Clark v. Chadwick et al

Filing 20

OPINION AND ORDER by Judge Ronald A. White : Granting 18 Motion to Dismiss Case as Frivolous. (case terminated) (acg, Deputy Clerk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
EASTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
ANTHONY R. CLARK,

)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
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SERGEANT CHADWICK and
)
CORRECTIONAL OFFICER GRAMS, )
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Defendants.
)

No. CIV 12-207-RAW-SPS

OPINION AND ORDER
This action is before the court on the defendants' motion to dismiss this action as
frivolous. The court has before it for consideration plaintiffs complaint, the defendants'
motion, and plaintiffs response. Plaintiff, an inmate in the custody of the Oklahoma
Department of Corrections (DOC) who is incarcerated at Davis Correctional Facility (DCF)
in Holdenville, Oklahoma, brings this action under the authorityof42 U.S.C. § 1983, seeking
compensatory and punitive damages for alleged constitutional violations during his
incarceration at DCF. The defendants are DCF Sergeant Chadwick and DCF Correctional
Officer Grams.
Plaintiff alleges that on October 25, 20 11, he was "hazed" by the defendants, suffering
cruel and unusual punishment and excessive use of force. He specifically claims the
defendants forced him to walk a long and grueling distance in restraints from Intake to Echo
Charlie Unit, while carrying his property bag and its contents. Plaintiff claims he suffered
serious physical and mental fatigue, lacerations to both wrists and ankles, permanent
numbness in his left thumb, and continuing muscle spasms in his right foot. He also suffered
psychological fear of intimidation and assault, caused by the defendants' taunting and verbal
threats of physical harm, done under the guise of policy and procedure. During the walk
Defendant Grams apparently tried to help plaintiff carry his belongings, but Defendant
Chadwick would not allow it, stating that plaintiff only needed what he could carry himself.
Furthermore, Chadwick decided to make plaintiff walk "the long way," instead of a shorter

route. Plaintiff asserts he suffers from "explosive anger disorder," a mental health problem
that existed prior to his first incarceration, and the alleged incident has caused him serious
psychological setbacks, especially when he is required to be "black boxed" for movement.
Plaintiffs further alleges his initial cell assignment had to be changed, because Inmate
Ervin refused to be cuffed to allow plaintiff to enter the cell. To avoid a violent, raciallyfueled conflict, plaintiff suffered embarrassment, was degraded, and received a misconduct
for yelling, "I fear for my life" to get the officers' attention. Plaintiff then was removed and
relocated to segregation.
To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must set forth factual allegations
sufficient to "raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Bell At/. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A plaintiff need not
detail factual allegations in the complaint, but must provide the grounds of entitlement to
relief, which entails more than labels and conclusions, and "a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action will not do." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. When considering a
motion to dismiss, courts look to the complaint and those documents attached to or referred
to in the complaint, accept as true all allegations contained in the complaint, and draw all
reasonable inferences from the pleading in favor of the pleader. Pace v. Swerdlow, 519 F .3d
1067, 1072 (lOth Cir. 2008); Alvarado v. KOB-TV, L.L.C., 493 F.3d 1210, 1215 (lOth Cir.
2007). A court, however, is not bound to accept as true a plaintiffs legal assertions. Iqbal,
556 U.S. at 678.
Although the court is required to exercise a liberal interpretation of plaintiffs
pleadings, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972), the court need not assume the role of
advocate for plaintiff, and he must present more than conclusory allegations to survive a
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, Hall v. Be limon, 935 F .2d 1106, 1110 (1Oth Cir.
1991). "[C]onclusory allegations without supporting factual averments are insufficient to
state a claim upon which relief can be based." !d. (citing cases). "[A] pro se plaintiff
requires no special legal training to recount the facts surrounding his alleged injury, and he

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must provide such facts, if the court is to determine whether he makes out a claim on which
relief can be granted." !d. With these standards in mind, the court turns to the merits of the
defendants' motion.
[A] prison official violates the Eighth Amendment only when two
requirements are met. First, the deprivation alleged must be, objectively,
"sufficiently serious," Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991); see also
Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 5 (1992); a prison officials's act or omission
must result in the denial of "the minimal civilized measures of life's
necessities," Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981) ....
The second requirement follows from the principle that "only the
unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain implicates the Eighth Amendment."
Wilson, 501 U.S. at 297. To violate the Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Clause, a prison official must have a "sufficiently culpable state of mind."
Ibid; see also id. at 302-03; Hudson, 503 U.S. at 8. In prison-conditions cases
that state of mind is one of"deliberate indifference" to inmate health or safety.
Wilson, 501 U.S. at 302-03 ....
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (footnote omitted).
The inquiry for Eighth Amendment excessive force claims by convicted prisoners is
"whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or
maliciously and sadistically to cause harm." Northington v. Jackson, 973 F.2d 1518, 1523
(lOth Cir.l992) (citing Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6 (1992)). "The 'malicious and
sadistic' requirement applies regardless of whether the plaintiff has alleged significant
physical injury, for the ultimate constitutional inquiry is directed at whether an unnecessary
and wanton infliction of pain has occurred." !d. (internal quotations omitted).
Here, plaintiff is alleging the "excessive force" exerted by the defendants was his
having to carry his own belongings from the prison's intake to his housing unit in restraints,
allegedly resulting in fatigue, lacerations, thumb numbness, muscle spasms, and exacerbation
of his mental problems. He does not allege that any of his injuries required medical
treatment. After careful review, the court finds this incident constituted nothing more than
an ordinary incident of prison life and did not rise to the level of a constitutional claim. As
for the defendants' unspecified, alleged verbal threats, the Tenth Circuit has held that verbal
abuse alone is not actionable under§ 1983. Collins v. Cundy, 603 F.2d 825, 827 (lOth Cir.

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1979).
Regarding the alleged incident about his cell assignment, the court finds he has not
alleged sufficient facts to state a claim.

The mere fact that he yelled for help and

subsequently was allegedly placed in segregation, fails to set forth the elements of an Eighth
Amendment claim.
Based on the foregoing reasons the court finds the allegations in plaintiffs complaint
are vague and conclusory, and the allegations do not rise to the level of a constitutional
violation. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals consistently has held that bald conclusions,
unsupported by allegations of fact, are legally insufficient, and pleadings containing only
such conclusory language may be summarily dismissed or stricken without a hearing. Dunn
v. White, 880 F.2d 1188, 1197 (lOth Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1059 (1990);Lorraine
v. United States, 444 F.2d 1 (lOth Cir. 1971). "Constitutional rights allegedly invaded,
warranting an award of damages, must be specifically identified. Conclusory allegations will
not suffice." Wise v. Bravo, 666 F.2d 1328, 1333 (lOth Cir. 1981) (citing Brice v. Day, 604
F.2d 664 (lOth Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1086 (1980)).
The court authorized commencement of this action in forma pauperis under the
authority of28 U.S.C. § 1915. Subsection (e) of that statute permits the dismissal of a case
when the court is satisfied that the complaint is without merit in that it lacks an arguable basis
either in law or fact. Nietzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319 (1989); Yellen v. Cooper, 828 F.2d
1471, 1475 (lOth Cir. 1987).

ACCORDINGLY, this action is, in all respects, DISMISSED as frivolous, and this
dismissal shall count as a STRIKE, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).

IT IS SO ORDERED this /

tJtv day of September 2013.
RONALD A. WHITE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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