Tate et al v. Statco Engineering, Inc. et al

Filing 190

OPINION AND ORDER by District Judge James H. Payne: granting in part and denying in part 80 Motion in Limine; granting in part and denying in part 106 Motion in Limine; granting in part and denying in part 131 Motion to Exclude Testimony; granting in part and denying in part 162 Motion to Strike or Exclude Evidence; granting 176 Motion in Limine; denying 178 Motion to Permit Jury to View Scene (cjt, Deputy Clerk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
EDISON C. TATE, individually,
and Gayle J. Tate, individually, as the
spouse of Edison C. Tate,
Plaintiffs,
v.
STATCO ENGINEERING AND
FABRICATORS, INC., and
PROCESS AUTOMATION DESIGN,
INC. d/b/a PROCESS AUTOMATION,
INC.,
Defendants,

SIGMA PROCESSED MEATS, INC.
and COMMERCE & INDUSTRY
INSURANCE COMPANY,
Intervenor Plaintiffs.

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Case No. 12-CV-0002-JHP

OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court are Defendant Statco Engineering and Fabricators, Inc’s (“Statco”)
Motion in Limine [Doc. No. 80]; Plaintiffs’ Motion in Limine [Doc. No. 106]; Statco’s Motion
to Exclude Testimony of J. Kenneth Blundell [Doc. No. 131]; Plaintiffs’ Motion to Strike or
Exclude Evidence Untimely Disclosed by Statco [Doc. No. 162]; Plaintiffs’ Motion in Limine
Regarding Defendant’s Trial Exhibit Numbers 45, 51, and 52 [Doc. No. 176] and Statco’s
Motion to Permit Jury to View Scene [Doc. No. 178]. Also before the Court are various legal

issues raised at the Pretrial Conference held on January 30, 2014, which were briefed in the
parties supplemental trial briefs.1 [See Doc. No. 173.]
BACKGROUND
The long procedural history of this case is detailed in the Court’s November 25, 2013
Opinion and Order. [See Doc. No. 119.] Following the Court’s November 25, 2013 Opinion and
Order denying Statco’s Motion for Summary Judgment, the Court held a Status and Scheduling
Conference on December 12, 2013. [Doc. No 124.] In light of the prolonged posture of the
case, the Court set the case for trial on the February 10, 2013 Trial Docket. [Doc. No. 125.] On
December 13, 2013, the Court entered an Order outlining the following deadlines:
Motions in Limine and Daubert issues to be filed by 12/19/2013, with responses
by 12/27/2013; Final Exhibit Lists to be filed and exhibits exchanged by
1/15/2014; Agreed Jury Instructions due by 1/15/2014; Trial Briefs (to include
disputed jury instruction issues) due by 1/15/2014; Designations and CounterDesignations due by 1/15/2014 and objections due by 1/18/2014; Agreed Pretrial
Order due by 1/27/2014. Pretrial Conference is set for 1/30/2014 at 10:00 AM in
Chambers, Room 201, US Courthouse, 5th & Okmulgee, Muskogee, OK before
District Judge James H. Payne. Jury Trial is set for 2/10/2014 at 9:00 AM in
Courtroom 1, Room 230, US Courthouse, 5th & Okmulgee, Muskogee, OK
before District Judge James H. Payne.
[Doc. No. 125.] Despite having agreed to a February 10, 2014 trial date, Statco filed a Motion
for Continuance of Trial Date and Entry of New Scheduling Order [Doc. No. 130] one week
after the Status and Scheduling Conference. On January 3, 2014, after considering the parties’
arguments on the matter, the Court denied Statco’s request to continue the trial. [Doc. No. 137.]

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  On  January  15,  2014,  Statco  filed  its  first  Trial  Brief  [Doc.  No.  148],  wherein  it  included  only  four  sentences 
regarding its theory of the case.  The Court noted the unhelpful nature of this brief at the January 30, 2014 Pretrial 
Conference, and directed Statco to submit a more detailed trial brief.  On February 5, 2014, Statco submitted its 
Extended Trial Brief [Doc. No. 184], which failed to include any information regarding Statco’s theory of the case.  
While Statco may regard a proper trial brief as perfunctory, information regarding Statco’s theory of the case is 
necessary for the Court’s trial preparation.  Statco is hereby directed to file a proper trial brief laying out its theory 
of  the  case  in  a  manner  that  would  be  helpful  to  the  Court’s  preparation  for  trial  no  later  than  9:00  a.m.  on 
February 10, 2013. 

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On January 27, 2014, the parties submitted an Agreed Pretrial Order to the Court for
consideration. After an exhaustive review of the Agreed Pretrial Order, the Court identified
numerous concerns with the Agreed Pretrial Order. On January 30, 2014, the parties appeared
for the Pretrial Conference, at which the Court thoroughly reviewed these issues with the parties.
The Court also viewed some of the demonstrative evidence Statco intended to present at trial,
including three computer generated animations created by Fearless Eye. Furthermore, the Court
directed the parties to re-submit a Second Agreed Pretrial Order along with Amended Trial
Briefs addressing specific issues raised at the Pretrial Conference.
DISCUSSION
A. Statco’s Motions in Limine
The Court addressed the majority of the issues raised in Statco’s Motion at a hearing held
on February 4, 2014. [See Doc. No. 182.] The remaining issue is addressed below.
1. Prior Rulings, Statements, or Actions Made by the Court
The Court finds all prior rulings, statements, or actions inadmissible pursuant to Fed. R.
Evid. 401, 402, and 403. Accordingly, Statco’s Motion in Limine regarding exclusion of this
Court’s prior rulings, statements, or actions is GRANTED.
B. Plaintiffs’ Motions In Limine
The Court addressed the majority of the issues raised in Statco’s Motion at a hearing held
on February 4, 2014. [See Doc. No. 182.] The remaining issue is addressed below.
1. Reference to Anything Other than the Actual Billed Amount of Plaintiffs’ Medical
Expenses
It is undisputed that the amount billed to Plaintiff by medical providers was
approximately $440,000.00, but the amount actually paid and accepted by those providers
pursuant to the fee schedule developed by the Oklahoma Workers’ Compensation Court
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Administrator was only $257,868.12. The difference between the amount billed and the amount
paid is approximately $182,000, which has been ostensibly written off by the medical providers.
Statco argues that because Plaintiffs are not and have never been legally obligated to pay the
difference, Plaintiffs are not entitled to seek that amount in damages. Plaintiffs argue that they
are entitled to recover the amount billed pursuant to the collateral source rule.
The collateral source rule is probably best described in Denco Bus Lines v. Hargis, as
follows:
Upon commission of a tort it is the duty of the wrongdoer to answer for the
damages wrought by his wrongful act, and that is measured by the whole loss so
caused and the receipt of compensation by the injured party from a collateral
source wholly independent of the wrongdoer does not operate to lessen the
damages recoverable from the person causing the injury.
229 P.2d 560 (Okla. 1951). However, Oklahoma courts have not specifically addressed the issue
of whether the collateral source rule applies to Workers’ Compensation Court write-offs.
Plaintiffs recognize that there is no Oklahoma authority addressing this issue, but argue
that “Oklahoma decisions generally apply the collateral source rule broadly in favor of a plaintiff
and exclude evidence of an alternative or collateral source that would lessen a plaintiff’s
damages.” (Doc. No. 180, 2) (citing Blythe v. Univ. of Okla., 82 P.3d 1021, 1026-27 (Okla.
2003) (applying collateral source rule in Workers’ Compensation Court to exclude evidence that
injured worker’s medical expenses were paid by insurance); Porter v. Manes, 347 P.2d 210
(Okla. 1959) (evidence that a plaintiff’s damages have been reimbursed or lessened by a
contribution from a collateral source wholly independent of the defendant is not admissible);
Denco Bus Lines, 229 P.2d at 564 (insurance benefits paid for by the injured plaintiff and not
contributed to by the defendant are a collateral source)).
specifically address Workers’ Compensation write-offs.

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None of these cases, however,

With regard to other statutory schemes that reduce the amount recoverable by medical
care providers, many courts have refused to apply the collateral source rule. See Michael W.
Cromwell, Comment, Cutting the Fat out of Health–Care Costs: Why Medicare and Medicaid
Write–Offs Should Not be Recoverable Under Oklahoma's Collateral Source Rule, 62 Okla.
L.Rev. 585, 595 (2010). In Compton v. Hale, a case involving Medicaid write-offs, the Court
held that “damages for medical care, treatment and services shall be limited to the medical
expenses actually paid by or on her behalf.” 2012 WL 5385680 (E.D. Okla. Oct. 2, 2012). The
Court finds this rationale persuasive, because to allow Plaintiffs to seek damages for medical
bills which never amounted to a legal obligation to pay would amount to a windfall in favor of
Plaintiffs. Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s may not present evidence of billed
amounts in support of compensatory damages. See Fed. R. Evid. 402, 403.
C. Statco’s Motion to Exclude Testimony of J. Kenneth Blundell
It is now well established that Fed. R. Evid. 702 imposes on a district court a gatekeeper
obligation to “ensure that any and all scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only
relevant, but reliable.” Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589, 113 S.Ct. 2786,
125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993). This gatekeeper function requires the judge to assess the reasoning and
methodology underlying the expert’s opinion, and determine whether it is both scientifically
valid and applicable to a particular set of facts. Id. at 592–93. The Supreme Court has made clear
that “where [expert] testimony’s factual basis, data, principles, methods, or their application are
called sufficiently into question ... the trial judge must determine whether the testimony has a
‘reliable basis in the knowledge and experience of [the relevant] discipline.’” Kumho Tire Co. v.
Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 149, 119 S.Ct. 1167, 143 L.Ed.2d 238 (1999)(quoting Daubert, 509
U.S. at 592).

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To be reliable under Daubert, an expert’s scientific testimony must be based on scientific
knowledge, which “implies a grounding in the methods and procedures of science” based on
actual knowledge, not “subjective belief or unsupported speculation.” 509 U.S. at 590. In other
words, “an inference or assertion must be derived by the scientific method ... [and] must be
supported by appropriate validation—i.e. ‘good grounds,’ based on what is known.” Id. “The
plaintiff need not prove that the expert is undisputably correct or that the expert’s theory is
‘generally accepted’ in the scientific community.” Mitchell v. Gencorp Inc., 165 F.3d 778, 781
(10th Cir. 1999). Instead, the plaintiff must show that the method employed by the expert in
reaching the conclusion is scientifically sound and that the opinion is based on facts which
satisfy Rule 702’s reliability requirements. Id.
To assist in the assessment of reliability, the Supreme Court has listed four nonexclusive
factors that the trial court may consider: (1) whether the opinion at issue is susceptible to testing;
(2) whether the opinion has been subjected to peer review; (3) whether there is a known or
potential rate of error associated with the methodology used and whether there are standards
controlling the technique’s operation; and (4) whether the theory has been accepted in the
scientific community. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593–94. As noted, the list is not exclusive, and
district courts applying Daubert have broad discretion to consider a variety of other factors.
Kuhmo Tire, 526 U.S. at 150. (“[W]e can neither rule out, nor rule in, for all cases and for all
time the applicability of the factors mentioned in Daubert ... Too much depends upon the
particular circumstances of the particular case at issue.”).
Generally, the district court should focus on an expert’s methodology rather than the
conclusions it generates. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595. However, an expert's conclusions are not
immune from scrutiny: “A court may conclude that there is simply too great an analytical gap

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between the data and the opinion proffered.” General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146, 118
S.Ct. 512, 139 L.Ed.2d 508 (1997)(“[N]othing in either Daubert or the Federal Rules of
Evidence requires a district court to admit opinion evidence which is connected to existing data
only by the ipse dixit of the expert.”). Under Daubert, “any step that renders the analysis
unreliable ... renders the expert's testimony inadmissible. This is true whether the step completely
changes a reliable methodology or merely misapplies that methodology.” Mitchell, 165 F.3d at
782 (quoting In re Paoli RR. Yard PCB Litigation, 35 F.3d 717, 745 (3d Cir. 1994). It is critical
that the district court determine “whether the evidence is genuinely scientific, as distinct from
being unscientific speculation offered by a genuine scientist.” Id. at 783 (quoting Rosen v. Ciba–
Geigy Corp., 78 F.3d 316, 318 (7th Cir. 1996). Regardless of the specific factors at issue, the
purpose of the Daubert inquiry is always “to make certain that an expert, whether basing
testimony upon professional studies or personal experience, employs in the courtroom the same
level of intellectual rigor that characterizes the practice of an expert in the relevant field.” Khumo
Tire, 526 U.S. at 152.
At a hearing held on February 4, 2014, the Court heard testimony from Dr. Blundell
regarding his qualifications and the methodology used to reach his conclusions. Further, the
Court asked the parties to submit supplemental briefs in light of the testimony given by Dr.
Blundell. The Court finds Dr. Blundell to be a highly qualified engineer, with experience and
training relevant to the issues in this case. The Court also finds the majority of Dr. Blundell’s
conclusions, including, but not limited to, the need for a redundant manual valve, to be based on
sufficiently reliable methodology—with the exception of Dr. Blundell’s opinion regarding the
reason for CV10101’s “transient fault.”

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Dr. Blundell’s testimony on the subject of CV10101’s failure revealed a glaring
analytical gap. Air-controlled valves, such as CV10101, are held shut by a powerful spring
attached to the valve and opened by pressurizing air contained in hoses also attached to the
valve. By design, when the Process System is powered down, the air pressure holding the valve
open is released and the force of the spring closes CV10101. In explaining CV10101’s failure
during the Daubert hearing, Dr. Blundell opined that debris from the process system prevented
the valve from closing, allowing the scalding water to escape. Dr. Blundell also explained that
the presence of debris could not be verified because it was likely washed away by the water
during the accident.

However, a photograph taken immediately after the accident shows

CV10101 open, even after all of the water had drained from the tank and the system is
purportedly powered down. Without debris or pressurized air to hold CV10101 open, logic
dictates that the powerful spring attached to CV10101 would have closed the valve. When asked
why the valve remained open under these circumstances, Dr. Blundell could offer no
explanation. Given the flawed logic underlying Dr. Blundell’s opinion regarding CV10101’s
temporary failure, the Court finds that Dr. Blundell’s opinions regarding CV10101’s “transient
fault” must be excluded.
Accordingly, the Court finds that Statco’s Motion to Exclude Testimony of J. Kenneth
Blundell [Doc. No. 131] is GRANTED in part, DENIED in part.
D. Plaintiffs’ Motion to Strike or Exclude Evidence Untimely Disclosed by Defendant2
1. Computer-Generated Animations
Statco wishes to utilize computer-generated animation to help the jury understand the
circumstance of Mr. Tate’s accident. At a hearing on the matter, Statco conceded that two of the

2

 Plaintiffs’ Motion to Strike or Exclude Evidence Untimely Disclosed by Defendant included a request to exclude 
certain  exhibits.    In  light  of  the  Court  rulings  since  the  Motion  was  filed,  Plaintiffs’  request  to  exclude  certain 
exhibits [Doc. No. 162, 5‐7] is STRICKEN, to be re‐urged at the time of trial if appropriate. 

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three animations, which endeavor to demonstrate the actions Mr. Tate should have taken in order
to avoid being injured on the day of his accident, should not be admitted due to the late
disclosure of these animations.
animation is admissible.

Therefore, the Court must only consider whether the first

Plaintiffs object to the use of this animation because it was not

disclosed in a timely manner and is not an accurate depiction of the conditions at the time of Mr.
Tate’s accident.
The party trying to use the animation should ensure its accuracy and allow all interested
parties—the court, the expert, and the opposing side—to satisfy themselves that the animation is
a trustworthy depiction, not a speculative re-enactment. See Illegality Defense to Action by
Commercial Landlord for Collection of Rent, 42 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 413 § 12. A
computer-generated video animation is admissible as demonstrative evidence when the
proponent shows the animation is authentic, relevant, fair, and accurate representation of the
evidence to which it relates, and its probative value substantially outweighs the danger of unfair
prejudice, confusing the issues, or misleading the jury. Clark v. Cantrell, 339 S.C. 369, 529
S.E.2d 528, 536 (2000).
The Court finds that Statco failed to establish that the animation is a fair representation of
the circumstances surrounding Mr. Tate’s injury.

Significantly, the animation emphasizes

certain sounds that should have alerted Mr. Tate that the process system was powered down.
However, it is undisputed that the noise level at the plant was significant enough to call Mr.
Tate’s ability to hear these noises into question. In fact, the parties agree that Sigma issued
employees ear plugs as a part of their personal protective equipment, which also suggests that
Mr. Tate would have been unable to hear the sounds emphasized in the animation. Therefore,

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the Court finds the animations inadmissible as demonstrative evidence. See Fed. R. Evid. 402,
403.
E. Plaintiffs’ Motion in Limine Regarding Defendant’s Trial Exhibit Numbers 45, 51, 52
Statco seeks to use a mock-up of the Process System (Exhibit No. 45), photographs of
Exemplar Mock-up (Exhibit No. 51), and a demonstration of fly wheel using model (Exhibit No.
52) as a demonstrative evidence at trial. Plaintiffs’ argue the mock-up is inadmissible due to
Statco’s untimely disclosure of the mock-up and the unrepresentative nature of the mock-up.
There is substantial disagreement regarding when Statco first made Plaintiffs aware of its intent
to use the mock-up.

However, it is undisputed that as of the January 30, 2014 Pretrial

Conference, the mock-up was not available for inspection by Plaintiffs, their counsel, or their
expert. While Statco arguably may have put Plaintiffs on notice that a mock-up of the Process
System was forthcoming, the specific nature and qualities of any such mock-up were not known
to Plaintiffs prior to the January 30, 2014 Pretrial Conference. Under these circumstances,
Plaintiffs had no opportunity to have the appropriate parties inspect the mock-up of the Process
System in order to verify its similarity to the actual Process System or challenge its use on other
grounds.3 These same concerns also apply to the photographs of and demonstration using the
Process System mock-up. Therefore, Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine Regarding Defendant’s Trial
Exhibit Numbers 45, 51, and 52 [Doc. No. 176] is GRANTED.
F. Issues Raised at the Pretrial Conference
1. OSHA Regulations and Investigation
Plaintiffs’ requests a ruling regarding the admissibility of OSHA regulations and
investigation reports. Plaintiff’s concede that “it may be proper to admit portions of OSHA

3

 The Court also notes that Plaintiffs’ expert, Dr. Blundell, is unavailable from January 30, 2014, until February 10, 
2014, the date this matter is set for trial, due to previously scheduled travel plans. 

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reports if this Court determines it is trustworthy pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 803 and that its
relevance outweighs the risk of [unfair] prejudice under Fed. R. Evid. 403.” [Doc. No. 180, 8.]
Due to the fact-specific nature of the issue of whether OSHA regulations or investigation reports
are admissible in this action, the Court reserves judgment on this issue until the time of trial.
2. Testimony of John D. Martins, Ph.D.
Plaintiffs seek to prevent Statco from calling John. D. Martins, Ph.D. as an expert witness
in this case. At the January 30, 2014 Pretrial Conference, Statco indicated its intent to rely on
the expert opinions of Dr. Martins. Dr. Martins was retained by Defendant Process Automation
Design, Inc. (“PAI”) and submitted an expert report as required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B) in
his capacity as an expert for PAI. Rule 26(a)(2) provides, in relevant part, the following:
(2)Disclosure of Expert Testimony.
(A) In General.In addition to the disclosures required by Rule 26(a)(1), a party
must disclose to the other parties the identity of any witness it may use at trial to
present evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 702, 703, or 705.
(B) Witnesses Who Must Provide a Written Report. Unless otherwise
stipulated or ordered by the court, this disclosure must be accompanied by a
written report—prepared and signed by the witness—if the witness is one retained
or specially employed to provide expert testimony in the case … .
The Court finds that while Dr. Martins was designated as an expert for PAI, he was never
properly designated as an expert for Statco as required by Rule 26(a)(2). As such, Plaintiffs were
not properly put on notice of the potential need to depose Dr. Martins or seek a rebuttal expert
with regard to Dr. Martins’ opinions in relation to the positions taken by Statco in this lawsuit.
Accordingly, the Court finds that Statco may not rely upon Dr. Martins to offer expert opinions,
as contemplated by Fed. R. Evid. 702, at trial.

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3. Sigma’s Accident Investigation
Plaintiffs seek to exclude evidence regarding Sigma’s investigation into Mr. Tate’s
accident.

Following Mr. Tate’s accident, Sigma conducted an accident investigation and

memorialized its results in an Sigma’s Supervisor’s Accident Investigation Report (“Accident
Investigation Report”) [Doc. No. 180, Ex. 3.] The Accident Investigation Report concludes that
the cause of the accident was Mr. Tate’s failure to drain the tank before working on the pump.
[Id.] The investigation and resulting report were prepared by Don Schiltz and James Trusley in
their capacity as Sigma employees.
Plaintiff objects to testimony or other evidence regarding this investigation on the
grounds that it is expert testimony under Fed. R. Evid. 702 and Statco failed to timely disclose
Messrs. Schiltz or Trusley as required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2). The Court finds that the
opinions of Messrs. Schiltz and Trusley regarding the ultimate cause of Mr. Tate’s accident are
expert opinions under Fed. R. Evid. 702. Consequently, because Statco did not comply with
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a), Messrs. Schiltz and Trusley may not testify as expert witnesses.
Accordingly, any reference to, testimony regarding, or admission of the Accident Investigation
Report is excluded.
G. Statco’s Motion to Permit the Jury to View the Scene
Statco requests permission from the Court to allow the jury to view the scene of
Plaintiff’s accident, as an alternative to allowing the use of Statco’s mock-up of the Process
System.

As outlined above, the Court finds that Statco’s mock-up is inadmissible as

demonstrative evidence, and, consequently, must now consider Statco’s request to allow the jury
to visit the Sigma plant in Seminole, Oklahoma.
While there is no specific federal rule with respect to permitting a jury to view the
premises of an accident, courts have long recognized their inherent power to grant inspection of
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premises. Fitzpatrick v. Sooner Oil Co., 212 F.2d 548 (10th Cir. 1954). Whether the jury is
permitted to view the scene of an accident outside the courtroom is a matter for the discretion of
the trial court. See United States v. Culpepper, 834 F.2d 879, 883 (10th Cir. 1987). A court
generally acts within that discretion in denying a motion for a view when there is sufficient
evidence describing the scene in the form of testimony, diagrams, or photographs. See United
States v. Pettiford, 962 F.2d 74, 76 (1st Cir. 1992); United States v. Drougas, 748 F.2d 8, 31 (1st
Cir. 1984).

In making this determination, the court should consider such factors as the

orderliness of the trial, whether the jury would be confused or misled without permitting the
view, whether it would be logistically difficult, who will pay for the transportation, and whether
cross-examination will be permitted regarding the details of the scene and/or object. See e.g.,
id.; United States v. Passos–Paternina, 918 F.2d 979, 986 (1st Cir. 1990); Bundy v. Dugger, 850
F.2d 1402, 1422 (11th Cir. 1988). In addition, the Court must consider whether alternative
means such as demonstrative exhibits, photographs, and/or diagrams are readily available to
assist the trier of fact. United States v. Crochiere, 129 F.3d 233, 236 (1st Cir. 1997).
Plaintiff opposes this request based primarily on safety, confidentiality and propriety
concerns, and expense. [Doc. No. 180, 13.] Furthermore, Sigma, through its General Counsel
Wade Swanson, has indicated to the parties that it strongly opposes such a visit for many of the
same reasons. [Id. at Ex. 13.] Mr. Swanson indicated that if the Court permitted a site visit,
Sigma would seek emergency reconsideration of the matter.

After considering all of the

circumstances of this case, the Court finds that allowing the jury to visit the Sigma plant is not
practically feasible or necessary. Accordingly, Statco’s Motion for Jury to Examine Scene [Doc.
No. 170] is DENIED.

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CONCLUSION
After review of the briefs, and for the reasons explained above, Statco Motion in Limine
[Doc. No. 80] is GRANTED in part, DENIED in part; Plaintiffs’ Motion in Limine [Doc. No.
106] is GRANTED in part, DENIED in part; Statco’s Motion to Exclude Testimony of J.
Kenneth Blundell [Doc. No. 131] is GRANTED in part, DENIED in part; Plaintiffs’ Motion
to Strike or Exclude Evidence Untimely Disclosed by Statco [Doc. No. 162] is GRANTED in
part, DENIED in part; Plaintiffs’ Motion in Limine Regarding Defendant’s Trial Exhibit
Numbers 45, 51, and 52 [Doc. No. 176] is GRANTED; and Statco’s Motion to Permit Jury to
View Scene [Doc. No. 178] is DENIED. Further, the Court’s rulings on various legal issues
raised at the Pretrial Conference held on January 30, 2014, and briefed in the parties
supplemental trial briefs are outlined above.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 7th day of February, 2014.

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