Bland v. Social Security Administration
Filing
24
OPINION AND ORDER Awarding Attorneys' Fees to the Plaintiff Under the EAJA by Magistrate Judge Steven P. Shreder GRANTING 21 Motion for Attorney Fees by Thomas Lee Bland. (ndd, Deputy Clerk)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
THOMAS LEE BLAND,
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
)
)
CAROLYN W. COLVIN,
)
Acting Commissioner of the Social )
Security Administration,
)
)
Defendant.
)
Case No. CIV-15-007-SPS
OPINION AND ORDER AWARDING
ATTORNEYS’ FEES TO THE PLAINTIFF UNDER THE EAJA
The Plaintiff was the prevailing party in this appeal of the Commissioner of the
Social Security Administration’s decision denying benefits under the Social Security Act.
He seeks a total of attorney’s fees in the amount of $4,294.00, under the Equal Access to
Justice Act (the “EAJA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2412. See Plaintiff’s Motion and Brief in Support
for an Award of Attorney’s Fees Under the Equal Access to Justice Act 28 U.S.C. § 2412
[Docket No. 21]. The Commissioner objects to the award of fees and urges the Court to
deny the request. For the reasons set forth below, the Court concludes that the Plaintiff
should be awarded the requested fees under the EAJA as the prevailing party herein.
On appeal, the Plaintiff asserted three arguments, including an argument that the
ALJ failed to properly consider the claimant’s obesity in combination with his other
impairments. This Court reversed, finding that the ALJ did fail to properly assess the
claimant’s obesity at step four. See Docket No. 19, p. 4. The Commissioner’s response
to the EAJA fees motion asserts that her position on appeal was substantially justified
because “reasonable minds could differ” as to whether the ALJ performed the proper
analysis. See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (“[A] court shall award to a prevailing party . . .
fees and other expenses . . . unless the court finds that the position of the United States
was substantially justified or that special circumstances make an award unjust.”). “The
test for substantial justification under the EAJA, the Supreme Court has added, is simply
one of reasonableness.” Madron v. Astrue, 646 F.3d 1255, 1257-1258 (10th Cir. 2011),
citing Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 563-564 (1988).
In order to establish
substantial justification, the Commissioner must show that there was a reasonable basis
for the position she took not only on appeal but also in the administrative proceedings
below. See, e. g., Gutierrez v. Sullivan, 953 F.2d 579, 585 (10th Cir. 1992) (“We
consider the reasonableness of the position the Secretary took both in the administrative
proceedings and in the civil action Plaintiff commenced to obtain benefits.”), citing
Fulton v. Heckler, 784 F.2d 348, 349 (10th Cir. 1986). See also Marquez v. Colvin, 2014
WL 2050754, at *2 (D. Colo. May 16, 2014) (“For purposes of this litigation, the
Commissioner’s position is both the position it took in the underlying administrative
proceeding and in subsequent litigation defending that position.”). “In other words, it
does not necessarily follow from our decision vacating an administrative decision that the
government’s efforts to defend that decision lacked substantial justification.” Madron,
646 F.3d at 1258. In this case, the Court found that the ALJ failed to connect the
claimant’s obesity to the assigned RFC, and further failed to make a determination as to
whether there were additional and cumulative effects. Inasmuch as it was the ALJ’s
-2-
obligation to provide such a reasonable basis it is difficult to see how anything said on
appeal could justify the ALJ’s failures at the administrative level in this case. See, e. g.,
Clifton v. Chater, 79 F.3d 1007, 1009 (10th Cir. 1996) (“In the absence of ALJ findings
supported by specific weighing of the evidence, we cannot assess whether relevant
evidence adequately supports the ALJ’s conclusion[.]”). See also Hackett v. Barnhart,
475 F.3d 1166, 1174 (10th Cir. 2007) (“[W]e hold that EAJA ‘fees generally should be
awarded where the government’s underlying action was unreasonable even if the
government advanced a reasonable litigation position.’”), quoting United States v.
Marolf, 277 F.3d 1156, 1159 (9th Cir. 2002); Drapeau v. Massanari, 255 F.3d 1211,
1214 (10th Cir. 2001) (“Although we review the ALJ’s decision for substantial evidence,
‘we are not in a position to draw factual conclusions on behalf of the ALJ.’”), quoting
Prince v. Sullivan, 933 F.2d 598, 603 (7th Cir. 1991).
The Court therefore concludes that the Plaintiff should be awarded attorney’s fees
as the prevailing party under the EAJA. See, e. g., Gibson-Jones v. Apfel, 995 F. Supp.
825, 826-27 n.3 (N.D. Ill. 1998) (holding that the Commissioner’s position was not
substantially justified where the ALJ provided an inadequate basis for denying benefits
and adding: “It would be unfair to require Ms. Gibson-Jones to appeal her denial of
benefits and then not award her attorney’s fees because the ALJ is given a second chance
to support his position.”).
The Commissioner cites a Sixth Circuit case for the
proposition that “in the vast majority of cases, a position defending a final administrative
decision despite its imperfections will be justified.” DeLong v. Commissioner of Social
Security Administration, 748 F.3d 723, 728 (6th Cir. 2014). Even aside from the purely
-3-
persuasive authority and dicta from which this citation arrives, the Court notes that
further scrutiny even in that Circuit has resulted in disavowing this statement: “In reality,
both published and unpublished case law strongly supports a contrary inference that in
the vast majority of social security cases, EAJA fees are awarded whenever a plaintiff
wins remand.” Stacy v. Commissioner of Social Security, 2016 WL 3079130, at *4 (S.D.
Ohio May 5, 2016), citing Glenn v. Commissioner of Social Security, 763 F.3d 494 (6th
Cir. 2014).
Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that the Plaintiff’s Motion and Brief in Support for
an Award of Attorney’s Fees Under the Equal Access to Justice Act 28 U.S.C. § 2412
[Docket No. 21] in the amount of $4,294.00 is hereby GRANTED and that the
Government is hereby ordered to pay attorney’s fees to the Plaintiff as the prevailing
party herein. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that if the Plaintiff’s attorney is subsequently
awarded any fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1), said attorney shall refund the smaller
amount of such fees to the Plaintiff pursuant to Weakley v. Bowen, 803 F.2d 575, 580
(10th Cir. 1986).
IT IS SO ORDERED this 1st day of July, 2016.
-4-
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?