Guthrie v. Gragg et al
Filing
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OPINION AND ORDER by District Judge James H. Payne: granting 14 Motion to Dismiss; dismissing Charles Pearson, Jr, the duly-elected Sheriff of Muskogee County, Oklahoma, in his official capacity (cjt, Deputy Clerk)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
1.
CECIL GUTHRIE,
Plaintiff,
v.
1.
JEFFREY GRAGG, a Muskogee County
Deputy Sheriff in his individual capacity,
2.
KENT BARBER, a Muskogee County
Deputy Sheriff in his individual capacity,
3.
CHARLES PEARSON, JR., the
duly-elected Sheriff of Muskogee County,
Oklahoma, in his official capacity,
4.
BOARD OF COUNTY
COMMISSIONERS FOR MUSKOGEE
COUNTY, OKLAHOMA,
Defendants.
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CASE NO. 15-cv-00162-JHP
OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court are Defendant Charles Pearson, Jr.’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 14),
Plaintiff’s Response and Motion in Opposition (Doc. No. 27), and Defendant’s Reply (Doc. No.
28). After consideration of the briefs, and for the reasons stated below, the Motion to Dismiss is
GRANTED.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Cecil Guthrie filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Oklahoma
Governmental Tort Claims Act (“OGTCA”), OKLA. STAT. tit. 51, §§ 151 et seq. Plaintiff seeks
recovery from defendants Jeffrey Gragg and Kent Barber, both Muskogee County, Oklahoma
Deputy Sheriffs, in their individual capacities; Charles Pearson, Jr., the duly-elected Sheriff of
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Muskogee County, Oklahoma, in his official capacity; and the Board of County Commissioners
for Muskogee County, Oklahoma. According to the Complaint, on April 3, 2014, Plaintiff was
counseling his emotionally troubled daughter in his pick-up truck. (Doc. No. 3). Plaintiff’s
daughter had allegedly consumed a number of pills and was likely in need of medical and mental
health attention. (Id.). EMS personnel arrived but agreed to allow Plaintiff to counsel his
daughter for a few minutes before taking her. (Id.). However, when Defendant Jeffrey Gragg
arrived, he began “barking orders” at Plaintiff, who was seated behind the wheel of his truck.
(Id.). Gragg then yanked at Plaintiff’s left arm, “without cause or provocation,” and fired his
Taser gun at Plaintiff. (Id.). Plaintiff received an electrical shock from the electrodes and lost
consciousness, which caused his foot to slip off the brake of his truck and the truck to roll 100 to
150 feet before stopping. (Id.). As Plaintiff regained consciousness, Gragg approached and
demanded Plaintiff produce identification, while Defendant Kent Barber approached and stated
his intent to charge Plaintiff with attempted assault and battery with his truck. (Id.). Plaintiff was
then transported to the hospital for treatment and was never charged with any criminal offense in
this matter. (Id.).
Relevant to this motion, Plaintiff asserts two respondeat superior claims against
defendant Charles Pearson, Jr., in his official capacity as Sheriff of Muskogee County: (1)
excessive force/assault and battery pursuant to the OGTCA (Second Cause of Action) and (2)
false imprisonment pursuant to the OGTCA (Fourth Cause of Action). Pearson has now moved
to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against him pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6),
because he has immunity under the OGTCA.
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DISCUSSION
In considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court must accept all well-pleaded allegations
of the complaint as true, and must construe them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See
Anderson v. Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith, Inc., 521 F.3d 1278, 1284 (10th Cir. 2008).
To withstand a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain enough allegations of fact “to state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007). The plaintiff bears the burden to frame “a complaint with enough factual matter (taken
as true) to suggest” he or she is entitled to relief. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556. “A pleading that
offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will
not do.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557).
Defendant Pearson argues he is immune from suit with respect to Plaintiff’s OGTCA
claims. The OGTCA generally immunizes “the state, its political subdivisions, and all of their
employees acting within the scope of their employment” from liability for torts. OKLA. STAT. tit.
51, § 152.1(A). This immunity is subject to a limited waiver for the state and its political
subdivisions, but “only to the extent and in the manner provided” in the OGTCA. OKLA. STAT.
tit. 51, § 152.1(B).
Pearson argues the limited waiver does not apply to suit against him in his official
capacity, because he is an employee of a political subdivision. Pearson is correct. The OGTCA
did not waive immunity of state employees. In fact, the OGTCA precludes tort actions against
“an employee of the state or political subdivision acting within the scope of his employment.”
OKLA. STAT. tit. 51, § 163(C). See OKLA. STAT. tit. 51, § 152(7)(a)(1) (defining “employee” to
include “all elected and appointed officers . . . for an agency or political subdivision”); OKLA.
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STAT. tit. 51, § 152(11)(c) (defining “political subdivision” to include a county). Accordingly, it
is improper under the OGTCA to sue a county official in his or her official capacity.
Plaintiff argues there is an “apparent conflict in the authorities” regarding the proper
subject of suit under the OGTCA for the alleged torts committed by employees of a county
sheriff’s office. (Doc. No. 27, at 4). As a result, Plaintiff pled entity liability against both
Pearson and the Board of County Commissioners for Muskogee County in “an abundance of
caution.” (Id.). The Court, however, finds the law to be clear on this issue. The Oklahoma
Supreme Court has held a “[s]uit against a government officer in his or her official capacity is
actually a suit against the entity that the officer represents,” which “is improper under the
[O]GTCA.” Speight v. Presley, 203 P.3d 173, 179 (Okla. 2008) (citing Pellegrino v. State ex rel.
Cameron University, 63 P.3d 535, 537 (Okla. 2003)). Rather, OGTCA claims brought against a
county must name that county’s board of county commissioners as a defendant. OKLA. STAT. tit.
19, § 4. Therefore, the Board, not Pearson, is the proper party defendant on the OGTCA claims.
As Plaintiff points out, the Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals has held a county board
cannot be held vicariously liable for torts committed by sheriff’s deputies in the course of
employment, because no master-servant relationship exists between the two with respect to
traditional tort claims. Bryson v. Oklahoma Cnty. ex rel. Oklahoma Cnty. Det. Ctr., 261 P.3d
627, 632-33 (Okla. Civ. App. 2011). However, this conclusion is inapplicable to Plaintiff’s
claims under the OGTCA, because Bryson addressed only a traditional tort claim without
reaching the terms of the OGTCA. To the extent the Court of Civil Appeals in Bryson intended
its ruling to apply to claims under the OGTCA, such ruling cannot be controlling, because it
would contradict the plain language of the OGTCA and the Oklahoma Supreme Court’s ruling in
Speight. Therefore, in accordance with the OGTCA and Speight, the Court concludes it is
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improper under the OGTCA to sue a county official in his or her official capacity. To the extent
Plaintiff seeks to recover against Muskogee County for the tortious acts of its sheriff’s deputies,
he must name the Board as a defendant. Accordingly, the OGTCA claims against Pearson are
dismissed.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons detailed above, Defendant Charles Pearson, Jr.’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc.
No. 14) is GRANTED.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 26th day of February, 2016.
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