Scaccia v. LYFT, Inc.
Filing
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ORDER DENYING PRO SE PLAINTIFFS MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION (DOC. 15 ). Signed by Judge Michael J. Newman on 11/18/21. (pb)(This document has been sent by regular mail to the party(ies) listed in the NEF that did not receive electronic notification.)
Case: 3:21-cv-00029-MJN-PBS Doc #: 20 Filed: 11/18/21 Page: 1 of 5 PAGEID #: 213
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION AT DAYTON
JOHN SCACCIA,
Plaintiff,
Case No. 3:21-cv-29
vs.
LYFT, INC.
District Judge Michael J. Newman
Magistrate Judge Peter B. Silvain, Jr.
Defendant.
______________________________________________________________________________
ORDER DENYING PRO SE PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
(DOC. 15)
______________________________________________________________________________
This matter is before the Court on pro se 1 Plaintiff John Scaccia’s (“Scaccia”) motion for
reconsideration. Doc. No. 15. Defendant Lyft, Inc. (“Lyft”) responded (Doc. No. 18), and Scaccia
replied (Doc. No. 19). Thus, this matter is ripe for review.
I.
Scaccia alleges in his motion for reconsideration that the Court erred in (1) dismissing his
quasi-contract claims because he pleaded in the alternative; (2) considering Lyft’s Terms of
Service (“TOS”) in dismissing his claims; and (3) more generally, dismissing his claims on their
merits. See Doc. No. 15 at PageID 156–60.
Scaccia, an attorney, once practiced law in Ohio. Due to his legal training and experience, he does not
receive “the special consideration which the courts customarily grant to pro se parties.” Harbulak v. Suffolk
Cnty., 654 F.2d 194, 198 (2d Cir. 1981) (quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam)).
See also, e.g., Andrews v. Columbia Gas Transp. Corp., 544 F.3d 618, 633 (6th Cir. 2008) (finding no abuse
of discretion when magistrate judge denied pro se party’s order based on legal deficiency because party
was a practicing attorney). Nonetheless, in the interest of justice, the Court has liberally construed Scaccia’s
arguments in his favor. See, e.g., O’Connor v. United States, 159 F.R.D. 22, 23–25 (D. Md. 1994) (liberally
construing pro se attorney’s pleadings).
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Motions for reconsideration are both “disfavored” and only available if there is “(1)
manifest error of law; (2) newly discoverable evidence which was not was not previously available
to the parties; or (3) intervening change of controlling law.” Libertarian Party of Ohio v. Wilhelm,
465 F. Supp. 3d 780, 785 (S.D. Ohio 2020) (quoting Ohio Midland, Inc. v. Proctor, No. C2-051097, 2006 WL 3793311, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 28, 2006)). In the interest of judicial economy,
the Court will not revisit earlier arguments made with a “different spin” that it previously
dismissed. Id.
II.
From the outset, Scaccia’s arguments are identical to the ones he raised in his opposition
to Lyft’s motion to dismiss. Compare Doc. No. 15 at PageID 158 (arguing, “[t]here is not a single
reference to Lyft’s TOS in the complaint”) with Doc. No. 10 at PageID 117 (arguing, “the
Complaint in the instant case makes no reference to a single formal written contract and there is
nothing about a TOS”); compare Doc. No. 15 at PageID 160 (arguing that Lyft owed a fiduciary
duty to Scaccia based on Lyft’s “money” handling and alleged improper disbursement) with Doc.
No. 10 at PageID 122 (arguing for a breach of fiduciary duty based on “Lyft’s handling of the
money” and allegation that “Lyft was withholding money”); compare Doc. No. 15 at PageID 157
with Doc. No. 10 at PageID 124. Scaccia does not get a second opportunity, so the Court rejects
these repetitious arguments. Libertarian Party of Ohio, 465 F. Supp. 3d at 785 (citing Aero-Motive
Co. v. Great Am. Ins., 302 F. Supp. 2d 738, 740 (S.D. Ohio 2003)).
Scaccia also argues that the Court erred in interpreting Greenberg, so it should not have
considered Lyft’s TOS. Doc. No. 15 at PageID 159–60. First, Scaccia already made this claim,
so the rationale for denying duplicative motions for reconsideration applies with equal force to
Scaccia’s mistaken interpretation of the Court’s reliance on Sixth Circuit precedent. See, e.g.,
Meekison v. Ohio Dep’t of Rehab. & Corr., 181 F.R.D. 571, 572–73 (S.D. Ohio 1998) (denying
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defendant’s motion for reconsideration where it rested on defendant’s mistaken interpretation of
Sixth Circuit cases). But second, because Scaccia now argues -- as he did previously -- that Lyft
made promises to him regarding (1) his anticipated revenues as a Lyft driver and (2) Lyft’s
purported obligations as to rider complaints, then that placed Lyft’s TOS into dispute, as it did in
Greenberg. Compare Doc. No. 1-1 at PageID 12–13 with Greenberg v. Life Ins. Co. of Va., 117
F.3d 507, 514 (6th Cir. 1999) (allowing insurer’s attachment of life insurance policy to motion to
dismiss to be considered in insured’s argument over bad faith and tortious behavior underlying
contractual relationship between insurer and insured). See also, e.g., Arnold v. Liberty Mut. Ins.
Co., 392 F. Supp. 3d 747, 764 (E.D. Ky. 2019) (considering contract in insurance contract dispute
when party alleged breach of contract). The Court concludes precisely as it did in the previous
order. Doc. No. 14 at PageID 152.
Moreover, regarding precedent, Scaccia does not realize that the district court cases on
which he relies are not binding on this Court. 2 “A decision of a federal district court judge is not
binding precedent in either a different judicial district, the same judicial district, or even upon the
same judge in a different case.” Camreta v. Greene, 563 U.S. 692, 709 n.7 (2011) (quoting 18 J.
Moore et al., Moore's Federal Practice § 134.02[1] [d] (3d ed. 2011)). His arguments are also
unpersuasive because the Court is not bound by the determinations of other judges in this judicial
district. See, e.g., Midlock v. Apple Vacations W., Inc., 406 F.3d 453, 457–58 (7th Cir. 2005)
(collecting cases). Thus, Scaccia’s quasi-contract claims fail for the reasons already stated in the
previous order. See, e.g., Ohio A. Philip Randolph Inst. v. Larose, 761 F. App’x 506, 513 n.4 (6th
Cir. 2019); Dillow v. Home Care Network, Inc., No. 1:16-cv-612, 2017 WL 749196, at *4 (S.D.
Ohio Feb. 27, 2017) (citing Camreta, 563 U.S. at 709). See also Colley v. Procter & Gamble Co.,
Scaccia relies on, for example, Miami Valley Mobile Health Serv., Inc. v. Examone Worldwide, Inc., 852
F. Supp. 2d. 925, 939–40 (S.D. Ohio 2012).
2
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1:16-cv-918, 2016 WL 5791658, at *15 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 4, 2016) (“Although some courts permit
alternative pleading, others in this district have dismissed unjust enrichment and quasi-contract
claims ‘even though Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(2) permits alternative pleading, because the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure do not alter substantive rights among the parties’ established by state law” (first
quoting Klusty v. Taco Bell Corp., 909 F. Supp. 516, 521 (S.D. Ohio 1995); and then citing
Amarado Oil Co. v. Davis, No. 5:12cv627, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 133571, at *31–35 (N.D. Ohio
Sept. 17, 2013))).
Any argument about pleading in the alternative, therefore, fails for the reasons stated in
this Court’s previous order. See XPX Armor & Equip., Inc. v. SkyLIFE Co., 158 N.E.3d 1024,
1047 (Ohio Ct. App. 2020) (quoting Kahler v. Cincinnati, Inc., No. C-140407, 2015 WL 1256323,
at *4 (Ohio Ct. App. 2015)). See also McConocha v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield Mut. of Ohio, 930
F. Supp. 1182, 1184 (N.D. Ohio 1996) (quoting In re August, 1993 Regular Grand Jury, 854 F.
Supp. 1403, 1406 (S.D. Ind. 1994)); Klusty, 909 F. Supp. at 521; B. & V. Distrib. Co. v. Dottore
Companies, LLC, No. 1:05 CV 2900, 2006 WL 1134225, at *5 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 26, 2006)
(dismissing quasi-contract claim when the plaintiff’s allegations noted “that it entered into an
express contact with Defendants”). Likewise, for the reasons expressed in the original order and
considering that Scaccia has failed to plead beyond speculation, his quasi-contract claims failed to
state plausible claims. See Watkins v. Healy, 986 F.3d 648, 660 (6th Cir. 2021) (quoting Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)); Klusty, 909 F. Supp. at 521 (citing Davis & Tatera, Inc. v.
Gray-Syracuse, Inc., 796 F. Supp. 1078 (S.D. Ohio 1992)); City of Elyria v. York Int’l Corp., No.
1:03CV2079, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10889, at *10 (N.D. Ohio June 7, 2005) (citing Weiper v.
W.A. Hill & Assocs., 661 N.E.2d 796 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995)) (dismissing unjust enrichment claim
when plaintiff pleaded for recovery under express agreement).
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III.
Therefore, Scaccia’s motion for reconsideration is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
November 18, 2021
s/Michael J. Newman
Hon. Michael J. Newman
United States District Judge
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