Rolens et al v. American Family Life Assurance Company of Columbus et al

Filing 23

AMENDED OPINION AND ORDER by District Judge James H. Payne: granting 14 MOTION to Dismiss Party American Family Life Assurance Company of Columbus and 15 MOTION to Remand to State Court (cjt, Deputy Clerk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
DAVID ROLENS and
OILMAN’S PUMP & SUPPLY, INC.,
an Oklahoma Corporation,
Plaintiffs,
v.
AMERICAN FAMILY
LIFE ASSURANCE COMPANY OF
COLUMBUS, a foreign corporation,
JACKY MCCOY, and
CHRISTY DAVENPORT FITE,
Defendants.

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Case No. 13-CV-0084-JHP

AMENDED OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court are Plaintiffs’ Motion to Remand [Doc. No. 15] and Defendant Jack
McCoy’s Response in Opposition [Doc. No. 17]. Also before the Court is Plaintiffs’ Motion to
Dismiss American Family Life Assurance Company (“AFLAC”) pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P.
41(a)(2) [Doc. No. 14]. For the reasons detailed below, both Plaintiffs’ Motion to Dismiss
AFLAC and Plaintiffs’ Motion to Remand are GRANTED.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs originally filed this action in the District Court of Pittsburg County, Oklahoma,
on January 25, 2013, Case No. CJ-2013-19, asserting claims against AFLAC, Jacky McCoy
(“McCoy”), and Christy Davenport Fite (“Fite”). [Doc. No 2, Ex. 2]. In their Petition, Plaintiffs
asserted the following claims seeking damages arising from an alleged failure to pay benefits: (1)
Breach of Contract as to AFLAC; (2) Breach of the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing as
to AFLAC; (3) Unjust Enrichment as to Fite; (4) Conversion as to Fite; and (5) Negligence as to

McCoy. On March 1, 2013, AFLAC removed the case to this Court through the filing of a
Notice of Removal as required under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441 and 1446, contending, because the
matter was essentially a claim for relief brought pursuant to the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”), this Court has jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1331. [Doc. No. 2]. On April 1, 2013, Plaintiffs simultaneously filed a Motion to
Dismiss AFLAC pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(a)(2) [Doc. No. 14] and a Motion to Remand
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) [Doc. No. 15], contending that this Court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction over this action. AFLAC did not file an objection to Plaintiffs’ Motion to Dismiss
AFLAC.
DISCUSSION
A. Dismissal Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(a)(2)
A plaintiff who wishes to voluntarily dismiss its action but who cannot do so via notice or
stipulation under Rule 41(a)(1) must seek an order of dismissal from the court. Fed.R.Civ.P.
41(a)(2). Rule 41(a)(2) authorizes the voluntary dismissal of a cause of action, but only “upon
order of the court and upon such terms and conditions as the court deems proper.” Fed.R.Civ.P.
41(a)(2). Generally, a dismissal under Rule 41(a)(2) is addressed to the sound discretion of the
trial court and the motion is granted unless the opposing party will suffer legal prejudice. See
Ohlander v. Larson, 114 F.3d 1531, 1537 (10th Cir.1997); see also Clark v. Tansy, 13 F.3d
1407, 1411 (10th Cir.1993). The Tenth Circuit has identified four non-exclusive factors that
should be considered when reviewing a request for voluntary dismissal: “the opposing party's
effort and expense in preparing for trial; excessive delay and lack of diligence on the part of the
movant; insufficient explanation of the need for dismissal; and the present stage of the

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litigation.” County of Santa Fe, New Mexico v. Public Service Co. of New Mexico, 311 F.3d
1031, 1048 (10th Cir.2002).
After careful consideration of the factors set out by the Tenth Circuit, the Court finds no
basis to conclude that AFLAC would suffer any legal prejudice if Plaintiffs’ Motion to Dismiss
AFLAC is granted at this early stage in the litigation. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ Motion to Dismiss
AFLAC is granted.
B. Motion to Remand
“[F]ederal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, and the party invoking federal
jurisdiction bears the burden of proof.” Penteco Corp. Ltd. Partnership—1985A v. Union Gas
Sys., Inc., 929 F.2d 1519, 1521 (10th Cir. 1991). Federal courts “possess only that power
authorized by [the] Constitution and statute.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511
U.S. 375, 377, 114 S.Ct. 1673, 128 L.Ed.2d 391 (1994). Among the powers that Congress has
bestowed upon the courts is the power to hear controversies arising under federal law-federal
question jurisdiction-and controversies arising between citizens of different states-diversity
jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1332. Here, the issue is not whether this Court had
subject matter jurisdiction at the time this action was removed; rather, the issue is whether this
Court retained jurisdiction over this matter following AFLAC’s dismissal from this action.
The Tenth Circuit has stated that “[w]hen all federal claims have been dismissed, the
court may and usually should, decline to exercise jurisdiction over any remaining state law
claims.” Smith v. City of Enid by and through Enid City Comm'n, 149 F.3d 1151, 1156 (10th
Cir.1998). Specifically, the Tenth Circuit has followed the Supreme Court's lead in classifying
supplemental jurisdiction not as a litigant's right, but as a matter of judicial discretion. See Estate
of Harshman v. Jackson Hole Mountain Resort Corp., 379 F.3d 1161, 1165 (10th

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Cir.2004)(citing City of Chi. v. Int'l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 173, 118 S.Ct. 523, 139
L.Ed.2d 525 (1997)). In circumstances where the supplemental jurisdiction statute may support
supplemental jurisdiction, the district court retains discretion to decline to exercise that
jurisdiction. The traditional analysis, based on the Supreme Court's opinion in United Mine
Workers v. Gibbs, compelled courts to consider “judicial economy, convenience and fairness to
litigants” when deciding whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction. 383 U.S. at 726, 86 S.Ct.
1130. Similarly, Congress’ supplemental jurisdiction statute enumerates four factors that the
court should consider:
(1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law,
(2) the claim substantially predominates over the claim or claims over which the
district court has original jurisdiction,
(3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original
jurisdiction, or
(4) in exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling reasons for declining
jurisdiction.
28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). In applying these factors, “a federal court should consider and weigh in
each case, and at every stage of the litigation, the values of judicial economy, convenience,
fairness, and comity in order to decide whether to exercise jurisdiction over a case brought in
that court involving pendent state-law claims.” Carnegie–Mellon University v. Cohill, 484 U.S.
343, 350 (1988).
With dismissal of Plaintiff's ERISA claim, only state law claims remain at this early stage
in the litigation, and the Court has “a powerful reason to choose not to continue to exercise
jurisdiction.” Carnegie–Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 351 (1988); see 28 U.S.C. §
1367(c)(3). Indeed, “it is generally preferable for a district court to remand remaining pendent
claims to state court[.]” Harrell v. 20th Century Ins. Co., 934 F.2d 203, 205 (9th Cir.1991); see

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also 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). Such claims are better litigated in state court. See Carnegie–Mellon,
484 U.S. at 350 n. 7 (“in the usual case in which all federal-law claims are eliminated before
trial, the balance of factors ... will point toward declining to exercise jurisdiction over the
remaining state-law claims.”). Accordingly, this action is remanded to the District Court of
Pittsburg County, Oklahoma.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, both Plaintiffs’ Motion to Dismiss AFLAC and Plaintiffs’
Motion to Remand are GRANTED.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 8th day of May, 2013.

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