the opinion,
consistency of the opinion with the record as a whole, and any specialization of the treating
physician.” Id. at 406; see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c). In addition, unless the opinion of the
treating source is entitled to controlling weight, an ALJ must “evaluate all medical opinions
according to [these] factors, regardless of their source[.]” Walton v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No.
97-2030, 1999 WL 506979, at *2 (6th Cir. June 7, 1999).
The Court acknowledges that an ALJ is not required to accept a physician’s conclusion
that his or her patient is “unemployable.” Whether a person is disabled within the meaning of
the Social Security Act is an issue reserved to the Commissioner, and a treating physician’s
8
opinion -- that his or her patient is disabled -- is not “give[n] any special significance.” 20
C.F.R. § 404.1527; see Warner v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 375 F.3d 387, 390 (6th Cir. 2004)
(stating that “[t]he determination of disability is ultimately the prerogative of the Commissioner,
not the treating physician”). However, “[t]here remains a presumption, albeit a rebuttable one,
that the opinion of a treating physician is entitled to great deference.” Hensley v. Astrue, 573
F.3d 263, 266 (6th Cir. 2009).
Here, contrary to the Commissioner’s contention on appeal, Dr. Whitecar’s opinion
includes more than a simple statement that Plaintiff is unemployable. See PageID 813. Dr.
Whitecar specified Plaintiff’s actual limitations, finding that Plaintiff could stand and walk for a
half hour per workday (five to ten minutes without interruption); sit for one hour per workday
(twenty minutes without interruption); and lift and/or carry up to five pounds occasionally. Id.
In finding that Dr. Whitecar’s opinion “is not entitled to more than minimal weight,” the ALJ
failed to conduct a controlling weight analysis, i.e., determine whether his opinion is “well
supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and [is] not
inconsistent with other substantial evidence in the case record.” See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2).
Failure to conduct that review, and adequately explain the controlling weight analysis, is
reversible error. See Aytch v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 3:13-cv-135, 2014 WL 4080075, at *4
(S.D. Ohio Aug. 19, 2014).
Accordingly, the undersigned finds that the ALJ’s non-disability finding must be reversed
as a result of the ALJ’s failure to comply with the treating physician rule.
B.
Other Medical Sources
Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ erred by failing to adopt all functional limitations found
by those medical sources -- namely record-reviewing state agency consultants -- to whom the
9
ALJ assigned “significant weight.” Doc. 9 at PageID 1339. The ALJ failed to identify these
doctors, provide any information concerning the substance of their opinions, or state more than
the conclusory assessment that “their opinions are supported by the relatively mild objective and
clinical findings of record, the nature and history of conservative treatment, and the claimant’s
activities as documented throughout the record.” PageID 62.
The record contains opinion evidence from four record-reviewing state agency medical
sources: James Gahman, M.D.; Robelyn Marlow, Ph.D.; Gerald Kylop, M.D.; and Paul
Tangeman, Ph.D. See PageID 117-20, 128-31, 143-46, 156-59. Given the ALJ’s conclusory
assessment of all state agency reviewers, the undersigned cannot adequately assess whether the
ALJ separately analyzed any of the required factors in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c) in weighing these
opinions. This failure constitutes reversible error. See Miller v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 3:14CV-208, 2015 WL 2383632, at *5 (S.D. Ohio May 19, 2015). The undersigned also notes that,
in weighing opinions of non-treating sources, Social Security regulations require the ALJ to
apply the same level of scrutiny as afforded to treating source opinions. Gayheart v. Comm’r of
Soc. Sec., 710 F.3d 365, 379 (6th Cir. 2013). “A more rigorous scrutiny of the treating-source
opinion than the nontreating and nonexamining opinions is precisely the inverse of the analysis
that the regulation[s] require[].” Id.
Further, the undersigned notes that, despite giving the opinions of Drs. Marlow and
Tangeman “significant weight,” the ALJ failed to adopt the limitations set forth in their reports.
Notably, Drs. Marlow and Tangeman both concluded that Plaintiff requires a work setting
“without strict production quotas.” See PageID 119,130, 145, 158. However, the ALJ concluded
-- without explanation -- that Plaintiff was capable of work “with a pace that would allow for
production quotas.” PageID 58.
10
Although the undersigned recognizes that an ALJ need only accept those limitations he or
she finds credible, see Casey v. Sec. of Health & Human Servs., 987 F.2d 1230, 1235 (6th Cir.
1993), the ALJ must meaningfully explain why certain limitations are not included in the RFC
determination -- especially when such limitations are set forth in opinions the ALJ weighs
favorably. See Hann v. Colvin, No. 12-cv-06234-JCS, 2014 WL 1382063, at *22 (N.D. Cal.
Mar. 28, 2014) (finding that “where an ALJ has already found a physician’s opinions to be
credible and concrete, an ALJ can err by omitting aspects of that physician’s opinions from the
RFC”); Stoddard v. Astrue, No. 3:09-cv-91, 2010 WL 3723924, at *1 (E.D. Tenn. Feb. 19,
2010); Washington v. Colvin, No. 13–1147–SAC, 2014 WL 4145547, at *3 (D. Kan. Aug. 19,
2014) (finding the ALJ’s “failure to either include [certain] limitations [as opined by a medical
source], or explain why they were not included in the RFC findings, [to be] especially
problematic in light of the fact that the ALJ accorded “substantial” weight to [the medical
source’s] opinions”).
Based on all of the foregoing, the undersigned concludes that the ALJ erred in analyzing
and failing to meaningfully explain the weight accorded the opinions of the record reviewing
physicians.
C.
Credibility
Plaintiff also contends that the ALJ erred in assessing his credibility -- by concluding that
his activities in helping his mother undermine his complaints of supposedly disabling pain. The
undersigned makes no conclusion with regard to the ALJ’s conclusion in this regard, but notes
that the ALJ relied on other factors in making his credibility finding -- such as the objective and
11
clinical findings of record allegedly not supportive of “the degree of pain or functional limitation
alleged” by Plaintiff. See PageID 59. 4
Finding remand warranted based upon the ALJ’s failure to properly assess and weigh
medical source opinions, the undersigned makes no finding with regard to this alleged error.
Instead, Plaintiff’s credibility -- along with all medical source and other source opinions of
record -- should be assessed anew on remand.
D.
Nurse Fussichen
The undersigned likewise makes no finding concerning the ALJ’s analysis of nurse
Fussichen’s opinion.
Because the undersigned concludes that a remand is required to
appropriately assess Dr. Whitecar’s opinion in accordance with the treating physician rule, the
undersigned directs the ALJ to reassess Nurse Fussichen’s opinion anew on remand.
IV.
When the ALJ’s non-disability determination is unsupported by substantial evidence, the
Court must determine whether to remand the matter for rehearing or to award benefits.
Generally, benefits may be awarded immediately “if all essential factual issues have been
resolved and the record adequately establishes a plaintiff’s entitlement to benefits.” Faucher v.
Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 17 F.3d 171, 176 (6th Cir. 1994); see also Abbott v. Sullivan,
905 F.2d 918, 927 (6th Cir. 1990). The Court may only award benefits where proof of disability
With regard to credibility, the ALJ, and not this Court, “evaluate[s] the credibility of witnesses,
including that of the claimant.” Rogers v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 486 F.3d 234, 247 (6th Cir. 2007). To
assess credibility, the ALJ must consider “the entire case record,” including “any medical signs and lab
findings, the claimant’s own complaints of symptoms, any information provided by the treating
physicians and others, as well as any other relevant evidence contained in the record.” Id. To that end,
“the ALJ is not free to make credibility determinations based solely upon an ‘intangible or intuitive notion
about an individual’s credibility’” and such determinations “must find support in the record.” Id. “In
other words, blanket assertions that the claimant is not believable will not pass muster, nor will
explanations as to credibility which are not consistent with the entire record and the weight of the relevant
evidence.” Id. at 248.
4
12
is strong and opposing evidence is lacking in substance, so that remand would merely involve the
presentation of cumulative evidence, or where proof of disability is overwhelming. Faucher, 17
F.3d at 176; see also Felisky v. Bowen, 35 F.3d 1027, 1041 (6th Cir. 1994); Mowery v. Heckler,
771 F.2d 966, 973 (6th Cir. 1985).
In this instance, evidence of disability is not overwhelming. There are a number of
divergent medical source opinions in the record regarding Plaintiff’s RFC.
See supra.
Accordingly, the undersigned concludes that remand for further proceedings is proper so that the
ALJ can properly assess all opinion evidence of record, and assess Plaintiff’s credibility anew in
light of the objections raised by Plaintiff in this appeal.
V.
IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED THAT:
1.
2.
This matter be REMANDED to the Commissioner under the Fourth
Sentence of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for proceedings consistent with this
opinion; and
3.
Date:
The Commissioner’s non-disability finding be found unsupported by
substantial evidence, and REVERSED;
This case be CLOSED.
November 17, 2015
s/ Michael J. Newman
Michael J. Newman
United States Magistrate Judge
13
NOTICE REGARDING OBJECTIONS
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), any party may serve and file specific, written
objections to the proposed findings and recommendations within FOURTEEN days after being
served with this Report and Recommendation. Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(d), this period is
extended to SEVENTEEN days because this Report and Recommendation is being served by
one of the methods of service listed in Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(b)(2)(C), (D), (E), or (F), and may be
extended further by the Court on timely motion for an extension. Such objections shall specify
the portions of the Report and Recommendation objected to, and shall be accompanied by a
memorandum of law in support of the objections. If the Report and Recommendation is based in
whole or in part upon matters occurring of record at an oral hearing, the objecting party shall
promptly arrange for the transcription of the record, or such portions of it as all parties may agree
upon or the Magistrate Judge deems sufficient, unless the assigned District Judge otherwise
directs. A party may respond to another party’s objections within FOURTEEN days after being
served with a copy thereof.
As is made clear above, this period is likewise extended to
SEVENTEEN days if service of the objections is made pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(b)(2)(C),
(D), (E), or (F). Failure to make objections in accordance with this procedure may forfeit rights
on appeal. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 153-55 (1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d
947, 949-50 (6th Cir. 1981).
14
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?