Hansbro v. White

Filing 20

DECISION AND ENTRY OVERRULING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION (DOC. # 19 ), TREATED AS A SUCCESSIVE MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT. Signed by Judge Walter H. Rice on 05/08/2024. (tp)(This document has been sent by regular mail to the party(ies) listed in the NEF that did not receive electronic notification.)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

WESTERN DIVISION (DAYTON)
ANTHONY L HANSBRO,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 3:23-CV-124
JUDGE WALTER H. RICE

V.

IAN WHITE,

MAGISTRATE JUDGE PETER B.

SILVAIN, JR.
Defendant.

DECISION

AND

ENTRY

OVERRULING

PLAINTIFF'S

MOTION

FOR

RECONSIDERATION (DOC. #19), TREATED AS A SUCCESSIVE MOTION
FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT

This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff Anthony Hansbro's ("Plaintiff" or
"Hansbro") Motion for Reconsideration. Doc. #19. The motion is Hansbro's most

recent attempt to have the Court alter or amend its prior order dismissing the case

for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Doc. #14. Hansbro's previous attempt was a
Pro Se Motion to File A[n] Appeal of the dismissal order. Doc. #16. After construing
the motion as one to alter or amend the dismissal order under Rule 59(e), the Court

ultimately overruled it as untimely. Doc. #17, PagelD #79.^
Hansbro's instant motion. Doc. #19, seeks the Court's reconsideration of its

previous order. Doc. #17, on the grounds that the Clerk of Courts failed to inform

^ Rule 59(e) requires that any motions seeking to alter or amend the Court's judgment must be filed
no later than twenty-eight (28) days after the judgment was entered. The order dismissing the case,
Doc. #14, was filed on Thursday, February 15, 2024. Hansbro's Pro Se Motion to File Appeal, Doc.
#16, was filed on Friday, March 15, 2024—twenty-nine (29) days later.

him of the deadline for his filing, Doc. #19 at PagelD #81,^ and asks that the Court
hear his appeal. Id. at PagelD #82.^
As the Court observed in its previous order, Doc. #17, despite holding pro se
parties "to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers,"
Er/ckson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam), pro se parties must still
meet normal procedural requirements. See McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106,

113 (1993) (quoting Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807, 826 (1980)).

Additionally, "the lenient treatment generally accorded to pro se litigants has limits."
Pilgrim v. Littiefieid, 92 F.3d 413, 416 (6th Cir. 1996)(citing Jourdan v. Jabe, 951
F.2d 108, 110 (6th Cir. 1991)). As the Court previously remarked, "Fed. R. Civ. P.
59(e) requires that 'motion[s] to alter or amend a judgment must be filed not later
than 28 days after the entry of the judgment.'" Doc. #17 (emphasis in original). The
Court cannot extend leniency afforded to pro se parties beyond what is allowed by
law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(2) (stating a court must not extend the time to act
under Rule[] . . . 59[(e)]" (emphasis added).

2 Hansbro also asks the Court to adopt the "mailbox rule" from contract law as a rule of procedure
to find that his filing was timely. Doc. #19 at PagelD #81. However, the Court is bound by the time
requirements laid out in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and cannot switch an unapplicable rule
of law—i.e., the "mailbox rule"—for a statutory rule of procedure. See, e.g.. Fed. R. Civ. P. 6{a).

^ Because Hansbro is pro se, and because this Court lacks authority to hear an appeal of its own
orders, the instant motion will be construed as a Motion for Relief under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1),

which provides the Court with the discretionary ability to relieve a party from an order due to
"mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect[.]"

Hansbro's prior motion. Doc. #16/ was filed twenty-nine (29) days after the
Court's order dismissing the case. Doc. #14. This was one day in excess of what
Rule 59(e) allows, and the Court has no authority to alter or amend the deadline.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(2). Thus, the motion was untimely, and the Court overruled
the motion. Doc. #17.

Hansbro's instant request for the Court to reconsider its prior order. Doc. #17,
is without legal merit. First, motions for reconsideration are not a proper avenue for
relief under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, so the Court must construe

Hansbro's self-titled "Motion for Reconsideration upon appeal case 3;23-cv-124
[sic]," Doc. #19, as either a Rule 59(e) or Rule 60(b) post-judgment motion. As

previously stated. Rule 59(e) motions are limited to final judgments and must be filed
no later than twenty-eight (28) days after the entry of final judgment. Rule 60

motions, on the other hand, must only be brought "within a reasonable time."® Since
the Court's previous order addressed Hansbro's prior motion under Rule 59(e), see
Doc. #17, and because his present motion. Doc. #19, is seeking relief from that
order, the Court will construe said motion as one seeking relief under Rule 60(b).

^ Both the prior motion, Doc. #16, and the instant motion, Doc. #19, contain language seeking for
the Court to review Hansbro's appeal of the order dismissing the case for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. Doc. #14. The District Court does not have the authority to hear an appeal from Hansbro
on the instant matter, see 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and any attempt at appellate review must be sought in
the proper Circuit Court of Appeals. Id. at § 1294, see also Fed. R. App. P. 3.

® Rule 60(b) motions must still be brought within a year if the justification is covered by subsections
(1)-(3), namely for "mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect . . . newly discovered
evidence. . . [or] fraud."

Rule 60(b) provides that "the court may relieve a party . . . from a[n] . . .
order" under a select few scenarios, (emphasis added). However, the only ones
relevant to Hansbro's prior motion are "mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable
neglect," or for "any other reason that justifies relief." Rule 60(b)(1) & (b)(6). That
said, even if the Court were to grant Hansbro discretionary relief from the prior order

due to the excusable neglect of filing of his filings "being 1 [sic] day late," Doc. #19,
PagelD #82, that would only resurrect his previous request seeking to alter or amend

the order dismissing his case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Doc. #16
(seeking relief from Doc. #14).
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 69(e), a motion to alter or amend a final

judgment must identify "(1) a clear error of law; (2) newly discovered evidence; (3)
an intervening change in controlling law; or (4) a need to prevent manifest injustice."

ACLU of Ky. v. McCreary Cnty., 607 F.Sd 439, 450 (6th Cir. 2010)(quoting Intera
Corp. V. Henderson, 428 F.3d 605, 620 (6th Cir. 2005)). Neither Hansbro's prior
motion nor his present motion identified any errors of law, newly discovered
evidence, or intervening changes in the law that provide legal grounds for a

reconsideration of the Court's prior order. See generally Doc. #16.
That leaves "manifest injustice," which Black's Law Dictionary defines as
"[a]n error in the trial court that is direct, obvious, and observable, such as a

defendant's guilty plea that is involuntary or that is based on a plea agreement that

the prosecution rescinds." 982 (8th ed. 2004). One reading of Hansbro's instant
motion might be that reconsidering the Court's dismissal order would redress the
4

manifest injustice of not allowing him to seek "justice from a neurosurgeon who
destroyed [his] life FOREVER" just because of a single day delay in filing. Doc. #19
at PagelD ##81-82 (emphasis in original). However, even if the Court were to
construe Hansbro's motion to make that argument, it would still fail. Hansbro's

original post-judgment motion attempted to describe fundamental concepts of

jurisdiction,® but it presented no valid arguments for why the Court should reconsider
its finding that the Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over his medical
malpractice claim. See generally Doc. #16.
Briefly, in the context of judicial proceedings, jurisdiction is "[a] court's power
to decide a case or issue a decree." Jurisdiction, Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed.
2019). Because the Court is a part of the federal court system, the Court's
jurisdiction is limited.

The provisions of the U.S. Constitution specify the outer limits of the
subject-matter jurisdiction of the federal courts and authorize Congress,
within those limits, to establish by statute the organization and
jurisdiction of the federal courts. Thus, Article III of the Constitution
defines the judicial power of the United States to include cases arising
under federal law and cases between parties of diverse state citizenship
as well as other categories.
Id. (quoting Fleming James Jr., Geoffrey C. Hazard Jr. & John Leubsdorf, Civil
Procedure § 2.1, at 55 (5th ed. 2001)). Stated another way, unless a party can

® Hansbro's motion. Doc. #16, tries to vaguely describe the concepts of exclusive, concurrent, and
supplemental jurisdiction before "[hjumbly request[ing] that this federal court adopt the notion of
jurisdiction in his [flavor by adopting . . . Exclusive Jurisdiction." Id. at PagelD #72. Hansbro also
asks the Court to pursue "any other possible way to reopen the case," id. at PagelD #73; however,
he does not indicate what that might entail aside from the aforementioned exclusive and concurrent
jurisdictional assertions.

show that their case falls within the narrow boundaries required by the Constitution,
a federal court cannot hear the case and it must be dismissed. Hansbro is seeking a
legal recourse for physical injuries and conditions arising from the alleged medical
malpractice of Defendant Ian White. While he is correct that a certificate of merit is
not required to proceed on a medical malpractice suit in federal court, see Gallivan

V. United States, 943 F.Sd 291, 293 (6th Cir. 2019),^ that is only a side issue in the
overall question of subject matter jurisdiction.
As a threshold matter, subject matter jurisdiction is the foundation upon which
any case must rest. If a court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, it has no authority to
hear the case, and thus it cannot issue an opinion or enforce a judgment on anything
related to the case. The Court cannot exercise jurisdiction over a question of state
law, such as medical malpractice, unless it has a legal basis for doing so. This can
happen in one of three broad ways: (1) the claim involves a federal law equivalent
to medical malpractice, or involves a suit against the federal government for acting
in the capacity of a medical provider, i.e., federal question jurisdiction; see, e.g.,
Gallivan, 943 F.3d 291 (involving a medical malpractice suit by a federal prisoner

against the federal government under the Federal Tort Claims Act); (2) the claim is
brought by a citizen of one state against a citizen of another state, i.e., diversity

jurisdiction; see, e.g., Albright v. Christensen, 24 F.4th 1039, 1042 (6th Cir. 2022)
(involving a medical malpractice suit between an Ohio patient and a Michigan medical

'
This contrasts with the standards for pleadings filed in state court, where Ohio Civ. R. 10(D)(2)(a)
requires that "a complaint that contains a medical claim .. . as defined in B.C. 2305.113, shall be
accompanied by one or more affidavits of merit . . . provided by an expert witness."

provider); or (3) the claim is brought alongside other interrelated claims which have

already provided the Court with jurisdiction to hear the case, i.e., supplemental
jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367. Unlike diversity and federal jurisdiction,
supplemental jurisdiction is not an independent legal basis for the Court to hear a
claim. Instead, it is used as a supplement to introduce other claims after diversity or
federal jurisdiction is established. Regrettably, despite the severity of the issues
Hansbro has presented to the Court, none of his facts or arguments provide the
Court with the legal basis to hear his case. No federal law is involved, and no federal
medical provider is being sued. Both Hansbro and the Defendant are residents of
Ohio, so there is no legal diversity between the parties. So, without any of those
grounds being satisfied, there is no other legal basis for the Court to hear Hansbro's

medical malpractice claims on supplemental jurisdictional grounds.
For the forgoing reasons. Plaintiff's motion to reconsider. Doc. #19, treated
as a Motion for Relief under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1), is OVERRULED. The Court's

prior orders. Docs. ##14 & 17, stand: the motion to alter or amend is dismissed as

untimely, and the case is dismissed without prejudice to its being refiled in a state
court of competent jurisdiction, with a Certificate of Merit, and in accordance with
applicable state statutes of limitation.

Date: May 8, 2024

in
WALTER H. RICE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE