Kibler v. Commissioner of Social Security
Filing
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DECISION AND ENTRY: (1) REVERSING THE ALJS NON-DISABILITY FINDING AS UNSUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE; (2) REMANDING THIS CASE UNDER THE FOURTH SENTENCE OF 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS; AND (3) TERMINATING THIS CASE ON THE COURTS DOCKET. Signed by Magistrate Judge Michael J. Newman on 4/20/118. (pb)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION AT DAYTON
SARAH E. KIBLER,
Plaintiff,
Case No. 3:17-cv-130
vs.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Magistrate Judge Michael J. Newman
(Consent Case)
Defendant.
______________________________________________________________________________
DECISION AND ENTRY: (1) REVERSING THE ALJ’S NON-DISABILITY FINDING
AS UNSUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE; (2) REMANDING THIS CASE
UNDER THE FOURTH SENTENCE OF 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) FOR FURTHER
PROCEEDINGS; AND (3) TERMINATING THIS CASE ON THE COURT’S DOCKET
______________________________________________________________________________
This Social Security disability benefits appeal is before the undersigned for disposition
based upon the parties’ consent. Doc. 16. At issue is whether the Administrative Law Judge
(“ALJ”) erred in finding Plaintiff not “disabled” and therefore unentitled to Disability Insurance
Benefits (“DIB”) and/or Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”).1 This case is before the Court
on Plaintiff’s Statement of Errors (doc. 9), the Commissioner’s memorandum in opposition (doc.
12), Plaintiff’s reply (doc. 13), the administrative record (doc. 7),2 and the record as a whole.
I.
A.
Procedural History
Plaintiff filed for DIB and SSI alleging a disability onset date of December 31, 2011.
PageID 230-39. Plaintiff claims disability as a result of a number of alleged impairments
“The Commissioner’s regulations governing the evaluation of disability for DIB and SSI are
identical . . . and are found at 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520, and 20 C.F.R. § 416.920 respectively.” Colvin v.
Barnhart, 475 F.3d 727, 730 (6th Cir. 2007). Citations in this Decision and Entry to DIB regulations are
made with full knowledge of the corresponding SSI regulations, and vice versa.
2
Hereafter, citations to the electronically-filed administrative record will refer only to the
PageID number.
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including, inter alia, degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine, bipolar disorder, panic
disorder with agoraphobia, and borderline intellectual functioning. PageID 54.
After an initial denial of her applications, Plaintiff received a hearing before ALJ
Benjamin Chaykin on November 20, 2015. PageID 70-98. The ALJ issued a decision on
December 11, 2015 finding Plaintiff not disabled. PageID 57-64. Specifically, the ALJ found at
Step Five that, based upon Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform a reduced
range of light work,3 “there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy
that [Plaintiff] can perform[.]” PageID 57-64.
Thereafter, the Appeals Council granted Plaintiff’s request for review. PageID 30-36.
The Appeals Council adopted the finding of the ALJ, making the ALJ’s non-disability finding
the final administrative decision of the Commissioner. PageID 33-36. See Casey v. Sec’y of
Health & Human Servs., 987 F.2d 1230, 1233 (6th Cir. 1993). Plaintiff then filed this timely
appeal. Cook v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 480 F.3d 432, 435 (6th Cir. 2007).
B.
Evidence of Record
The evidence of record is adequately summarized in the ALJ’s decision (PageID 51-64),
Plaintiff’s Statement of Errors (doc. 9), the Commissioner’s memorandum in opposition (doc.
12), and Plaintiff’s reply (doc. 13). The undersigned incorporates all of the foregoing and sets
forth the facts relevant to this appeal herein.
The Social Security Administration (“SSA”) classifies jobs as sedentary, light, medium, heavy,
and very heavy depending on the physical exertion requirements. Light work “involves lifting no more
than 20 pounds at a time with frequent lifting or carrying of objects weighing up to 10 pounds” and
“requires a good deal of walking or standing, or . . . sitting most of the time with some pushing and
pulling of arm or leg controls.” Id. § 404.1567(b). An individual who can perform light work is
presumed also able to perform sedentary work. Id. Sedentary work “involves lifting no more than 10
pounds at a time and occasionally lifting or carrying articles like docket files, ledgers, and small tools.
Although a sedentary job is defined as one which involves sitting, a certain amount of walking and
standing is often necessary in carrying out job duties.” Id. § 404.1567(a).
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II.
A.
Standard of Review
The Court’s inquiry on a Social Security appeal is to determine (1) whether the ALJ’s
non-disability finding is supported by substantial evidence, and (2) whether the ALJ employed
the correct legal criteria. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Bowen v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 478 F.3d 742,74546 (6th Cir. 2007). In performing this review, the Court must consider the record as a whole.
Hephner v. Mathews, 574 F.2d 359, 362 (6th Cir. 1978).
Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). When
substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s denial of benefits, that finding must be affirmed, even if
substantial evidence also exists in the record upon which the ALJ could have found Plaintiff
disabled. Buxton v. Halter, 246 F.3d 762, 772 (6th Cir. 2001). Thus, the ALJ has a “‘zone of
choice’ within which he [or she] can act without the fear of court interference.” Id. at 773.
The second judicial inquiry -- reviewing the correctness of the ALJ’s legal analysis -may result in reversal even if the ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial evidence in the
record. Rabbers v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 582 F.3d 647, 651 (6th Cir. 2009). “[A] decision of the
Commissioner will not be upheld where the [Social Security Administration] fails to follow its
own regulations and where that error prejudices a claimant on the merits or deprives the claimant
of a substantial right.” Bowen, 478 F.3d at 746.
B.
“Disability” Defined
To be eligible for disability benefits, a claimant must be under a “disability” as defined
by the Social Security Act. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). Narrowed to its statutory meaning, a
“disability” includes physical and/or mental impairments that are both “medically determinable”
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and severe enough to prevent a claimant from (1) performing his or her past job and (2) engaging
in “substantial gainful activity” that is available in the regional or national economies. Id.
Administrative regulations require a five-step sequential evaluation for disability
determinations. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4). Although a dispositive finding at any step ends the
ALJ’s review, see Colvin v. Barnhart, 475 F.3d 727, 730 (6th Cir. 2007), the complete sequential
review poses five questions:
1.
Has the claimant engaged in substantial gainful activity?;
2.
Does the claimant suffer from one or more severe impairments?;
3.
Do the claimant’s severe impairments, alone or in combination, meet or
equal the criteria of an impairment set forth in the Commissioner’s Listing
of Impairments (the “Listings”), 20 C.F.R. Subpart P, Appendix 1?;
4.
Considering the claimant’s RFC, can he or she perform his or her past
relevant work?; and
5.
Assuming the claimant can no longer perform his or her past relevant
work -- and also considering the claimant’s age, education, past work
experience, and RFC -- do significant numbers of other jobs exist in the
national economy which the claimant can perform?
20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4); see also Miller v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 181 F. Supp.2d 816, 818
(S.D. Ohio 2001). A claimant bears the ultimate burden of establishing disability under the
Social Security Act’s definition. Key v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 109 F.3d 270, 274 (6th Cir. 1997).
III.
In her Statement of Errors, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by: (1) making unsupported
findings regarding her mental impairments; and (2) failing to explain his departure from credited
medical opinions. Doc. 9 at PageID 1055-61. Plaintiff also argues the Appeals Council erred by
neglecting his response to the Appeals Council’s notice of proposed action. PageID 1061-63.
Finding merit to Plaintiff’s second alleged error regarding the ALJ’s departure from credited
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medical opinions, the undersigned does not reach the merits of Plaintiff’s remaining alleged
errors, but directs that they be addressed by the ALJ on remand.
Until March 27, 2017, “the Commissioner’s regulations [that apply to this appeal]
establish[ed] a hierarchy of acceptable medical source opinions[.]” Snell v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,
No. 3:12-cv-119, 2013 WL 372032, at *9 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 30, 2013). In descending order, these
medical source opinions are: (1) treaters; (2) examiners; and (3) record reviewers. Id. Under the
regulations then in effect, which control here, the opinions of treaters are entitled to the greatest
deference because they “are likely to be . . . most able to provide a detailed, longitudinal picture
of [a claimant’s] medical impairment(s) and may bring a unique perspective to the medical
evidence that cannot be obtained from the objective medical findings alone or from reports of
individual examinations[.]” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2).
A treater’s opinion must be given “controlling weight” if “well-supported by medically
acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and . . . not inconsistent with the other
substantial evidence in [the] case record.” LaRiccia v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 549 F. App’x 377,
384 (6th Cir. 2013). Even if a treater’s opinion is not entitled to controlling weight, “the ALJ
must still determine how much weight is appropriate by considering a number of factors,
including the length of the treatment relationship and the frequency of examination, the nature
and extent of the treatment relationship, supportability of the opinion, consistency of the opinion
with the record as a whole, and any specialization of the treating physician.” Blakley v. Comm’r
of Soc. Sec., 581 F.3d 399, 406 (6th Cir. 2009); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c).4
In essence, “opinions of a treating source . . . must be analyzed under a two-step process, with
care being taken not to conflate the steps.” Cadle v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 5:12-cv-3071, 2013 WL
5173127, at *5 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 12, 2013). Initially, “the opinion must be examined to determine if it is
entitled to controlling weight” and “[o]nly if . . . the ALJ does not give controlling weight to the treating
physician’s opinion is the opinion subjected to another analysis based on the particulars of” 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1527. Id.
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After treaters, “[n]ext in the hierarchy are examining physicians and psychologists, who
often see and examine claimants only once.” Snell, 2013 WL 372032, at *9.
Record reviewers are afforded the least deference and these “non-examining physicians’
opinions are on the lowest rung of the hierarchy of medical source opinions.” Id. Put simply,
“[t]he regulations provide progressively more rigorous tests for weighing opinions as the ties
between the source of the opinion and the individual [claimant] become weaker.” Id. (citing
SSR 96-6p, 1996 WL 374180, at *2 (July 2, 1996)). In the absence of a controlling treating
source opinion, an ALJ must “evaluate all medical opinions” with regard to the factors set forth
in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c), i.e., length of treatment history; consistency of the opinion with
other evidence; supportability; and specialty or expertise in the medical field related to the
individual’s impairment(s). Walton v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 97-2030, 1999 WL 506979, at
*2 (6th Cir. June 7, 1999).
The medical evidence here at issue includes, inter alia, opinions from examining
psychologist Giovanni Bonds, Ph.D., and record reviewing psychologists Karen Steiger, Ph.D.
PageID 109-10, 497-505. After an examination of Plaintiff, Dr. Bonds opined that she would
work “best in positions where she works mostly alone,” and “would have difficulty with work
pressure for working around other people or dealing with the public.” PageID 497-505. The
ALJ assigned Dr. Bonds’s opinion “great weight.” PageID 62.
Following a review of Plaintiff’s medical records, Dr. Steiger opined that Plaintiff was
moderately limited5 in her ability to complete a normal workday and workweek without
interruptions from psychologically-based symptoms, perform at a consistent pace without an
unreasonable number and length of rest periods, interact appropriately with the general public,
Whereas “mild” and “moderate” functional limitations are generally considered “nondisabling,” see Sims v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 406 F. App’x 977, 980 (6th Cir. 2011), “marked” limitations
are suggestive of disability. See 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1 § 12.00(C); Lankford v. Sullivan, 942
F.2d 301, 307 (6th Cir. 1991).
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accept instructions and respond appropriately to criticism from supervisors, and get along with
co-workers or peers without distracting them or exhibiting behavioral extremes. PageID 109-10.
Dr. Steiger specifically noted that Plaintiff should have minimal contact with others, minimal
work changes, and minimal production demands. PageID 109-10. The ALJ signed Dr. Steiger’s
opinion “great weigh[t]” as it is “consistent with the opinion of Dr. Bonds, [Plaintiff’s] mental
health treatment notes, and [Plaintiff’s] subjective complaints, despite the inconsistencies in her
testimony and the examples of noncompliance with treatment.” PageID 62.
Plaintiff alleges the ALJ erred in failing to incorporate the limitations opined by Drs.
Bonds and Steiger, or explain his reasoning for not including these limitations in Plaintiff’s RFC.
PageID 1059-61. Despite Dr. Bonds’s opinion that Plaintiff would work best in positions where
she is mostly alone, and Dr. Steiger’s opinion that she have no more than “minimal contact with
others,” see PageID 109-10, 504-05, and despite the ALJ giving such opinions “great weight,”
PageID 75, the ALJ included in his RFC the limitation that Plaintiff was capable of “occasional
interaction with supervisors and coworkers.” PageID 57. The ALJ’s RFC altered Dr. Steiger’s
language of “minimal contact” to “occasional interaction.” Plaintiff claims this was erroneous
because Social Security regulations interpret “occasional” to mean up to one-third of a workday.
See SSR 83-10, 1983 SSR LEXIS 30 (Jan. 1, 1983). A limitation concerning the ability to
interact with supervisors and coworkers is significant because the VE testified at the
administrative hearing that such an individual could not maintain employment (and would thus
be disabled).
The Commissioner correctly notes that an ALJ is not required to repeat the medical
record word-for-word when constructing a claimant’s RFC. However, “minimal” contact and
interaction “up to one-third” of each day are not commensurate with one another. See SSR 8310, 1983 SSR LEXIS 30 (Jan. 1, 1983). And, although the undersigned recognizes that the ALJ
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need only accept those limitations found credible, see Casey v. Sec. of Health & Human Servs.,
987 F.2d 1230, 1235 (6th Cir. 1993), the ALJ still must meaningfully explain why certain
limitations are not included in the RFC determination -- especially when such limitations are set
forth in opinions the ALJ weighs favorably. O’Ryan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 3:14-CV-125,
2015 WL 6889607, at *4 (S.D. Ohio July 30, 2015), report and recommendation adopted, No.
3:14-CV-125, 2015 WL 4934190 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 18, 2015); Howard v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,
No. 3:14-CV-364, 2015 WL 8213614, at *4 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 9, 2015), report and
recommendation adopted, No. 3:14-CV-364, 2016 WL 99114 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 7, 2016); see also
SSR 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184, at *7 (July 2, 1996) (stating that, “[i]f the RFC assessment
conflicts with an opinion from a medical source, the adjudicator must explain why the opinion
was not adopted”); Hann v. Colvin, No. 12-cv-06234-JCS, 2014 WL 1382063, at *22 (N.D. Cal.
Mar. 28, 2014) (finding that “where an ALJ has already found a physician’s opinions to be
credible and concrete, an ALJ can err by omitting aspects of that physician’s opinions from the
RFC”); Stoddard v. Astrue, No. 3:09-cv-91, 2010 WL 3723924, at *1 (E.D. Tenn. Feb. 19, 2010)
(same); Washington v. Colvin, No. 13–1147–SAC, 2014 WL 4145547, at *3 (D. Kan. Aug. 19,
2014) (finding the ALJ’s “failure to either include [certain] limitations [as opined by a medical
source], or explain why they were not included in the RFC findings, [to be] especially
problematic in light of the fact that the ALJ accorded “substantial” weight to [the medical
source’s] opinions”).
Here, the RFC and non-disability finding are both unsupported by substantial evidence in
light of the ALJ’s failure to explain why Plaintiff is capable of “occasional” interaction with
supervisors and co-workers and is not limited to “minimal contact” in her ability, as opined by
Drs. Bonds and Steiger. See PageID 57, 109-10, 504-05; see also SSR 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184,
at *7. Such failure amounts to reversible error. See O’Ryan, 2015 WL 6889607, at *4.
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IV.
When, as here, the ALJ’s non-disability determination is unsupported by substantial
evidence, the Court must determine whether to reverse and remand the matter for rehearing or to
reverse and order the award of benefits. The Court has authority to affirm, modify or reverse the
Commissioner’s decision “with or without remanding the cause for rehearing.”
42 U.S.C.
§ 405(g); Melkonyan v. Sullivan, 501 U.S. 89, 100 (1991). Generally, benefits may be awarded
immediately “only if all essential factual issues have been resolved and the record adequately
establishes a plaintiff’s entitlement to benefits.” Faucher v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 17
F.3d 171, 176 (6th Cir. 1994); see also Abbott v. Sullivan, 905 F.2d 918, 927 (6th Cir. 1990);
Varley v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 820 F.2d 777, 782 (6th Cir. 1987). In this instance,
evidence of disability is not overwhelming, and a remand for further proceedings is necessary.
V.
For the foregoing reasons, IT IS ORDERED THAT: (1) the Commissioner’s nondisability finding is unsupported by substantial evidence, and REVERSED; (2) this matter is
REMANDED to the Commissioner under the Fourth Sentence of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for
proceedings consistent with this opinion; and (3) this case is TERMINATED on the docket.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Date:
April 20, 2018
s/ Michael J. Newman
Michael J. Newman
United States Magistrate Judge
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