Reynolds v. ODM Restaurant Operations, LLC

Filing 17

ENTRY AND ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S RENEWED MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT (DOC. NO. 16 ) - The Clerk of Courts is direct to terminate this matter on the docket. Signed by Judge Thomas M. Rose on 3/6/2025. (acw)

Case: 3:22-cv-00317-TMR-CHG Doc #: 17 Filed: 03/06/25 Page: 1 of 4 PAGEID #: 65

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION AT DAYTON
ELIZABETH REYNOLDS,

:
:
Plaintiff,
:
Case No. 3:22-cv-317
:
v.
:
Judge Thomas M. Rose
:
Magistrate Judge Caroline H. Gentry
ODM RESTAURANTS OPERATIONS, LLC, :
:
Defendant.
:
:
______________________________________________________________________________
ENTRY AND ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S RENEWED MOTION FOR
DEFAULT JUDGMENT (DOC. NO. 16)
______________________________________________________________________________
Presently before the Court is Plaintiff’s Renewed Motion for Default Judgment (“Motion”)
(Doc. No. 16). In her Motion, Plaintiff Elizabeth Reynolds’ (“Plaintiff”) moves this Court to enter
default judgment and award her $80,000 in damages. (Id.)
Plaintiff filed her Complaint on November 7, 2022 alleging claims under the Americans
with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, et seq. (Doc. No. 1.) Defendant
ODM Restaurant Operations, LLC (“Defendant”) was served, but failed to file a response on its
required date of June 5, 2023. (See Doc. No. 6.) On September 1, 2023, Magistrate Judge Caroline
H. Gentry issued an order to show cause as to why Plaintiff had not filed a motion with the Clerk
of Court for entry of default. (Doc. No. 7.) Plaintiff filed such a motion with the Clerk on
September 13, 2023 (Doc. No. 8) and the Clerk entered default on September 14, 2023 (Doc. No.
9). Over one year later, on September 25, 2024, Magistrate Judge Gentry issued a second show
cause order as to Plaintiff’s failure to file a motion for default judgment and ordered Plaintiff to
file a response by October 25, 2024. (Doc. No. 11.) Plaintiff filed her Motion for Default

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Judgment on November 8, 2024. (Doc. No. 14.) The Court found Plaintiff’s motion lacking in a
number of respects, but, nonetheless, gave Plaintiff another opportunity to provide evidence in
support of her damages claim. (Doc. No. 15 at PageID 43.) Specifically, the Court ordered
Plaintiff to, “file a motion for default with all accompanying evidence in support of its damages
claim….” (Id.)
Plaintiff filed the present Motion on November 26, 2024. (Doc. No. 16.) The
Motion presently before the Court attaches a declaration from Plaintiff (Doc. No. 16-1), a
declaration from counsel (Doc. No. 16-2), the agreement between Plaintiff and counsel for
legal services (Doc. No. 16-3), and a docket notice of the filing of the Complaint (Doc. No.
16-4). These four documents contain only two sentences relating to Plaintiff’s damages,
both found in Plaintiff’s declaration. First, Plaintiff alleges, “Since my discharge, I have
suffered $35,000 of wage loss.” (Doc. No. 16-1 at PageID 54.) Second, Plaintiff alleges,
“I believe $45,000 would adequately compensate me for my emotional distress and allow
me to continue my ongoing treatment plan.” (Id. at PageID 55.)
“Where damages are unliquidated a default admits only defendant’s liability and
the amount of damages must be proved.” Antoine v. Atlas Turner, Inc., 66 F.3d 105, 110
(6th Cir.1995) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Fehlhaber v. Fehlhaber, 681
F.2d 1015, 1026 (5th Cir. 1982) (en banc)); Kelley v. Carr, 567 F.Supp. 831, 841 (W.D.
Mich. 1983) (“A default judgment on well-pleaded allegations establishes only defendant’s
liability; plaintiff must still establish the extent of damages”). “‘The district court must
instead conduct an inquiry in order to ascertain the amount of damages with reasonable
certainty.’” Vesligaj v. Peterson, 331 F. App’x 351, 355 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Credit
Lyonnais Sec. (USA), Inc. v. Alcantara, 183 F.3d 151, 155 (2d Cir. 1999)).

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Plaintiff fails to prove her damages in any meaningful respect in the Motion
presently before the Court. Instead, she assumes that because the Defendant has failed to
oppose this lawsuit, the Court is a rubber stamp for whatever damages award she desires.
This is not so.
Plaintiff states that she has $35,000 in lost wages. (Doc. No. 16-1 at PageID 54.)
Yet she has not attached a paystub to show the Court what she was earning before her
discharge, she does not offer any explanation as to what time period this would cover, and
she fails to explain how she arrived at that number based on any tangible source of proof.
Similarly, Plaintiff states that, “$45,000 would adequately compensate me for my
emotional distress and allow me to continue my ongoing treatment plan.” (Id. at PageID
55.) While compensation for emotion distress is more difficult to quantify, her ongoing
treatment plan would surely have some sources of evidence to support this figure.
However, Plaintiff fails to attach any copays, insurance costs, medication costs, or any real
metric by which this Court could justify an award of $45,000.
The complete failure to provide any documentation in support of her damages
figure warrants denial of an award of damages in this case. See Flynn v. People’s Choice
Home Loans, Inc., 440 F. App’x 452, 456-57 (6th Cir. 2011) (affirming district court’s
denial of damages on default judgment where the plaintiff, “failed to establish any plausible
damages and claimed an enormous figure… unsupported by the documentation he
provided…”). Indeed, despite Plaintiff’s dilatory pursuit of a declaratory judgment in this
matter, the Court gave Plaintiff a second attempt to prove her damages with the specific
instruction to, “all accompanying evidence in support of its damages claim.” (Doc. No.
16-1 at PageID 55.) The burden rests solely on Plaintiff to prove her damages and she has

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failed to support her claim in any meaningful way. See Antoine, 66 F.3d at 110.
Plaintiff’s counsel did undertake marginally more effort to ensure he was awarded
his fee. He proposed that he should be awarded either 35% of the amount recovered or be
awarded his hourly rate of $300 per hour for 32.7 hours of work plus costs. (Doc. No. 16
at PageID 50-51.) The Court will not award attorney’s fees based on Plaintiff’s counsel’s
calculation of his hourly rate. Again, Plaintiff simply attaches a declaration stating he
worked 32.7 hours on this matter (Doc. No. 16-2 at PageID 58), but he does not attach any
proof to support that number. Similarly, if the Court were to award 35% of the gross
amount recovered, Plaintiff’s counsel would be entitled to $0 because $0 have been
recovered. Thus, even if the Court were to determine that attorney’s fees were warranted
under the ADA and Title VII, a decision within the district court’s discretion under 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k), the result would be the same.
The Clerk of Courts is direct to terminate this matter on the docket.
DONE and ORDERED in Dayton, Ohio, this Thursday, March 6, 2025.
s/Thomas M. Rose
________________________________
THOMAS M. ROSE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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