Bowden v. Social Security Administration

Filing 20

OPINION AND ORDER by Magistrate Judge Steven P. Shreder reversing and remanding the decision of the ALJ. (tmb, Chambers)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
RODNEY E. BOWDEN,
Plaintiff,
v.
NANCY A. BERRYHILL,
Acting Commissioner of the Social
Security Administration, 1
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CIV-16-231-SPS

OPINION AND ORDER
The claimant Rodney E. Bowden requests judicial review of a denial of benefits
by the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 405(g). He appeals the Commissioner’s decision and asserts the Administrative Law
Judge (“ALJ”) erred in determining he was not disabled. For the reasons set forth below,
the Commissioner’s decision is hereby REVERSED and the case is REMANDED to the
ALJ for further proceedings.
Social Security Law and Standard of Review
Disability under the Social Security Act is defined as the “inability to engage in
any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or
mental impairment[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). A claimant is disabled under the
Social Security Act “only if his physical or mental impairment or impairments are of such
1

On January 23, 2017, Nancy A. Berryhill became the Acting Commissioner of Social Security.
In accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d), Ms. Berryhill is substituted for Carolyn Colvin as the
Defendant in this action.

severity that he is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his
age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work
which exists in the national economy[.]” Id. § 423 (d)(2)(A). Social security regulations
implement a five-step sequential process to evaluate a disability claim. See 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1520, 416.920. 2
Section 405(g) limits the scope of judicial review of the Commissioner’s decision
to two inquiries: whether the decision was supported by substantial evidence and whether
correct legal standards were applied. See Hawkins v. Chater, 113 F.3d 1162, 1164 (10th
Cir. 1997). Substantial evidence is “more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”
Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971), quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v.
NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938). See also Clifton v. Chater, 79 F.3d 1007, 1009 (10th
Cir. 1996). The Court may not reweigh the evidence or substitute its discretion for the
Commissioner’s. See Casias v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, 933 F.2d 799,

2

Step One requires the claimant to establish that he is not engaged in substantial gainful
activity. Step Two requires the claimant to establish that he has a medically severe impairment
(or combination of impairments) that significantly limits his ability to do basic work activities. If
the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful activity, or his impairment is not medically severe,
disability benefits are denied. If he does have a medically severe impairment, it is measured at
step three against the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpt. P, App. 1. If the claimant
has a listed (or “medically equivalent”) impairment, he is regarded as disabled and awarded
benefits without further inquiry. Otherwise, the evaluation proceeds to step four, where the
claimant must show that he lacks the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to return to his past
relevant work. At step five, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to show there is significant
work in the national economy that the claimant can perform, given his age, education, work
experience, and RFC. Disability benefits are denied if the claimant can return to any of his past
relevant work or if his RFC does not preclude alternative work. See generally Williams v.
Bowen, 844 F.2d 748, 750-51 (10th Cir. 1988).
-2-

800 (10th Cir. 1991). But the Court must review the record as a whole, and “[t]he
substantiality of the evidence must take into account whatever in the record fairly detracts
from its weight.” Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 488 (1951); see also
Casias, 933 F.2d at 800-01.
Claimant’s Background
The claimant was born on April 12, 1966, and was forty-eight years old at the time
of the administrative hearing (Tr. 34, 117). He completed the eleventh grade while
attending special education classes, and has worked as a construction laborer (Tr. 23,
133). The claimant alleges that he has been unable to work since May 16, 2011, due to
deep depression and back problems (Tr. 133).
Procedural History
On May 16, 2011, the claimant applied for supplemental security income
payments under Title XVI of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381-85.

His

application was denied. ALJ J. Frederick Gatzke held an administrative hearing and
determined the claimant was not disabled in a written opinion dated June 6, 2014 (Tr. 1125). The Appeals Council denied review, so the ALJ’s opinion is the Commissioner’s
final decision for purposes of this appeal. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.1481.
Decision of the Administrative Law Judge
The ALJ made his decision at step five of the sequential evaluation.

He

determined that the claimant had the RFC to perform light work as defined in 20 C.F.R.
§ 416.967(b), except that he was precluded from work around dangerous moving
machinery. Furthermore, the ALJ determined that the claimant must avoid work that
-3-

requires no more than occasional collaboration with co-workers with only superficial
contact with the public and simple one to two step job instructions (Tr. 17). The ALJ
found that although the claimant could not return to his past relevant work, he was
nevertheless not disabled because there was work that he was capable of performing, i. e.,
janitor, hand packer, and assembler (Tr. 23-24).
Review
The claimant contends that the ALJ erred: (i) by failing to properly assess his
impairments with regard to the Listings, particularly as to Listing 12.05C in the MedicalVocational Guidelines, and (ii) by failing to properly consider the evidence regarding his
mental impairments. The undersigned Magistrate Judge finds that the ALJ did fail to
properly determine whether the claimant satisfied the criteria of Listing 12.05C, and the
decision of the Commissioner should therefore be reversed.
The claimant reported in his application that he completed the eleventh grade and
attended special education classes (Tr. 133). Additionally, the claimant testified at the
administrative hearing that he was in special education classes while in school, and that
he did not have a driver’s license because he struggled with comprehension on the exam
(Tr. 45).
The claimant was largely treated through the Choctaw Nation (Tr. 321-349, 368400) and his treating physician, Dr. Ryan Magnus, prepared a number of statements
regarding the claimant’s ability to work between June 2011 and June 2012 (Tr. 316-319).
On each form, he indicated that the claimant’s impairments included major depressive
disorder, moderate, as well as impulse control disorder NOS, which affected him because
-4-

his anger and depression impaired his ability to work and be around people (Tr. 316-319).
He indicated at first that he was unsure how long the claimant would be incapacitated and
that the claimant reported he could not work, then indicated that the claimant could
perform sedentary work in October 2011, but then indicated that he had no work
tolerance by June 2012 (Tr. 316-319). On February 27, 2014, Dr. Magnus completed
another assessment indicating that the claimant had a mood disorder, that anxiety and
depression prohibited him from working at this time, and that he had no work tolerance
(Tr. 402).
On November 17, 2011, Betty J. Feir, Ph.D. conducted a psychological evaluation
of the claimant, and also administered the WAIS-IV test for intellectual assessment
(Tr. 278). She stated that he appeared to have good testing motivation and maintained his
interest, and that he was cooperative and the results appeared valid (Tr. 278). The
claimant obtained a Verbal Comprehension score of 63, a Perceptual Reasoning score of
75, a Working Memory score of 66, and a Processing Speed score of 62, with a Full Scale
IQ score of 65 (Tr. 279). Dr. Feir thus found the claimant had borderline intellectual
functioning (Tr. 279).

Dr. Feir then stated that she believed his IQ was an

underestimation because:
His lesser verbal based ability summary score approaches a clinically
significant difference from his sensory abilities that are in the borderline
classification; thus, borderline ability may represent his premorbid and/or
current capability intellectually. Records with the referral indicated from
his report he had depression and back problem. He does appear to be
functioning with ability that is subaverage and affected from difficulties
with his perceived depressed mood that records suggested. He was
originally requested to have a mental status examination that was
inadvertently admitted. He does appear to have a very slow rate of learning
-5-

and limited memory and would have difficulty with managing finances
with the current ability findings. Additional referral or re-referral could be
helpful if the current findings and any school or other records are not
available for his case.
(Tr. 279).
On April 18, 2012, Dr. Theresa Horton conducted a mental status examination of
the claimant (Tr. 288). Dr. Horton noted that the claimant appeared to have a limited
fund of information and functioned in the range of borderline intelligence, “likely in the
range of 75-85” (Tr. 291). She assessed him with bipolar disorder, type I, current episode
depressed but historically and predominantly mixed, as well as generalized anxiety
disorder and learning disorder NOS, along with borderline intellectual functioning
(Tr. 291). She stated that the claimant appeared capable of understanding, remembering,
and managing simple and somewhat more complex instructions and tasks, though he
likely required close training and supervision on tasks as they became more complex; that
he likely had difficulty with management of tasks as they became more complex due to
frustration; and that he did not appear capable of sustaining employment over long
periods of time as supported by his erratic employment history (Tr. 291). Finally, noting
the claimant’s history of alcohol abuse in relation to problems with anger management,
she nonetheless stated that the claimant appeared to present with manic type symptoms
including grandiose and irrational thoughts by history in addition to insomnia, all of
which contributed to problems on the job in the past (Tr. 291).
As to the state reviewing physician process, state reviewing physician Kathleen
Gerrity originally found that the claimant met Listing 12.04 because his functional
-6-

impairment reached the listing level (Tr. 254-266). She then updated the case analysis,
noting that they had all they needed regarding the claimant’s intellectual functioning,
including the Full Scale IQ score of 65, but that they needed more information on other
impairments, specifically depression, to assess whether the claimant met Listing 12.05C
(Tr. 283). In May 2012, Dr. Gerrity conducted another review of the record and found
that the claimant did not meet a listing but that he had moderate limitations in the three
areas of functional limitation (Tr. 300-312). She completed a mental RFC assessment
finding the claimant markedly limited in the three typical areas of understanding and
remembering detailed instructions, carrying out detailed instructions, and interacting
appropriately with the general public (Tr. 296-297). She also found that the claimant was
moderately limited in seven other areas, including the ability to make simple workrelated decisions, the ability to maintain socially appropriate behavior and to adhere to
basic standards of neatness and cleanliness, and the ability to set realistic goals or make
plans independently of others (Tr. 296-297). She then concluded that the claimant could
perform simple tasks with supportive routine supervision and interact appropriately with
a small number of co-workers and with a supervisor for superficial work purposes, that
he could not sustain interaction with the general public, but that he could adapt to a work
environment (Tr. 298).
In his written opinion, the ALJ determined at step two that the claimant had the
severe impairments of seizure disorder, obesity, depression, anxiety, and borderline
intellectual functioning (Tr. 13). At step three, he assessed whether the claimant met
Listings 11.02, 12.02, 12.04, 12.06, and 12.09, but not 12.05, and ultimately concluded
-7-

that he did not meet at Listing. (Tr. 13-16). At step four, the ALJ summarized the
claimant’s hearing testimony as well as much of the medical evidence. He summarized
Dr. Feir’s assessment, noting the Full Scale IQ score only, and qualifying it by stating
that Dr. Feir placed his with borderline sensory processing and that she believed his IQ
was an underestimation based on the difference between his verbal ability and sensory
ability scores (Tr. 19). He also noted Dr. Horton’s assessment, focusing on her statement
that the claimant’s thought processes were logical, organized, and goal directed, and that
he maintained “normal memory and concentration abilities” (Tr. 20). He gave great
weight to Dr. Gerrity’s more recent reviewing assessment of the claimant’s RFC, finding
that it reflected the most updated evidence available at the time of her review (Tr. 21).
He further assigned significant weight to Dr. Horton’s assessment, finding that it was
supported by her exam with regard to the claimant’s thought processes, memory, and
concentration. As to Dr. Magnus’s numerous opinions, the ALJ assigned them little
weight, finding them to be conclusory and stating that they were based primarily on the
claimant’s subjective allegations (Tr. 23).

He assigned no weight to and made no

findings with regard to Dr. Feir’s assessment (Tr. 19).
Although the claimant bears the burden of proof at step three to establish that he
meets or equals the requirements for a listed impairment, see Fischer-Ross v. Barnhart,
431 F.3d 729, 733 (10th Cir. 2005), the ALJ’s responsibilities at step three of the
sequential analysis require him to determine “whether the claimant’s impairment is
equivalent to one of a number of listed impairments that . . . [are] so severe as to preclude
substantial gainful activity.” Clifton v. Chater, 79 F.3d 1007, 1009 (10th Cir. 1996)
-8-

[quotation omitted]. Clifton requires the ALJ to discuss the evidence and explain why
claimant was not disabled at step three. Id. at 1009, citing Cook v. Heckler, 783 F.2d
1168, 1172-73 (4th Cir. 1986).
In this case at step three, the ALJ made no findings with regard to Listing 12.05C,
despite evidence in the record that this specific Listing might be applicable. In order to
satisfy section 12.05C to establish intellectual disability at the time of the ALJ’s opinion,
the claimant must first satisfy the diagnostic description included in the introductory
paragraph which requires that the claimant possess “significantly subaverage general
intellectual functioning with deficits in adaptive functioning initially manifested during
the developmental period; i. e., the evidence demonstrates or supports onset of the
impairment before age 22.” 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1, Listing 12.05 (Effective
February 26, 2014 to December 8, 2014). This initial requirement is referred to as the
“capsule definition.”

Peck v. Barnhart, 214 Fed. Appx. 730, 736 (10th Cir. 2006)

[unpublished opinion]. In addition to satisfying the capsule definition, the claimant must
also satisfy two additional prongs in order to meet the requirements of Listing 12.05C: “a
valid verbal, performance, or full scale IQ of 60 through 70 and a physical or other
mental impairment imposing an additional and significant work-related limitation of
function[.]” 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1, Listing 12.05C (emphasis added).
As to the capsule definition applicable to the entirety of Listing 12.05, the ALJ’s
opinion wholly failed to discuss whether the claimant satisfied the capsule definition. In
spite of the claimant’s written application statement and hearing testimony that he was in
the special education program, the Commissioner continues to argue that the claimant’s
-9-

self-reports are insufficient evidence to support a finding of onset prior to age 22.
However, “a claimant ‘is not required to affirmatively prove that he [had an intellectual
disability] prior to reaching the age of twenty two so long as there was no evidence that
the claimant’s IQ had changed.’” Johnson v. Colvin, 2016 WL 7176655, at *5-6 (W.D.
Okla. Dec. 8, 2016), quoting McKown v. Shalala, 5 F.3d 546, 1993 WL 335788 at *3
(10th Cir. Aug. 26, 1993) (unpublished table opinion). “As one of our sister courts has
found, an IQ score within the range in the regulation ‘is itself some evidence of mental
retardation before age twenty-two.” Young v. Colvin, 2013 WL 5417211, at *4 (E.D.
Okla. Sept. 26, 2013), quoting Fox v. Barnhart, 2007 WL 1063198, at *5-6 (D. Kan.
April 2, 2007) (collecting cases).
More importantly, “[t]he Commissioner’s argument ignores our ruling in Clifton
where we held that we can only review ALJ decisions that make specific findings on the
facts of the case. If [the claimant] does not meet the capsule definition, then the ALJ
must make that determination in the first instance.”

Peck, 214 Fed. App. at 736.

Moreover, if the ALJ disagreed with the record regarding the claimant’s impairments and
whether they were established prior to age 22, then he would have been required to
discuss his reasons for such a finding. See, e. g., Haga v. Astrue, 482 F.3d 1205, 1208
(10th Cir. 2007) (“[T]he ALJ should have explained why he rejected four of the moderate
restrictions on Dr. Rawlings’ RFC assessment while appearing to adopt the others. An
ALJ is not entitled to pick and choose through an uncontradicted medical opinion, taking
only the parts that are favorable to a finding of nondisability. . . . [T]he ALJ did not state
that any evidence conflicted with Dr. Rawlings’ opinion or mental RFC assessment. So it
-10-

is simply unexplained why the ALJ adopted some of Dr. Rawlings’ restrictions but not
others. We therefore remand so that the ALJ can explain the evidentiary support for his
RFC determination.”).
The SSA has not adopted a standard to measure what constitutes “‘deficits of
adaptive functioning’ under the capsule definition of Listing 12.05(C). Instead, the SSA
allows use of the measurement methods authorized by four major professional
organizations dealing with mental retardation. . . . The ALJ’s decision, however, is silent
with respect to what method he used to measure Plaintiff’s deficits of adaptive
functioning.” Johnson v. Colvin, 2016 WL 7176655, at *6 (W. D. Okla. Dec. 8, 2016),
citing Barnes v. Barnhart, 116 Fed. Appx. 934, 942 (10th Cir. 2004). The undersigned
Magistrate Judge thus finds that the ALJ ignored evidence to support the likelihood the
claimant had deficits in adaptive functioning prior to age 22. See Johnson v. Colvin,
2016 WL 7176655, at *7 (“Significantly, the ALJ failed to explain why Plaintiff’s
completion of the tenth grade, in light of the additional evidence that she was
recommended for special education classes and could not complete her GED, supports a
finding that she did not have the requisite deficits in adaptive functioning to support the
Listing 12.05(C) criteria.”).
Turning to the two prongs of section 12.05C, “‘the purpose of § 12.05C is to
compensate a claimant with an IQ in the 60-70 range and a limitation of function that
affects his work.’” Hinkle v. Apfel, 132 F.3d 1349, 1352 (10th Cir. 1997), quoting Sird v.
Chater, 105 F.3d 401, 403 n.6 (8th Cir. 1997).

With respect to the requirements

specifically comprising Listing 12.05C, the claimant appears to satisfy the first prong
-11-

since all but one of his IQ scores fell below 70, e. g., he obtained a Verbal
Comprehension score of 63, a Perceptual Reasoning score of 75, a Working Memory
score of 66, and a Processing Speed score of 62, with a Full Scale IQ score of 65. See id.
§ 12.00D(6)(c) (“In cases where more than one IQ is customarily derived from the test
administered, e. g., where verbal, performance, and full scale IQs are provided in the
Wechsler series, we use the lowest of these in conjunction with 12.05.”). Although it is
true that a proper rejection of an IQ score as invalid is a sufficient basis for an ALJ to
find that a claimant does not meet Listing 12.05C, see Lax v. Astrue, 489 F.3d 1080, 1087
(10th Cir. 2007), there is no such finding in this case.
The second prong of Listing 12.05C requires the claimant to have a “physical or
other mental impairment imposing an additional and significant work-related limitation
of function.” 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, Listing 12.05C. The Tenth Circuit has
adopted the view of the First and Eleventh Circuits that a Ҥ 12.05C limitation is
significant if the claimant suffers from a severe physical or other mental impairment, as
defined at step two of the disability analysis, apart from the decreased intellectual
function.” Hinkle, 132 F.3d at 1352. (“We conclude the analysis employed by the First
and Eleventh Circuits is the better interpretation of what must be shown to satisfy the
second prong of § 12.05C.”), citing Edwards v. Heckler, 736 F.2d 625, 629-631 (11th
Cir. 1984) and Nieves v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, 775 F.2d 12, 14 & n.7
(1st Cir. 1985). “[W]hether a claimant has a § 12.05C ‘significant limitation’ should
‘closely parallel’ the step two standard, and is to be made without consideration of
whether the claimant can perform any gainful activity beyond the analysis as made at step
-12-

two.” Hinkle, 132 F.3d at 1352-1353, citing Fanning v. Bowen, 827 F.2d 631, 634 (9th
Cir. 1987) (if claimant meets the § 12.05C listing and the durational requirement, “he
must be found disabled without consideration of his age, education, and work
experience[.]”) [internal citations omitted]. Here, the ALJ determined that, in addition to
borderline intelligence, the claimant had the severe impairments of seizure disorder,
obesity, depression, and anxiety (Tr. 13). This was sufficient to satisfy the second prong.
See Peck, 214 Fed. Appx. at 734 (“Based on the ALJ’s findings [that the claimant had
severe impairments that combined to significantly limit her ability to perform basic workrelated functions and was unable to perform her past relevant work], Peck meets the
additional significant impairment requirement under Listing 12.05C.”), citing Hinkle, 132
F.3d at 1352-1353 & n.4. Thus, contrary to the ALJ’s conclusion regarding Listing
12.05C, the claimant did provide evidence that his impairment existed before the age of
22, and both that he had an IQ score in the range of 60-70 and a “physical or other mental
impairment imposing an additional and significant work-related limitation,” either by his
seizure disorder, obesity, depression, or anxiety. As stated above, a proper rejection of
an IQ score as invalid is a sufficient basis for an ALJ to find that a claimant does not
meet Listing 12.05C. However, here there is no such proper rejection and the ALJ does
seem to rely on Dr. Feir’s findings to some extent.
But even proceeding to step four, the Court agrees with the claimant’s second
contention that the ALJ failed to properly assess Dr. Magnus’s treating physician opinion.
Medical opinions from a treating physician such as Dr. Magnus are entitled to controlling
weight if they are “‘well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory
-13-

diagnostic techniques . . . [and] consistent with other substantial evidence in the record.’”
See Langley v. Barnhart, 373 F.3d 1116, 1119 (10th Cir. 2004), quoting Watkins v.
Barnhart, 350 F.3d 1297, 1300 (10th Cir. 2003). Even if a treating physician’s opinions
are not entitled to controlling weight, the ALJ must nevertheless determine the proper
weight to give them by analyzing the factors set forth in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527. Id. at
1119 (“Even if a treating physician’s opinion is not entitled to controlling weight,
‘[t]reating source medical opinions are still entitled to deference and must be weighed
using all of the factors provided in [§] 404.1527.’”), quoting Watkins, 350 F.3d at 1300.
The pertinent factors are: (i) the length of the treatment relationship and the frequency of
examination; (ii) the nature and extent of the treatment relationship, including the
treatment provided and the kind of examination or testing performed; (iii) the degree to
which the physician’s opinion is supported by relevant evidence; (iv) consistency
between the opinion and the record as a whole; (v) whether or not the physician is a
specialist in the area upon which an opinion is rendered; and (vi) other factors brought to
the ALJ’s attention which tend to support or contradict the opinion. Watkins, 350 F.3d at
1300-01 [quotation marks omitted], citing Drapeau v. Massanari, 255 F.3d 1211, 1213
(10th Cir. 2001). Finally, if the ALJ decides to reject a treating physician’s opinion
entirely, “he must . . . give specific, legitimate reasons for doing so[,]” id. at 1301
[quotation marks omitted; citation omitted], so it is “clear to any subsequent reviewers
the weight [he] gave to the treating source’s medical opinion and the reasons for that
weight.” Id. at 1300.

-14-

The Court finds that most of the ALJ’s reasoning for rejecting Dr. Magnus’s
opinion is not legally sound. First, the ALJ’s opinion failed to take into account that
“[t]he practice of psychology is necessarily dependent, at least in part, on a patient’s
subjective statements.” Thomas v. Barnhart, 147 Fed. Appx. 755, 759 (10th Cir. 2005).
See also Wise v. Barnhart, 129 Fed. Appx. 443, 447 (10th Cir. 2005) (“[A] psychological
opinion does not need to be based on ‘tests;’ those findings can be based on ‘observed
signs and symptoms.’ Dr. Houston’s observations of Ms. Wise do constitute specific
medical findings.”), citing Robinson v. Barnhart, 366 F.3d 1078, 1083 (10th Cir. 2004),
citing 20 C.F.R. Subpt. P, app. 1 § 12.00(B).

Second, even Dr. Horton expressed

concerns about the claimant’s ability to work, and yet the ALJ erroneously stated that
there was a lack of supporting medical evidence showing a complete inability to work.
See, e.g., Langley, 373 F.3d at 1123 (“Because the ALJ failed to explain or identify what
the claimed inconsistencies were between Dr. Williams’s opinion and the other
substantial evidence in the record, his reasons for rejecting that opinion are not
‘sufficiently specific’ to enable this court to meaningfully review his findings.”), quoting
Watkins, 350 F.3d at 1300. Accordingly, the ALJ provided no analysis in relation to the
proper factors, misstated the evidence, and thus failed to properly evaluate Dr. Magnus’s
opinion.
Because the ALJ’s findings at steps three and four are not supported by
substantial evidence, the decision of the Commissioner should be REVERSED and the
case REMANDED to the ALJ for further analysis as outlined above.

-15-

Conclusion
The Court hereby FINDS that correct legal standards were not applied by the ALJ,
and the Commissioner’s decision is therefore not supported by substantial evidence. The
decision of the Commissioner is accordingly REVERSED and the case is REMANDED
for further proceedings consistent herewith.
DATED this 25th day of September, 2017.

______________________________________
STEVEN P. SHREDER
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

-16-