Titsworth v. Oklahoma Department of Corrections et al

Filing 22

OPINION AND ORDER by District Judge James H. Payne: granting 21 Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (cjt, Deputy Clerk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
STEVEN O. TITSWORTH,
Plaintiff,
v.
OKLAHOMA DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS, et al.,
Defendants.

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Case No. 13-CV-390-JHP

OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court is Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), [Doc. No. 21]. For the reasons set forth below, Defendants’
Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED.
BACKGROUND
On August 28, 2013, Plaintiff commenced this action against Defendants, asserting
various claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 stemming from Defendants’ alleged failure to factor
an enhanced earned credit level into the calculation of Plaintiff’s prison sentence.1 Plaintiff
asserts that this denial of enhanced credit level unlawfully caused him to remain in custody
beyond the date upon which his release was otherwise mandated. On November 8, 2013,
Defendants’ filed a Motion to Dismiss, [Doc. No. 21], arguing that Plaintiff’s claims must be
dismissed because (1) Plaintiff’s claims against ODOC and the other Defendants in their official

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  On  August  28,  2013,  Plaintiff  filed  a  Motion  for  Leave  to  Proceed  In  Forma  Pauperis,  [Doc.  No.  2],  which  was 
subsequently granted by this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, [Doc. No. 4].  Pursuant to the Prison Litigation 
Reform  Act  of  1996  (“PLRA”),  a  district  court  may  dismiss  an  action  filed  in  forma  pauperis  “at  any  time”  if  the 
court determines that the action is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted. See 
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 

capacity are barred by the Eleventh Amendment, and (2) Plaintiff’s claims are time barred. This
motion is now fully briefed and before the Court.

DISCUSSION
Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). Rule 12(b)(1) empowers a court to dismiss a complaint for
“lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter.” Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1) is not a judgment
on the merits of a plaintiff's case, but only a determination that the court lacks authority to
adjudicate the matter. See Castaneda v. INS, 23 F.3d 1576, 1580 (10th Cir. 1994) (recognizing
federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and may only exercise jurisdiction when
specifically authorized to do so).
Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 12(b)(6) states that a court may dismiss a complaint for “failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” To withstand a motion to dismiss, a complaint
must contain enough allegations of fact “to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The burden is on the plaintiff to
frame “a complaint with enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest” that he or she is
entitled to relief. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556. “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right
to relief above the speculative level.” Id.
A. The Eleventh Amendment
Defendants move for dismissal pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) on grounds that they
are immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution.

The Eleventh

Amendment bars actions in federal court against States and also bars suits in federal court
against state officers sued in their official capacities for money damages. Edelman v. Jordan,
415 U.S. 651, 663 (1974). Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not abrogate this immunity, Will v.
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Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66-67 (1989), nor has Oklahoma waived its
Eleventh Amendment immunity. OKLA. STAT. tit. 51 § 152.1(B) (“it is not the intent of the state
to waive any rights under the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution”).
Moreover, neither States nor state officials sued in their official capacities are “persons” within
the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Will, 491 U.S. at 71. Because ODOC is considered an “arm
of the state” of Oklahoma, Plaintiff's claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeking monetary relief
against ODOC are also barred by the State’s Eleventh Amendment immunity. Eastwood v.
Department of Corrections, 846 F.2d 627, 631-32 (10th Cir. 1988). The Eleventh Amendment
bars a federal suit against a state agency regardless of the type of relief sought. ANR Pipeline
Co. v. LaFaver, 150 F.3d 1178, 1187 (10th Cir. 1998), abrogated on other grounds as
recognized in Hill v. Kemp, 478 F.3d 1236, 1259 (10th Cir. 2007). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s
claims against the ODOC and the remaining Defendants in their official capacity must be
dismissed without prejudice. Polaski v. Colorado Dept. of Transp., No. 05-1401, 198 Fed.Appx.
684, 685-686 (10th Cir. Aug. 2, 2006) (unpublished)2 (dismissal on grounds of Eleventh
Amendment immunity is a dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and must be without
prejudice) (citing Brereton v. Bountiful City Corp., 434 F.3d 1213, 1218 (10th Cir. 2006).
B. The Statute of Limitations
No statute of limitations is expressly provided for claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
However, the Supreme Court has held that courts must look to state law for the appropriate
period of limitations in § 1983 cases. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 266–67 (1985). The
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has stated that the appropriate period of limitations for § 1983
actions brought in the State of Oklahoma is two years, pursuant to OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §

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 This and any other unpublished disposition are cited pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 and 
Tenth Circuit Rule 32.1. 

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95(3). Meade v. Grubbs, 841 F.2d 1512, 1522–24 (10th Cir. 1988). While state law governs
limitations and tolling issues, federal law determines the accrual of § 1983 claims. Fratus v.
Deland, 49 F .3d 673, 675 (10th Cir. 1995); Baker v. Board of Regents, 991 F.2d 628, 632 (10th
Cir. 1993). A civil rights action accrues when “facts that would support a cause of action are or
should be apparent.” Fratus, 49 F.3d at 675 (quoting Blumberg v. HCA Management Co., 848
F.2d 642, 645 (5th Cir. 1988)); see also Johnson v. Johnson County Comm'n Bd., 925 F.2d 1299,
1301 (10th Cir. 1991). Thus, a plaintiff must bring an action within two years of the date when
facts that would support a cause of action are or should be apparent.
Taking the allegations contained in Plaintiff’s complaint as true, the Court finds that
Plaintiff’s cause of action accrued more than two years prior to the filing of this action.
Specifically, based on the attachments to Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff knew or
should have known that the conviction in CRF-84-51 was being used in his sentence calculation
as of March of 2005, more than eight years prior to commencing this action. [See Doc. No. 13,
Ex. 1 at 2]. Accordingly, all of Plaintiff’s remaining claims must be dismissed as time barred.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons detailed above, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, [Doc. No. 21], is
GRANTED.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 25th day of November, 2013.

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