Wallace v. Montgomery County Ohio/Montgomery County Board of Commissioners et al

Filing 33

ENTRY AND ORDER granting 15 Defendant Campbell's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and granting in part 16 Montgomery County Defendants' Partial Motion to Dismiss Cross-Claims. The Court GRANTS Campbell's Motion for Judgmenton t he Pleadings 15 and DISMISSES the Montgomery County Defendants'Cross-Claim for indemnification. The Court GRANTS IN PART the MontgomeryCounty Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 16). Specifically, the Court DISMISSES Count III of Campbell's Cross-Claim and DENIES the Montgomery Count Defendants' request for dismissal of Counts IV through VIII of the same. Signed by Judge Thomas M. Rose on 2-14-2018. (de)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION AT DAYTON
DARYL WALLACE,
Plaintiff,
v.
MONTGOMERY COUNTY, OHIO
And THE MONTGOMERY COUNTY
BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS, et al.,

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Case No. 3:17-cv-00183
Judge Thomas M. Rose

Defendants.
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______________________________________________________________________________
ENTRY AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT CAMPBELL’S MOTION
FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS (DOC. 15) AND
GRANTING IN PART THE MONTGOMERY COUNTY DEFENDANTS’
PARTIAL MOTION TO DISMISS (DOC. 16) CROSS-CLAIMS
______________________________________________________________________________
This case is before the Court on the Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Doc.
15) under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c) filed by Defendant Jerrid Campbell (“Campbell”) and the
Partial Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 16 at PAGEID # 84-95) Campbell’s Cross-Claims under
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) filed by Defendants Montgomery County, Ohio, the
Montgomery County Board of Commissioners, and Montgomery County Sheriff Phil
Plummer (collectively, the “Montgomery County Defendants”). Both the Motion for
Judgment on the Pleadings and Motion to Dismiss are fully briefed and ripe for review.
(See Docs. 15, 18, 19 and 16, 21, 22, respectively.) For the reasons below, the Court
GRANTS Campbell’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Doc. 15) and GRANTS
IN PART the Montgomery County Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 16).

I.

BACKGROUND
A. Wallace’s Complaint

As alleged in the Complaint, Plaintiff Daryl Wallace (“Wallace”) was an inmate
in the Montgomery County Jail. (Doc. 1 at ¶ 8.) On September 28, 2015, the hot water
was not working in his cell. (Id. at ¶ 9.) Wallace twice complained to Campbell, a
Montgomery County Sheriff Corrections Officer, about the lack of hot water. (Id. at ¶
10.) Campbell allegedly refused to call maintenance to address the problem. (Id.)
Around 11:15 a.m., Wallace became frustrated, cursed at Campbell, and called
him a name. (Id. at ¶ 11.) Campbell allegedly followed Wallace and told him to stop.
(Id. at ¶ 12.) After Wallace complied, Campbell allegedly shoved Wallace off his feet to
the ground and repeatedly punched him while using handcuffs as makeshift brass
knuckles. (Id. at ¶ 12-13.) Wallace pushed Campbell off of him, but Campbell allegedly
returned to Wallace and punched him again. (Id. at ¶ 15.) Additional correctional
officers arrived to the scene and Wallace was handcuffed. (Id. at ¶ 16.) Campbell led
Wallace to another part of the jail and into an elevator, where Campbell allegedly
pushed Wallace’s head into a corner. (Id. at ¶ 18.)
A medic later cleaned and dressed a wound to Wallace’s scalp. (Id. at ¶ 19.)
Wallace claims to experience regular migraines and worsened vision due to the alleged
assault. (Id. at ¶ 20-21.)
On May 24, 2017, Wallace filed the Complaint in this case, asserting claims for
violation of his civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Campbell and the
Montgomery County Defendants. Specifically, he alleged that the Defendants deprived

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him of his rights secured by the First, Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to
the United States Constitution, including his right to exercise freedom of speech
without retaliation, right to be free from excessive force, his right to be free from cruel
and unusual punishment, and his right to be free of governmental actions that shock the
conscience. (Id. at ¶ 32.) Wallace further alleged that Montgomery County’s policies,
practices, and customs were a moving force behind his injuries; that it failed to properly
supervise, train and discipline Campbell; and ratified Campbell’s unconstitutional
conduct. (Id. at ¶ 32.)
B. Defendants’ Responses to the Complaint
On August 11, 2017, the Montgomery County Defendants filed their Answer to
the Complaint, which included a Cross-Claim against Campbell. (Doc. 12.) In the
Cross-Claim, the Montgomery County Defendants assert a claim for complete
indemnity from Campbell in the event that a judgment is entered against them on
Wallace’s claims. (Doc. 12 at ¶ 64.)
On August 27, 2017, Campbell filed an Answer to the Complaint, Answer to the
Montgomery County Defendants’ Cross-Claim, and Cross-Claim against the
Montgomery County Defendants. (Doc. 14.) In support of his Cross-Claim, Campbell
alleges that he was employed as a Montgomery County Corrections Officer from
August 1, 2013 through May 23, 2017. (Id. at PAGEID # 55.) Beginning in 2015, he
allegedly became aware of a hostile work environment for African American employees
and racial discrimination at the Montgomery County Jail. (Id. at PAGEID # 56.) For
example, Campbell alleges that female inmates were segregated on the basis of race,

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with African American inmates being placed in less desirable cell conditions than
Caucasian inmates. (Id.) He also allegedly became aware of corrections officers using
excessive force to injure inmates. (Id.)
In October 2016, Campbell alleges that he told a reporter for the Dayton Daily
News about the segregation of African American inmates in less desirable cell
conditions and that African Americans working in the jail were being subjected to racial
discrimination. (Id.) On November 5, 2016, the reporter published an article in the
Dayton Daily News that disclosed Campbell as the source of information about alleged
racial discrimination at the Montgomery County Jail. (Id.) On April 9, 2017, Campbell
alleges that Defendant Montgomery County Sheriff Phil Plummer (the “Sheriff”) put
him on a three-day suspension for making public statements to the Dayton Daily News
about the conditions at Montgomery County Jail. (Id.)
In January 2017, Campbell met with a reporter for the Dayton Weekly News. (Id.)
Campbell allegedly told this reporter about racial discrimination and the hostile work
environment at Montgomery County Jail. (Id.) He also disclosed that an inmate was
allegedly “beaten into a coma by a corrections officer and another inmate was
murdered.” (Id. at PAGEID # 56-57.) Campbell claims to have told the reporter that, in
his opinion, the Sheriff had covered up both matters. (Id. at PAGEID # 57.) On May 3,
2017, the Sheriff allegedly issued Campbell a ten-day suspension for making public
statements about the Montgomery County Jail. (Id.) On May 23, 2017, the Sheriff
terminated Campbell’s employment.

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Montgomery County has not provided a legal defense for Campbell or agreed to
indemnify him against any judgment in this case. Campbell alleges that the Sheriff has
threatened not to provide legal representation for other officers and employees who
have been sued, if the officer “would not agree to show him loyalty and conformance to
the Sheriff’s program and agenda.” (Doc. 14 at PAGEID # 54.) Campbell further alleges
that he was denied representation in this case as a result of discrimination and in
retaliation for his exercise of his constitutional, statutory, and civil rights. (Id.)
Campbell’s Cross-Claim asserts eight causes of action: (1) declaratory action for
statutory indemnification for costs of defense under Ohio Revised Code § 2744.07(A)(1)
against the Montgomery County Board of Commissioners, (2) declaratory action for
statutory indemnification under Ohio Revised Code § 2744.07(A)(2) against the
Montgomery County Board of Commissioners, (3) state-law claim for bad faith, breach
of duty to defend against the Montgomery County Defendants, (4) claim for retaliation
in violation of Campbell’s rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the
United States Constitution and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Montgomery County
Defendants, (5) claim for damages for race discrimination under Ohio Revised Code §
4112.02 and 4112.99 against the Montgomery County Defendants, (6) claim for damages
for retaliation under Ohio Revised Code § 4112.02 and 4112.99 against the Montgomery
County Defendants, (7) claim for damages for race discrimination under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. against the Montgomery County
Defendants, and (8) claim for damages for race discrimination and retaliation under 42
U.S.C. § 1981 against the Montgomery County Defendants.
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C. Dismissal of Wallace’s Complaint
On December 6, 2017, Wallace moved to dismiss all of his claims with prejudice
against all named Defendants pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2). (Doc. 23.) On
December 8, 2017, after Defendants notified the Court that they did not oppose the
motion, the Court granted Wallace’s Motion to Dismiss. (Doc. 24.) As a result, the only
remaining claims in this case are the Defendants’ cross-claims against each other.
II.

ANALYSIS
A. Campbell’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings

Campbell moves for judgment on the pleadings on the Montgomery County
Defendants’ cross-claim for indemnification. This motion presents a pure question of
law: May a defendant in a § 1983 action for violation of an inmate’s civil rights bring a
cross-claim for indemnification against a co-defendant?

Campbell argues that the

answer to this question is no. The Montgomery County Defendants disagree.
In Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union of America, AFL–CIO, 451
U.S. 77 (1981), the Supreme Court stated that courts are not free to read a cause of action
for indemnity into statutes where no statutory basis exists for such a claim. In that case,
the Supreme Court determined that no right to contribution exists among co-defendants
under the Equal Pay Act or Title VII. The Montgomery County Defendants note that
Northwest Airlines did not involve claims under § 1983. Nevertheless, the principle
articulated in the case—that courts should not read an indemnification claim into a
statute without any statutory basis—still applies. The Montgomery County Defendants

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have not pointed to any provision of § 1983, nor any legislative history, to support the
contention that § 1983 provides for an indemnification claim.
Neither the Sixth Circuit nor any district courts in the Southern District of Ohio
have addressed this question. Other districts courts in the Sixth Circuit, however, have
uniformly held that a defendant in a § 1983 action cannot bring an indemnification
claim against a co-defendant. See Frantz v. City of Pontiac, 432 F. Supp. 2d 717, 722 (E.D.
Mich. 2006); Compton v. City of Harrodsburg, Ky., No. 5:12-CV-302-JMH, 2013 WL
4785325, at *3 (E.D. Ky. Sept. 6, 2013), order vacated in part on other grounds on
reconsideration, No. 5:12-CV-302-JMH-REW, 2013 WL 5503195 (E.D. Ky. Oct. 2, 2013);
Dempsey v. City of Lawrenceburg, No. CIV.A. 3:09-33-DCR, 2010 WL 3724838, at *3 (E.D.
Ky. Sept. 17, 2010); Cochran v. Folger, No. CIV.A 5:09-302-JMH, 2010 WL 2696634, at *3
(E.D. Ky. July 6, 2010); Hart v. City of Williamsburg, Ky., No. CIV.A. 6:04-321-DCR, 2005
WL 1676894, at *3 (E.D. Ky. July 16, 2005); Hughes v. Adams, No. CIV.A.5:06CVP176-R,
2007 WL 3306076, at *2 (W.D. Ky. Nov. 6, 2007). All or most of these cases rely on the
Supreme Court’s decision in Northwest Airlines and the absence of any statutory basis or
other authority supporting the existence of a right to indemnification under § 1983. In
addition, at least one district court also noted that permitting a state law claim for
indemnification in a § 1983 case would not be consistent with § 1983’s deterrence policy.
Hughes 2007 WL 3306076, at *2.
The Court is persuaded by the reasoning in these cases and Northwest Airlines
that there is no right to indemnification under § 1983. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS
Campbell’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings.
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B. The Montgomery County Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss
The Montgomery County Defendants move to dismiss Counts III through VIII of
Campbell’s Cross-Claim.
i. Count III – Bad Faith and Breach of Duty
The Montgomery County Defendants argue that Campbell’s claims for bad faith
and breach of the duty to defend must be dismissed because they fail to state claims
upon which relief can be granted. (Doc. 16 at 7, citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).) The
Montgomery County Defendants first argued that they owed no duty to Campbell, but
abandoned that argument in their reply brief. Instead, they argue that, while Ohio
Revised Code § 2744.07(A)(1) imposes a duty to provide a legal defense in certain
circumstances, it does not support a claim for breach of that duty or its bad faith
execution. (Doc. 22 at 1-3.) This argument is well-taken.
The Montgomery County Defendants’ duty to provide Campbell legal
representation arises under Ohio Revised Code § 2744.07(A)(1), which states:
Except as otherwise provided in this division, a political subdivision shall
provide for the defense of an employee, in any state or federal court, in
any civil action or proceeding which contains an allegation for damages
for injury, death, or loss to person or property caused by an act or
omission of the employee in connection with a governmental or
proprietary function. The political subdivision has the duty to defend the
employee if the act or omission occurred while the employee was acting
both in good faith and not manifestly outside the scope of employment or
official responsibilities. Amounts expended by a political subdivision in
the defense of its employees shall be from funds appropriated for this
purpose or from proceeds of insurance. The duty to provide for the
defense of an employee specified in this division does not apply in a civil
action or proceeding that is commenced by or on behalf of a political
subdivision.

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Ohio Rev. Code § 2744.07(A)(1). Campbell has not been provided legal representation
by Montgomery County in this case on the grounds that he was not “acting both in
good faith and not manifestly outside the scope of employment or official
responsibilities.” Id.
The Ohio Revised Code provides for a court determination of whether a political
subdivision is required to provide a defense under subsection (A)(1). It states:
If a political subdivision refuses to provide an employee with a defense in
a civil action or proceeding as described in division (A)(1) of this section,
upon the motion of the political subdivision, the court shall conduct a
hearing regarding the political subdivision's duty to defend the employee
in that civil action. The political subdivision shall file the motion within
thirty days of the close of discovery in the action. After the motion is filed,
the employee shall have not less than thirty days to respond to the motion.
At the request of the political subdivision or the employee, the court shall
order the motion to be heard at an oral hearing. At the hearing on the
motion, the court shall consider all evidence and arguments submitted by
the parties. In determining whether a political subdivision has a duty to
defend the employee in the action, the court shall determine whether the
employee was acting both in good faith and not manifestly outside the
scope of employment or official responsibilities. The pleadings shall not be
determinative of whether the employee acted in good faith or was
manifestly outside the scope of employment or official responsibilities.
If the court determines that the employee was acting both in good faith
and not manifestly outside the scope of employment or official
responsibilities, the court shall order the political subdivision to defend
the employee in the action.
Ohio Rev. Code § 2744.07(C).
Campbell argues that, in addition to this statutory remedy for refusal to provide
a legal defense, he may also bring claims for breach of the duty to defend and bad faith
in the exercise of that duty. “In determining whether statutes may create a private

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cause of action for enforcement, the Ohio Supreme Court has held that a ‘statutory
policy’ may not be implemented by the Ohio courts in a private civil action absent a
clear implication that such a remedy was intended by the Ohio Legislature.” Ayers v.
City of Cleveland, 2017-Ohio-8571, ¶ 30 (quoting Fawcett v. G. C. Murphy & Co., 46 Ohio
St.2d 245, 249, 348 N.E.2d 144 (1976)). Ohio courts apply a three-part test to determine
when a private cause of action arises by implication under a statute. “The three prongs
of the test ask (1) are the plaintiffs in a class for whose special benefit the statute was
enacted; (2) is there any indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to
create or deny a private cause of action; and (3) is it consistent with the underlying
purposes of the legislative scheme to imply such a remedy for the plaintiffs?” Ayers,
2017-Ohio-8571 at ¶ 30 (citing Strack v. Westfield Cos., 33 Ohio App.3d 336, 337, 515
N.E.2d 1005 (9th Dist.1986); Elwert v. Pilot Life Ins. Co., 77 Ohio App.3d 529, 602 N.E.2d
1219 (1st Dist.1991)). Here, this test is not met.
Campbell’s claims meet an insurmountable obstacle at the second prong of the
test. The legislative history of the statute strongly implies that the Ohio legislature
intended for the court determination set out in § 2744.07(C) to be the only remedy for a
refusal to defend under § 2744.07(A)(1).

In 2002, the Ohio legislature amended §

2744.07(C) to remove a provision entitling an employee to file an action in the court of
common pleas seeking a determination “as to the appropriateness of the refusal of the
political subdivision to provide him with a defense . . . .”

Political Subdivisions—

Inclusion of Certain School Facilities and Railroad Quiet Zones as Governmental Functions—
General Amendments, 2002 Ohio Laws File 239 (S.B. 106). In its place, it inserted the

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current remedy, which empowers only the political subdivision to bring a motion for a
hearing on the issue within thirty days of the close of discovery. Id. This amendment
implies that the Ohio legislature intended to take away an employee’s ability to bring a
private action in favor of a court determination initiated by the political subdivision. It
would be inconsistent with this amendment to imply an even broader private right of
action, such as the claims asserted by Campbell.
Campbell cites several cases in support of the existence of his claims, but they are
all distinguishable. (Doc. 21 at 3-6, (citing Koenig v. Dayton, 28 Ohio App.3d 70 (2d Dist.
1985); Suver v. Pers. Serv. Ins. Co., 11 Ohio St. 3d 6, 7 (1984); Hoskins v. Aetna Life Ins. Co.,
6 Ohio St. 3d 272 (1983); Allen v. Standard Oil Co., 2 Ohio St. 3d 122 (1982)).) The
primary case that he relies on is Koenig, in which the City of Dayton refused to defend
the plaintiff police officer pursuant to an agreement between it and the Fraternal Order
of Police. 28 Ohio App. 3d at 71. In that case, the court of appeals found that the City of
Dayton agreed to act as a self-insurer for police professional liability insurance and
therefore was responsible for the attorney fees and costs in both the action against the
officer and officer’s action to enforce the city’s obligation to defend. Id. at 73. The court
of appeals reasoned that “[i]n all such contract cases, the rationale behind allowing
attorney fees is to place the insured in the position he would have occupied if the
insurer had performed its duty.” Id. Thus, the indemnification claim in Koenig was, in
essence, a claim for breach of contract similar to one that might be brought against an
insurance company. The court of appeals did not imply a private right of action to
enforce a statutory right to a legal defense.
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The other cases cited by Campbell are likewise inapposite. They involve the
enforcement of contractual rights, not the interpretation of statutory rights. Suver, 11
Ohio St. 3d at 6 (issuer of a financial responsibility bond has a duty to act in good faith
in the handling and payment of claims); Hoskins, 6 Ohio St. 3d at 272 (“Based upon the
relationship between an insurer and its insured, an insurer has the duty to act in good
faith in the handling and payment of the claims of its insured.”); Allen, 2 Ohio St. 3d at
125 (oil company entitled to indemnification under indemnification provision of
agreement, including payment of attorney fees and costs to enforce such provision).
The Court grants the Montgomery County Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss
Campbell’s claims for breach of the duty to defend and bad faith.
ii. Counts IV through VIII Relating to Campbell’s Employment
The Montgomery County Defendants move to dismiss Counts IV through VIII of
the Complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. They
argue that these claims do not arise out of the transaction or occurrence that is the
subject matter of the original action and therefore are not proper cross-claims under
Fed. R. Civ. P. 13(g). In response, Campbell argues that these claims are not crossclaims under Rule 13 because they were brought in response to the Montgomery
County Defendants’ Cross-Claim. When the Montgomery County Defendants brought
claims against him, argues Campbell, they became opposing parties under Rule 13 and
therefore his claims are mandatory and permissive counterclaims against an opposing
party under Rule 13(a) and (b).

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The Montgomery County Defendants distinguish one of the cases relied on by
Campbell—Allstate Ins. Co. v. Smith, 169 F. Supp. 374 (E.D. Mich. 1959)—but fail to
distinguish the more analogous and controlling precedent: Kane v. Magna Mixer Co., 71
F.3d 555 (6th Cir. 1995). In Kane, the Sixth Circuit held that a defendant’s failure to
assert an indemnity counterclaim against its co-defendant prevented its assignees from
later pursuing that indemnity claim in a separate action. 71 F.3d at 561.
In the underlying action, a woman working in a cookie company lost two fingers
of one hand while operating an industrial dough mixer.

Id. at 558. She and her

husband sued the successor company that purchased the industrial dough mixer
manufacturer’s assets.

The successor company filed a third-party complaint for

indemnification against the manufacturer. The asset purchase agreement between the
successor company and the manufacturer contained complementary indemnity
provisions. Under the provisions, the manufacturer agreed to indemnify the successor
company for any liability arising from the transferred assets prior to their transfer; and
the successor company agreed to indemnify the manufacturer for any liabilities arising
from the transferred assets after their transfer. Id. The manufacturer did not bring any
counterclaims against the successor company in the underlying suit. Meanwhile, the
plaintiffs amended their complaint to bring direct claims against the manufacturer in
addition to those against the successor company.
The successor company obtained a judgment in its favor on summary judgment.
Id. The plaintiffs later obtained a default judgment against the manufacturer. The
manufacturer could not pay the judgment, however, and so assigned its
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indemnification right under the asset purchase agreement to plaintiffs. Plaintiffs then
brought a lawsuit against the successor company to enforce the indemnification
provision and collect on the judgment against the manufacturer.
In the latter action for indemnification, the successor company argued, among
other arguments, that the plaintiffs could not bring the indemnification claim because
the manufacturer waived it by failing to assert it in the prior action. The district court
agreed, finding that the manufacturer’s indemnification claim was a compulsory
counterclaim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 13(a), which the manufacturer had failed to assert.
Id. at 559. On appeal, the Sixth Circuit affirmed. It held that, once the successor
company brought its indemnification claim against the manufacturer in the plaintiffs’
prior action, the manufacturer was required to bring its indemnification claim as a
mandatory counterclaim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 13(a). Its failure to do so waived its
assignees’ right to bring the claim in the later action. Id. at 562-63.
Here, Wallace initiated this action against the Montgomery County Defendants
and Campbell. With their Answer, the Montgomery County Defendants filed a CrossClaim for indemnification against Campbell. Under Kane, the Montgomery County
Defendants and Campbell became opposing parties and Campbell was obligated to
bring any compulsory counterclaims that he had against them under Rule 13(a).
Campbell was further permitted, under Rule 13(b), to state any other claims that he had
against the Montgomery County Defendants. The Montgomery County Defendants’
failure to distinguish Kane in their Reply is fatal to their Motion to Dismiss Counts IV
through VIII.
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Whether compulsory or permissive, Campbell was permitted to bring the claims
in Count IV through VII of his Cross-Claim. Permitting him to proceed on those claims
is consistent with the Sixth Circuit’s statement that the purpose of Rule 13 is to have “all
issues be resolved in one action, with all parties before one court, complex though the
action may be.” LASA Per L’Industria Del Marmo Societa Per Azioni v. Alexander, 414 F.2d
143, 147 (6th Cir. 1969).
This action has grown more complex, but there is a relationship among the
parties’ claims. Wallace brought a civil rights action under § 1983 for infringement of
his civil rights. (Doc. 1 at ¶ 32.) In response, the Montgomery County Defendants
sought indemnification from Campbell on the theory that “his acts were the sole and
proximate cause of Plaintiff’s injuries.” (Doc. 12 at PAGEID # 39.) Campbell, on the
other hand, alleges that he is entitled to a legal defense and indemnification from the
Montgomery County Defendants—not the other way around—because he was acting in
the scope and course of his employment, and in good faith, at all times relevant to
Wallace’s claims. (Doc. 14 at PAGEID # 52.) He further alleges that he has been denied
a legal defense in retaliation for his own assertion of his civil rights, which are the facts
underlying Counts IV through VIII of his Cross-Claim. (Id. at PAGEID # 54-55.) Thus,
the remaining claims in this case are related to Wallace’s original claims, although
through a complex web.
It is also worth noting that the Court has subject matter jurisdiction over
Campbell’s claims, as some of them are asserted under 42 U.S.C. §1983 and Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Consequently, Campbell could simply re-file his claims in
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federal court in a separate lawsuit, which would introduce unnecessary expense and
delay into this litigation.
The Court denies the Montgomery County Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss
Counts IV through VIII of Campbell’s Cross-Claim.
III.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Campbell’s Motion for Judgment
on the Pleadings (Doc. 15) and DISMISSES the Montgomery County Defendants’
Cross-Claim for indemnification.

The Court GRANTS IN PART the Montgomery

County Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 16). Specifically, the Court DISMISSES
Count III of Campbell’s Cross-Claim and DENIES the Montgomery Count Defendants’
request for dismissal of Counts IV through VIII of the same.
DONE and ORDERED in Dayton, Ohio, this Wednesday, February 14, 2018.
s/Thomas M. Rose
________________________________
THOMAS M. ROSE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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