McClain v. Social Security Administration
Filing
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OPINION AND ORDER Awarding Attorneys' Fees to the Plaintiff Under the EAJA by Magistrate Judge Steven P. Shreder GRANTING 22 Motion for Attorney Fees, and GRANTING 25 Supplemental Motion for Attorney Fees by Kathy L. McClain. (tls, Deputy Clerk)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
KATHY L. MCCLAIN,
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
)
)
CAROLYN W. COLVIN,
)
Acting Commissioner of the Social )
Security Administration,
)
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Defendant.
)
Case No. CIV-15-308-SPS
OPINION AND ORDER AWARDING
ATTORNEYS’ FEES TO THE PLAINTIFF UNDER THE EAJA
The Plaintiff was the prevailing party in this appeal of the Commissioner of the
Social Security Administration’s decision denying benefits under the Social Security Act.
She seeks a total of attorney’s fees in the amount of $5,951.80, under the Equal Access to
Justice Act (the “EAJA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2412. See Plaintiff’s Motion and Brief in Support
for an Award of Attorney’s Fees Under the Equal Access to Justice Act 28 U.S.C. § 2412
[Docket No. 22] and Plaintiff’s Supplemental Motion for an Award of Attorney’s Fees
Under the Equal Access to Justice Act [Docket No. 25]. The Commissioner objects to the
award of fees and urges the Court to deny the request. For the reasons set forth below, the
Court concludes that the Plaintiff should be awarded the requested fees and costs under the
EAJA as the prevailing party herein.
On appeal, the Plaintiff asserted arguments related to the ALJ’s RFC assessment
was not supported by substantial evidence, and the Court agreed that the ALJ had erred in
evaluating a treating physician opinion. The Commissioner’s response to the present
motion asserts that her position was substantially justified because the arguments made
before this Court were plausible and reasonable in fact and law, essentially restating the
arguments made in the Response Brief and challenging this Court’s findings. See 28
U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (“[A] court shall award to a prevailing party . . . fees and other
expenses . . . unless the court finds that the position of the United States was substantially
justified or that special circumstances make an award unjust.”). The Court disagrees with
the Commissioner’s arguments and position. In order to establish substantial justification,
the Commissioner must show that there was a reasonable basis for the position she took
not only on appeal but also in the administrative proceedings below. See, e. g., Gutierrez
v. Sullivan, 953 F.2d 579, 585 (10th Cir. 1992) (“We consider the reasonableness of the
position the Secretary took both in the administrative proceedings and in the civil action
Plaintiff commenced to obtain benefits.”), citing Fulton v. Heckler, 784 F.2d 348, 349 (10th
Cir. 1986). See also Marquez v. Colvin, 2014 WL 2050754, at *2 (D. Colo. May 16, 2014)
(“For purposes of this litigation, the Commissioner’s position is both the position it took
in the underlying administrative proceeding and in subsequent litigation defending that
position.”). The Commissioner’s original argument was that the ALJ did not need to
evaluate that opinion because the Plaintiff did not meet the durational requirement, which
this Court rejected as improper post hoc rationalization. The Commissioner now asserts
that the post hoc rationalization was based on a reasonable belief that the ALJ did not have
a duty to articulate his reasoning in these circumstances and that otherwise requiring him
to discuss a diagnosed impairment would require a discussion of “every time a claimant
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south treatment for the flu or an injury caused by an accident.” Although the Commissioner
may have provided some reasonable post hoc bases for the ALJ’s findings, the ALJ did not
do so in the first instance. Inasmuch as it was the ALJ’s obligation to provide such a
reasonable basis, see, e. g., Clifton v. Chater, 79 F.3d 1007, 1009 (10th Cir. 1996) (“In the
absence of ALJ findings supported by specific weighing of the evidence, we cannot assess
whether relevant evidence adequately supports the ALJ’s conclusion[.]”).
See also
Drapeau v. Massanari, 255 F.3d 1211, 1214 (10th Cir. 2001) (“Although we review the
ALJ’s decision for substantial evidence, ‘we are not in a position to draw factual
conclusions on behalf of the ALJ.’”), quoting Prince v. Sullivan, 933 F.2d 598, 603 (7th
Cir. 1991), it is difficult to see how anything said on appeal could justify the ALJ’s failure
to do so. See Hackett v. Barnhart, 475 F.3d 1166, 1174 (10th Cir. 2007) (“[W]e hold that
EAJA ‘fees generally should be awarded where the government’s underlying action was
unreasonable even if the government advanced a reasonable litigation position.’”), quoting
United States v. Marolf, 277 F.3d 1156, 1159 (9th Cir. 2002).
Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that the Plaintiff’s Motion and Brief in Support for
an Award of Attorney’s Fees Under the Equal Access to Justice Act 28 U.S.C. § 2412
[Docket No. 22] and Plaintiff’s Supplemental Motion for an Award of Attorney’s Fees
Under the Equal Access to Justice Act [Docket No. 25] are hereby GRANTED and that the
Government is hereby ordered to pay attorney’s fees in the amount of $5,951.80 to the
Plaintiff as the Prevailing party herein. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that if the Plaintiff’s
attorney is subsequently awarded any fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1), said attorney
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shall refund the smaller amount of such fees to the Plaintiff pursuant to Weakley v. Bowen,
803 F.2d 575, 580 (10th Cir. 1986).
IT IS SO ORDERED this 8th day of December, 2016.
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