Easterling v. Manning

Filing 9

ENTRY AND ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF (RULE 65A) AND WAIVER OF SECURITY (RULE 65C). DOC. 3 , GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM, DOC. 5 , DENYING MOTION TO OVERRULE, DOC. 7 , FINDING MOOT MOTION FOR DISCOVERY, DOC. 8 , AND TERMINATING CASE. Signed by Judge Thomas M Rose on 3/25/15. (ep)(This document has been sent by regular mail to the party(ies) listed in the NEF that did not receive electronic notification.)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION AT DAYTON

Warren Easterling,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 3:15-cv-058
Judge Thomas M. Rose

James L. Manning, Judge,
Defendant.

ENTRY AND ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
(RULE 65A) AND WAIVER OF SECURITY (RULE 65C). DOC. 3,
GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A
CLAIM, DOC. 5, DENYING MOTION TO OVERRULE, DOC. 7, FINDING
MOOT MOTION FOR DISCOVERY, DOC. 8, AND TERMINATING
CASE.

Pro se Plaintiff Warren Easterling has filed a complaint stating one claim:
VIOLATION [OF] TITLE 42 U.S.C. 1985 – VIOLATION OF
TITLE 42 U.S.C. 1985 – OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE –
DEPRIVING ONE OF RIGHTS GUARANTEED TO ALL
CITIZENS (WHETHER BY CONSPIRACY OR NOT).

Complaint, Doc. 1 at 7. The Complaint opens a federal civil rights action against the Honorable
James. L. Manning of the Montgomery County, Ohio Municipal Court, Western Division.
Easterling’s complaint stems from an underlying traffic case over which Judge Manning presided.
I.

Background
On December 16, 2014, Judge Manning found Easterling guilty of a turn signal violation,

as well as two other charges. (See Plaintiff’s Exhibit #1). There was argument at trial by Easterling
regarding the interpretation of which paragraph of Ohio Revised Code §4511.39 the words “when

required” referred to. Doc. 1 at 4. Judge Manning decided that the words “when required”
referred to paragraph one of Ohio Revised Code §4511.39 and not paragraph two as Easterling
argued. Id. Judge Manning found Easterling guilty. Id. at 5.
Easterling has now filed a Complaint against Judge Manning alleging that Judge Manning
made a ruling contrary to law when he interpreted the meaning of “when required” as stated in
Ohio Revised Code §4511.39. Easterling further argues that Judge Manning violated Title 42
U.S.C. §1985, violated the plaintiff’s right to a fair trial, obstructed justice by an act of fraud, and
conspired against him to change the course of the proceedings in favor of the state, thus violating
his right to equal protection. Id. Plaintiff now asks this Honorable Court to reverse his state court
conviction due to these alleged violations of federal law. Id. at 9.
For purposes of the pending motions, the Court will “construe the complaint liberally in the
plaintiff’s favor and accept as true all factual allegations and permissible inferences therein,”
Gazette v. City of Pontiac, 41 F.3d 1067, 1064 (6th Cir. 1994). However, a complaint must state
a “plausible claim for relief” to survive a motion to dismiss. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 173
L.Ed.2d 868 (2009).
Easterling’s claims against Judge Manning fail as a matter of law because Judge Manning
is absolutely immune from suit and Easterling fails to assert a claim against Judge Manning for
which relief can be granted.
II.

Standards
Plaintiff filed a Motion for Temporary Restraining Order seeking to enjoin “the

requirement to pay fines,” “any warrants for the Plaintiff’s arrest associated with the judgment,”
and “the application of the violations to the Plaintiff’s driving record (motor vehicle report
(MVR)).” (Motion, Doc. 3, at 2, PAGEID 34).
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“In determining whether to issue a temporary restraining order, the Court should consider:
‘(1) whether the movant has a strong likelihood of success on the merits; (2) whether the movant
would suffer irreparable injury without the injunction; (3) whether the issuance of the injunction
would cause substantial harm to others; and (4) whether the public interest would be served by the
issuance of the injunction.”’ Hunter v. Hamilton County Bd. of Elections, 635 F.3d 219, 233 (6th
Cir. 2011).
Defendant’s position on Plaintiff’s likelihood of success on the merits is identical to
Defendant’s motion to dismiss: according to Defendant, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim. Thus,
the Court will also state the standard for ruling on a motion to dismiss and analyze these questions
together.
Rule 12(b)(6) authorizes the dismissal of a complaint for “failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Under Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure a complaint must provide “‘a short and plain statement of the claim showing that
the pleader is entitled to relief’ in order to ‘give the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and
the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)
(quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). “Although a
plaintiff need not plead specific facts, the complaint must ‘give the defendant fair notice of what
the claim is, and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Nader v. Blackwell, 545 F.3d 459, 470 (6th Cir.
2008)(quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007)). “To survive a motion to dismiss
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), a complaint must contain either direct or inferential allegations
respecting all the material elements to sustain a recovery under some viable legal theory.” Klusty v.
Taco Bell Corp., 909 F. Supp. 516, 520 (S.D. Ohio 1995).
III.

Analysis
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Plaintiff alleges one claim in the Complaint against Defendant for violation of 42 U.S.C. §
1985(3). According to the Complaint, Defendant deprived him of rights or privileges granted to
all citizens by way of wrongful termination in violation of Ohio Revised Code § 4112.02, possibly
by conspiracy. (Complaint, Doc. 1). The Court notes that 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) does not create
substantive rights itself, but is a purely remedial statute. Instead, a plaintiff must support a §
1985(3) claim with allegation of a violation of an underlying right or privilege. However,
Easterling’s claims against Judge Manning are subject to dismissal because Judge Manning is
immune from suit under the doctrine of judicial immunity.
A judge is absolutely immune from any claim arising against him related to the
performance of a judicial act, provided he had at least some jurisdiction over the case before him.
Domanick v. Lias, N.D. Ohio No. 1:11-cv-1102, 2011 WL 2149299 (June 1, 2011), citing Mireles
v. Waco, 501 U.S.9, 9 (1991), and Barnes v. Winchell, 105 F.3d 1111, 1115 (6th Cir. 1997). In
Domanick, the rationale for judicial immunity was explained when the court dismissed a pro se
lawsuit against a judge. The Court stated, “Judges are provided with this far-reaching protection
to ensure that their independent and impartial exercise of judgment is not impaired by the exposure
of potential damages.” Domanick, supra at *8. Judge Manning’s absolute immunity can only be
overcome in two situations:
- If he was acting in the complete absence of all jurisdiction, or
- If his challenged actions were non-judicial.
Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11-12; Barnes, 105 F.3d at 1116. Easterling’s allegations do not support
either situation.
As long as Judge Manning was acting with some jurisdiction, he is immune. See Stump v.
Sparkman, 435 U.S 349, 356-357, 55 L.Ed.2d 331 (1978) (Stern v. Mascio, 262 F.3d 600, 608 (6th
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Cir. 2001). The judicial immunity jurisdiction inquiry focuses only on jurisdiction over the
subject matter, not the person or geographical location. See, e.g., Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d
1072, 1076 (9th Cir. 1986) (en banc); John v. Barron, 897 F.2d 1387, 1392 (7th Cir. 1990);
Crabtree v. Muchmore, 904 F.2d 1475, 1477 (10th Cir. 1990). Where a court has even some
subject matter jurisdiction, there is sufficient jurisdiction for immunity purposes. See, e.g., Stump,
435 U.S. at 356-57 (focusing only on whether the judge has some subject matter, not personal,
jurisdiction to find absolute immunity); Borkowski v. Abood, 117 Ohio St.3d 347, 2008-Ohio-857,
884 N.E.2d 7, paragraph 15, (2008) (judge had immunity, even when he ruled after a removal
petition had been filed and the filing rendered him completely without jurisdiction over the
proceedings; the fact he acted in the absence of jurisdiction during only part of the proceedings –
but had jurisdiction at some other point in time – meant he had absolute immunity); see also Stern,
262 F.3d at 607-608 (“When, however, a court with subject matter jurisdiction acts where…
personal jurisdiction is lacking, judicial and prosecutorial absolute immunity remain intact.”)
(citing Holloway v. Brush, 220 F.3d 767, 773 (6th Cir. 2000)(en banc); Barnes v. Winchell, 105
F.3d 1111, 1122 (6th Cir. 1997).
As a judge of the Montgomery County Municipal Court, Judge Manning had jurisdiction
over Easterling’s traffic case. Thus, his immunity cannot be challenged on this point.
The remaining inquiry is whether Judge Manning’s alleged actions were “judicial acts,”
and thus protected by immunity.

“The application of judicial immunity is simple and

non-controversial when applied to ‘paradigmatic judicial acts,’ or acts of actual adjudication, i.e.,
acts involved in resolving disputes between parties who have invoked the jurisdiction of the
court.” Barrett v. Harrington, 130 F.3d 246, 255 (6th Cir. 1997).

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Here, Easterling complains that Judge Manning interpreted the Ohio statute in a manner
inconsistent with Easterling’s argument at trial, which ultimately led to the Judge rendering a
guilty verdict against him. This finding was a judicial act by Judge Manning and thus Judge
Manning is immune from Easterling’s claims.
Even if Judge Manning were not immune, Plaintiff could not prevail on the merits, as he
has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Easterling alleges that Judge
Manning conspired to deny him of his civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1985. Easterling, however,
has failed to meet the requirements of any portion of this statute.
Section 1985(1) prohibits two or more persons from conspiring to prevent any person from
holding public office or performing any official duty. Easterling has not alleged that he is a public
official or that Judge Manning prevented him from accepting or holding a public officer’s position.
Therefore, he has failed to state a claim under § 1985(1).
Section 1985(2) prohibits conspiracies to influence parties, witnesses, or jurors in federal
court proceedings. This is inapplicable to this case, which only challenges a state court action. Fox
v. Mich. State Police Dep’t, 173 Fed. App’x, 372, 376 (6th Cir. 2006).

This section is

inapplicable to Easterling’s claims.
Additionally, under § 1985(2) and § 1985(3), a plaintiff must allege that there was “some
racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus behind the
conspirator’s actions.” Id., citing Kuch v. Rutledge, 460 U.S. 719, 726, 75 L.Ed.2d. 413 (1983);
Collyer v. Darling, 98 F.3d 211, 233 (6th Cir. 1996); Bray v. Alexandria Women’s Health Clinic,
506 U.S. 263, 268, 122 L.Ed.2d 34, (1993). Easterling’s complaint lacks any reference to
discriminatory animus behind Judge Manning’s alleged conspiracy. He fails to articulate any
claims with the requisite specificity to support this claim. See Farhat v. Jopke, 370 F.3d 580, 599
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(6th Cir. 2004) (“Claims of [civil] conspiracy must be pled with some specificity: vague and
conclusory allegations that are unsupported by material facts are not sufficient to state a § 1983
claim.”). Therefore, Easterling fails to state a claim under § 1985(2) or § 1985(3).
Finally, the Court acknowledges that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Easterling’s
claim based on Rooker-Feldman. Easterling asks this court to reverse Judge Manning’s guilty
finding based on his equal protection/conspiracy/obstruction of justice claims. This is not the
first time that Easterling has filed a complaint against a State Court Judge who has not ruled in his
favor making these same claims. See, e.g., Easterling v. Gorman, 6th Cir. No. 3:14-cv-00096,
2014 WL 2095381, (May 20, 2014), Easterling v. Henderson, 6th Cir. No. 3:14-cv-064, 2014 WL
936305, (March 10, 2014), Easterling v. Crawford, 6th Cir. No. 3:13-cv-430, 2014 WL 428931
(February 4, 2014). In Easterling v. Crawford, Magistrate Judge Merz stated as follows:
Rooker-Feldman, bars relitigation of claims actually raised in
state-court proceedings as well as claims that are inextricably
intertwined with the judgment of those proceedings.” Catz v.
Chalker, 142 F.3d, 279, 293 (6th Cir. 1998). “In practice this
means that when granting relief on the federal claim would imply
that the state-court judgment on the other issues was incorrect,
federal courts do not have jurisdiction. “Where federal relief can
only be predicated upon a conviction that the state court was wrong,
it is difficult to conceive the federal proceeding as, in substance,
anything other than a prohibited appeal of the state-court judgment.”
Pieper v. American Arbitration Assn., Inc., 336 F.3d 458, 460 (6th
Cir. 2003) (Moore J.), quoting Catz: Simply put, “federal district
courts do not stand as appellate courts for decision of state courts.”
Hall v. Callahan, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 11055, **7, 2013 WL
2364140 (6th Cir. 2013). The Sixth Circuit has explained the
Rooker-Feldman as follows:
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine, named for Rooker v.
Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 44 S.Ct. 149, 68
L.Ed. 362 (1923), and District of Columbia Court of
Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 103 S.Ct. 1303,
75 L.Ed.2d 206 (1983), stands for the proposition
that a party aggrieved by a state-court decision
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cannot appeal that decision to a district court, but
must instead petition for a writ of certiorari from the
United States Supreme Court. This circuit has
devised a number of formulae for determining when
a district court lacks jurisdiction under the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine; broken down to
essentials, there are two categories of cases barred by
the doctrine. First, when the federal courts are
asked to “engage in appellate review of state court
proceedings,” the doctrine necessarily applies.
Peterson Novelties, Inc. v. City of Berkley, 305 F.3d
386, 390 (6th Cir. 2002). In determining when a
plaintiff asks for appellate review, we have in the
past looked to the relief sought, See Dubuc v. Mich.
Bd. Of Law Exam’rs., 342 F.3d 610, 618-19 (6th Cir.
2003), or asked the question whether the plaintiff
alleges “that the state court’s judgment activity
caused him injury [rather than] that the judgment
merely failed to redress a preexisting injury,” Piper
v. Am Arbitration Ass’n. Inc., 336 F.3d 458, 461 n.1
(6th Cir. 2003). See also Hutcherson v. Lauderdale
County, 326 F.3d 747, 755 (6th Cir. 2003)(“‘The
fundamental and appropriate question to ask is
whether the injury alleged by the federal plaintiff
resulted from the state court judgment itself or is
distinct from that judgment.’” (quoting Garry v.
Geils, 82 F.3d 1362, 1365 (7th Cir. 1996)); Tropf v.
Fid. Nat’l Title Ins. Co., 289 F.3d 929, 937 (6th Cir.
2002) (The doctrine “precludes federal court
jurisdiction where the claim is a specific grievance
that
the
law
was
invalidly--even
unconstitutionally--applied in the plaintiff’s
particular case.” (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted).
The second category of cases barred by RookerFeldman is those which allege an injury that predates
a state-court determination, but present issues
inextricably intertwined with the claim asserted in
the prior state court proceeding.
Easterling v. Crawford, 3:13-cv-430, doc. 4 at 18, PAGEID 225, 2014 WL 428931 *10.

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In this case, Easterling is asking this Court to engage in appellate review of a state court
proceeding, something that is not subject to review under the Rooker- Feldman doctrine. This
Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to do so.
IV.

Conclusion
Among the factors governing the issuance of an injunction, the likelihood of success factor

predominates. Gallina v. Wyandotte Police Dept., 2008 WL 5090551, *4 (E.D. Mich. 2008).
Thus, “[a]lthough no one factor is controlling, a finding that there is simply no likelihood of
success on the merits is usually fatal.” Gonzales v. National Bd. of Med. Exam'rs, 225 F.3d 620,
625 (6th Cir. 2000); Michigan State AFL-CIO v. Miller, 103 F.3d 1240, 1249 (6th Cir. 1997)
(“While, as a general matter, none of these four factors are given controlling weight, a preliminary
injunction issued where there is simply no likelihood of success on the merits must be reversed.”).
Both because of Defendant’s absolute immunity and because this Court lacks jurisdiction,
Plaintiff’s likelihood of success on the merits is non-existent, obviating the need to consider the
other factors governing injunctive relief. For these reasons, Plaintiff’s Motion for Injunctive
Relief (Rule 65A) and Waiver of Security (Rule 65C), doc. 3, is DENIED. For the same reasons,
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim, doc. 5, is GRANTED. Thus,
Plaintiff’s Motion for Discovery, doc. 8, is MOOT, and Plaintiff’s Motion to Overrule
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, doc. 7, is DENIED.
The instant case is TERMINATED from the dockets of the Southern District of Ohio,
Western District at Dayton.

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DONE and ORDERED in Dayton, Ohio, on Wednesday, March 25, 2015.

s/Thomas M. Rose
________________________________
THOMAS M. ROSE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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