Self v. Social Security Administration
Filing
30
OPINION AND ORDER Awarding Attorneys' Fees to the Plaintiff Under the EAJA by Magistrate Judge Steven P. Shreder GRANTING 24 Motion for Attorney Fees AND 28 Supplemental Motion for Attorney Fees by Clendon Joe Self. (ndd, Deputy Clerk)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
CLENDON JOE SELF,
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
)
)
CAROLYN W. COLVIN,
)
Acting Commissioner of the Social )
Security Administration,
)
)
Defendant.
)
Case No. CIV-15-160-SPS
OPINION AND ORDER AWARDING
ATTORNEYS’ FEES TO THE PLAINTIFF UNDER THE EAJA
The Plaintiff was the prevailing party in this appeal of the Commissioner of the
Social Security Administration’s decision denying benefits under the Social Security Act.
He seeks attorney’s fees in the amount of $6,293.60, under the Equal Access to Justice
Act (the “EAJA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2412. See Plaintiff’s Motion and Brief in Support for an
Award of Attorney’s Fees Under the Equal Access to Justice Act 28 U.S.C. § 2412
[Docket No. 24] and Plaintiff’s Supplemental Motion for an Award of Attorney’s Fees
Under the Equal Access to Justice Act [Docket No. 28]. The Commissioner objects to
the award of fees and urges the Court to deny the request. For the reasons set forth
below, the Court concludes that the Plaintiff should be awarded the requested fees under
the EAJA as the prevailing party herein.
On appeal, the Plaintiff asserted two arguments, including an argument related to
the claimant’s need for a sit/stand option. The Commissioner’s response to the EAJA
fees motion asserts that her position on appeal was substantially justified because the
arguments made before this Court were plausible and reasonable in fact and law, and the
duty to weigh evidence is the sole province of the ALJ. See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A)
(“[A] court shall award to a prevailing party . . . fees and other expenses . . . unless the
court finds that the position of the United States was substantially justified or that special
circumstances make an award unjust.”). “The test for substantial justification under the
EAJA, the Supreme Court has added, is simply one of reasonableness.” Madron v.
Astrue, 646 F.3d 1255, 1257-1258 (10th Cir. 2011), citing Pierce v. Underwood, 487
U.S. 552, 563-564 (1988).
In order to establish substantial justification, the
Commissioner must show that there was a reasonable basis for the position she took not
only on appeal but also in the administrative proceedings below. See, e. g., Gutierrez v.
Sullivan, 953 F.2d 579, 585 (10th Cir. 1992) (“We consider the reasonableness of the
position the Secretary took both in the administrative proceedings and in the civil action
Plaintiff commenced to obtain benefits.”), citing Fulton v. Heckler, 784 F.2d 348, 349
(10th Cir. 1986). See also Marquez v. Colvin, 2014 WL 2050754, at *2 (D. Colo. May
16, 2014) (“For purposes of this litigation, the Commissioner’s position is both the
position it took in the underlying administrative proceeding and in subsequent litigation
defending that position.”). “In other words, it does not necessarily follow from our
decision vacating an administrative decision that the government’s efforts to defend that
decision lacked substantial justification.” Madron, 646 F.3d at 1258. In this case, the
Court found that the ALJ failed to account for the parameters of the assigned sit/stand
option. Here, the Commissioner argues the ALJ’s RFC assessment was reasonable and
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therefore substantially justified because other courts have upheld similar RFC
Assessments. But this Court found that the ALJ did not properly assess the claimant’s
RFC. Inasmuch as it was the ALJ’s obligation to provide such a reasonable basis it is
difficult to see how anything said on appeal could justify the ALJ’s failures at the
administrative level in this case. See, e. g., Clifton v. Chater, 79 F.3d 1007, 1009 (10th
Cir. 1996) (“In the absence of ALJ findings supported by specific weighing of the
evidence, we cannot assess whether relevant evidence adequately supports the ALJ’s
conclusion[.]”). See also Hackett v. Barnhart, 475 F.3d 1166, 1174 (10th Cir. 2007)
(“[W]e hold that EAJA ‘fees generally should be awarded where the government’s
underlying action was unreasonable even if the government advanced a reasonable
litigation position.’”), quoting United States v. Marolf, 277 F.3d 1156, 1159 (9th Cir.
2002); Drapeau v. Massanari, 255 F.3d 1211, 1214 (10th Cir. 2001) (“Although we
review the ALJ’s decision for substantial evidence, ‘we are not in a position to draw
factual conclusions on behalf of the ALJ.’”), quoting Prince v. Sullivan, 933 F.2d 598,
603 (7th Cir. 1991).
The Court therefore concludes that the Plaintiff should be awarded attorney’s fees
as the prevailing party under the EAJA. See, e. g., Gibson-Jones v. Apfel, 995 F. Supp.
825, 826-27 n.3 (N.D. Ill. 1998) (holding that the Commissioner’s position was not
substantially justified where the ALJ provided an inadequate basis for denying benefits
and adding: “It would be unfair to require Ms. Gibson-Jones to appeal her denial of
benefits and then not award her attorney’s fees because the ALJ is given a second chance
to support his position.”).
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Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that the Plaintiff’s Motion and Brief in Support for
an Award of Attorney’s Fees Under the Equal Access to Justice Act 28 U.S.C. § 2412
[Docket No. 24] in the amount of $5,852.00 and Plaintiff’s Supplemental Motion for an
Award of Attorney’s Fees Under the Equal Access to Justice Act [Docket No. 28] in the
amount of $441.60 are hereby GRANTED and that the Government is hereby ordered to
pay attorney’s fees in the amount of $6,293.60 to the Plaintiff as the prevailing party
herein. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that if the Plaintiff’s attorney is subsequently
awarded any fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1), said attorney shall refund the smaller
amount of such fees to the Plaintiff pursuant to Weakley v. Bowen, 803 F.2d 575, 580
(10th Cir. 1986).
IT IS SO ORDERED this 29th day of November, 2016.
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