Chappell v. Social Security Administration
Filing
23
OPINION AND ORDER Awarding Attorneys' Fees to the Plaintiff Under the EAJA by Magistrate Judge Steven P. Shreder GRANTING 19 Motion for Attorney Fees by Michael W. Chappell. (ndd, Deputy Clerk)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
MICHAEL W. CHAPPELL,
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
)
)
CAROLYN W. COLVIN,
)
Acting Commissioner of the Social )
Security Administration,
)
)
Defendant.
)
Case No. CIV-14-242-SPS
OPINION AND ORDER AWARDING
ATTORNEYS’ FEES TO THE PLAINTIFF UNDER THE EAJA
The Plaintiff was the prevailing party in this appeal of the Commissioner of the
Social Security Administration’s decision denying benefits under the Social Security Act.
She seeks attorneys’ fees in the amount of $5,221.40 and costs in the amount of $400.00,
under the Equal Access to Justice Act (the “EAJA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2412. See Plaintiff’s
Application for an Award of Attorneys’ Fees Under the Equal Access to Justice Act and
Motion for Award of Court Costs [Docket No. 19]. The Commissioner objects to the
award of fees and costs and urges the Court to deny the request. For the reasons set forth
below, the Court concludes that the Plaintiff should be awarded the requested fees and
costs under the EAJA as the prevailing party herein.
On appeal, the Plaintiff asserted a number of arguments related to the ALJ’s stepfour analysis and RFC determination. The Commissioner’s response asserts that her
position was substantially justified because the arguments made before this Court were
plausible and reasonable in fact and law, essentially restating the arguments made in the
Response Brief. See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (“[A] court shall award to a prevailing
party . . . fees and other expenses . . . unless the court finds that the position of the United
States was substantially justified or that special circumstances make an award unjust.”).
The Court disagrees. In order to establish substantial justification, the Commissioner
must show that there was a reasonable basis for the position she took not only on appeal
but also in the administrative proceedings below. See, e. g., Gutierrez v. Sullivan, 953
F.2d 579, 585 (10th Cir. 1992) (“We consider the reasonableness of the position the
Secretary took both in the administrative proceedings and in the civil action Plaintiff
commenced to obtain benefits.”), citing Fulton v. Heckler, 784 F.2d 348, 349 (10th Cir.
1986). See also Marquez v. Colvin, 2014 WL 2050754, at *2 (D. Colo. May 16, 2014)
(“For purposes of this litigation, the Commissioner’s position is both the position it took
in the underlying administrative proceeding and in subsequent litigation defending that
position.”). Although the Commissioner may have provided a reasonable post hoc basis
for the ALJ’s assessment of Dr. Farrow’s opinion on appeal, the ALJ did not do so in the
first instance. Inasmuch as it was the ALJ’s obligation to provide such a reasonable
basis, see, e. g., Clifton v. Chater, 79 F.3d 1007, 1009 (10th Cir. 1996) (“In the absence
of ALJ findings supported by specific weighing of the evidence, we cannot assess
whether relevant evidence adequately supports the ALJ’s conclusion[.]”).
See also
Drapeau v. Massanari, 255 F.3d 1211, 1214 (10th Cir. 2001) (“Although we review the
ALJ’s decision for substantial evidence, ‘we are not in a position to draw factual
conclusions on behalf of the ALJ.’”), quoting Prince v. Sullivan, 933 F.2d 598, 603 (7th
-2-
Cir. 1991), it is difficult to see how anything said on appeal could justify the ALJ’s
failure to do so. See Hackett v. Barnhart, 475 F.3d 1166, 1174 (10th Cir. 2007) (“[W]e
hold that EAJA ‘fees generally should be awarded where the government’s underlying
action was unreasonable even if the government advanced a reasonable litigation
position.’”), quoting United States v. Marolf, 277 F.3d 1156, 1159 (9th Cir. 2002).
The Court therefore concludes that the Plaintiff should be awarded attorney’s fees
and costs as the prevailing party under the EAJA. See, e. g., Gibson-Jones v. Apfel, 995
F. Supp. 825, 826-27 n.3 (N.D. Ill. 1998) (holding that the Commissioner’s position was
not substantially justified where the ALJ provided an inadequate basis for denying
benefits and adding: “It would be unfair to require Ms. Gibson-Jones to appeal her denial
of benefits and then not award her attorney’s fees because the ALJ is given a second
chance to support his position.”).
Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that the Plaintiff’s Application for an Award of
Attorneys’ Fees Under the Equal Access to Justice Act and Motion for Award of Court
Costs [Docket No. 19] is hereby GRANTED and that the Government is hereby ordered
to pay attorney’s fees in the amount of $5,221.40 and costs in the amount of $400.00 to
the Plaintiff as the Prevailing party herein. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that if the
Plaintiff’s attorney is subsequently awarded any fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1),
said attorney shall refund the smaller amount of such fees to the Plaintiff pursuant to
Weakley v. Bowen, 803 F.2d 575, 580 (10th Cir. 1986).
-3-
IT IS SO ORDERED this 29th day of December, 2015.
-4-
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?