Aldaba v. Marshall County Board of County Commissioners et al
Filing
23
OPINION AND ORDER by Judge Frank H. Seay denying 15 Motion to Dismiss as to defendants, City of Madill, Brandon Pickens and James Fullingim (trl, Chambers)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
EASTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
ERMA ALDABA, personal representative
and next of kin to JOHNNY MANUEL
LEIJA, deceased,
Plaintiff,
v.
THE BOARD OF MARSHALL COUNTY
COMMISSIONERS; JAMES ATNIP;
STEVE BEEBE; Marshall County Sheriff
ROBERT WILDER, in his individual and
official capacity; THE CITY OF MADILL,
a municipal corporation; BRANDON
PICKENS; Madill Chief of Police JAMES
FULLINGIM, in his individual and
official capacity,
Defendants.
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) No. CIV-12-85-FHS
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OPINION AND ORDER
This is a civil rights action brought by Plaintiff, Erma
Aldaba, the personal representative of the estate of Johnny Manuel
Leija (“Leija”), for claimed violations of Leija’s Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendment rights.
Plaintiff also asserts pendent state
tort claims for negligence. Before the Court for its consideration
is the Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. No. 15) filed by Defendants, the
City of Madill (“the City”), Brandon Pickens (“Pickens”), and James
Fullingim (“Fullingim”).
Pickens, a police officer with the City,
contends he is entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiff’s civil
rights claims.
Fullingim, the Chief of Police for the City,
contends Plaintiff has failed to properly allege a failure to train
claim against him. Finally, the City contends Plaintiff has failed
to properly allege a claim for municipal liability and, further,
that it is immune from liability as to Plaintiff’s pendent state
1
law claim for negligence.1
Under Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a
party asserting a claim must present in her pleading “a short and
plain statement of the claim showing that [she] is entitled to
relief.”
When testing the sufficiency of a complaint, the Court
accepts the allegations of the complaint as true and views all
allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.
Stidham
v. Peach Officer Standards and Training, 265 F.3d 1144, 1149 (10th
Cir. 2001).
‘detailed
The pleading standard under Rule 8 “does not require
factual
allegations,’
but
it
demands
unadorned,
the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me
Ashcroft
Iqbal,
v.
129
S.Ct.
1937,
1949
more
than
an
accusation.”
(2009)(quoting
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
Bell
“Naked
assertions” without any “further factual enhancement” will not
suffice.
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557.
Likewise, “a pleading that
offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action will not do.’” Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at
1949 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
Under this pleading standard, “[f]actual allegations must be
enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level[.]”
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 545.
Pursuant to Rule 8, “[t]o survive a
motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (quoting Twombly,
550 U.S. at 570).
“The plausibility standard is not akin to a
1
By minute order of April 12, 2012, the Court granted
Plaintiff’s Motion to Dismiss Without Prejudice (Dkt. No. 17) all
pendent state tort claims asserted against the individual
defendants. Thus, the only remaining pendent state tort claims
are against the City and the Board of Marshall County
Commissioners.
2
‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer
Id. (quoting
possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.”
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
To satisfy this standard, Plaintiff
must “nudge[] [her] claims across the line from conceivable to
plausible.”
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.
The degree of specificity
required is dependent on the context of the case.
Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1248 (10th Cir. 2008).
Robbins v.
In a civil rights
action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 involving the affirmative defense of
qualified immunity, “plaintiff[] must allege facts sufficient to
show that the defendants violated their constitutional rights, and
that those rights were clearly established at the time.”
1249.
Id. at
In such cases, a plaintiff must “make clear exactly who is
alleged to have done what to whom, to provide each individual with
fair notice as to the basis of the claims against him or her . . .”
Id. at 1250.
Plaintiff’s allegations are set forth in the First Amended
Petition.2
The events giving rise to Plaintiff’s claims occurred
on March 24, 2011. On that date, Leija was voluntarily admitted to
the Integris Hospital in Madill, Oklahoma, for symptoms consistent
with pneumonia.
After being placed in a hospital room and given
intravenous medications, Leija “desired to leave the hospital.”
First Amended Petition at 3.
Hospital employees attempted to
persuade Leija to remain at the hospital.
(“Atnip”)
and
Steve
Beebe
(“Beebe”),
Defendants, James Atnip
Marshall
County
Deputy
Sheriffs, and Pickens, a City of Madill police officer, were called
to assist in the effort to prevent Leija from leaving the hospital.
Atnip, Beebe, and Pickens arrived at the hospital and confronted
Leija outside of his hospital room.
2
These officers “tried to
This action was removed to this federal court from the
District Court of Marshall County, Oklahoma, on February 23,
2012.
3
subdue Mr. Leija and prevent him from leaving” the hospital.
Id.
Leija persisted in his desire to leave and, as a result, “Beebe
shot Mr. Leija in the chest with his taser and subsequently gave
him two charges of electric voltage causing Mr. Leija considerable
pain.”
Id.
All three officers then “attacked, tackled and forced
Mr. Leija face down on the ground where they handcuffed him behind
his back.”
Id.
Almost immediately thereafter, Leija “stopped
breathing and lost consciousness.”
consciousness
and
contends
officers’
the
died
shortly
Id.
Leija “never regained
thereafter.”
restraint
and
Id.
seizure
Plaintiff
of
Leija
was
unreasonable and that the force they applied to him was excessive.
It is Plaintiff’s contention that Leija “died as a result of this
excessive force and unreasonable detention.”
These
allegations
clearly
survive
Id.
the
refined
dismiss standard set forth under Iqbal and Twombly.
motion
to
Plaintiff’s
allegations state a plausible claim for an unreasonable restraint
and detention in violation of Leija’s constitutional rights.
The
First Amended Petition clearly apprises the respective defendants
of their actions/inactions in the context of the altercation with
Leija at the hospital.
Plaintiff
asserts
As alleged in the First Amended Petition,
that
law
enforcement
officials,
including
Pickens, took actions to physically restrain Leija, a voluntary
patient
at
Integris
Hospital,
from
leaving
the
hospital.
Plaintiff’s allegations intimate that in attempting to leave, Leija
desired to refuse medical treatment from the hospital staff. These
allegations are sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss as a
patient generally has the right to refuse medical treatment.
Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, (1990);
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 722 n. 17 (1997); see
Granato
v.
City
and
County
of
Denver,
2011
WL
3820730,
*7
(“Although couched in somewhat tentative and speculative terms,
4
Cruzan nevertheless appears to recognize a constitutional right of
a competent person to refuse undesired medical treatment.”).
The
existence of this clearly established constitutional right as
applied to the alleged facts precludes any attempt at dismissal at
this
stage
of
the
litigation.3
Plaintiff’s
allegations
are
sufficient to establish (1) a claim against Pickens for unlawfully
restraining and arresting Leija as he was attempting to leave the
hospital and (2) claims against Fullingim and the City for a
failure to train Pickens in connection with law enforcement’s
authority when coming in contact with voluntarily-admitted medical
patients who are attempting to refuse medical treatment. Dismissal
of Plaintiff’s state law negligence claim against the City is
likewise inappropriate as there is no evidentiary basis at this
stage of the litigation to establish the City’s immunity defense
under Okla. Stat. tit. 51, § 155(6) that the City’s actions,
through its officials, resulted from “the failure to provide, or
the method of providing, police . . . protection.”
Consequently,
whether this immunity provision has application herein must await
the development of an evidentiary record and it is not capable of
resolution
on
a
motion
to
dismiss
in
light
of
Plaintiff’s
allegations of negligence against the City with respect to the
altercation with Leija.
Based on the foregoing reasons, the Motion to Dismiss (Dkt.
3
The version of the events presented by counsel in the
Motion to Dismiss suggests “mental confusion” by Leija and a
desire on the part of the officers to “protect Leija from the
serious harm that would occur without continued hospital care.”
Motion to Dismiss at 2. At this stage of the litigation, the
Court is not concerned with potential evidence that defendants
might present at trial, but it must limit its review to the four
corners of the First Amended Petition to determine if Plaintiff
has stated a claim upon which relief can be granted. Jacobsen v.
Deseret Book Co., 287 F.3d 936, 941 (10th Cir. 2002).
5
No. 15) filed by Pickens, Fullingim, and the City is denied.
It is so ordered this 24th day of April, 2012.
6
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