Spencer v. American Airlines, Inc. et al
Filing
23
OPINION AND ORDER by Judge Frank H. Seay granting 19 Motion to Dismiss. ; terminating party AMR, Inc., and American Airlines, Inc. (trl, Chambers)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
EASTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
CHARLES D. SPENCER,
)
)
)
)
) No. CIV-11-128-FHS
)
)
)
)
Plaintiff,
v.
AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC., et al.,
Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER
Defendants, American Airlines, Inc. (“American Airlines”) and
its parent company, AMR Corp. (“AMR”)1, have moved the Court to
dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint pursuant to Rules 8(a) and 12(b)(6)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
response in opposition.
Plaintiff has filed a
Having fully considered the motion and
Plaintiff’s response, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s Complaint
fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted as to
either American Airlines or AMR.
Consequently, American Airlines
and AMR are entitled to a dismissal of all claims asserted against
them by Plaintiff.
Under Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a
party asserting a claim must present in his pleading “a short and
plain statement of the claim showing that [he] is entitled to
relief.”
In the context of a complaint filed pro se by a party,
the Court must liberally construe the complaint in favor of the
Plaintiff, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), but the
Plaintiff cannot rely on “conclusory allegations without supporting
1
Defendants contend Plaintiff’s Complaint incorrectly
identifies AMR as “AMR, Inc.” rather than as “AMR Corp.”.
1
averments,” Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991),
and survive a properly supported motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
standard
under
Rule
8
“does
not
require
The pleading
‘detailed
factual
allegations,’ but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendantunlawfully-harmed-me accusation.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct.
1937, 1949 (2009)(quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 570 (2007)).
enhancement”
will
“Naked assertions” without any “further factual
not
suffice.
Twombly,
550
U.S.
at
557.
Likewise, “a pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not
do.’” Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
Under this pleading standard, “[f]actual allegations must be
enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level[.]”
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 545.
Pursuant to Rule 8, “[t]o survive a
motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (quoting Twombly,
550 U.S. at 570).
“The plausibility standard is not akin to a
‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer
possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.”
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
Id. (quoting
To satisfy this standard, Plaintiff
must “nudge[] [his] claims across the line from conceivable to
plausible.”
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.
The Court has thoroughly reviewed the 10-page Complaint with
supporting documentation filed by Plaintiff.
For the most part,
the Complaint can be described as a disjointed and incoherent
recitation of unspecified violations related to the taking of
Plaintiff’s property.
“ADMIRALTY[,]
LIBEL
Plaintiff styles his Complaint as one in
OF
REVIEW
[,]
2
COMPLAINT
OF
INVOLUNTARY
SERVITUDE AND PEONAGE.
IN RE ALL PROPERTY AND RIGHTS TO PROPERTY
OF SPENCER THE ESTATE AND TRUST.”
In addition to naming American
Airlines and AMR as “Respondent/Libelants,” Plaintiff lists “Agents
for International Monetary Fund Internal Revenue Service, District
Director, Special Procedures Function Officer and Their Principal,
Governor of International Monetary Fund a/k/a Secretary of the
Treasury” as “Respondent/Libelants.”
The Complaint references
numerous amendments to the United States Constitution and sections
of the United States Code, as well as unspecified “Foreign Law,”
and the “Law of Nations.”
The only semblance of a claim against American Airlines and
AMR to be found in the Complaint comes from a review of a portion
of paragraph seven wherein Plaintiff, an American Airlines retiree,
alleges “American Airlines, Inc. . . . unlawfully suspended vested
flight privileges of Petitioner/Claimant for refusing to fill out
IRS Form 4669 . . . .”
It is further alleged that agents of
American Airlines “are committing a Dishoner of Contract against
Petitioner by denying logging into the Retiree’s Jet Net web site
. . . .”
Plaintiff cites 42 U.S.C. § 1986 as an “Action for
neglect to prevent.”2
2
From these statements, the Court concludes
42 U.S.C. § 1986 provides, in relevant part:
Every person who, having knowledge that any
of the wrongs conspired to be done, and
mentioned in section 1985 of this title, are
about to be committed, and having power to
prevent or aid in preventing the commission
of the same, neglects or refuses so to do, if
such wrongful act be committed, shall be
liable to the party injured, or his legal
representatives, for all damages caused by
such wrongful conduct, which such person by
reasonable diligence could have prevented; .
. . .
3
Plaintiff
is
attempting
to
bring
an
action
against
American
Airlines and its parent company, AMR, under § 1986 for failing to
prevent some unidentified conspiracy against him aimed at denying
him the flight privileges afforded to American Airlines’ retirees.
Such allegations, however, do not invoke the protections afforded
under § 1986.
The language of § 1986 authorizes “an action against a party
who knows that a § 1985(3) violation will occur, has the power to
prevent it, and fails to do so.”
O’Connor v. St. John’s College,
290 Fed. Appx. 137, 141 (10th Cir. 2008).
A conspiracy to
violate
a person’s civil rights is remediable under § 1985(3).3
“The
essential elements of a § 1985(3) claim are: (1) a conspiracy; (2)
to deprive plaintiff of equal protection or equal privileges and
immunities; (3) an act in furtherance of the conspiracy; and (4) an
injury or deprivation resulting therefrom.
Tilton v. Richardson,
6 F.3d 683, 686 (10th Cir. 1993)(citing Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403
U.S. 88, 102-03 (1971)).
1985(3).
otherwise
Only
those
class-based,
Not all conspiracies are covered by §
motivated
by
invidiously
“some
racial,
discriminatory
or
perhaps
animus”
are
within the scope of the protections afforded under § 1985(3).
Griffin, 403 U.S. at 101-02.
Plaintiff’s complaint contains no
allegations of racial or class-based discriminatory animus as
required under § 1985(3).
Consequently, Plaintiff’s complaint
fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under §
1985(3). Likewise, no § 1986 claim has been stated by Plaintiff as
3
Plaintiff does not assert any of the provisions of § 1985
in his Complaint. The Court’s liberal construction of the
Complaint recognizes § 1985(3) as the applicable provision. The
provisions of § 1985(1) addressing the prevention of United
States officers from performing duties and § 1985(2) addressing
obstruction of justice and intimidating a party, witness, or
juror do not appear to apply herein.
4
a precondition to a valid § 1986 claim is the existence of a valid
Abercrombie v. City of Catoosa, Okl., 896 F.2d
§ 1985(3) claim.
1228, 1230 (10
th
Cir. 1990).
In sum, Plaintiff has failed to state
an actionable claim against either American Airlines or AMR.
Plaintiff’s response does not address the arguments asserted
by American Airlines and AMR in their motion.
Rather, Plaintiff
avoids any discussion of a claim under § 1986 and asserts that
“this is a proceeding in admiralty,” Plaintiff’s Response (Dkt. No.
22) at 2 (emphasis in original), and that American and AMR are
bound by an “administrative judgment issued by notary public,
Brenda
G.
Mann
on
or
about
October
14,
2010,”
id.
at
3.4
Plaintiff’s references to admiralty jurisdiction do not save his
Complaint with respect to American Airlines and AMR.
The bare
assertion of “admiralty jurisdiction” and the invocation of Rule
9(h)
do
not
jurisdiction.
transform
this
matter
into
one
of
admiralty
Nothing has been alleged by Plaintiff to show that
this matter concerns maritime activity or admiralty matters.
See
Jerome B. Gruhart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock, 513 U.S. 527,
531-32 (1995)(in order to invoke admiralty jurisdiction a plaintiff
must
satisfy
“connection”
the
two-part
conditions
test
with
involving
respect
to
the
“location”
maritime
and
activity).
Neither the suspension of flight privileges nor the nonsensical
assertion of the binding effect of an “administrative judgment
issued by [a] notary public” in any way relate to navigable waters
or traditional maritime activities.
4
Admiralty jurisdiction is referenced by Plaintiff in the
Complaint. Plaintiff contends this is a proceeding in admiralty
and that it involves an “admiralty/maritime cause of action
within the meaning of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 9(h).
Complaint, ¶ 2.
5
Based on the foregoing reasons, the Motion to Dismiss (Dkt.
No. 19) filed by American Airlines and AMR is granted and this
action is ordered dismissed as to American Airlines and AMR.
It is so ordered this 4th day of October, 2011.
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