Young v. Social Security Administration

Filing 20

OPINION AND ORDER by Magistrate Judge Kimberly E. West : The ruling of the Commissioner of Social Security Administration should be and is REVERSED and the matter REMANDED for further proceedings.(acg, Deputy Clerk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
EASTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
THRESEA K. YOUNG,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff,
v.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting
Commissioner of Social
Security Administration,
Defendant.

Case No. CIV-13-488-KEW

OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Thresea K. Young (the “Claimant”) requests judicial
review of the decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security
Administration (the “Commissioner”) denying Claimant’s application
for disability benefits under the Social Security Act.

Claimant

appeals the decision of the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) and
asserts that the Commissioner erred because the ALJ incorrectly
determined
discussed

that
below,

Claimant
it

is

was
the

not

disabled.

finding

of

this

For

the

Court

reasons

that

the

Commissioner’s decision should be and is REVERSED and the case is
REMANDED for further proceedings.
Social Security Law and Standard of Review
Disability under the Social Security Act is defined as the
“inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason
of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment. . .”

42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A).
Security

Act

“only

if

A claimant is disabled under the Social
his

physical

or

mental

impairment

or

impairments are of such severity that he is not only unable to do
his previous work but cannot, considering his age, education, and
work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful
work

which

exists

§423(d)(2)(A).

in

the

national

economy.

.

.”

42

U.S.C.

Social Security regulations implement a five-step

sequential process to evaluate a disability claim.

See, 20 C.F.R.

§§ 404.1520, 416.920.1
Judicial review of the Commissioner’s determination is limited
in scope by 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
two inquiries:

This Court’s review is limited to

first, whether the decision was supported by

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Step one requires the claimant to establish that he is not
engaged in substantial gainful activity, as defined by 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1510, 416.910. Step two requires that the claimant establish that
he has a medically severe impairment or combination of impairments that
significantly limit his ability to do basic work activities. 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1521, 416.921. If the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful
activity (step one) or if the claimant’s impairment is not medically
severe (step two), disability benefits are denied. At step three, the
claimant’s impairment is compared with certain impairments listed in 20
C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1. A claimant suffering from a listed
impairment or impairments “medically equivalent” to a listed impairment
is determined to be disabled without further inquiry.
If not, the
evaluation proceeds to step four, where claimant must establish that he
does not retain the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform his
past relevant work.
If the claimant’s step four burden is met, the
burden shifts to the Commissioner to establish at step five that work
exists in significant numbers in the national economy which the claimant
– taking into account his age, education, work experience, and RFC – can
perform. Disability benefits are denied if the Commissioner shows that
the impairment which precluded the performance of past relevant work does
not preclude alternative work. See generally, Williams v. Bowen, 844
F.2d 748, 750-51 (10th Cir. 1988).

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substantial

evidence;

and,

standards were applied.

second,

whether

the

correct

legal

Hawkins v. Chater, 113 F.3d 1162, 1164

(10th Cir. 1997)(citation omitted). The term “substantial evidence”
has been interpreted by the United States Supreme Court to require
“more than a mere scintilla.

It means such relevant evidence as a

reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”
Richardson

v.

Perales,

402

U.S.

389,

401

(1971)

(quoting

Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)).

The

court may not re-weigh the evidence nor substitute its discretion
for that of the agency.

Casias v. Secretary of Health & Human

Servs., 933 F.2d 799, 800 (10th Cir. 1991). Nevertheless, the court
must review the record as a whole, and the “substantiality of the
evidence must take into account whatever in the record fairly
detracts from its weight.” Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S.
474, 488 (1951); see also, Casias, 933 F.2d at 800-01.
Claimant’s Background
Claimant was born on May 24, 1961 and was 50 years old at the
time of the ALJ’s decision.
education.

Claimant completed her high school

Claimant has worked in the past as a fast food service

manager, kitchen supervisor, dietary assistant, telephone solicitor,
and gate guard.

Claimant alleges an inability to work beginning

March 15, 2009 due to limitations resulting from bipolar disorder

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and depression.
Procedural History
On July 9, 2009, Claimant protectively filed for disability
insurance benefits under Title II (42 U.S.C. § 401, et seq.) and for
supplemental security income pursuant to Title XVI (42 U.S.C. §
1381, et seq.) of the Social Security Act.

Claimant’s applications

were denied initially and upon reconsideration.

On February 24,

2012, an administrative hearing was held before Administrative Law
Judge (“ALJ”) Trace Baldwin by video with Claimant appearing in Ada,
Oklahoma and the ALJ presiding in McAlester, Oklahoma.
dated

April

benefits.

18,

2012,

the

ALJ

denied

Claimant’s

By decision
request

for

The Appeals Council denied review of the ALJ’s decision

on August 29, 2013. As a result, the decision of the ALJ represents
the Commissioner’s final decision for purposes of further appeal.
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.981, 416.1481.
Decision of the Administrative Law Judge
The ALJ made his decision at step five of the sequential
evaluation.

He determined that while Claimant suffered from severe

impairments, she did not meet a listing and retained the residual
functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform a full range of work at all
exertional levels.
Errors Alleged for Review

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Claimant asserts the ALJ committed error in (1) failing to
properly evaluate the opinion of Claimant’s treating physician; and
(2) failing to perform a proper credibility determination.
Evaluation of the Treating Physician’s Opinion
In his decision, the ALJ found Claimant suffered from the
severe impairments of depression and bipolar disorder.

(Tr. 15).

The ALJ determined Claimant retained the RFC to perform a full range
of work at all exertional levels with the non-exertional limitations
that due to psychological pathology Claimant was limited but can
understand, remember, and perform simple unskilled tasks with
routine supervision, could relate to supervisors and peers on a
superficial basis, could not relate to the general public, and could
adapt to a work situation without withdrawing from the worksite or
work processes.

(Tr. 17).

After consultation with a vocational expert, the ALJ found
Claimant could perform the representative jobs of sweeper/cleaner,
assembler, and cleaner, all of which the vocational expert testified
existed in sufficient numbers nationally and regionally.

(Tr. 25).

The ALJ, therefore, concluded Claimant was not disabled.

(Tr. 25-

26).
Claimant contends the ALJ failed to properly consider the
opinion of her treating physician, Dr. Alycea Merideth.

Dr.

Merideth completed a Medical Assessment of Ability to Do Work-

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Related Activities (Mental) form on Claimant.

She determined

suffered from a “complete loss of ability to perform in a regular,
competitive employement” the functions of the ability to demonstrate
reliability by maintaining regular attendance and being punctual
within

customary

tolerances;

maintaining

concentration

for

an

extended period of 2 hours; maintaining attention/stay on task for
an extended period of 2 hours; the ability to act appropriately with
the general public; the ability to ask simple questions or request
assistance;
appropriately

the
to

ability

to

criticism

accept
from

instructions

supervisors;

and

behaving

respond
in

an

emotionally stable manner; the ability to respond appropriately to
changes in a routine work setting; and the ability to finish a
normal work week without interruption from psychologically based
symptoms.

(Tr. 551-52).

Dr. Merideth also determined Claimant suffered a “substantial
loss of ability to perform the activity in a regular, competitive
employment” the functions of the ability to apply commonsense
understanding to carry out detailed but uninvolved written or oral
instructions; ability to perform at a consistent pace without an
unreasonable number and length of rest periods/breaks; and ability
to get along with co-workers or peers without unduly distracting
them or exhibiting behavioral extremes. Id. Dr. Merideth estimated
Claimant’s GAF at 51 and noted Claimant suffered from crying spells,

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appetite disturbance, sleep disturbance, paranoia, low energy,
difficulty thinking/confusion, racing thoughts, chronic depression,
suicidal thoughts, and anger outbursts.

The form also indicates

that when Dr. Merideth stated in her notes that Claimant was “doing
well” or “doing OK”, it meant that minimal positive adjustment may
have occurred and that even a minimal increase in mental demands or
change in the environment would be predicted to cause the individual
to decompensate.

(Tr. 552).

Dr. Merideth stated that Claimant’s condition would cause her
to be absent from work more than 4 days per month.
indicated no substance abuse was noted.

She also

(Tr. 553).

The ALJ noted this assessment but found the opinion (1) invaded
the province of the ALJ by stating Claimant was disabled; (2)

Dr.

Merideth did not describe her relationship with Claimant; (3) Dr.
Merideth was not Claimant’s primary mental health provider; (4) the
opinion is inconsistent with the evidence of record; and (5) the
opinion is not supported by medical signs and laboratory findings.
(Tr. 21-22).

As a result, the ALJ gave the opinion “no weight.”

(Tr. 22).
This Court has not located anywhere in the opinion where she
stated Claimant was disabled.

The remainder of the opinion on the

form consists of functional restrictions based upon Claimant’s
diagnosed condition.

Further, while Claimant clearly responded to

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medication, she suffered from the conditions and symptoms which Dr.
Merideth accurately set forth on the assessment form.

Claimant was

diagnosed with crying spells, appetite and sleep disturbances,
paranoia, fatigue, confusion, racing thoughts, suicidal thoughts,
and anger outbursts. (Tr. 397-99, 406, 412-13, 428, 432-34, 436-38,
445, 448, 451, 454, 460, 463, 466, 493, 495, 499-500, 503, 517, 522,
528, 533, 541, 543-44, 548, 566, 570, 578, 580-82).

Additionally,

Dr. Merideth expressly stated on the form that the fact she
indicated

in

her

notes

that

Claimant

was

“doing

well”

only

demonstrated that a minimal advancement had been made subject to
setback with a change of circumstance.
Most disturbing in the ALJ’s analysis is a line of statements
that Dr. Merideth and the group for which she works had as its goal
to find Claimant disabled.

Specifically, the ALJ stated

MHSO records reflect that from the get-go it was one of
that agency’s goals to qualify claimant for disability
benefits (probably out of funding concerns).
Dr.
Merideth may present a MSS that possibly reflects less
than an entirely impartial medical opinion (that may be
a reflection of her MHSO employer’s goals).
(Tr. 22).
This statement smacks of the old “treating physician’s report

appears to have been prepared as an accommodation to a patient”
statement that has been roundly rejected as a basis for reducing
the controlling weight normally afforded a treating physician’s
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opinion.

Miller v. Chater, 99 F.3d. 972, 976 (10th Cir. 1996)

citing Frey v. Bowen, 816 F.2d 508, 515 (10th Cir. 1987).
statements

made

by

the

ALJ

in

this

regard

represent

The
rank

speculation as to the purpose and goal of the treatment at MHSO
that has no place in the treating physician analysis.
The ALJ also found without explanation that Dr. Merideth did
not appear to be Claimant’s primary mental health care giver.

The

records from MHSO do not reflect any other physician rendering
treatment.
In deciding how much weight to give the opinion of a treating
physician, an ALJ must first determine whether the opinion is
entitled to “controlling weight.”
1297, 1300 (10th Cir. 2003).

Watkins v. Barnhart, 350 F.3d

An ALJ is required to give the

opinion of a treating physician controlling weight if it is both:
(1) “well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory
diagnostic techniques”; and (2) “consistent with other substantial
evidence in the record.”

Id. (quotation omitted).

“[I]f the

opinion is deficient in either of these respects, then it is not
entitled to controlling weight.”

Id.

Even if a treating physician's opinion is not entitled to
controlling weight, “[t]reating source medical opinions are still
entitled to deference and must be weighed using all of the factors

9

provided in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527.”

Id. (quotation omitted).

factors reference in that section are:

The

(1) the length of the

treatment relationship and the frequency of examination; (2) the
nature and extent of the treatment relationship, including the
treatment

provided

and

the

kind

of

examination

or

testing

performed; (3) the degree to which the physician's opinion is
supported by relevant evidence; (4) consistency between the opinion
and the record as a whole; (5) whether or not the physician is a
specialist in the area upon which an opinion is rendered; and (6)
other factors brought to the ALJ's attention which tend to support
or contradict the opinion.

Id. at 1300-01 (quotation omitted).

After considering these factors, the ALJ must “give good reasons”
for the weight he ultimately assigns the opinion.

20 C.F.R. §

404.1527(d)(2); Robinson v. Barnhart, 366 F.3d 1078, 1082 (10th
Cir.

2004)(citations

omitted).

Any

such

findings

must

be

“sufficiently specific to make clear to any subsequent reviewers
the weight the adjudicator gave to the treating source’s medical
opinions and the reason for that weight.”

Id.

“Finally, if the

ALJ rejects the opinion completely, he must then give specific,
legitimate reasons for doing so.”

Watkins, 350 F.3d at 1301

(quotations omitted).
While the ALJ cited the various factors, it is apparent that

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his evaluation of Dr. Merideth’s opinion and treatment regimen was
jaded by his stated belief that the opinion was manufactured for
the purpose of finding Claimant disabled and improving the funding
position of MHSO.

In essence, the ALJ sacrificed his objectivity

upon the alter of speculation while ignoring the various findings
of Claimant’s mental health problems. On remand, the ALJ rendering
this decision, or perhaps a less jaded ALJ, shall reconsider his
findings on Dr. Merideth’s opinion in light of the medical record
utilizing the factors recognized by the case authority and the
regulations.
Credibility Determination
The ALJ determined Claimant was not credible in her stated
restrictions in functioning.
support such restrictions.

He found the medical evidence did not
Since this Court is ordering that the

opinion of Claimant’s treating physician be re-evaluated, it is
prudent to permit the ALJ to determine whether the re-evaluation
results in an effect upon the credibility of Claimant’s testimony.
Conclusion
The

decision

of

the

Commissioner

is

not

supported

by

substantial evidence and the correct legal standards were not
applied. Therefore, this Court finds the ruling of the Commissioner
of Social Security Administration should be and is REVERSED and the

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matter REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion
and Order.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 30th day of March, 2015.

______________________________
KIMBERLY E. WEST
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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