Ward v. United States

Filing 40

OPINION AND ORDER by Judge Frank H. Seay granting 28 Motion for Summary Judgment (dma, Deputy Clerk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
TERRY WARD,

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Plaintiff,
vs.
UNITED STATES,
Defendant.

Case No. 14-CV-192-FHS

OPINION AND ORDER
This matter comes before the court on Defendant’s Motion for
Summary Judgment (Dkt. # 28).

Plaintiff filed his response on

December 23, 2014 (Dkt. # 29) and the defendant filed a reply on
December 31, 2014 (Dkt. # 38).
STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS
Plaintiff is a disabled Veteran of the United States Army who
resides in Sequoyah County, Oklahoma. On August 5, 2013, Plaintiff
met with Dr. J’Dene Rogers at the VA Hospital’s East Behavioral
Center.

After meeting with Plaintiff, Dr. Rogers prepared an

“Initial

Assessment,

Statement.”
Plaintiff,

Licensed

Mental

Health

Professional

This statement reflected Dr. Rogers opinion that
as

a

result

of

alcohol/drug

dependency

or

mental

illness, was a person requiring treatment and that emergency
detention was warranted.
As a result of this initial assessment, Dr. Rogers initiated
procedures that caused Plaintiff to be apprehended by the Acting
Chief of Police, Tony Turner, who escorted Plaintiff from Dr.

Rogers’ office to Plaintiff’s vehicle.
Emergency

Medical

Service

personnel

From Plaintiff’s vehicle,
transported

Plaintiff

by

ambulance to the Muskogee Veterans Administration Emergency Room
for treatment.
Thereafter, a “Request for Prehearing Detention” was filed
with the District Court of Muskogee County, Oklahoma1 and an “Order
Directing Prehearing Detention” was entered on August 8, 2013, by
a judge in the District Court of Muskogee County, Oklahoma.

In

issuing this order, the state court judge found “It is the opinion
of the court there is probable cause to detain Respondent for the
protection of Respondent or others until a hearing on the Petition
in this matter.”

Dkt. # 28-4.

This order further provided that

the Plaintiff would be detained at the Department of Veterans
Affairs Medical Center.

Id.

On or about August 8, 2013, a “Petition for Involuntary
Commitment” was filed against Plaintiff in the District Court of
Muskogee County, State of Oklahoma and an Order was entered
appointing

attorney

Lynn

Nolen

to

represent

the

plaintiff.

Plaintiff requested a jury trial in regards to the Petition for
Involuntary Commitment and on August 15, 2013 a jury trial was held
on said petition.

After hearing the evidence, the jury returned a

verdict finding the Plaintiff was “a person requiring treatment”

1

While the document filed with the Court does not indicate the date this request was filed, Plaintiff admits it was filed
in the District Court of Muskogee County, State of Oklahoma.

2

and a state court judge entered an order and judgment finding
Plaintiff “is not competent to consent to or refuse treatment, and
the treating physician is authorized to treat Respondent without
Respondent’s consent, . . . .”

Dkt. # 28-8.

The Order further

provided “placement within the Jack C. Montgomery Veterans Affairs
Medical

Center

or

associated

Department

of

Veterans

Affairs

facility is the least restrictive form of treatment practical” and
ordered

plaintiff

be

“committed

to

the

custody

of

Jack

C.

Montgomery Veterans Affairs Medical Center or associated Department
of Veterans Affairs facility, for care, treatment and medication,
and that the treating physician is authorized to treat Respondent
without Respondent’s consent.”

Id.

Plaintiff did not file any

appeal of this order nor did he file a petition for habeas corpus.
Petitioner also never filed a written request asking the treatment
order be reviewed by the committing court, or a court in the county
where

Plaintiff

was

confined.

Plaintiff

was

released

from

treatment at the Jack C. Montgomery Veterans Affairs Medical Center
by Dr. Chelf on August 23, 2013.
LEGAL ANALYSIS
Summary judgment is appropriate where there is no dispute of
material facts and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.

Fed.R.Civ.P.56.

When presented with a summary

judgment motion, this Court must determine whether there “are any
genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved only by the
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finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of
either party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250,
106 S.Ct. 2505, 2511, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).

When evaluating a

motion for summary judgment, this Court must examine the factual
record and reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most
favorable to the party opposing summary judgment. Gray v. Phillips
Petroleum Co., 858 F.2d 610, 613 (10th Cir. 1988).

The party

opposing

upon

summary

judgment,

however,

“may

not

rest

mere

allegations or denials of his pleading but . . . must set forth
specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.”
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. at 2510 (quoting First
National Bank of Arizona v. Cities Service Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288,
88 S.Ct. 1575, 20 L.Ed.2d 569 (1968)).
Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges a “tort claim” against the
government.

Basically, Plaintiff alleges the doctors, police and

other staff employed by the Jack C. Montgomery VA Medical Center
deprived him of his civil rights when they initiated procedures to
have him committed and then kept him at the VA hospital for 19 days
after his commitment.

In his response, Plaintiff acknowledges

Supreme Court precedent likely bars any claims challenging the
state-court decision that resulted in his commitment. See, Heck v.
Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). Plaintiff claims, however, because
he has pleaded statutory claims under 38 U.S.C. §7316,2 he can
2

Section 7316 provides a remedy for “malpractice and negligence suits” against the United States.

4

amend his pleadings and add a state law claim for the tort of
“outrage” based upon the fact Dr. Rogers “wielded great power over
[plaintiff] and her mistake caused [plaintiff] to suffer severe
emotional distress.”

The case plaintiff cites to support his

position is Breeden v. League Services Corp., 575 P.2d 1374 (Okla.
1978).

The facts in Breeden are substantially different than the

ones in this case. Specifically, the Breeden case involved a trial
court granting summary judgment in favor of defendant collection
companies in a suit brought by a debtor, seeking to recover damages
for mental anguish allegedly suffered as the result of harassing
and

threatening

companies.

collection

While

the

tactics

Oklahoma

used

Supreme

by
Court

the
did

collection
provide

a

definition for the tort of “outrage,” the Court affirmed the trial
court’s grant of summary judgment and indicated liability will only
arise ‘where the conduct has been so outrageous in character, and
so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of
decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable
in a civilized community.”

Id., at 1376.

In so doing, the

Oklahoma court indicated a court must, in the first instance,
“determine

whether

the

defendant’s

conduct

may

reasonably

be

regarded so extreme and outrageous as to permit recovery.” Id., at
1377.

In this case, where the doctors acted in accordance with

Oklahoma law and obtained an order to involuntarily commit the
Plaintiff, this Court does not believe their conduct was outrageous

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or extreme.

Moreover, on August 20, 2014, a scheduling order was

entered herein and any amended pleadings were due by September 3,
2014.
Having admitted all of the material facts set forth in the
Defendant’s motion for summary judgment, this Court finds Plaintiff
was lawfully detained, committed and treated as allowed by the
mental health laws of the State of Oklahoma.

Accordingly, the

Court grants the Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. #
28) and dismisses Plaintiff’s complaint.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, this Court grants the Motion
for Summary Judgment (Dkt. # 28)and hereby dismisses this action
against the Plaintiff with prejudice.
It is so ordered on this 7th day of January, 2015.

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