Rolens et al v. American Family Life Assurance Company of Columbus et al

Filing 21

OPINION AND ORDER by District Judge James H. Payne: granting 15 Motion to Remand to State Court (case terminated) (cjt, Deputy Clerk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
DAVID ROLENS and
OILMAN’S PUMP & SUPPLY, INC.,
an Oklahoma Corporation,
Plaintiffs,
v.
AMERICAN FAMILY
LIFE ASSURANCE COMPANY OF
COLUMBUS, a foreign corporation,
JACKY MCCOY, and
CHRISTY DAVENPORT FITE,
Defendants.

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Case No. 13-CV-0084-JHP

OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court are Plaintiffs’ Motion to Remand [Doc. No. 15] and Defendant Jack
McCoy’s Response in Opposition [Doc. No. 17]. For the reasons detailed below, Plaintiffs’
Motion to Remand is GRANTED.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs originally filed this action in the District Court of Pittsburg County, Oklahoma,
on January 25, 2013, Case No. CJ-2013-19, asserting claims against American Family Life
Assurance Company (“AFLAC”), Jacky McCoy (“McCoy”), and Christy Davenport Fite
(“Fite”). [Doc. No 2, Ex. 2]. In their Petition, Plaintiffs asserted the following claims seeking
damages arising from an alleged failure to pay benefits: (1) Breach of Contract as to AFLAC; (2)
Breach of the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing as to AFLAC; (3) Unjust Enrichment as
to Fite; (4) Conversion as to Fite; and (5) Negligence as to McCoy. On March 1, 2013, AFLAC
removed the case to this Court through the filing of a Notice of Removal as required under 28

U.S.C. §§ 1441 and 1446, contending, because the matter was essentially a claim for relief
brought pursuant to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”), this
Court had jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. [Doc. No. 2]. On April 1,
2013, Plaintiffs simultaneously filed a Motion to Dismiss AFLAC pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P.
41(a)(2) [Doc. No. 14], which was subsequently granted by this Court [Doc. No. 18], and a
Motion to Remand pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) [Doc. No. 15], contending that this Court
lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this action due to AFLAC’s dismissal.
DISCUSSION
“[F]ederal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, and the party invoking federal
jurisdiction bears the burden of proof.” Penteco Corp. Ltd. Partnership—1985A v. Union Gas
Sys., Inc., 929 F.2d 1519, 1521 (10th Cir. 1991). Federal courts “possess only that power
authorized by [the] Constitution and statute.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511
U.S. 375, 377, 114 S.Ct. 1673, 128 L.Ed.2d 391 (1994). Among the powers that Congress has
bestowed upon the courts is the power to hear controversies arising under federal law-federal
question jurisdiction-and controversies arising between citizens of different states-diversity
jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1332. Here, the issue is not whether this Court had
subject matter jurisdiction at the time this action was removed; rather, the issue is whether this
Court retained jurisdiction over this matter following AFLAC’s dismissal from this action.
The Tenth Circuit has stated that “[w]hen all federal claims have been dismissed, the
court may and usually should, decline to exercise jurisdiction over any remaining state law
claims.” Smith v. City of Enid by and through Enid City Comm'n, 149 F.3d 1151, 1156 (10th
Cir.1998). Specifically, the Tenth Circuit has followed the Supreme Court's lead in classifying
supplemental jurisdiction not as a litigant's right, but as a matter of judicial discretion. See Estate

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of Harshman v. Jackson Hole Mountain Resort Corp., 379 F.3d 1161, 1165 (10th
Cir.2004)(citing City of Chi. v. Int'l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 173, 118 S.Ct. 523, 139
L.Ed.2d 525 (1997)). In circumstances where the supplemental jurisdiction statute may support
supplemental jurisdiction, the district court retains discretion to decline to exercise that
jurisdiction. The traditional analysis, based on the Supreme Court's opinion in United Mine
Workers v. Gibbs, compelled courts to consider “judicial economy, convenience and fairness to
litigants” when deciding whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction. 383 U.S. at 726, 86 S.Ct.
1130. Similarly, Congress’ supplemental jurisdiction statute enumerates four factors that the
court should consider:
(1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law,
(2) the claim substantially predominates over the claim or claims over which the
district court has original jurisdiction,
(3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original
jurisdiction, or
(4) in exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling reasons for declining
jurisdiction.
28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). In applying these factors, “a federal court should consider and weigh in
each case, and at every stage of the litigation, the values of judicial economy, convenience,
fairness, and comity in order to decide whether to exercise jurisdiction over a case brought in
that court involving pendent state-law claims.” Carnegie–Mellon University v. Cohill, 484 U.S.
343, 350 (1988).
With dismissal of Plaintiff's ERISA claim, only state law claims remain at this early stage
in the litigation, and the Court has “a powerful reason to choose not to continue to exercise
jurisdiction.” Carnegie–Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 351 (1988); see 28 U.S.C. §
1367(c)(3). Indeed, “it is generally preferable for a district court to remand remaining pendent

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claims to state court[.]” Harrell v. 20th Century Ins. Co., 934 F.2d 203, 205 (9th Cir.1991); see
also 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). Such claims are better litigated in state court. See Carnegie–Mellon,
484 U.S. at 350 n. 7 (“in the usual case in which all federal-law claims are eliminated before
trial, the balance of factors ... will point toward declining to exercise jurisdiction over the
remaining state-law claims.”). Accordingly, this action is remanded to the District Court of
Pittsburg County, Oklahoma.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Plaintiffs’ Motion to Remand is GRANTED.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 6th day of May, 2013.

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