Manuel v. Social Security Administration
Filing
27
OPINION AND ORDER by Magistrate Judge Steven P. Shreder DENYING 21 Motion for Attorney Fees Under the EAJA by Joanna R. Manuel. (ndd, Deputy Clerk)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
JOANNA R. MANUEL,
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Plaintiff,
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v.
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CAROLYN W. COLVIN,
)
Acting Commissioner of the Social )
Security Administration,
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Defendant.
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Case No. CIV-14-239-SPS
OPINION AND ORDER
The Plaintiff was the prevailing party in this appeal of the Commissioner of the
Social Security Administration’s decision denying benefits under the Social Security Act.
She seeks attorney’s fees in the amount of $3,704.58 under the Equal Access to Justice
Act (the “EAJA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2412. See Plaintiff’s Motion for an Award of Attorney
Fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act [Docket No. 21]. The Commissioner objects
and urges the Court to deny the request. For the reasons set forth below, the Court agrees
with the Commissioner and finds that fees under the EAJA should not be awarded in this
case.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A), “[A] court shall award to a prevailing party . . .
fees and other expenses . . . unless the court finds that the position of the United States
was substantially justified or that special circumstances make an award unjust.” “The test
for substantial justification under the EAJA, the Supreme Court has added, is simply one
of reasonableness.” Madron v. Astrue, 646 F.3d 1255, 1257-1258 (10th Cir. 2011), citing
Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 563-564 (1988). In order to establish substantial
justification, the Commissioner must show that there was a reasonable basis for the
position she took not only on appeal but also in the administrative proceedings below.
See, e. g., Gutierrez v. Sullivan, 953 F.2d 579, 585 (10th Cir. 1992) (“We consider the
reasonableness of the position the Secretary took both in the administrative proceedings
and in the civil action Plaintiff commenced to obtain benefits.”), citing Fulton v. Heckler,
784 F.2d 348, 349 (10th Cir. 1986). See also Marquez v. Colvin, 2014 WL 2050754, at
*2 (D. Colo. May 16, 2014) (“For purposes of this litigation, the Commissioner’s
position is both the position it took in the underlying administrative proceeding and in
subsequent litigation defending that position.”). “In other words, it does not necessarily
follow from our decision vacating an administrative decision that the government’s
efforts to defend that decision lacked substantial justification.” Madron, 646 F.3d at
1258.
On appeal, the Plaintiff asserted that the ALJ erred by failing to find the claimant
had additional severe impairments, which then caused him to improperly evaluate her
RFC and his findings related to the jobs she could perform. Noting that any failure to
find additional severe impairments is not in itself a cause for reversal, see Hill v. Astrue,
289 Fed. Appx. 289, 292 (10th Cir. 2008), this Court found that the ALJ did fail to
consider the claimant’s nonsevere impairments in combination, which finding was
bolstered by evidence submitted to the Appeal Council. The Commissioner asserts that
her position was substantially justified because the ALJ found the claimant not credible
(a finding not challenged on appeal), he was substantially justified in not finding further
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RFC limitations to account for her complaints. Additionally, she correctly notes that the
Plaintiff did not even mention or raise the evidence submitted to the Appeals Council.
The Plaintiff argues without support that it is unreasonable to find she waived her
arguments related to the Appeals Council because she did not raise them. The Court
agrees that the error regarding the evidence submitted to the Appeals Council—used to
support the reversal based on consideration of the claimant’s nonsevere impairments—
was not even briefed by the Plaintiff’s attorney.
The Court thus finds that the
Commissioner’s position on appeal was reasonable in both law and fact, and that the
Commissioner’s position was therefore substantially justified. Compare with KeyesZachary v. Astrue, 695 F.3d 1156, 1161 (10th Cir. 2012) (“We will consider and discuss
only those of her contentions that have been adequately briefed for our review.”). See
also Cantreras v. Barnhart, 79 Fed. Appx. 708, 709 (5th Cir. 2003) (per curiam)
(“Contreras’s attorney did not brief the issue that served as the basis for the remand and
the attorney’s efforts did nothing more than to keep Contreras’s case alive.”). Because
the Commissioner’s position was substantially justified, the Court finds that an award of
attorney fees in favor of the Plaintiff is therefore precluded.
Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that the Plaintiff’s Motion and Brief in Support for
an Award of Attorney’s Fees Under the Equal Access to Justice Act 28 U.S.C. § 2412
[Docket No. 21] is hereby DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 3rd day of February, 2016.
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