Roe v. Amazon.com et al

Filing 60

ENTRY AND ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT JANE DOE'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS, DOC. 45 , AND GRANTING ALL OTHER DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. DOCS. 23 , 24 , 32 , 37 , AND 42 . The Clerk is ORDERED to enter summary judgment in favor of Defendants Amazon.com, Barnes & Noble, and Smashwords, Inc. on all claims against them. Signed by Judge Thomas M. Rose on 3/15/16. (ep)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION AT DAYTON

John and Jane Roe,
Plaintiffs,
v.

Case No. 3:15-cv-111
Judge Thomas M. Rose

Amazon.com, et al.,
Defendants.

ENTRY AND ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT JANE
DOE’S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS,
DOC. 45, AND GRANTING ALL OTHER DEFENDANTS’
MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. DOCS. 23, 24, 32,
37, AND 42.

Pending before the Court are a variety of motions by all Defendants. Defendant Jane
Doe1 would have the Court grant a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. Doc. 45. Defendants
Amazon.com, Barnes & Noble Inc., and Smashwords Inc., who comprise all other remaining
defendants, and who will be referred to as the “Corporate Defendants,” all seek summary
judgment.2 Docs. 23, 32 (BN), 24, 37 (Amazon.com), 42 (Smashwords). Amazon.com and
Barnes & Noble Inc. moved for summary judgment against the original complaint, doc. 37 & 24,
and renewed their motions when Plaintiffs John and Jane Roe amended their complaint to include
Smashwords, 37, 32 & 42. The instant action stems from publication of Plaintiffs’ engagement
photograph on the cover of an erotic book authored by Jane Doe. Plaintiffs assert three claims:
1 An individual whose true identity was unknown to Plaintiffs when they filed their complaint, Jane Doe is a man
named Greg McKenna who writes under the female pseudonym “Lacey Noonan.”)
2 Apple Inc. was named a defendant, but was dismissed when Plaintiff learned that Smashwords Inc. produced the
books sold on the Apple Inc. site. Doc. 58.

wrongful appropriation of their persona for commercial purposes as made actionable under Ohio
Revised Core § 2741, “invasion of privacy as that tort is recognized in the State of Ohio,” and “tort
liability for violation of Restatement (Second) of Torts 652.” Liability against Jane Doe is sought
on the theory that she authored the work in question. Liability is sought against all other
defendants on the theory that they published Jane Doe’s work.
I.

Background
Plaintiffs allege that sometime in 2014 Defendant Jane Doe wrote a book entitled A

Gronking to Remember and had it published by Defendants, Amazon.com, Inc., Barnes & Noble,
Inc., Apple, Inc. and Smashwords3 (the “Corporate Defendants”). The Corporate Defendants
offered the book for sale on their websites in both digital formats (e.g. Nook, Kindle, iBooks) as
well as in paperback.
The cover of the book contains a photograph of Plaintiffs taken during their engagement
prior to their wedding. Plaintiffs allege the photograph was appropriated by the Defendants for
commercial gain with neither the permission of Plaintiffs nor the permission of any lawful
copyright holder. Plaintiffs were not compensated for the use of their image on the cover of these
books. Plaintiffs allege they did not place the photograph on the internet for expropriation as the
color photograph on the cover of this book.
A Gronking to Remember, is alleged to be less than tasteful and to be offensive. Plaintiffs
allege the use of their image has held them up to ridicule and embarrassment. Their connection to
the book was aggravated when the book, with Plaintiffs’ image on the cover, was shown in
3 In the case at bar, Plaintiffs did not address Smashwords by name within the complaint. Plaintiffs agreed with all
defense counsel (including Smashwords current counsel) before there was a ruling on the motion for leave to amend in
order to obtain an agreement to the amendment to add Smashwords, a similarly situated corporate defendant. The
amended complaint makes the same allegations against Smashwords, as a corporate defendant, as the allegations
against the other corporate defendants.
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nationwide media. The book was used in jokes on The Tonight Show and Jimmy Kimmel Live as
well as being displayed and read before the press at media day for the XLIX Super Bowl.
Plaintiffs filed suit on February 24, 2015 in the Miami County, Ohio Court of Common
Pleas naming Amazon.com, Barnes & Noble Inc., Apple Inc., and Jane Doe as defendants. Doc. 1.
Defendants removed the matter to this Court on March 27, 2015. Doc. 1. Apple, Barnes & Noble
and Amazon.com filed motions for summary judgment. Docs. 20, 23, 24. On July 7, 2015,
Plaintiffs amended their complaint, substituting Smashwords Inc., for Apple Inc. Doc. 28. The
moving parties who remained renewed their motions for summary judgment, with Smashwords
adding its own. Docs. 32, 37, 39, 42. Jane Doe added a motion for Judgment on the Pleadings.
Doc. 45. All pending motions have now been responded to and replies filed in their support,
rendering them ripe for decision.
Plaintiffs assert claims for wrongful appropriation of their persona for commercial
purposes as made actionable under Ohio Revised Code § 2741, “invasion of privacy as that tort is
recognized in the State of Ohio,” and “tort liability for violation of Restatement (Second) of Torts
652.” Liability against Jane Doe is sought on the theory that she authored the work in question.
Liability is sought against all other defendants on the theory that they knowingly or recklessly
published Jane Doe’s work.
Plaintiffs seek the recovery of actual damages, including any profits derived from and
attributable to the allegedly unauthorized use. In the alternative, Plaintiffs claim entitlement to
statutory damages in an amount of $10,000.00. Plaintiffs also seek an accounting from each of
the Defendants in order to elect remedies. Moreover, Plaintiffs seek the recovery of punitive
damages. and attorney fees, courts costs and reasonable expenses associated with the pursuit of
this civil action. Alleging Defendants knew or should have known that they did not have the right
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to use the Plaintiffs’ persona for commercial purposes, Plaintiffs seek the recovery of treble
damages. The Court will first rule upon Jane Doe’s Motion for judgment on the Pleadings.
II.

Standard for Motion on the Pleadings
Courts apply the same analysis to motions for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c)

as they apply to motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Warrior
Sports, Inc. v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 623 F.3d 281, 284 (6th Cir. 2010). “For purposes of
a motion for judgment on the pleadings, all well-pleaded material allegations of the pleadings of
the opposing party must be taken as true, and the motion may be granted only if the moving party
is nevertheless clearly entitled to judgment.” JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Winget, 510 F.3d
577, 582 (6th Cir. 2007) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). However, the court need
not accept as true legal conclusions or unwarranted factual inferences. Id. (citing Mixon v. Ohio,
193 F.3d 389, 400 (6th Cir. 1999)).
To withstand a Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings, “a complaint must
contain direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material elements under some viable
legal theory.” Commercial Money Ctr., Inc. v. Illinois Union Ins. Co., 508 F.3d 327, 336 (6th Cir.
2007). “The factual allegations in the complaint need to be sufficient to give notice to the
defendant as to what claims are alleged, and the plaintiff must plead ‘sufficient factual matter’ to
render the legal claim plausible, i.e., more than merely possible.” Fritz v. Charter Twp. of
Comstock, 592 F.3d 718, 722 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009)).
A “legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation” need not be accepted as true, nor are
recitations of the elements of a cause of action sufficient. Hensley Mfg. v. ProPride, Inc., 579 F.3d
603, 609 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). In
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considering a motion for judgment on the pleadings, a court considers the pleadings, which consist
of the complaint, the answer, and any written instruments attached as exhibits. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(c); Fed. R. Civ. P. 7(a) (defining “pleadings” to include both the complaint and the answer);
Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c) (stating that “[a] copy of a written instrument that is an exhibit to a pleading is
part of the pleading for all purposes”); Northern Ind. Gun & Outdoor Shows, Inc. v. City of South
Bend, 163 F.3d 449, 452 (7th Cir. 1998). While the allegations in the complaint are the primary
focus in assessing a Rule 12(c) motion, “matters of public record, orders, items appearing in the
record of the case, and exhibits attached to the complaint[ ] also may be taken into account.”
Barany–Snyder v. Weiner, 539 F.3d 327, 332 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting Amini v. Oberlin Coll., 259
F.3d 493, 502 (6th Cir. 2001)). In addition, a court may consider exhibits attached to a motion for
judgment on the pleadings “so long as they are referred to in the Complaint and are central to the
claims contained therein.” Bassett v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 528 F.3d 426, 430 (6th Cir.
2008).
Because judgment is sought on claims brought under Ohio law, this Court must apply the
law of Ohio, as interpreted by the Supreme Court of Ohio. Northland Ins. Co. v. Guardsman
Prods. Inc., 141 F.3d 612, 617 (6th Cir. 1998). Specifically, this Court must apply the substantive
law of Ohio “‘in accordance with the then-controlling decision of the highest court of the State.”’
Imperial Hotels Corp. v. Dore, 257 F.3d 615, 620 (6th Cir. 2001) (quoting Pedigo v. UNUM Life
Ins. Co., 145 F.3d 804, 808 (6th Cir. 1998). Also, to the extent that the highest court in Ohio has
not addressed the issue presented, this Court must anticipate how Ohio’s highest court would rule.
Id. (quoting Bailey Farms, Inc. v. NOR-AM Chem. Co., 27 F.3d 188, 191 (6th Cir. 1994)).
III.

Analysis of Motion for Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings

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Doe first seeks judgment on Roe’s claim for commercial use of persona. Under Ohio law
a person may use an individual's persona for a commercial purpose during the individual's lifetime
if the person first obtains written consent to use the individual's persona from various statutorily
prescribed persons, including inter alia, the individual whose right of publicity is at issue. See
Ohio Rev. Code § 2741.02(B). Persona is defined as an individual's, “name, voice, signature,
photograph, image, likeness, or distinctive appearance, if any of these aspects have commercial
value.” Ohio Rev. Code § 2741.01(A). Absent that consent, Ohio law provides a private right of
action to an individual to recover actual or statutory damages from the person who commercially
used such individual's persona. Brauer v. Pannozzo, 232 F. Supp. 2d 814, 820 (N.D. Ohio 2002)
(citing Ohio Rev. Code §§ 2741.06, 2741.07). There is a paucity of precedent in Ohio regarding
the application of this tort. James v. Bob Ross Buick, Inc., 855 N.E.2d 119, 123 (Ohio App. 2006).
Defendant Jane Doe asserts she is entitled to judgment on Plaintiffs’ claims under Ohio
Revised Code § 2741.02 for four reasons: because Doe’s use is exempt and Plaintiffs’ persona has
no commercial value, because, she asserts, her use of Plaintiffs’ photograph on a book cover is
exempt under Ohio Revised Code § 2741.09, because Plaintiffs have failed to plead any facts to
demonstrate the required element of persona and because, she asserts, Defendant Doe did not use
Plaintiffs’ photograph for a commercial purpose.
Defendant Doe asserts there is no commercial value in Plaintiffs’ persona because
plaintiffs are not celebrities and because the use is allowed because of the work allegedly being a
literary work. Celebrity status is not, however, a requirement to recover under the statute. In
James v. Bob Ross Buick, 855 N.E.2d 119 (Ohio App. 2006)(Wolff, J.), the Second District Court
of Appeals found there was value in the salesman’s name because his former employer used his
signature to induce prospective clients to favor Defendant. Id. at 343.
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While Plaintiffs’ photograph does not have widely marketable commercial value, the court
in James found “the appropriation of a plaintiff’s image is more properly in the nature of a
usurpation of the plaintiff’s property rights, … courts have held that it is proper to vindicate
plaintiff’s right to the use of his image against this deliberate violation, even if plaintiff cannot
prove actual damages.” James, 855 N.E.2d at 129 ((quoting Ainsworth v. Century Supply Co., 693
N.E.2d 510 (Ill. App. 1998)). This Court finds the Second District position persuasive, and will
also adopt the property right view.
Because the Court finds Plaintiffs’ persona to have commercial value, it must consider
whether the persona was used for a commercial purpose:
"Commercial purpose" means the use of or reference to an aspect of an individual's persona
in any of the following manners:
(1) On or in connection with a place, product, merchandise, goods,
services, or other commercial activities not expressly exempted
under this chapter;
(2) For advertising or soliciting the purchase of products,
merchandise, goods, services, or other commercial activities not
expressly exempted under this chapter;
(3) For the purpose of promoting travel to a place;
(4) For the purpose of fundraising.
Ohio Rev. Code § 2741.01(B). Thus, if a photo is a literary or fiction work or an advertisement
for the literary or fiction work, it is excepted under the chapter, Ohio Rev. Code § 2741.01(B), –
other uses are not excepted. However, neither Ohio common law nor the Ohio Revised Code
defines the term literary or fiction work. Therefore, the Court must look elsewhere in the law to
find a definition.

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Plaintiffs propose that the Court adopt the definition of literary work found in federal
copyright law, which defines a literary work as “works, other than audiovisual works, expressed in
words, numbers, or other verbal or numerical symbols or indicia, regardless of the nature of the
material objects, such as books, periodicals, manuscripts, phonorecords, film, tapes, disks, or
cards, in which they are embodied.” 17 U.SC. § 101 (emphasis added). Using this definition of
“literary work,” Plaintiffs submit the photo at issue does not constitute a literary or fictional work.
The Court agrees that only the author’s manuscript constitutes the literary or fiction work,
since it is made of “words, numbers, or other verbal or numerical symbols…” 17 U.S.C. § 101.
The photo of the Plaintiffs is a separate copyrightable aspect from the manuscript. This point is
highlighted by the decision to change the photo on the cover of the book. The literary or fictional
work itself remained the same. Notably, the Copyright Act defines “photograph” separately
under the definition for “Pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works.” 17 U.S.C. § 101. Defendant
Doe’s manuscript is not at issue in this case, only Plaintiffs’ image.
Defendant Doe also argues that Plaintiffs have not alleged the persona element under the
statute. However, the statute defines persona as “an individual's name, voice, signature,
photograph, image, likeness…” Ohio Rev. Code § 2741.01. Plaintiffs alleged in their complaint
“The cover of the book contains a photograph of the Plaintiffs…” Pl.’s First Am. Compl. at ¶ 4. As
such, Defendant’s argument fails on this point as Plaintiffs allege the use of a photograph which,
under the statute, constitutes the use of their persona.

Defendant Doe is alleged to have

appropriated a photo of the Plaintiffs and used it to assist in his production of income from his
book. Defendant Doe is not entitled to judgment on the pleadings against Plaintiffs on Count I.
Plaintiffs’ second claim is for common law invasion of privacy. Defendant argues that
Ohio Revised Code § 2741.01(B) preempts common law rights for invasion of privacy and cites to
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Bolles v. Toledo Trust Co., 144 Ohio St. 195 (1944) to support that proposition. However, the
current statutory provision was adopted in 1999. In 2006 the James court noted that the “statutory
cause of action did not supplant the common-law claim.” James, at n.2. The statute specifically
states “The remedies provided for in this chapter are in addition to any other remedies provided for
by state or federal statute or common law.” Ohio Rev. Code § 2741.08. Plaintiffs’ claims for
invasion of privacy have not been preempted by statute.
Plaintiffs assert common law invasion of privacy by means of appropriation. In Zacchini
v. Scripps-Howard Broad., Co., 351 N.E. 2d 454 (Ohio 1976), the Supreme Court of Ohio,
outlined the tort of invasion of privacy by appropriation: “One who appropriates to his own use or
benefit the name or likeness of another is subject to liability to the other for invasion of privacy,
and the use or benefit need not necessarily be commercial.” Zacchini, 351 N.E. 2d at 455. By
adopting this protection, the court sought to protect the right to the “exclusive use of [each
individual’s] own identity… whether the misuse is for commercial purpose or otherwise.” The
court stated that the “fundamental wrong is the appropriation.” Id. at 458.
Defendants attack the false light theory of invasion of privacy theory claiming it is
unavailable when, “the statement obviously purports to be fictitious.” Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 652E, Reporters Notes, cmt. a (citing Hicks v. Casablanca Records, 464 F. Supp. 426
(S.D.N.Y. 1978)). See Botts v. N.Y. Times Co., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23785, at *19–20 (D.N.J.
Aug. 29, 2003) (“Where a statement obviously purports to be fictitious, there can be no falsity of
the publicized matter, and, therefore, no reckless disregard for such falsity.”) (dismissing a claim
for false light publicity where an advertisement used a real person’s name in association with the
image of another individual in a fictional setting). Here, however, if the book depicts a woman

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who fantasizes of sexual acts in response to an inattentive spouse, it does not seem that the fiction
is obvious. Based upon the pleadings in this case, this remains a jury question.
Plaintiffs’ third claim alleges liability under the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652(e).
In Welling v. Weinfeld, the Supreme Court of Ohio recognized the privacy tort of false light, as
outlined in the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652(e). Welling v. Weinfeld, 866 N.E. 2d 1051
(Ohio 2007). The court held that “one who gives publicity to a matter concerning another that
places the other before the public in a false light” is liable if “(a) the false light in which the other
was placed would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and (b) the actor had knowledge of
or acted in reckless disregard as to the falsity of the publicized matter and the false light in which
the other would be placed.” Id. at 464 (emphasis added).
The highly offensive standard “applies only when the defendant knows that the plaintiff, as
a reasonable man, would be justified in the eyes of the community in feeling seriously offended
and aggrieved by the publicity.” There must be “such a major misrepresentation of his character,
history, or activities…” that a reasonable person would be offended. Id. at 472. The knowledge
element requires that the actor had “knowledge of or acted in reckless disregard as to the falsity of
the matter and the false light in which the other would be placed…” Id at 472. Liability attaches
when the publishing party acts with knowledge or reckless disregard. Id. at 473. In this case, the
Roes’ engagement photo was placed on the cover of “A Gronking to Remember”, a book many
might view as having obscene or pornographic references. As the photograph in question depicts
a romantic relationship, a jury may find that Doe was reckless in his disregard for insinuating a
fantasized relationship between Jane Doe and Gronkowski. Thus, Doe is alleged to have had
knowledge sufficient to allow Plaintiffs to proceed against Doe on this claim.

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Defendant Doe also argues that his use of the photograph on the cover of his manuscript is
protected by the incidental use doctrine and cites to Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition §
47 cmt. C (1995) to justify his wrongful use. This argument confuses and misstates the issue in
this case – it would be relevant if the Plaintiff in this case were Ron Gronkowski, a public figure.
The incidental use doctrine applies, however, only to persons with celebrity or other notorious
status – which Plaintiffs did not have. Second, Plaintiffs are not claiming a right of publicity tort
as defined by the Defendant. Plaintiffs’ claim is for the invasion of their privacy that includes the
right to the commercial value associated with their name or likeness and the wrongful
appropriation of their likeness. The court in Vinci v. Ameriican Can Co., 591 N.E.2d 793, 794
(Ohio Ct. App. 1990) stated “Regardless of the notoriety attained… under Zacchini, the invasion
would nonetheless be actionable.” Vinci, 591 N.E.2d at 510.
Defendant also cites to Jackson v. Playboy, 574 F.Supp. 10 (N.D. Ohio 1983). Jackson
involved three boys who were out on a public street and photographed standing next to a female
police officer. The photo was then used alongside nude photos of the same police officer in a
Playboy article. The boys sued Playboy claiming an invasion of privacy. The Defendant’s
Motion to Dismiss was sustained because the boys did not make allegations or submit facts
necessary to support the elements of such a claim. The Roes have. They have alleged: that their
likeness was expropriated by Defendant for his own commercial benefit; that they have suffered
humiliation, embarrassment and ridicule; and that Plaintiffs have been placed by Defendant in a
false light with their image on the cover of his erotic book. Thus, Defendant Doe’s Motion for
Judgment on the Pleadings will be denied.
IV.

Standard of Review on Corporate Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgment
The standard of review applicable to motions for summary judgment is established by
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Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 and associated case law. Rule 56 provides that summary
judgment “shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(c). Alternatively, summary judgment is denied “[i]f there are any genuine factual issues that
properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor
of either party.” Hancock v. Dodson, 958 F.2d 1367, 1374 (6th Cir. 1992) (quoting Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250, 106 S. Ct. 2505 (1986)). Thus, summary judgment must
be entered “against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an
element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.”
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S. Ct. 2548 (1986).
The party seeking summary judgment has the initial burden of informing the court of the
basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, admissions and affidavits which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine
issue of material fact. Id., at 323. The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party who “must set
forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S., at 250, 106
S. Ct. 2505 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)).
Once the burden of production has shifted, the party opposing summary judgment cannot
rest on its pleadings or merely reassert its previous allegations. It is not sufficient to “simply
show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co.,
Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 106 S. Ct. 1348 (1986). Rule 56 “requires the
nonmoving party to go beyond the pleadings” and present some type of evidentiary material in
support of its position. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S., at 324, 106 S. Ct. 2548.
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In determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, a court must assume as true
the evidence of the nonmoving party and draw all reasonable inferences in the favor of that party.
Anderson, 477 U.S., at 255, 106 S. Ct. 2505. If the parties present conflicting evidence, a court
may not decide which evidence to believe by determining which parties’ affiants are more
credible. 10A Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 2726. Rather, credibility
determinations must be left to the fact-finder. Id.
Because summary judgment is sought on claims brought under Ohio law, this Court must
apply the law of Ohio, as interpreted by the Supreme Court of Ohio. Northland Ins. Co. v.
Guardsman Prods. Inc., 141 F.3d 612, 617 (6th Cir. 1998). Specifically, this Court must apply
the substantive law of Ohio “‘in accordance with the then-controlling decision of the highest court
of the State.”’ Imperial Hotels Corp. v. Dore, 257 F.3d 615, 620 (6th Cir. 2001) (quoting Pedigo v.
UNUM Life Ins. Co., 145 F.3d 804, 808 (6th Cir. 1998). Also, to the extent that the highest court
in Ohio has not addressed the issue presented, this Court must anticipate how Ohio’s highest court
would rule. Id. (quoting Bailey Farms, Inc. v. NOR-AM Chem. Co., 27 F.3d 188, 191 (6th Cir.
1994)).
V.

Analysis of Motion for Motion for Summary Judgment
The Corporate Defendants seek summary judgment asserting that they are not publishers

of the book and that any use on their part was incidental. They also claim that as distributors, they
neither knew nor had any reason to know of alleged wrongdoing pertaining to specific content and
that they are shielded from liability by the Communications Decency Act of 198, 47 U.S.C.
§230(e)(3).
The Corporate Defendants’ liability attaches or fails depending upon whether they are
considered distributers or publishers. Under Ohio law, “one who appropriates to his own use or
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benefit the name or likeness of another is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his
privacy.” Reeves v. Fox TV Network, 983 F. Supp. 703, 710 (N.D. Ohio 1997) (quoting Vinci v.
American Can Co., 459 N.E.2d 507 (Ohio 1984) (¶2 of the syllabus)); see Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 652C. However, Ohio law distinguishes between “mere incidental use of a person’s name
and likeness, which is not actionable, from appropriation of the benefits associated with the
person’s identity, which is.” Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 351 N.E.2d 454 (Ohio
1976), reversed on other grounds 433 U.S. 562 (1977); see also Bosley v. WildWetT.com, 310 F.
Supp. 2d 914, 920 (N.D. Ohio 2004) (“[I]ncidental use of one’s name or likeness is permissible.”).
One prong of the argument that the Corporate Defendants are not publishers focuses on the
relationship between the Corporate Defendants and Defendant Doe. The Corporate Defendants
allege that they did not publish the book, but that Defendant Doe used their systems to publish it,
an argument that Plaintiffs might characterized as the Corporate Defendants contractually
agreeing to let the inmates run the asylum. Notably, Plaintiffs were not a party to this contract.
Additional facts concerning the publication of the book are necessary to resolve this question.
Doe uploaded the manuscript and cover of his book through Amazon’s KDP, Kindle
Digital Publishing, on December 29, 2014, and through CreateSpace on December 31, 2014. As
part of that process, Doe agreed to KDP’s Terms and Conditions and executed CreateSpace’s
Member Agreement containing representations that the uploader owned all rights to the material
and that no rights were being violated. Amazon reviewed the book for pornographic images, and
checked the text for offensive material or plagiarism, but none was detected. Accordingly, an
electronic version of the book was offered on Amazon beginning on January 2, 2015, and a print
version of the book became available via CreateSpace on January 3, 2015.

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Prior to publishing the Barnes & Noble NOOK Book Edition using NOOK Press, Doe
represented and warranted to Barnes & Noble that he held “the necessary rights, including all
intellectual property rights, in and to the [book] and related content.” At the same time, he also
represented and warranted that the book could be “sold, marketed, displayed, distributed and
promoted [by Barnes & Noble] without violating or infringing the rights of any other person or
entity, including, without limitation, infringing any copyright, patent, trademark or right of
privacy, or any other intellectual or industrial property right, title or interest of any party, and
without obligating Barnes & Noble to pay any fees to third parties.”
Barnes & Noble began listing the NOOK Book Edition with its original cover—which
depicted the Plaintiffs—when Doe uploaded it on December 31, 2014. The company began
listing the hard copy CreateSpace Edition, also with the original cover (i.e., the cover depicting
Plaintiffs’ photograph), on January 16, 2015. During the time the book was available with
Plaintiffs’ image on the cover, Barnes & Noble sold approximately 142 NOOK Book Edition
e-books and 27 CreateSpace Edition print-on-demand paperbacks.
In January, the owners of the New England Patriots protested to Doe. Doe notified
Amazon that he had changed the cover, removing the Patriots’ trademarks.
On January 29, 2015, Doe received a letter from the Roes’ counsel objecting to the use of
their photograph on the book’s cover. That same day, Doe notified Amazon by email that he had
become “aware of a new third party claiming copyright on a part of the cover image for my book”
and that he was “currently removing this image and replacing it with stock images that [he] ha[d]
licensed for this book . . . .” (Ex. 9).
On January 30 and 31, 2015, respectively, Doe uploaded via KDP and CreateSpace another
new cover that purported to resolve the new infringement allegation that was referenced in Doe’s
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January 29, 2015 email to Amazon. A replacement cover was displayed on Amazon, via KDP
and CreateSpace, beginning on January 30 and February 1, 2015, respectively. (Id. ¶ 18).7
On January 31, 2015, Doe, who had also received correspondence from Plaintiffs’ counsel,
had uploaded a different cover for the book via NOOK Press. Bock Decl. at ¶23; McKenna Decl. at
¶9. The new version of the NOOK Press Edition cover did not include the Plaintiffs’ image. Bock
Decl. at ¶24. And as of February 2, 2015, CreateSpace or its affiliate removed the CreateSpace
Edition from sale. Id. at ¶25. Thus, as of February 2, 2015, Barnes & Noble had ceased offering for
sale with a cover depicting Plaintiffs’ image both the NOOK Book Edition as well as the
CreateSpace Edition for printing on demand thereafter. Id. The cover containing the Plaintiffs’
image no longer appeared on BN.com as of that date. Id.
On February 3, 2015, two days after the Super Bowl, Barnes & Noble received a letter
from Plaintiffs’ counsel alleging that Plaintiffs had not authorized the use of their image on the
book’s cover. Shortly after receiving the letter, Barnes & Noble contacted Doe about the
allegations and to request replacement of the cover images. McKenna Decl. at ¶12. It appears
Doe had already replaced them. Bock Decl. at ¶23 & Ex. D; see also McKenna Decl. at ¶¶9, 12.
On February 24, 2015, the Roes filed this lawsuit. In their complaint, the Roes named as
defendants Doe, Amazon.com, B&N, and Apple. The Roes did not originally sue Smashwords.
If there is a paucity of case law to interpret Ohio law regarding invasion of privacy, there is
less on the question of whether the provider of a self-publishing service is a publisher. The
Corporate Defendants also assert that the uncontroverted facts of the case do not warrant finding
them to be publishers. They then seek to further remove themselves from liability, asserting that
any use of the book cover on their sites was incidental to commercial use, and constitutionally
protected at that.
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Plaintiffs assert that the Corporate Defendants are publishers, not in the sense of a legal
term of art such as with the elements of defamation, but in the colloquial and everyday
understanding of a book publisher. According to Plaintiffs, the Corporate Defendants provide a
platform for working in concert with authors in publishing their books the same way a traditional
publishing house does. Plaintiffs assert that to publish is “to distribute copies [of a work] to the
public.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1352 (9th ed. 2009). One publishing house, Hugo Publishing,
defines the term “publish” as “a book produced and ready to be sold.” Hugo House Publ’g.,
http://hugohousepublishers.com/publishing_process/ Ex. 1 at 1, ¶ 1, (last visited July 31, 2015).
Plaintiffs assert Defendants acted as publishers when they created a platform that allowed
Defendant Doe to publish his book using their publishing platform. Plaintiffs contend traditional
publishing houses use a vetting process that would have prevented Doe from distributing for sale
his book with the Plaintiff’s photo on the cover. As stated in United States v. Apple, Inc., 791 F.3d
290 at 296 (2nd Cir. 2015), “Since the invention of the printing press, the distribution of books has
involved a fundamentally consistent process: compose a manuscript, print and bind it into physical
volumes, and then ship and sell the volumes to the public.” The booksellers are the ones to whom
the already published books are sent to be sold to the public.
Among the steps in the publishing process are editing the book for grammar and flow,
marketing, and designing the book cover. Hugo House, Ex. 1 at 3 - 6. Defendants do not conduct
the editing and design steps, as their service is commonly known as self-publishing, but might also
be thought of as self-editing. Self-publishing is arguably not publishing, as that word is known in
the book industry, because to publish is to place a book in final form for distribution to booksellers
for sale. “In the ordinary course of operating Nook Press, Barnes & Noble does not write or edit
content...” Bock Decl. at ¶ 15.

“Amazon does not otherwise read, edit, or fact check
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self-published books.” Watson Decl. at ¶ 7. “Smashwords does not… undertake[] any editorial
review of the books that authors and publishers publish using its service.” Coker Decl. at ¶ 8.
These are steps that the author conducts as part of using the publishing platform. However,
Defendants provide a marketing platform and advertising space that the author utilizes once the
book is published. Normally, the interior of the book is also designed by the publishing house.
Hugo House, Ex. 1 at 5. Here, this step is performed via the Corporate Defendants’ publishing
platforms. When the user uploads the book, it is formatted to fit the specifications for the
publishing platform. Barnes & Noble, FAQ, supra, Ex. 2. Amazon, FAQ, supra, Ex. 3 at 3 ¶ 1.
Defendant Smashwords provides a style guide that outlines its formatting requirements for
publication by Smashwords. Smashwords, FAQ, supra, Ex. 10 at 11 ¶ 1. The final steps are
printing and distribution. Hugo House, Ex. 1 at 7. Defendants print the work and distribute the
book which then has placed by the author on the internet for purchase by consumers visiting the
bookseller sites.
While Corporate Defendants characterize themselves as “book sellers” in their motions,
Barnes & Noble also submits it “contacted [Doe] about the allegations and to request replacement
of the cover images.” Barnes & Noble Motion for Summary Judgment at 4. Amazon stated the
same “…and directed [Doe] to address the allegation for infringement.” Amazon Motion for
Summary Judgment at 6. The Corporate Defendants have a direct cost-sharing arrangement with
the author. Watson Decl. Ex. 2 at 14. Coker Decl. Ex. A at 3. Bock Decl. Ex. A at 4. Plaintiffs
assert a bookseller receives books and puts them on a shelf (physical or digital) in order to sell
them. If there is a complaint about the content or the cover image on the book, a mere bookseller
has no ability to require the author or the publisher to change the content or image. Defendants
not only had access to the author to request to make the changes, they were able to demand and
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require Doe to change the cover image. Barnes & Noble Motion for Summary Judgment at 4 - 5.
Amazon also “direct[ed] [Doe] to address the allegation of infringement.” Amazon Motion for
Summary Judgment at 6. Plaintiffs contend only a publisher of a book has access to the author
and the authority to change a cover image in this manner. A book publisher has cost-sharing
arrangements with the author - a mere bookseller does not. The only things a bookseller can do:
sell or not sell the book.
Corporate Defendants claim it would be impractical and prohibitively expensive for them
to endeavor to review each and every piece of content that third parties publish using their presses.
Plaintiffs allege that the Corporate Defendants published their image knowingly or recklessly
without their consent. See McKenna Decl. at ¶18; see also Bock Decl. at ¶5.

Corporate

Defendants contend their use of Plaintiffs’ image was merely incidental, not a commercial use or
an actionable appropriation as Plaintiffs allege, as they assert Ohio law does not extend liability to
them; however, they claim even if Ohio law could otherwise be construed so broadly, the First
Amendment does not permit booksellers to be held strictly liable for an author’s torts.
The First Amendment protects the right to distribute books. To prevent chilling and
self-censorship, bookstores and other distributors generally have no duty to monitor the content of
the material they distribute. See, e.g., Lerman v. Flynt Distributing Co., 745 F.2d. 123, 139 (2d Cir.
1984) (stating that “national distributor of hundreds of periodicals has no duty to monitor each
issue” and that “[s]uch a rule would be an impermissible burden on the First Amendment”). If it
were otherwise, “the bookseller’s burden would become the public’s burden . . . ,” and “[i]f the
contents of bookshops and periodical stands were restricted to material of which their proprietors
had made an inspection, they might be depleted indeed.” Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 153
(1959).
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Of course, as Corporate Defendants also make clear, this publication was not on the shelve
of any bookshop, or on any periodical stand. Thus, we are not confronted with the public burden
Smith envisioned, one of a limited supply of ideas, but one caused by the ever-lowering barriers to
publication. Because it costs nothing to publish, books that previously were considered not worth
publishing are now published.

It bears note, however, that disseminating speech was not

historically free. As the cost diminished from transcription, to printing presses, to photocopiers to
the internet, however, the public is deluged, creating a cost on their end. One can imagine a social
benefit in requiring the modicum of review required to assure that no rights are violated in
production. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942) (concluding that the
First Amendment does not protect some types of speech because they serve “no essential part of
any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that
may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.”).
For now, this Court will apply the old standards to the new technology, treating the Corporate
Defendants’ process as if it were next logical step after the photocopier. Just as Xerox would not
be considered a publisher and held responsible for an invasion of privacy tort carried out with a
photocopier, Corporate Defendants will not be liable as publishers for the tort allegedly committed
using their technology.
As Plaintiffs have not alleged facts that would allow the conclusion that the Corporate
Defendants are publishers, the Court need not consider whether the Corporate Defendants knew or
recklessly knew or had reason to know the Roes’ rights were potentially being violated. States
may not impose criminal or civil liability against booksellers or other distributors for distribution
where the distributor neither knew nor had any reason to know of alleged wrongdoing pertaining to
specific content. Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 153 (1959).
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Because the Court concludes that the Corporate Defendants are not publishers, neither is it
necessary to consider whether they are shielded from liability by the Communications Decency
Act of 198, 47 U.S.C. §230(e)(3).
VI.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Defendant Jane Doe’s Motion for Judgment
on the Pleadings, Doc. 45, and GRANTS the Corporate Defendants’ Motions for Summary
Judgment. Docs. 23, 24, 32, 37, and 42. The Clerk is ORDERED to enter summary judgment in
favor of Defendants Amazon.com, Barnes & Noble, and Smashwords, Inc. on all claims against
them.
DONE and ORDERED in Dayton, Ohio, this Tuesday, March 15, 2016.
s/Thomas M. Rose
________________________________
THOMAS M. ROSE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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