Modeste v. Good Samaritan Hospital et al

Filing 3

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS: 2 Plaintiff's Complaint be dismissed, and the case be terminated on the Court's docket. Objections to R&R due by 5/14/2018. Signed by Magistrate Judge Sharon L. Ovington on 4-27-2018. (mcm)(This document has been sent by regular mail to the party(ies) listed in the NEF that did not receive electronic notification.)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION AT DAYTON
CHELSEA MODESTE,
Plaintiff,

vs.
GOOD SAMARITAN HOSPITAL, et al.,

Defendants.

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Case No. 3:18-cv-00120
District Judge Walter H. Rice
Magistrate Judge Sharon L. Ovington

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 1
Plaintiff Chelsea Modeste is a resident of Dayton, Ohio. She brings this case pro
se alleging that she did not receive proper medical care when she visited the emergency
room at Miami Valley Hospital in November 2017. She also alleges that on a separate
occasion, she visited Good Samaritan Hospital where she was incorrectly diagnosed and,
as a result, she began taking prescription medicine she did not need.
The Court previously granted Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed in forma pauperis
under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. The case is presently before the Court for a sua sponte review to
determine whether Plaintiff’s Complaint, or any portion of it, should be dismissed
because it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). If the Complaint raises a claim with an arguable
or rational basis in fact or law, it is neither frivolous nor malicious, and it may not be
dismissed sua sponte. Brand v. Motley, 526 F.3d 921, 923-24 (6th Cir. 2008); see Lawler
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Attached is a NOTICE to the parties regarding objections to this Report and Recommendations.

v. Marshall, 898 F.2d 1196, 1198 (6th Cir. 1990). A Complaint has no arguable factual
basis when its allegations are “fantastic or delusional.” Brand, 526 F.3d at 923 (quoting
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327-28, 109 S.Ct. 1827 (1989)); see Lawler, 898 F.2d
at 1199. A Complaint has no arguable legal basis when it presents “indisputably
meritless” legal theories—for example, when the defendant is immune from suit or when
the plaintiff claims a violation of a legal interest which clearly does not exist. See
Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327-28; see also Brand, 526 F.3d at 923.
A Complaint is also subject to dismissal when it fails to “contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). Pro
se Complaints must satisfy this plausibility standard. Ogle v. Columbia Gas
Transmission, LLC, 513 F. App’x 520, 522 (6th Cir. 2013). “Under this plausibility
standard, the well-pleaded facts must permit more than the mere possibility of
misconduct, they must show that the pleader is entitled to relief. A complaint that pleads
facts that are “merely consistent with a defendant’s liability ... stops short of the line
between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.” Id. (quoting, in part,
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 678). When assessing a pro se Complaint under these standards, the
Court accepts its allegations as true and liberally construes it in the plaintiff’s favor. See
Williams v. Curtin, 631 F.3d 380, 383 (6th Cir. 2011).
Plaintiff asserts that when she went to Miami Valley Hospital’s emergency room
in November 2017, they treated her with antibiotics without testing her for anything.
They told her she “had an STD” and that she needed to inform her sexual partner. But,
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they did not specify which STD [she] had.” (Doc. #2, PageID #20). Plaintiff
encountered further problems when she went to Good Samaritan Hospital. She explains:
I … developed a very severe yeast infection and visited Good Samaritan
Hospital the following day[.] [T]hey examined my genital area and
diagnosed me with genital herpes. I then informed my partner. I also made
a follow[-]up appointment with my OB and he performed a blood test in
which they discovered I did not have the disease. I also had been taking
medication prescribed by the hospital for this disease in which I did not
have. What the blood test revealed was that I just had it in the lips and I
was informed that this disease was only transferable if I developed a cold
sore in which I did not have.
(Doc. #2, PageID #20).
Plaintiff’s Complaint does not identify the relief she seeks, but the Civil Cover
Sheet she completed and signed indicates that she seeks $500,000. (Doc. #1, PageID
#8). Her Civil Cover Sheet also indicates that she seeks to invoke the Court’s federalquestion jurisdiction. Id. And, where her Civil Cover sheets asks for a “[b]rief
description of cause,” Plaintiff wrote, “Negligence.” Id.
Accepting Plaintiff’s factual allegations as true and construing her pro se
Complaint liberally in her favor, see Williams, 631 F.3d at 383, reveals that it fails to
raise a plausible federal claim. The applicable federal statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, requires
Plaintiff to allege sufficient facts to show that a defendant, while operating under the
color of state law, deprived her of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the
United States. Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 155, 98 S.Ct. 1729 (1978); see
Sumpter v. Wayne County, 868 F.3d 473, 494 (6th Cir. 2017). Rather than implicating a
violation of Plaintiff’s federal rights, her allegations identify matters related to state-law
torts of medical malpractice or negligence. This is seen in her allegations that (1) she
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was misdiagnosed with an STD without undergoing any medical testing; (2) she was
prescribed and took medication she did not need; (3) she was incorrectly instructed by
hospital personnel to inform her sexual partner that she had an STD; and (4) she later
learned that she did not have the disease and that it could spread only if she developed a
cold sore, which she did not have. These medical-malpractice or negligence allegations
do not rest on a plausible violation of Plaintiff’s federal rights and instead arise under
state law. See Peete v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville, 486 F.3d 217, 222 (6th Cir. 2007) (“the
plaintiff may be entitled to recovery under the state law of negligence, but improper
medical treatment by a government employee, standing alone, does not violate the Fourth
or Fourteenth Amendment.”); see also Daniels v Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 335-36, 106
S.Ct. 662 (1986); cf. Davis v. Sapp, No. 99-5769, 2000 WL 572067, at *2 (6th Cir. 2000)
(“A patient’s disagreement with his physician over the proper medical treatment alleges
no more than a medical malpractice claim, which is a tort actionable in state court, but is
not cognizable under § 1983.”).
In addition, Plaintiff has failed to set forth any factual allegations capable of
indicating the named-defendant hospitals are not private entities or committed some act
under the color of state law. “Private individuals and companies do not act under color of
state law.” Thomas v. Better Bus. Bureau, 79 F. App’x 748 (6th Cir.2003) (citing
Lansing v. City of Memphis, 202 F.3d 821, 828 (6th Cir. 2000)). Thus, the Complaint
fails to raise a reasonable inference that either hospital can be considered a state actor or
acted under the color of state law.
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Complaint is subject to dismissal under 28 U.S.C. §
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1915(e)(2).
IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED THAT:
1.

Plaintiff’s Complaint be dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); and

2.

The case be terminated on the Court’s docket.

April 27, 2018

s/Sharon L. Ovington
Sharon L. Ovington
United States Magistrate Judge

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NOTICE REGARDING OBJECTIONS
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), any party may serve and file specific, written
objections to the proposed findings and recommendations within SEVENTEEN days
after being served with this Report and Recommendations. Such objections shall specify
the portions of the Report objected to and shall be accompanied by a memorandum of
law in support of the objections. If the Report and Recommendation is based in whole or
in part upon matters occurring of record at an oral hearing, the objecting party shall
promptly arrange for the transcription of the record, or such portions of it as all parties
may agree upon or the Magistrate Judge deems sufficient, unless the assigned District
Judge otherwise directs. A party may respond to another party’s objections within
SEVENTEEN days after being served with a copy thereof.
Failure to make objections in accordance with this procedure may forfeit rights on
appeal. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947,
949-50 (6th Cir. 1981).

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