Chatman v. Buller

Filing 77

OPINION AND ORDER by District Judge James H. Payne: granting in part and denying in part 74 Plaintiff's Supplemental Motion for Attorney Fees (cjt, Deputy Clerk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
DARRYLE CHATMAN,
Plaintiff,
v.
TROY BULLER,
Defendants.

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Case No. 12-CV-182-JHP

OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court are Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and Prejudgment Interest,
[Doc. No. 50]; Defendant’s Response in Opposition thereto, [Doc. No. 55]; Plaintiff’s Reply to
Defendant’s Response, [Doc. No. 60]; and Plaintiff’s Supplemental Motion for Attorneys’ Fees,
[Doc. No. 74].1

For the reasons stated below, Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and

Prejudgment Interest is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
DISCUSSION
A. Attorneys’ Fees
As the prevailing party in this civil rights case brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiff
is entitled to seek reimbursement for his reasonable attorneys’ fees. 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b).2 A fee

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  On October 10, 2013, Defendant filed an untimely Response In Opposition to Plaintiff’s Supplemental Motion for 
Attorney’s Fees, [Doc. No. 76], without first seeking leave to file his response out of time as required by LCvR 7.1(j).  
As  this  filing  fails  to  comply  with  the  Court’s  September  25,  2013  Order,  which  directed  Defendant  to  file  an 
expedited  response  by  October  2,  2013,  Defendant’s  Response  In  Opposition  to  Plaintiff’s  Supplemental  Motion 
for Attorneys’ Fees, [Doc. No. 76], is STRICKEN. 

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 This fee statute provides: 

In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of sections 1981, 1981a, 1982, 1983 [etc.] ... of 
this  title  ...,  the  court,  in  its  discretion,  may  allow  the  prevailing  party,  other  than  the  United 
States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs. 

42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). 

request under § 1988(b) places the burden on Plaintiff to establish two elements: (1) that he was
the “prevailing party” in the litigation; and (2) that his request is “reasonable.” See Hensley v.
Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983); Phelps v. Hamilton, 120 F.3d 1126, 1129 (10th Cir. 1997);
Ellis v. University of Kansas Medical Center, 163 F.3d 1186, 1193 (10th Cir. 1998). As there is
no question about Plaintiff’s prevailing party status, the lone inquiry in this case is whether
Plaintiff has established that his fee request is “reasonable.”
In determining reasonable attorneys’ fees, courts first calculate the “lodestar” figure, that
is, the product of multiplying reasonable hours by a reasonable hourly rate. Hensley, 461 U.S. at
434.

This “lodestar amount” is “the centerpiece of attorney’s fee awards.”

Blanchard v.

Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 94 (1989). The lodestar figure “is the presumptively reasonable fee.”
Metz v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 39 F.3d 1482, 1493 (10th Cir. 1994). The
lodestar amount is then adjusted upwardly or downwardly to reflect other factors, such as those
listed in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Exp., Inc., 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974), when necessary.
The [twelve] Johnson factors are: the time and labor required, the novelty and
difficulty of the question presented by the case, the skill requisite to perform the
legal service properly, the preclusion of other employment by the attorneys due to
acceptance of the case, the customary fee, whether the fee is fixed or contingent,
any time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances, the amount
involved and the results obtained, the experience, reputation and ability of the
attorneys, the “undesirability” of the case, the nature and length of the
professional relationship with the client, and awards in similar cases.
Gottlieb v. Barry, 43 F.3d 474, 482 n. 4 (10th Cir. 1994) (citing Johnson, 488 F.2d at 717–19).
Although the court must address these factors, not every factor will apply in the circumstances of
a particular case. See Uselton v. Commercial Lovelace Motor Freight, Inc., 9 F.3d 849, 854
(10th Cir. 1993).

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1. Hours Expended
Defendant does not dispute the reasonableness of the number of hours submitted by
Plaintiff. Nevertheless, the Court has reviewed Plaintiff’s submissions and finds the hours to be
properly recorded and reasonable in nature. Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s counsel
are entitled to fees for a total of 280.90 hours spent on this case, which includes 227 hours for
time spent through the conclusion of the trial and 53.9 hours for time accrued thereafter, detailed
below by attorney.
Counsel

Hours Through Trial

Post-Trial Hours

Total

Mr. Steven Terrill

92.5

7.2

99.7

Mr. Spencer Bryan

134.5

46.7

181.2

2. Reasonable Hourly Rate
“The establishment of hourly rates in awarding attorneys’ fees is within the discretion of
the trial judge who is familiar with the case and the prevailing rates in the area.” Lucero v. City
of Trinidad, 815 F.2d 1384, 1385 (10th Cir. 1987) (citation omitted). A court is to look “to the
prevailing market rates in the relevant community” in calculating a reasonable fee. Blum, 465
U.S. at 895. The relevant community is the area in which the litigation occurs. Ramos, 713 F.2d
at 555.
Plaintiff submitted affidavits from local attorneys familiar with the hourly billing rates of
attorneys with comparable skill and experience in civil rights litigation who practice in the
Eastern District of Oklahoma along with a survey of rates charged by law firms located in Tulsa,

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Oklahoma.3 The survey indicates that lawyers with attorneys with 10-12 years of experience
charge hourly rates ranging between $160.00 and $330.00 per hour, with most respondents
charging $250 per hour. The survey also shows that attorneys with 7-9 years of experience
charge hourly rates between $130 and $295 per hour, with most respondents charging $225 per
hour. Further, the affidavits from local attorneys state that Mr. Terrill and Mr. Bryan are entitled
to $250 and $290 per hour, respectively.
Plaintiff also submitted affidavits of counsel, wherein each describe their substantial
federal civil rights litigation experience. Since becoming a member of the Oklahoma Bar
Association in 2002, Mr. Bryan has litigated 83 federal civil rights cases filed among the three
federal district courts in Oklahoma.

Similarly, since his admission to the Oklahoma Bar

Association in 2005, Mr. Terrill has also gained significant experience in federal civil rights
litigation. Furthermore, both attorneys specialize in complex civil rights litigation. The Court
notes that Plaintiff’s counsel provided highly professional and competent representation
throughout the litigation, submitting comprehensive, well-researched briefs addressing a number
of complex issues and demonstrating a high level of preparedness during the trial.
Based upon the Court's own knowledge of the prevailing rates in the relevant area, the
complex nature of federal civil rights litigation, counsels’ specialized practice and respective
experience, including federal civil rights litigation experience, and the level of skill demonstrated
by Plaintiff’s counsel throughout the litigation, Plaintiff’s attorneys’ fees will be permitted at the
rate of $250 per hour for Mr. Terrill and $300 per hour for Mr. Bryan.

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  Given the close proximity of this Court’s location in Muskogee, Oklahoma, to Tulsa, Oklahoma, along with the 
fact that a significant portion of the lawyers practicing before this Court are based in Tulsa, the Court considers 
Tulsa part of the relevant area for purposes of determining a reasonable rate. 

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3. Lodestar Calculation
Applying the conclusions outlined above, the Court finds the “lodestar” figure for
Plaintiff’s attorneys’ fees as follows:
Counsel

Total Hours

Rate

Compensation

Mr. Steven Terrill

99.7

$250 per hour

$24,925.00

Mr. Spencer Bryan

181.2

$300 per hour

$54,360.00

Accordingly, Plaintiff is hereby awarded attorneys’ fees in the amount of $79,285.00.
4. Prejudgment Interest
Plaintiff also asserts that he is entitled to prejudgment interest. The Tenth Circuit has
explained that “‘although prejudgment interest is ordinarily awarded in a federal case, it is not
recoverable as a matter of right.’” Malloy v. Monahan, 73 F.3d 1012, 1019 (10th Cir. 1996)
(quoting Zuchel v. City & County of Denver, 997 F.2d 730, 746 (10th Cir. 1993)). Under federal
law, the purpose of prejudgment interest “is to compensate the wronged party for being deprived
of the monetary value of his loss from the time of the loss to the payment of the judgment.”
Zuchel, 997 F.2d at 746 (quotation omitted). In the Tenth Circuit, an award of prejudgment
interest is to be determined by a two-step analysis. Id.
First, the trial court must determine whether an award of prejudgment interest
would serve to compensate the injured party. Second, when an award would
serve a compensatory function, the court must still determine whether the equities
would preclude the award of prejudgment interest.
Id. (quotation omitted). Accordingly, this Court must exercise its discretion in determining
whether an award of prejudgment interest is appropriate.

Id.

Significantly, Tenth Circuit

precedent dictates that the Court not award prejudgment interest for non-economic portion of a
judgment. Id.

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The Court has thoroughly reviewed the trial record and finds an award of prejudgment
interest inappropriate in the instant case. Plaintiff presented no evidence to the jury of any
economic loss resulting from the violation of his constitutional rights. While Plaintiff’s losses
were significant, his emotional distress, mental anguish, and suffering did not “deprive him of
the monetary value of his loss from the time of the loss to the payment of the judgment.” Id.
Therefore, rather than compensating Plaintiff, an award of prejudgment interest in this case
would improperly “duplicate damages already awarded.” F.D.I.C. v. UMIC, Inc., 136 F.3d 1375,
1388 (10th Cir. 1998). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s request for prejudgment interest is denied.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons outlined above, Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and Prejudgment
Interest, [Doc. No. 55], is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 22nd day of October, 2013.

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