Wilson v. Trammell
OPINION AND ORDER by Judge Ronald A. White : Denying 32 petitioner's Motion to Remand to the Eastern District of Oklahoma to allow making an amended pleading for further proceedings pursuant to Rule 60(b)(1),(3),(6). (acg, Deputy Clerk)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
EASTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
TIMOTHY ALAN WILSON,
JANET DOWLING, Warden,
No. CIV 14-460-RAW-KEW
OPINION AND ORDER
On October 20, 2014, Petitioner filed this habeas corpus action pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241, challenging his loss of earned credits as a result of a prison disciplinary hearing for
the misconduct of Battery (Dkt. 1). On August 1, 2016, the petition was dismissed as barred
by the one-year statute of limitations imposed by 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) (Dkt. 20). Petitioner
filed a notice of appeal on September 26, 2016 (Dkt. 25), and on November 8, 2016, the
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal as untimely in Case No. 16-7074 (Dkt.
31). On February 15, 2017, Petitioner filed in this Court a “motion to remand to the Eastern
District of Oklahoma to allow making an amended pleading and for further proceedings
pursuant to Rule 60(b)(1), (3), (6)” (Dkt. 32).
As set forth in the Court’s previous Orders (Dkts. 16, 20), Petitioner entered a “no
contest” plea to a prison misconduct for Battery, and punishment was imposed on June 28,
2012 (Dkt. 10-6). Petitioner claims that in exchange for changing his disciplinary plea from
“not guilty” to “no contest,” the Disciplinary Investigator included a written stipulation
constructed by Petitioner stating that Petitioner would not be prosecuted for any criminal
charges predicated on the facts of the misconduct incident (Dkt. 19 at 1-2). Petitioner,
however, was prosecuted in Woodward County District Court Case No. 2012-289 for
Aggravated Assault and Battery,1 which he claims was contrary to the terms of the alleged
written agreement foreclosing criminal prosecution.
Petitioner argues the ambiguous wording in the Judgment and Sentence for the
Woodward County conviction has resulted in denial of credits he should have received (Dkt.
32 at 4). He also claims his prosecution in state court constituted a double jeopardy
violation, because he had a “binding contract” signed by the prison’s hearing officer stating
that “street law violations would not be filed with the district attorney.” Id. at 4-5.
Petitioner complains that because of the statute of limitations in this case, his “valid issues
fell upon [the] deaf ears of the Honorable Federal Court” (Dkt. 32 at 2). He further states
he has “restructured his pleading to remand to Eastern District to clarify reasons he should
not be procedurally barred from making his habeas claims causing him significant hardships,
illegal detainment, [and] lengthened prison sentence.” Id.
In addition, Petitioner makes conclusory claims about the effectiveness of his counsel,
his alleged innocence, the voluntariness of his plea, and perjured testimony, among other
things, apparently related to his conviction in Woodward County District Court Case No.
2012-289, not the disciplinary hearing at issue in this petition. He apparently believes his
habeas petition was denied pursuant to a procedural bar, which he states he can overcome
by showing a fundamental miscarriage of justice. The petition, however, was not denied
because of a procedural default. It was instead barred by the statute of limitations.
The pertinent portions of Rule 60(b) allow relief from a final judgment, order, or
proceeding for the following reasons:
(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; . . .
The Court takes judicial notice of the Oklahoma Department of Corrections Offender
website at https://www.ok.gov/doc/ and the Oklahoma State Courts Network at http://www.oscn.net.
See Triplet v. Franklin, 2010 WL 409333, at * n.8 (10th Cir. Feb. 5, 2010) (taking judicial notice
of the ODOC website pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 201). See also Pace v. Addison, No. CIV-14-0750HE, 2014 WL 5780744 n.1 (W.D. Okla. Nov. 5, 2014) (taking judicial notice of the public records
of the Oklahoma County District Court).
(3) fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation,
or misconduct by an opposing party; . . .
(6) any other reason that justifies relief.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). “Rule 60(b) relief ‘is extraordinary and may only be granted in
exceptional circumstances.’” Zurich North America v. Matrix Service, Inc., 426 F.3d 1281,
1289 (10th Cir. 2005) (quoting Servants of Paraclete v. Does, 204 F.3d 1005, 1009 (10th Cir.
2000)). Furthermore, “[i]n a Rule 60(b) proceeding the motion is addressed to the sound
discretion of the [district] court.” Caribou Four Corners v. Truck Ins. Exchange, 443 F.2d
796, 799 (10th Cir. 1971) (citations omitted).
The Court has carefully reviewed the record and construes Petitioner’s pleadings
liberally. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972). To the extent he is challenging the
dismissal of this petition challenging his disciplinary proceedings, the Court finds he has
raised no issues that would allow relief under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1), (3), or (6).
To the extent Petitioner is attempting to challenge his conviction and sentence in the
Woodward County criminal case, that matter is not the subject of this lawsuit, and this Court
has made no rulings regarding that criminal prosecution.
ACCORDINGLY, Petitioner’s “motion to remand to the Eastern District of
Oklahoma to allow making an amended pleading and for further proceedings pursuant to
Rule 60(b)(1), (3), (6)” (Dkt. 32) is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 18th day of September 2017.
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