Argabright v. Commissioner of Social Security

Filing 16

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS: The ALJ's non-disability decision on December 9, 2015 be affirmed 2 Objections to R&R due by 2/2/2018. Signed by Magistrate Judge Sharon L. Ovington on 1-19-18. (mcm)(This document has been sent by regular mail to the party(ies) listed in the NEF that did not receive electronic notification.)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION AT DAYTON
SHEILA ARGABRIGHT,
Plaintiff,
vs.
NANCY A. BERRYHILL,
Commissioner Of The Social Security
Administration,
Defendant.

: Case No. 3:16-cv-00494
:
: District Judge Thomas M. Rose
: Magistrate Judge Sharon L. Ovington
:
:
:
:
:
:
:

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS1
I.

Introduction
Plaintiff Sheila Argabright brings this case pro se challenging the Social Security

Administration’s decision to deny her applications for Disability Insurance Income and
Supplemental Security Income. The denial occurred mainly through the determination by
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Mark Hockensmith that Plaintiff was not under a
benefits-qualifying disability.
Plaintiff states, “I really truly am not able to hold down a job because of the
emotional and physical ailments that I deal with on a daily basis. I will need further
surgeries and my sarcoidosis can require ongoing treatment.” (Doc. #12). She indicates
that her monthly income is very low, and she cannot better herself “in any way without a

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Attached is a NOTICE to the parties regarding objections to this Report and Recommendations.

break somewhere.” Id. And she reports that most of Plaintiff’s physicians have agreed
that she cannot hold down a job at this point in her life. Id.
The Commissioner contends that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s finding
that, despite her health problems, Plaintiff could still perform sedentary work with certain
limitations. The Commissioner further argues that the ALJ properly weighed the various
medical-source opinions of record, including (but not limited to) the opinions of her longterm treating physician, Dr. Mullennix, and the opinions of her psychiatrist, Dr. Bishop.
II.

Background
On the date of the ALJ’s decision, in December 2015, Plaintiff was 47 years old.

She was therefore considered to be a “younger” person under Social Security law. She
has a high-school education. Her employment history involved work as a grocery clerk
and an electronic assembler, but she has no past relevant work.
Before issuing his non-disability decision, the ALJ held a hearing during which
Plaintiff was represented by counsel. Plaintiff’s counsel identified the onset date of
Plaintiff’s disability as June 30, 2011. (Doc. #6, PageID #102).
Plaintiff testified that she has numerous health problems. Her knees and
sarcoidosis were giving her the most trouble. She had undergone multiple knee surgeries
and her remaining step would be knee-replacement surgery. She was told, presumably by
a physician, that such surgery would not be a good idea at her age because the knee
replacement last only 15 years. She would then need to go through another kneereplacement surgery. Id. at 109-10.
Knee pain limits Plaintiff’s ability to climb stairs to one step at a time, each step
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followed by a pause. She has to hold onto something when she does this. Her knee pain
is constant. When she moves her legs a certain way it feels like the bones are grinding
together. Id. at 110. This happens a lot with her left knee. She receives treatment with
cortisone shots every three months. She also feels pain when sitting. And she gets
“really stiff” when she stands up. She has arthritis in her knees and lower back. Id. at
115.
Plaintiff explained that she has sarcoidosis in her lungs and groin. She
experiences shortness of breath and coughing along with pain in her groin area. She
takes medication for sarcoidosis, but the medication causes her to be nauseated and have
headaches at least two to three times a week. Id. at 122. She also has diabetes (treated
with insulin and Metformin). See id. at 124. When her blood glucose is high, she has
shakiness, nausea, sweating, and blurry vision. Id. She noted that her diabetes “has
gotten better” with weight loss. Id. at 114. She lost weight due to stress. At the time of
the ALJ’s hearing, she weighed approximately 282 pounds and was five feet eight inches
tall. Id. at 104.
Plaintiff can walk for 30 minutes. She finds lifting a gallon of milk with one hand
“actually kind of heavy.” Id. at 115-16. She explained that she could not perform a job
that required her to stock shelves with products weighing this amount because her arms
are not strong enough to repeatedly this much weight. Id. at 125-26. If she sits for too
long her “rear end gets numb.” Id. at 116. She can sit on a soft surface (like a recliner)
for 30 to 45 minutes before needing to stand. When she sits in a normal chair her legs
hurt all the time, and her back gets stiff.
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Her normal daily routine involves staying in her bedroom most of the time so she
can lie down and watch television. Lying with her legs up is the most comfortable
position for her.
Plaintiff has pain in her hip that prevents her from lifting her right leg high enough
to put on her sock and shoe. She has undergone hip surgery, and her hip is better but
physical therapy did not help.
Plaintiff testified that she has had depression for many years. She has feelings of
no self-worth causing lack of confidence (“I don’t think I’m good enough to do these
things.”). Id. at 119. Her brother’s death (a year before the ALJ’s hearing) worsened her
depression. She also has anxiety. She worries a lot about not being able to do things
right.
Plaintiff maintained that she could not perform a full-time job because when she
stands up her “legs crack” and because she has “to stand for a second before [she] can
actually take a step.” Id. at 120. Her legs will also shake, if she sits too long. Her ability
to concentrate is not good; her mind wanders a lot. She does not do well in social
settings and doubts that she can work with the public. She feels like everybody is
looking at her and that there’s something wrong. Id. at 121. When she drives on the
highway she gets “very, very nervous.” Id. at 127. She has difficulty sleeping and takes
sleep medication, which does not help—she wakes up two or three times each night.
Two or three times a week she takes naps during the day. Her longest nap lasts two
hours.
On average during an eight-hour day, Plaintiff sits in recliner four to five hours.
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When she is not depressed, she lies on her bed for a few hours then moves to a recliner.
When she is depressed she can stay in her bedroom all day. This occurs, on average, two
to three times a week. Id. at 123. Her energy level during the day is usually between
poor and average. Id. at 125. She has “no motivation.” Id.
III.

“Disability” and The ALJ’s Decision
To be eligible for Disability Insurance Benefits or Supplemental Security Income

a claimant must be under a “disability” as the term is defined by the Social Security Act.
See 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(a), (d), 1382c(a). The definition of the term “disability” is
essentially the same for both benefit programs. See Bowen v. City of New York, 476 U.S.
467, 469-70 (1986). Narrowed to its statutory meaning, a “disability” includes only
physical or mental impairments that are both “medically determinable” and severe
enough to prevent the applicant from (1) performing his or her past job and (2) engaging
in “substantial gainful activity” that is available in the regional or national economies.
See id. at 469-70.
As noted previously, it fell to ALJ Hockensmith to evaluate the evidence
connected to Plaintiff’s benefit applications. He did so by conducting the 5-step
sequential evaluation mandated by Social Security regulations. See 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4). He ultimately concluded that Plaintiff was not under a
benefits-qualifying disability based on the following findings:
Step 1:

Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since her
alleged disability onset date (June 30, 2011).

Step 2:

Plaintiff’s severe impairments include “degenerative joint disease
of the knees, degenerative hip disease, right hip necrosis with
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residuals of joint replacement surgery, diabetes mellitus,
hypertension, obesity, sarcoidosis/chronic obstructive pulmonary
disease, major depressive disorder, [and] anxiety disorder.”
(Doc. #6, PageID #71).
Step 3:

Plaintiff’s impairments did not meet or equal the criteria of an
impairment in the Commissioner’s Listings.2

Step 4:

Plaintiff could perform sedentary work limited to additional
limitations: “(1) lifting and carrying no more than 20 pounds
occasionally and ten pounds frequently; (2) standing or walking
no more than two hours during any given eight-hour workday;
(3) sitting up to six hours during any given eight-hour workday;
(4) the opportunity to stand for a few minutes every 30 minutes
while remaining at the workstation; (5) no climbing ladders
ropes, or scaffolds; (6) no crouching or crawling; (7) no more
than occasional climbing of ramps or stairs; (8) no more than
occasional kneeling or stooping; (9) no more than occasional
pushing or pulling with the lower extremities; (10) no work at
unprotected heights; (11) no concentrated exposure to fumes,
dusts, gases, odors or poorly ventilated areas; (12) no
concentrated exposure to extreme heat or cold or humid
conditions; (13) limited to simple, routine task in a static work
environment with few changes in work routine; (14) no fastpaced duties or strict production quotas; (15) no more than
occasional (and only brief) contact with the public.” Id. at 79.

Step 5:

A significant number of jobs exist in the national economy that
Plaintiff can perform. Examples of these jobs were inspector,
sorter, and bench assembler.

(Doc.# 6, PageID#s 71-87). The ALJ’s sequential evaluation led him to conclude, as
previously indicated, that Plaintiff was not under a benefits-qualifying disability.
IV.

Judicial Review
The Social Security Administration’s denial of Plaintiff’s applications for benefits

– here, embodied in ALJ Hockensmith’s decision—is subject to judicial review along
2

See 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1.

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two lines: whether the ALJ applied the correct legal standards and whether substantial
evidence supports the ALJ’s findings. Blakley v. Comm'r of Social Sec., 581 F.3d 399,
405 (6th Cir. 2009); see Bowen v. Comm’r of Social Sec., 478 F3d 742, 745-46 (6th Cir.
2007). Reviewing the ALJ’s legal criteria for correctness may result in reversal even if
the record contains substantial evidence supporting the ALJ’s factual findings. Rabbers
v. Comm’r of Social Sec., 582 F.3d 647, 651 (6th Cir. 2009); see Bowen, 478 F3d at 746.
The substantial-evidence review does not ask whether the Court agrees or disagrees with
the ALJ’s factual findings or whether the administrative record contains evidence
contrary to those factual findings. Rogers v. Comm’r of Social Sec., 486 F.3d 234, 241
(6th Cir. 2007); see Her v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 203 F.3d 388, 389-90 (6th Cir. 1999).
Instead, substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s factual findings when a “‘reasonable
mind might accept the relevant evidence as adequate to support a conclusion.’” Blakley,
581 F.3d at 406 (quoting Warner v. Comm’r of Social Sec., 375 F.3d 387, 390 (6th Cir.
2004)). Substantial evidence consists of “more than a scintilla of evidence but less than a
preponderance...” Rogers, 486 F.3d at 241.
V.

Discussion
At the conclusion of the ALJ’s hearing, Plaintiff’s then-counsel argued that the

opinions of her treating-medical sources, including Drs. Mullennix and Bishop, were due
controlling weight. The ALJ’s decision is reviewed in light of this contention along with
Plaintiff’s present contention that her treating physicians found she could no longer work
and her contention that she can no longer work due to her emotional and physical health
problems, including sarcoidosis and her future need for additional surgeries.
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In weighing the opinions presented by Plaintiff’s physician and the other medical
professionals, ALJ Hockensmith placed some (but not great) weight on the opinions of
state-reviewing physicians, Drs. Villanueva and McKee. These physicians agreed with
an earlier decision by a different ALJ that Plaintiff could perform sedentary work. This
indicated that she could lift as much as 20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequently,
as well as push/pull without limitation, and work without postural, manipulative, or
environmental restrictions. See Doc. #6, PageID #s 80, 130-31, 186-88. ALJ
Hockensmith concluded that, based on new evidence (after the June 2011 decision), such
as evidence about Plaintiff’s right-hip-replacement surgery, she required an additional
limitation allowing her to stand at a work station for a few minutes after a 30-minute
interval. Id. at 83. Additionally, the ALJ reasoned that Plaintiff needed postural
restrictions against climbing ladders, ropes, scaffolds plus a limitation to occasional
climbing of ramps and stairs, as well as occasional kneeling, stooping, and
pushing/pulling with the lower extremities. Id. The ALJ noted that safety considerations
precluded Plaintiff from working at unprotected heights. And the ALJ concluded—due
to Plaintiff’s respiratory impairments—she needed to avoid concentrated exposure to
fumes, dusts, gases, orders, poorly ventilated areas; and extreme heat, cold, or humidity.
Id.
The ALJ also considered the treatment notes and opinions of Plaintiff’s long-time
family physician, Dr. Mullennix. The ALJ noted that in January 2012, Dr. Mullennix
reported that Plaintiff was released to work in December 2011. Id. at 80, 455. The ALJ
also noted Dr. Mullennix’s opinion in December 2011 that Plaintiff could sit for eight
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hours during an eight-hour workday and lift as much as ten pounds. Id. at 80, 449. The
ALJ noted that although Dr. Mullennix stated that Plaintiff was “unemployable,” she
qualified that statement by explaining that Plaintiff could perform a desk job. Id. at 80,
449.
The ALJ further recognized that Dr. Mullennix opined in April 2014 that Plaintiff
could not sit or stand for more than one hour during an eight-hour workday. Id. at 80-81,
2169-72. Dr. Mullennix also opined that Plaintiff needed to alternate positions multiple
times in a one-to-two-hour period, and could lift up to 20 pounds occasionally. Id. at
2172. The ALJ considered Dr. Mullennix’s comment that Plaintiff had significant
limitations in repetitive reaching, handling, fingering, or lifting, moderate limitations
bilaterally in her grip strength and manipulative ability, and difficulty maintaining her
neck in a constant position (as required, for example, to look at a computer screen). Id. at
81, 2172-73. The ALJ noted Dr. Mullennix’s statement within this opinion that Plaintiff
was unable to do a full-time competitive job on a sustained basis and was not capable of
even low-stress work. Id. at 81, 2174.
Additionally, the ALJ considered Dr. Mullennix’s October 2015 opinion that
Plaintiff could not do repetitive physical tasks secondary to arthritis and pain issues; Dr.
Mullennix also stated that Plaintiff was physically disabled since June 2011, not capable
of gainful employment, and had permanent disability. Id. at 81, 2417.
Social security regulations require ALJs to generally extend “greater deference …
to the opinions of treating physicians than to those of non-treating physicians, commonly
known as the treating physician rule.” Rogers, 486 F.3d at 242 (citations omitted). A
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treating physician or psychologist’s opinions must be given controlling weight when (1)
the opinion “is well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic
techniques”; and (2) the opinion “is not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in
[the] case record.” Gayheart v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 710 F.3d 365, 376 (6th Cir. 2013)
(quoting in part 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2)); see Gentry, 741 F.3d at 723. If the treating
physician's opinion is not controlling, “the ALJ, in determining how much weight is
appropriate, must consider a host of factors, including the length, frequency, nature, and
extent of the treatment relationship; the supportability and consistency of the physician's
conclusions; the specialization of the physician; and any other relevant factors.” Rogers,
486 F.3d at 242 (citing Wilson, 378 F.3d at 544). These factors likewise apply when an
ALJ weighs the opinions of non-treating medical sources. Gayheart, 710 F.3d at 376.
The Regulations also require ALJs to provide “good reasons” for the weight
placed upon a treating source’s opinions. Wilson, 378 F.3d at 544. This mandatory
“good reasons” requirement is satisfied when the ALJ provides “specific reasons for the
weight placed on a treating source’s medical opinions.” Id. (quoting Soc. Sec. R. 96-2p,
1996 WL 374188, at *5 (Soc. Sec. Admin. July 2, 1996)).3 The goal is to make clear to
any subsequent reviewer the weight given and the reasons for that weight. Id. Substantial
evidence must support the reasons provided by the ALJ. Id.
In the present case, the ALJ set forth the correct legal criteria applicable to
weighing treating medical source opinions. (Doc. #6, PageID #75). The ALJ placed
little weight on Dr. Mullennix’s opinions. Id. at 83. He first found that her opinions vary
widely and are, largely, without sufficient support in the medical record. He accurately
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observed that Dr. Mullennix qualified her opinion that Plaintiff was “unemployable” with
the notation “desk job.” Perhaps more significantly, the ALJ correctly recognized that
Dr. Mullennix’s reference to “desk job” was consistent with Plaintiff’s work abilities as
Dr. Mullennix described them on the same page of her report. Id. at 81-82, 449. Dr.
Mullennix also indicated in this report that Plaintiff could sit for eight hours in an eighthour workday and lift as much as ten pounds, which is consistent with the abilities
needed to perform sedentary work. Id.; see 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(a); 416.967(a)
(defining full range of sedentary work).
The ALJ likewise explained that Dr. Mullennix’s opinions included multiple
inconsistencies and contradictory statements. For example, the ALJ noted that although
Dr. Mullennix opined in October 2015 that Plaintiff was physically disabled and
incapable of gainful employment since June 2011, this conclusion was directly
contradictory to her December 2011 statement that Plaintiff was employable, and to her
January 2012 statement that she had released Plaintiff to return to work on December 18,
2011. (Doc. #6, PageID #s 82, 449, 455, 2417). The ALJ also noted that while Dr.
Mullennix opined in April 2014 that Plaintiff could not sit for more than one hour in a
workday or stand more than one hour in a workday, and needed to alternate positions
multiple times in a one-to-two-hour period, Dr. Mullennix had inconsistently stated in
January 2012 that Plaintiff could sit as much as eight hours in an eight-hour workday (for
two hours at a time) and could perform a desk job. Id. at 449, 2169-72. And the ALJ
concluded that the more recent limitations on sitting, standing and walking were not
supported by objective medical evidence and clinical findings. Id.
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The ALJ, moreover, concluded that Dr. Mullennix’s assessments varied greatly
without sufficient support in the record, and were also lacking in clarity. Id. at 81. For
example, in looking at the extensive limitations Dr. Mullennix set with regard to
repetitive reaching, handling, fingering, and lifting, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff herself
had not stated any upper-extremity limitations in her testimony, and the evidence
documents an upper extremity impairment. Id. at 82. She noted also that Dr. Mullennix
referred only to moderate to severe arthritis in the hips and knees, which do not impact
the capacity to reach, handle or finger. And, Plaintiff’s grip strength and manipulative
ability were deemed moderately limited but with no reference to upper extremity
impairments. Id. at 81, 2170, 2172-73. Similarly, in assessing Dr. Mullennix’s
restrictions against maintaining the neck in a constant position, being unable to perform a
full time job competitively on a sustained basis, needing to take five-to-ten minute
unscheduled breaks at unpredictable intervals during the workday, and needing to be
absent from work more than three times a month, the ALJ found properly concluded that
the record lacked evidence to support the medical necessity for these limitations. Id. at
82, 2122-24.
Turning to Plaintiff’s mental-work limitations, the ALJ also considered the
evidence related to her mental-health history. Id. at 73-79. He considered the treatment
given by psychiatrist Dr. Jeffrey Bishop, who began treating Plaintiff in March 2011 on a
monthly basis. Id. at 74, 76. The ALJ noted that (1) Dr. Bishop had reported
prescriptions of psychotropic medication, (2) Dr. Bishop gave moderate-to-marked
degrees of limitation in most aspects of mental functioning capacity, and (3) estimated
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that Plaintiff would miss work two to three days a month due to her impairment. Id. at
74, 76, 2423. The ALJ gave some weight to Dr. Bishop’s statement that Plaintiff had a
moderate degree of mental limitation but concluded that Dr. Bishop’s estimate of
absences was speculative and not supported in the objective medical evidence and
clinical findings. Id. at 77. The ALJ also placed little to no weight on Dr. Bishop’s
opinions that many of Plaintiff’s mental-work limitations were “moderate to marked”
because they were extreme. Id. at 76; see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2) (treating
physician’s opinion is entitled to controlling weight only if it is well supported by
medically accepted clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent
with other substantial evidence of record); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(3) (“The
more a medical source presents relevant evidence to support an opinion, particularly
medical signs and laboratory findings, the more weight we will give that opinion.”). The
ALJ therefore provided good reasons for finding that not all of Dr. Bishop’s opinions
were due great weight.
This is further seen in other evidence of record. The ALJ noted that during
psychologist Dr. Griffith’s December 2013 consultative examination that Plaintiff was
friendly and polite, able to tend to her own personal grooming and hygiene, performed a
few light chores, shopped for groceries with an electric cart, handled her own financial
matters, displayed no loose associations, flight of ideas, or delusional believes. She was
alert, response, and fully oriented with intact memory and no mental confusion. Id. at 7374, 1433-34. Dr. Griffiths documented his diagnostic impression that Plaintiff had
depressive disorder but he also observed that (1) Plaintiff had no difficulty understanding,
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remember, and following simple instructions; (2) her attention and concentration skills
were adequate for a limited time frame but she would have more difficulty paying
attention and concentrating over extended periods; (3) anxiety and depression could
affect her interpersonal functioning at work to some extent, and work stress could lead to
slowed work performance. Id. at 74, 77, 1434-36. The ALJ also gave great weight to the
state reviewing psychologists, who believed that Plaintiff had only mild limitations in
performing activities of daily living and moderate limitations in social functioning and
maintaining concentration, persistence, or pace. Id. at 77-78, 171, 185, 203, 220.
Still further, the ALJ noted that mental-health-treatment notes attributed many of
Plaintiff’s psychological symptoms to relationship issues with her boyfriend and family,
and her symptoms were alleviated with medication, such as Wellbutrin. Id. at 76, 1080,
1757, 1759. Examination findings indicated normal memory, normal attention span,
normal ability to concentrate, appropriate mood and affect, and appropriate judgment. Id.
at 76, 975, 1424, 1783. The ALJ therefore limited her to simple, routine tasks in a static
work environment with few changes in the work routine, no fast paced duties or strict
production quotas, and no more than occasional and brief contact with the public. Id. at
83-84.
Plaintiff’s argument that her doctors found her unemployable lacks merit and
presents a disagreement with how the ALJ weighed differing medical opinions, “which is
clearly not a basis for … setting aside the ALJ’s factual findings.” Mullins v. Sec’y of
Health and Human Servs., 836 F.2d 980, 984 (6th Cir. 1987). It is well-established,
based on social-security regulations and case law, that the ALJ, not a medical source,
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assesses and determines a claimant’s residual functional capacity. See 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1545(a) (“We will assess your residual functional capacity based on all the relevant
evidence in your case record.”); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1546(c) (“the administrative law judge .
. . is responsible for assessing your residual functional capacity”); 20 C.F.R. §
404.1527(d)(2) (the final responsibility for deciding residual functional capacity is
reserved to the Commissioner); Webb v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 368 F.3d 629, 633 (6th Cir.
2004) (“the ALJ is charged with the responsibility of evaluating the medical evidence and
the claimant’s testimony to form an ‘assessment of [her] residual functional. See Poe v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 342 F. App’x 149, 157 (6th Cir. 2009) (“[t]he responsibility for
determining a claimant’s residual functional capacity rests with the ALJ, not a
physician….”).
In summary, the ALJ considered Plaintiff’s allegations in light of the record as a
whole, and concluded that she was not as limited as she claimed, but rather, retained the
ability to perform a range of sedentary work. In so doing, the ALJ considered Plaintiff’s
statements and testimony, her complaints to medical sources, her statements regarding
her functional status, as well as the medical records from numerous doctors who treated
her, examined her, or reviewed the longitudinal medical record. Based on such, the ALJ
concluded that Plaintiff was not as limited as she claimed and could perform a range of
sedentary work with postural, environmental, and mental limitations. (Doc. #6, PageID
#79).
Accordingly, for all reasons set forth herein, the ALJ’s decision applied the correct
legal criteria and is supported by substantial evidence.
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IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED THAT:
The ALJ’s non-disability decision on December 9, 2015 be affirmed.

January 19, 2018

s/Sharon L. Ovington
Sharon L. Ovington
United States Magistrate Judge

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NOTICE REGARDING OBJECTIONS
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), any party may serve and file specific, written
objections to the proposed findings and recommendations within FOURTEEN days after
being served with this Report and Recommendations. Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(d),
this period is extended to SEVENTEEN days because this Report is being served by one
of the methods of service listed in Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(b)(2)(C), (D), (E), or (F). Such
objections shall specify the portions of the Report objected to and shall be accompanied
by a memorandum of law in support of the objections. If the Report and
Recommendation is based in whole or in part upon matters occurring of record at an oral
hearing, the objecting party shall promptly arrange for the transcription of the record, or
such portions of it as all parties may agree upon or the Magistrate Judge deems sufficient,
unless the assigned District Judge otherwise directs. A party may respond to another
party=s objections within FOURTEEN days after being served with a copy thereof.
Failure to make objections in accordance with this procedure may forfeit rights on
appeal. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947,
949-50 (6th Cir. 1981).

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