Rankin v. Social Security Administration
Filing
19
OPINION AND ORDER by Magistrate Judge Steven P. Shreder reversing and remanding the decision of the ALJ (Re: 2 Social Security Complaint) (dma, Deputy Clerk)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
DONNA RANKIN,
Plaintiff,
v.
MICHAEL J. ASTRUE,
Commissioner of the Social
Security Administration,
Defendant.
)
)
)
)
) Case No. CIV-10-260-SPS
)
)
)
)
)
)
OPINION AND ORDER
The claimant Donna Rankin requests judicial review of a denial of benefits by the
Commissioner of the Social Security Administration pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). She
appeals the Commissioner’s decision and asserts the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”)
erred in determining she was not disabled.
For the reasons set forth below, the
Commissioner’s decision is hereby REVERSED and REMANDED to the ALJ for further
proceedings.
Social Security Law and Standard of Review
Disability under the Social Security Act is defined as the “inability to engage in
any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or
mental impairment[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). A claimant is disabled under the
Social Security Act “only if h[er] physical or mental impairment or impairments are of
such severity that [s]he is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering
h[er] age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful
work which exists in the national economy[.]” Id. § 423 (d)(2)(A). Social security
regulations implement a five-step sequential process to evaluate a disability claim. See
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920.1
Section 405(g) limits the scope of judicial review of the Commissioner’s decision
to two inquiries: whether the decision was supported by substantial evidence and whether
correct legal standards were applied. See Hawkins v. Chater, 113 F.3d 1162, 1164 (10th
Cir. 1997). Substantial evidence is “‘more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’”
Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971), quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v.
NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938). See also Clifton v. Chater, 79 F.3d 1007, 1009 (10th
Cir. 1996). The Court may not reweigh the evidence or substitute its discretion for the
Commissioner’s. See Casias v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, 933 F.2d 799,
800 (10th Cir. 1991). But the Court must review the record as a whole, and “[t]he
substantiality of evidence must take into account whatever in the record fairly detracts
1
Step One requires the claimant to establish that she is not engaged in substantial gainful
activity. Step Two requires the claimant to establish that she has a medically severe impairment
(or combination of impairments) that significantly limits her ability to do basic work activities.
If the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful activity, or her impairment is not medically
severe, disability benefits are denied. If she does have a medically severe impairment, it is
measured at step three against the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpt. P, App. 1. If
the claimant has a listed (or “medically equivalent”) impairment, she is regarded as disabled and
awarded benefits without further inquiry. Otherwise, the evaluation proceeds to step four, where
the claimant must show that she lacks the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to return to her
past relevant work. At step five, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to show there is
significant work in the national economy that the claimant can perform, given her age,
education, work experience, and RFC. Disability benefits are denied if the claimant can return to
any of her past relevant work or if her RFC does not preclude alternative work. See generally
Williams v. Bowen, 844 F.2d 748, 750-51 (10th Cir. 1988).
-2-
from its weight.” Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 488 (1951). See also
Casias, 933 F.2d at 800-01.
Claimant’s Background
The claimant was born April 15, 1957, and was fifty-two years old at the time of
the administrative hearing (Tr. 122). She completed her GED (Tr. 136), and has worked
as clerical/receptionist, delivery driver, and data entry (Tr. 17, 37). The claimant alleged
that she has been unable to work since July 1, 2005, due to congestive heart failure,
arthritis, carpal tunnel, depression, anxiety, high blood pressure, and a knee injury. (Tr.
24, 123, 131).
Procedural History
On December 21, 2006, the claimant applied for disability insurance benefits
under Title II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-434 (Tr. 106-110).2 Her
application was denied. ALJ Deborah L. Rose conducted an administrative hearing and
determined that the claimant was not disabled in a written opinion dated June 8, 2009.
(Tr. 9-18). The Appeals Council denied review; thus, the ALJ’s written opinion is the
Commissioner’s final decision for purposes of this appeal. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.981.
Decision of the Administrative Law Judge
The ALJ made her decision at step five of the sequential evaluation. She found
that, through the claimant’s date last insured, she had the residual functional capacity
(RFC) to perform a full range of sedentary work, i. e., she could lift no more than 10
2
The claimant also applied for, and was awarded, supplemental security income benefits
as of December 21, 2006. (Tr. 21).
-3-
pounds at a time, and occasionally lift/carry docket files, ledgers, and small tools. The
ALJ imposed the additional limitations of only occasionally crawling, kneeling,
crouching, climbing, or handling. (Tr. 13). The ALJ concluded that, although the
claimant could not return to her past relevant work, she was nevertheless not disabled
because there was work she could perform, e. g., information clerk, telephone soliciting,
and semi-conductor loader. (Tr. 17-18).
Review
The claimant contends that the ALJ erred (i) by failing to properly determine her
RFC, because the ALJ included no limitation on the her fingering capacity; (ii) by failing
to perform a proper credibility analysis; and (iii) by finding at step five that she could do
the job of information clerk, which requires no fingering, because the job does not exist
in sufficient numbers. The Court finds the claimant’s second contention persuasive, and
the decision of the Commissioner must therefore be reversed.
The ALJ found that the claimant had the severe impairments of congestive heart
failure, degenerative joint disease in the right knee and right radio-carpal joint, and that
she had nonsevere depression. (Tr. 11). The claimant had complaints of right knee pain
as early as November 2002, and a November 2004 MRI revealed substantial non-surgical
damage. (Tr. 170, 176). The same November 2004 exam as discussed above revealed
that the claimant had “marked tenderness over the dorsum of the hand with substantial
reduction in the mobility at the wrist and each finger.” (Tr. 177). In October 2006, the
claimant had x-rays of her right wrist, which indicated generalized osteopenia, deformity
of the distal radius suggesting a healed fracture, and a chronic ulnar styloid fracture, as
-4-
well as degenerative change of the radiocarpal joint with joint space narrowing. (Tr.
230). A February 2007 screening of the claimant’s right wrist revealed severe joint space
narrowing identified at the radiocarpal joint, with subarticular sclerosis and submarginal
osteophyte formation.
The impression was that the claimant had osteopenia,
osteoarthritis, and old healed trauma in her right wrist. (Tr. 218).
The claimant was also assessed on January 23, 2007 at CREOKS Mental Health
Services. She was assigned a Global Assessment of Functioning (“GAF”) score of 48,
and assessed as having a depressive disorder not elsewhere classified, as well as
generalized anxiety disorder. (Tr. 243). A state consultative examiner performed a
mental status exam on May 15, 2007, assigned the claimant a GAF of 55, and concluded
that “[f]rom a psychological standpoint, based on her reported symptoms, history, and
performance on this exam, her ability to perform adequately in most job situations,
handle the stress of a work setting and deal with supervisors or co-workers is estimated to
be low average. The examiner did not expect the claimant’s condition to improve
significantly in the next year. (Tr. 285).
At the administrative hearing, the claimant testified that she had broken her hand
in the fifth grade and again in 1982, that she struggles with numbness in her hands and
fingertips, that her right hand struggles with buttons and zippers, that she uses an aid to
remove lids from jars, and that she can only type for five to ten minutes. (Tr. 30-32). As
to her knee, she stated that she injured it in 2002, and there is no cartilage under the
kneecap; and that it hurts to walk on her knee, because it grinds. (Tr. 32-33).
-5-
Additionally, she testified that she struggles with shortness of breath, and struggles with
memory and concentration. (Tr. 34-35).
The claimant contends, inter alia, that the ALJ failed to properly analyze her
credibility with regard to the limiting nature of her condition. A credibility determination
is entitled to deference unless there is an indication the ALJ misread the medical evidence
taken as a whole. Casias v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, 933 F.2d 799, 801
(10th Cir. 1991). Further, an ALJ may disregard a claimant’s subjective complaints of
pain if unsupported by any clinical findings. Frey v. Bowen, 816 F.2d 508, 515 (10th Cir.
1987). But credibility findings “should be closely and affirmatively linked to substantial
evidence and not just a conclusion in the guise of findings.” Kepler v. Chater, 68 F.3d
387, 391 (10th Cir. 1995) [quotation omitted]. A credibility analysis “must contain
‘specific reasons’ for a credibility finding; the ALJ may not simply ‘recite the factors that
are described in the regulations.’” Hardman v. Barnhart, 362 F.3d 676, 678 (10th Cir.
2004), quoting Soc. Sec. Rul. 96-7p, 1996 WL 374186, at *4 (July 2, 1996).
The ALJ’s credibility analysis here was the following: “After careful consideration
of the evidence, I find that the claimant’s medically determinable impairments could
reasonably be expected to cause the alleged symptoms; however, the claimant’s
statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms
are not credible to the extent they are inconsistent with the above residual functional
capacity assessment.” (Tr. 16). The problem with this analysis (apart from vagueness) is
that the ALJ should have first evaluated the claimant’s testimony (along with all the other
evidence) according to the above guidelines and then formulated an appropriate RFC, not
-6-
the other way around, i. e., the ALJ apparently judged the credibility of the claimant’s
testimony by comparing it to a pre-determined RFC. The ALJ compounded this error by
failing to specify evidence that caused her to disbelieve the claimant, despite a lengthy
recitation of the evidence (including the testimony of the claimant). See Soc. Sec. Rul.
06-03p, 2006 WL 2329939, at * 2 (August 9, 2006) (“In addition to evidence from
‘acceptable medical sources,’ we may use evidence from ‘other sources,’ as defined in 20
CFR 404.1513(d) and 416.913(d), to show the severity of the individual's impairment(s)
and how it affects the individual's ability to function. These sources include, but are not
limited to: Medical sources who are not ‘acceptable medical sources,’ such as nurse
practitioners, physician assistants, licensed clinical workers, naturopaths, chiropractors,
audiologists, and therapists[.]”).
Because the ALJ failed to properly analyze the claimant’s credibility, the decision
of the Commissioner should be reversed and the case remanded to the ALJ for further
analysis. If such analysis results in any adjustments to the claimant’s RFC, the ALJ
should re-determine what work the claimant can perform, if any, and ultimately whether
she is disabled.
Conclusion
The Court hereby FINDS that correct legal standards were not applied by the ALJ,
and the Commissioner’s decision is therefore not supported by substantial evidence. The
Commissioner’s decision is accordingly REVERSED and the case REMANDED for
further proceedings consistent herewith.
-7-
DATED this 20th day of September, 2011.
-8-
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?