Easterling v. Rice et al
Filing
11
ORDER denying 3 Motion for Temporary Injunction; denying 8 Plaintiff's Addendum to the Motion for Temporary Injuction; finding as moot 2 Motion for Waiver of Security. Signed by Judge Algenon L. Marbley on 8/18/2015. (cw)(This document has been sent by regular mail to the party(ies) listed in the NEF that did not receive electronic notification.)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
WARREN EASTERLING
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
Plaintiff,
v.
WALTER H. RICE, et al.
Defendants.
Case No. 3:15-CV-257
JUDGE ALGENON L. MARBLEY
OPINION & ORDER
This matter is before the Court for consideration of Plaintiff’s Motion for
Temporary Injunction, (Doc. 3), and Plaintiff’s First Addendum to the Motion for
Temporary Injunction, (Doc. 8). In this action, Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, brings suit
against Defendants, alleging violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985. (Complaint, Doc. 1). In the
present motion, Plaintiff seeks a temporary and preliminary injunction relieving him of
any requirements to obey an order issued by Defendant Judge Walter H. Rice, barring
Plaintiff from entering the United States District Court Building and Office Complex,
located at 200 W. 2nd Street, in Dayton, Ohio, (see Doc. 1-3), “ceas[ing] enforcement” of
the same, and removing all cases filed by Plaintiff from Defendants’ personal
jurisdiction. For the reasons that follow, Plaintiff’s Motion for Temporary Injunction
(Doc. 3) and Plaintiff’s First Addendum to the Motion for Temporary Injunction (Doc. 8)
are DENIED. Plaintiff’s Motion for Wavier of Security (Doc. 2) is MOOT.
I.
BACKGROUND
In his motion seeking injunctive relief, Plaintiff requests an order from this Court
relieving him of any requirements to obey an order issued by Defendant Judge Walter H.
Rice barring Plaintiff from entering the United States District Court Building and Office
Complex, located at 200 W. 2nd Street, in Dayton, Ohio, (see Doc. 1-3, hereinafter “the
August 1, 2014 Court Order), “ceas[ing] enforcement” of the same, and removing all
cases filed by Plaintiff from Defendants’ personal jurisdiction.
The August 1, 2014 Court Order issued by Judge Rice states that, as a result of
Plaintiff’s “penchant to phone, in a repeated fashion, the office of United States
Magistrate Judge Michael Merz” to express frustration with the legal system, repeated
visits to the office of the Clerk of Courts for a similar purpose, the United States
Marshals Service directed the Court Security Officers to escort Plaintiff to each office he
desired to contact during every occasion on which he entered the building. According to
the Court Order, on July 30, 2014, Plaintiff “engaged in belligerent, verbal altercation
with several Court Security Officers which, according to reports, came very close to a
physical altercation and the detention of Mr. Easterling until he could be arrested[.]” The
Court Order noted that Plaintiff’s conduct had “become more and more disruptive over
the past several weeks.”1 For those reasons, the Order declared that Plaintiff was barred
from entering the United States District Court Building and Office Complex without prior
written permission of the Chief Judge of the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Ohio.
On July 28, 2015, Plaintiff filed this action in the Western Division of the United
States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio. On that same day, Plaintiff filed
the present motion requesting injunctive relief. On July 29, 2015, Judge Rice recused
and transferred the case to Chief Judge Edmund A. Sargus, Jr. for reassignment to any
1
The August 1, 2014 Order also indicated that Plaintiff was to be declared a vexatious litigator in a filing to
be issued several days after it was filed.
2
judicial officer in the District not in the Dayton seat of court. (Doc. 6). On August 12,
2015, this action was reassigned to this Court for adjudication. Plaintiff’s Motion is ripe
for decision.
II. DISCUSSION
To determine whether a party is entitled to a preliminary injunction under
Fed.R.Civ.P. 65(a), the Court is required to weigh four factors: (1) the likelihood that the
movant will succeed on the merits of the claim; (2) whether the movant would suffer
irreparable injury without the injunction; (3) whether the issuance of the injunction would
cause substantial harm to others; and (4) whether issuance of the injunction is in the
public interest. Hunter v. Hamilton County Bd. of Elections, 635 F.3d 219, 233 (6th Cir.
2011); Washington v. Reno, 35 F.3d 1093, 1099 (6th Cir. 1994). The Court should not
consider the factors as prerequisites to be met; no one factor is dispositive. Edward Rose
& Sons, 384 F.3d at 261 (6th Cir. 2004). Rather, the Court must balance these four
factors in deciding whether preliminary injunctive relief should issue. In re Delorean
Motor Co., 755 F.2d 1223, 1229 (6th Cir. 1985). These same factors are to be considered
in addressing a request for temporary injunctive relief under Fed.R.Civ.P. 65(b). See,
e.g., Hunter, 635 F.3d at 233; Northeast Ohio Coal. for Homeless and Serv. Emp. Intern.
Union, Local 1199 v. Blackwell, 467 F.3d 999, 1009 (6th Cir. 2006); Chabad of S. Ohio
& Congregation Lubavitch v. City of Cincinnati, 363 F.3d 427, 432 (6th Cir. 2004).2
2
Plaintiff has represented that he did not provide notice to the Defendants that he was seeking a TRO.
(Doc. 3 at 4). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65 provides that:
The court may issue a temporary restraining order without written or oral notice to the
adverse party or its attorney only if:
(A) specific facts in an affidavit or a verified complaint clearly show that immediate and
irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the movant before the adverse party
can be heard in opposition; and
3
The Court finds that the relevant factors weigh in favor of denying Plaintiff’s
Motion.
A. Likelihood of Success
Plaintiff’s Complaint brings one claim against Defendants for violation of 42
U.S.C. § 1985, alleging “Defendants conspired to obstruct justice and deprive the
Plaintiff of rights granted to all citizens with no basis in law.” As support for his claim,
Plaintiff references Defendant Judge Rice’s August 1, 2014 order barring him from
entering the courthouse, and asserts that Defendant Jeremy Rose ordered a member of the
U.S. Marshal’s Service to “taze” him and subsequently take him into custody when
“initiating the enforcement of the court order.” Even holding Plaintiff’s Complaint to the
less stringent standard afforded to pleadings by pro se parties, see, e.g., Haines v. Kerner,
404 U.S. 519, 520, 92 S.Ct. 594, 596, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972), it is unlikely that Plaintiff’s
Complaint can survive a motion to dismiss under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule
12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, and therefore his
claim is unlikely to be successful.3
(B) the movant’s attorney certifies in writing any efforts made to give notice and the
reasons why it should not be required.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 65(b)(1). Accordingly, the Court is precluded from issuing the TRO unless the Plaintiff
satisfies the requirements of subsections (A) and (B). Here, the Plaintiff has not. The Plaintiff has failed to
demonstrate that he lacked time to provide notice to Defendants before immediate and irreparable injury
would occur; he merely makes a conclusory assertion that he could contact Defendants in a timely fashion.
Further, Plaintiffs explanation as to why no notice was provided to the other Parties is not acceptable to the
Court. Plaintiff states that notice of this action should be excused because his constitutional rights are
being violated by the order he challenges in this action, and therefore the order is illegal. Even if the order
Plaintiff challenges is illegal, that illegality does not put Defendants on notice of the possibility that
Plaintiff is seeking a temporary and permanent injunctive relief against them in Federal Court. Thus, this
Court notes, that Plaintiff’s Motion also fails to comply with the requirements of Rule 65 for the issuance
of a TRO without notice to opposing parties. See Bell v. Rankin, No. 2:11–cv–168, 2011 WL 761544, at *1
(S.D. Ohio Feb. 24, 2011).
3
Under Rule 12(b)(6), dismissal of a complaint is authorized for “failure to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). “To survive a motion to dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), a
complaint must contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material elements to sustain
a recovery under some viable legal theory.” Klusty v. Taco Bell Corp., 909 F.Supp. 516, 520 (S.D.Ohio
1995). Under Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure a complaint must provide “ ‘a short and
4
Based on the language used in the Complaint, it appears that Plaintiff intends to
assert a violation of § 1985(2) and/or § 1985(3). Section 1985(2) provides for a private
cause of action against individuals who acts, by “force, intimidation, or threat,” to
obstruct justice or intimidate a party or witness to testify truthfully “in any court of the
United States.” Plaintiff makes no allegation or argument that either Defendant was
attempting to keep him from making truthful testimony in court. Section1985(3)
provides a private cause of action against those who conspire to “depriv[e], either directly
or indirectly, any class of persons of the equal protections of the laws.” The Court notes
that 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) does not create substantive rights itself, but is a purely remedial
statute. Instead, a plaintiff must support a § 1985(3) claim with allegation of a violation
of an underlying right or privilege.
Generally, to prevail on a § 1985(3) claim, one must prove: (1) a conspiracy; (2)
for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons
of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges or immunities of the laws; (3)
an act in furtherance of the conspiracy; (4) whereby a person is either injured in his
person or property or deprived of any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States.
Radvansky v. City of Olmsted Falls, 395 F.3d 291, 314 (6th Cir. 2005). As stated in
Center for Bio–Ethical Reforms, Inc. v. City of Springboro, 477 F.3d 807 (6th Cir. 2007),
‘ “conspiracy claims must be pled with some degree of specificity and ... vague and
conclusory allegations unsupported by material facts will not be sufficient to state such a
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief’ in order to ‘give the defendant fair
notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’ ” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47, 78
S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2)). While a plaintiff is not required to plead specific
facts, the complaint must give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is, and the grounds upon which it
rests. Nader v. Blackwell, 545 F.3d 459, 470 (6th Cir.2008) (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93,
127 S.Ct. 2197, 167 L.Ed.2d 1081 (2007)).
5
claim.’ “ Id. at 832 (quoting Vakilian v. Shaw, 335 F.3d 509, 518 (6th Cir. 2003)). “A
civil conspiracy is an agreement between two or more persons to injure another by
unlawful action. . . .” Chumpia v. State of Tennessee, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53537
(W.D.Tenn.2014),
Not only has Plaintiff failed to allege that he was deprived of a right or privilege
of a United States citizen remediable under § 1985(3), but Plaintiff has also failed to
allege sufficient facts to support his claim of conspiracy with the required degree of
specificity. Instead, Plaintiff makes only a conclusory allegation that Defendants
conspired to obstruct justice and deprive him of his rights. He does not allege or plead
specific facts demonstrating that Defendants had an agreement or plan to violate his
constitutional rights or take any unlawful act. Instead, Plaintiff alleges that Judge Rice
issued an order barring his entry from the Courthouse and that Defendant Rose executed
that order by preventing his entry and detaining him when he attempted to violate the
order. Such actions are not unlawful conduct.
For these reasons, Plaintiff’s allegations fail to state a claim as a matter of law.
Thus, Plaintiff fails to demonstrate that he is likely to succeed on the merits of his claim.
Indeed, it appears that Plaintiff is unlikely to succeed on the merits.
B. Irreparable Harm
Neither can Plaintiff demonstrate that he will suffer of irreparable harm if
injunctive relief is not granted. Plaintiff’s Motion argues only that irreparable harm will
result to him because if he attempts to enter the courthouse – that is, if he violates the
August 1, 2014 Court Order – could result in his detention, arrest, and prosecution. But
even if the potential for his detention, arrest, and prosecution for violation of the Court
6
order could be considered “irreparable harm,” there is only a mere possibility that such a
result will occur – a possibility that is wholly within Plaintiff’s control. Plaintiff has not
put forward any obligation or urgent necessity that would require him to physically enter
the courthouse, and thereby result in his violation of the August 1, 2014. The mere
possibility that Plaintiff could face consequence for the violation of a court order is not
enough, alone, to demonstrate a likelihood of irreparable harm for the purposes of
injunctive relief. Therefore, Plaintiff cannot demonstrate that he will suffer irreparable
harm if the temporary restraining order is not issued.
C. Substantial Harm to Others
In assessing harm to others, the Court must “(1) balance the harm [p]laintiff
would suffer if its request for a preliminary injunction were denied against the harm
[d]efendants would suffer if an injunction were to issue, and (2) assess the impact the
preliminary injunction might have on relevant third parties.” Merck Sharp & Dohme
Corp. v. Conway, 861 F. Supp .2d 802, 817 (E.D.Ky.2012).
There is no evidence on the record either way on the element of substantial harm,
so this factor is neutral. This Court takes note, however, that the August 1, 2014 Order
that Plaintiff disputes was issued as a result of the increasingly disruptive nature of his
frequent visits to the courthouse. It seems likely that such behavior would reoccur if
injunctive relief were granted lifting the August 1, 2014 Order.
D. Public Interest
The Court also finds that the public interest would not be served by issuance of a
TRO in this matter, which effectively would overturn a well-reasoned order issued by a
competent court after what appears to have been a long history of accommodating
Plaintiff in his interactions with the court and court staff.
7
E. Balancing of the Factors
Among the factors governing the issuance of an injunction, the ‘likelihood of
success’ predominates. Gallina v. Wyandotte Police Dept., 2008 WL 5090551, *4
(E.D.Mich. 2008). Thus, “[a]lthough no one factor is controlling, a finding that there is
simply no likelihood of success on the merits is usually fatal.” Gonzales v. National Bd.
of Med. Exam'rs, 225 F.3d 620, 625 (6th Cir. 2000); Michigan State AFL–CIO v. Miller,
103 F.3d 1240, 1249 (6th Cir.1997) (“While, as a general matter, none of these four
factors are given controlling weight, a preliminary injunction issued where there is
simply no likelihood of success on the merits must be reversed.”). The likelihood of
success on the merits weighs strongly against denying injunctive relief, along with at
least two other factors. Plaintiff is unlikely to succeed on the merits, has made no
showing of irreparable injury, and public interest weighs against granting injunctive
relief. Finally, there is a possibility of harm to others. No factor weighs in favor of
granting injunctive relief here. Therefore, Plaintiff's Motion for Temporary Injunction is
DENIED.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s Motion for Temporary Injunction (Doc. 3)
and Plaintiff’s First Addendum to the Motion for Temporary Injunction (Doc. 8) are
DENIED. Plaintiff’s Motion for Wavier of Security (Doc. 2) is MOOT.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/ Algenon L. Marbley
ALGENON L. MARBLEY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
DATED: August 18, 2015
8
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?