Prado v. Mazeika, et al.

Filing 25

ENTRY AND ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF GLENDA JACQUELINE PRADO'S MOTION TO DISQUALIFY COUNSEL 19 . Signed by Judge Thomas M. Rose on 11-28-2016. (de)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION AT DAYTON
GLENDA JACQUELINE PRADO,

:
Case No. 3:16-cv-320
:
Plaintiff,
:
Judge Thomas M. Rose
:
v.
:
:
PAT MAZEIKA, et al.,
:
:
Defendants.
:
______________________________________________________________________________
ENTRY AND ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF GLENDA JACQUELINE PRADO’S
MOTION TO DISQUALIFY COUNSEL (DOC. 19)
______________________________________________________________________________
This case is before the Court on the Motion to Disqualify Counsel (Doc. 19) filed by
Plaintiff Glenda Jacqueline Prado (“Prado”). Prado brought this action for damages based on the
alleged discriminatory actions of the Defendant Greene County Department of Job & Family
Services, Children Services Division (“Greene County Child Services”) and its employees. (Doc.
1.) In the motion now before the Court, Prado moves to disqualify Defendants’ counsel from
representing all or any more than one of the named Defendants. (Doc. 19.) In response,
Defendants contend that, since the individual Defendants are not sued in their individual
capacities, there is only one real party in interest—Greene County, Ohio—named as a Defendant
and no conflicts of interest therefore exist. (Doc. 21.) As discussed below, the Court agrees with
Defendants’ analysis and DENIES the Motion to Disqualify Counsel.1
I.

BACKGROUND
Prado was an employee of Greene County Child Services from October 6, 2014 until

March 11, 2015. (Doc. 1 at ¶ 14, 86.) In her Complaint, Prado alleges that her supervisors and
1. The Court acknowledges the valuable contribution and assistance of judicial extern Russell Knowles in drafting
this opinion.

fellow employees at Greene County Child Services subjected her to racially motivated harassment
and made disparaging comments about her. (Id. at ¶¶ 28-31.) Prado asserts claims under Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”) and the due process and equal protection clauses
of the United States Constitution. (Id.) In addition to Greene County Child Services, Prado
named as Defendants Greene County, Ohio (“Greene County”); the Greene County Board of
Commissioners; Brandon Huddleson, the County Administrator for Greene County; and Greene
County Child Services employees Pat Mazeika, Beth Rubin, Amy Amburn, Malana Penney,
Joshua Comer, and Beth Keller. 2 (Id. at ¶¶ 3-12.) Greene County employs all of the individual
Defendants. (Doc. 21 at 2.)
II.

LEGAL STANDARD
“Motions to Disqualify are viewed with ‘disfavor’ and disqualification is considered a

‘drastic measure which courts should hesitate to impose except when absolutely necessary.’” In
re Valley-Vulcan Mold Co., 237 B.R. 322, 337 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 1999) (citing Alexander v.
Primerica Holding, Inc., 822 F. Supp. 1099, 1114 (D.N.J. 1993) (citations omitted). “The party
seeking disqualification must carry a ‘heavy burden’ and must meet a ‘high standard of proof’
before a lawyer is disqualified,” because “although a party has no right to specific counsel, ‘a
party’s choice of counsel is entitled to substantial deference.’” Id.
An attorney should only be disqualified “when there is a reasonable possibility that some
specifically identifiable impropriety actually occurred and, in light of the interest underlying the
standards of ethics, the social need for ethical practice outweighs the party’s right to counsel of his
own choice.” Siddhar v. Sivanesan, No. 2:13-CV-747, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 173414, *31 (S.D.

2. Defendants note that Brandon Huddleson was incorrectly identified as “Brian Huddleston” and Amy Amburn was
incorrectly identified as “Amy Auburn” the Complaint. (Doc. 21.)

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Ohio Dec. 11, 2013) (citing United States v. Kitchin, 592 F.2d 900, 903 (5th Cir. 1979)) (internal
quotes omitted). The party seeking disqualification of counsel must identify articulable facts
demonstrating a conflict or any legitimate basis for disqualification. Id. at *32. Without these
types of articulable facts, “it would be all too easy for opposing parties to harass one another.” Id.
III.

ANALYSIS
Prado argues that Defendants’ counsel cannot adequately represent all of the named

Defendants due to likely conflicts of interest.

She anticipates, for example, that certain

employees may wish to present defenses that conflict with their supervisors’ defenses. (Doc. 19
at 2.) Defendants contend that there is no conflict of interest and Prado has failed to demonstrate
any articulable basis for disqualification. (Doc. 21 at 2.)
Defendants first argue that none of the individual Defendants are alleged to hold positions
meeting the statutory definition of an “employer” who may be held personally liable under Title
VII. See Wathen v. Gen. Elec. Co., 115 F.3d 400, 405 (6th Cir.1997); Hawthorne-Burdine v.
Oakland Univ., 158 F. Supp. 3d 586, 601 (E.D. Mich. 2016). As a result, Prado’s claims under
Title VII for disparate treatment, harassment and retaliation must be maintained against the
individual Defendants only in their official capacities. When the individual Defendants are sued
in their official capacities, no conflict can exist among the Defendants because Greene County is
the only party in interest. Smith v. Leis, 407 Fed. Appx. 918, 927 (6th Cir. 2011) (individuals sued
in their official capacity stand in the shoes of the entity they represent).
Defendants argue that Prado’s Section 1983 claims (for violation of her due process rights
and equal protection rights) also should be construed as suing the individual Defendants in their
official capacities. Defendants cite Moore v. City of Harriman, 272 F.3d 769, 775 (6th Cir. 2001),

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in which the Sixth Circuit held that Ҥ 1983 plaintiffs must clearly notify any defendants of their
intent to seek individual liability.” Defendants argue that the Complaint fails to meet this
standard because it neither explicitly states that Defendants are sued in their individual capacities
nor contains allegations that would put them on clear notice of any such intent. As a result,
Prado’s Section 1983 claims also constitute a suit against Greene County, not the individual
Defendants personally. Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464, 471-472 (1985).
In reply, Prado argues that Defendants should be on notice that they are being sued in their
individual capacities because she seeks both actual and punitive damages. (Doc. 23.) Prado also
contends that it is not necessary to explicitly state that she is suing the Defendants in their personal
capacities if it is nonetheless evident from the “course of proceedings” in the case. (Id. at 2 (citing
Rodgers v. Banks, 344 F.3d 587 (6th Cir. 2003)).)
The course of proceedings test “considers such factors as the nature of the plaintiff’s
claims, requests for compensatory or punitive damages, and the nature of any defenses raised in
response to the complaint, particularly claims of qualified immunity, to determine whether the
defendant had actual knowledge of the potential for individual liability.” Moore, 272 F.3d at n.1.
A request for actual and punitive damages alone is insufficient to put the Defendants on notice that
they are being sued in their individual or personal capacity. The Sixth Circuit addressed this very
issue in Shepard v. Wellman, 313 F.3d 963, 969 (6th Cir. 2002). The Sixth Circuit found that “the
request for monetary damages is one factor that might place an individual on notice that he is being
sued in his individual capacity, we do not [believe] that a request for money damages is alone
sufficient to place a state official on notice that he is being sued in his individual capacity.” Id.
The Sixth Circuit explained that to do so would be inappropriate when the rest of the suit strongly

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suggests that the Defendants are being sued in their official capacity. Id.
Here, the caption of the Complaint does not state that the Defendants are being sued in their
individual capacities. Moreover, the caption lists the names of the individual Defendants along
with their business addresses, not their personal addresses—which is consistent with a suit against
them in their official capacities. The Complaint’s allegations concern Greene County’s policies
and practices relevant to Prado’s employment and the individual Defendants’ actions as Greene
County representatives. The course of proceedings test is not satisfied, and the Complaint does
not clearly notify the Defendants that they are being sued in their individual capacities.
In the final paragraph of her Reply, Prado states that she “may move to amend her
complaint to use the words ‘in her individual capacity’ if necessary.” (Doc. 23 at 4.) If Prado
wishes to amend her Complaint, she must move for leave to do so in compliance with Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure Rule 15 and Southern District of Ohio Local Rule 7.2.
IV.

CONCLUSION
The Motion to Disqualify Counsel (Doc. 19) is DENIED.
DONE and ORDERED in Dayton, Ohio, this Monday, November 28, 2016.
s/Thomas M. Rose
________________________________
THOMAS M. ROSE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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