Mooney v. Social Security Administration
Filing
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OPINION AND ORDER by Magistrate Judge Steven P. Shreder granting 27 Motion for Attorney Fees by Michael W. Mooney. (ndd, Deputy Clerk)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
MICHAEL W. MOONEY,
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
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v.
)
)
CAROLYN W. COLVIN,
)
Acting Commissioner of the Social )
Security Administration,
)
)
Defendant.
)
Case No. CIV-10-185-SPS
OPINION AND ORDER AWARDING
ATTORNEY’S FEES UNDER 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)
The Plaintiff appealed the decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security
Administration denying his request for benefits. The Court reversed the Commissioner’s
decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. On remand, the Administrative
Law Judge (“ALJ”) found that the Plaintiff was disabled and awarded him over
$149,797.00 in past-due benefits. The Plaintiff’s attorney now seeks an award of fees
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1). For the reasons set forth below, the Court finds that
the Motion for an Award of Attorney Fees Under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) [Docket No. 27]
should be granted and that Plaintiff’s attorney should be awarded $23,500.00 in
attorney’s fees.
When “a court renders a judgment favorable to a claimant under this subchapter
who was represented before the court by an attorney, the court may determine and allow
as part of its judgment a reasonable fee for such representation, not in excess of 25
percent of the total of the past-due benefits to which the claimant is entitled by reason of
such judgment[.]” 42 U.S.C. 406(b)(1)(a). The 25% does not include any fee awarded
by the Commissioner for representation in administrative proceedings pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 406(a). Wrenn v. Astrue, 525 F.3d 931, 937 (10th Cir. 2008) (“Based on the
plain language and statutory structure found in § 406, the 25% limitation on fees for court
representation found in § 406(b) is not itself limited by the amount of fees awarded by the
Commissioner.”). The amount requested in this case is $23,500.00, approximately 16%
of the Plaintiff’s past-due benefits in accordance with the applicable attorney fee
agreement, and the motion was timely filed within thirty days following the attorney’s
receipt of the Notice of Award and issuance of a status letter to Plaintiff’s attorney.1 See
Harbert v. Astrue, 2010 WL 3238958 at *1 n. 4 (E.D. Okla. Aug. 16, 2010) (slip op.)
(“The Court notes here that while no explanation is needed for a Section 406(b)(1)
motion filed within thirty days of issuance of the notice of appeal, lengthier delays will
henceforth be closely scrutinized for reasonableness, including the reasonableness of
efforts made by appellate attorneys to obtain a copy of any notice of award issued to
separate agency counsel.”). See also McGraw v. Barnhart, 450 F.3d 493, 504-505 (10th
Cir. 2006) (“Section 406(b) itself does not contain a time limit for fee requests. . . . We
believe that the best option in these circumstances is for counsel to employ Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6) in seeking a § 406(b)(1) fee award.”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c)(1)
1
The Notice of Award in this case was issued July 30, 2014, but because counsel did not
represent the claimant at the administrative level, he did not receive a copy of the Notice of
Award until October 7, 2015. Upon receipt of the Notice of Award, Counsel filed an unopposed
motion (Docket No. 25) for an additional thirty days in which to file for attorney’s fees, which
this Court granted on October 13, 2015 (Docket No. 26).
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(“A motion under Rule 60(b) must be made within a reasonable time[.]”). The Court
therefore need only determine if this amount is reasonable for the work performed in this
case. Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 807 (2002) (“[Section] 406(b) does not
displace contingent-fee agreements as the primary means by which fees are set for
successfully representing Social Security benefits claimants in court. Rather, § 406(b)
calls for court review of such arrangements as an independent check, to assure that they
yield reasonable results in particular cases.”).
Factors to consider include: (i) the
character of the representation and results achieved, (ii) whether any dilatory conduct
might allow attorneys to “profit from the accumulation of benefits during the pendency of
the case in court[,]” and (iii) whether “the benefits are [so] large in comparison to the
amount of time counsel spent on the case” that a windfall results. Id. at 808, citing
McGuire v. Sullivan, 873 F.2d 974, 983 (7th Cir. 1989) (reducing fees for substandard
work); Lewis v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, 707 F.2d 246, 249-50 (6th Cir.
1983) (same); Rodriguez v. Bowen, 865 F.2d 739, 746-47 (6th Cir. 1989) (noting fees are
appropriately reduced when undue delay increases past-due benefits or fee is
unconscionable in light of the work performed); Wells v. Sullivan, 907 F.2d 367, 372
(2nd Cir. 1990) (court should consider “whether the requested amount is so large as to be
a windfall to the attorney”). Contemporaneous billing records may be considered in
determining reasonableness. Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 808 (“[T]he court may require the
claimant’s attorney to submit, not as a basis for satellite litigation, but as an aid to the
court’s assessment of the reasonableness of the fee yielded by the fee agreement, a record
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of the hours spent representing the claimant and a statement of the lawyer’s normal
hourly billing charge for noncontingent-fee cases.”), citing Rodriguez, 865 F.2d at 741.
Based on the factors enunciated in Gisbrecht, the Court concludes that $23,500.00
in attorney’s fees is reasonable for the work done in this case. First, the attorney ably
represented the Plaintiff in his appeal to this Court and obtained excellent results on his
behalf, i. e., a reversal of the Commissioner’s decision denying benefits and remand for
further consideration. The Plaintiff’s success on appeal enabled him not only to prevail
in his quest for social security benefits, but also to obtain $6,475.00 in attorney’s fees as
the prevailing party on appeal under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C.
§ 2412(d), which will essentially reduce any amount awarded from his past-due benefits
pursuant to Section 406(b). Second, there is no evidence that the Plaintiff’s attorneys
caused any unnecessary delay in these proceedings. Third, the requested fee does not
result in any windfall to the Plaintiff’s attorneys, who spent a total of 37.6 hours on this
appeal. See Docket No. 28, Ex. 1. This would equate to a rate of $625.00 per hour at
most, which is hardly excessive given that the fee was contingent and the risk of loss was
not negligible. The Court therefore concludes that the requested fee of $23,500.00 is
reasonable within the guidelines set by Gisbrecht.
The status letter to the Plaintiff’s counsel reflects that the Commissioner withheld
$37,449.25 from the Plaintiff’s past-due benefits for payment of attorneys’ fees,
including $6,000 that has previously been paid to the Plaintiff’s representative at the
agency level. It thus appears from the record that the Commissioner retains sufficient
funds to pay the $23,500.00 awarded to the Attorney herein. But if for any reason the
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Commissioner does not have sufficient funds on hand, the Plaintiff’s attorneys must
recover any balance due from the Plaintiff herself, not from her past-due benefits. See
Wrenn, 525 F.3d at 933 (“If the amount withheld by the Commissioner is insufficient to
satisfy the amount of fees determined reasonable by the court, the attorney must look to
the claimant, not the past-due benefits, to recover the difference.”). Furthermore, because
the $23,500.00 awarded herein pursuant to Section 406(b)(1) exceeds the $6,475.00
previously awarded to the Plaintiff under the EAJA, the Plaintiff’s attorneys must refund
the latter amount to the Plaintiff. See Weakley v. Bowen, 803 F.2d 575, 580 (10th
Cir.1986).
Accordingly, the Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorney Fees Pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 406(b) [Docket No. 27] is hereby GRANTED. The Court approves an award of
attorney fees in the amount of $23,500.00 to the Plaintiff’s attorney pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 406(b)(1), and directs the Commissioner to pay to the Plaintiff’s attorney the balance of
any past-due benefits in her possession up to said amount. The Plaintiff’s attorney shall
thereupon refund to the Plaintiff the full amount previously awarded under the EAJA.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 24th day of November, 2015.
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