Huddleston v. Social Security Administration
Filing
22
OPINION AND ORDER by Magistrate Judge Kimberly E. West reversing and remanding the decision of the ALJ(sjr, Chambers)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
EASTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
PATRICIA K. HUDDLESTON,
Plaintiff,
v.
NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting
Commissioner of Social
Security Administration,
Defendant.
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Case No. CIV-16-346-KEW
OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Patricia K. Huddleston (the “Claimant”) requests
judicial review of the decision of the Commissioner of the Social
Security Administration (the “Commissioner”) denying Claimant’s
application for disability benefits under the Social Security Act.
Claimant appeals the decision of the Administrative Law Judge
(“ALJ”) and asserts that the Commissioner erred because the ALJ
incorrectly
determined that Claimant was not disabled.
For the
reasons discussed below, it is the finding of this Court that the
Commissioner’s decision should be and is REVERSED and the case is
REMANDED to Defendant for further proceedings.
Social Security Law and Standard of Review
Disability under the Social Security Act is defined as the
“inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason
of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment. . .”
42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A).
Security
Act
“only
if
A claimant is disabled under the Social
his
physical
or
mental
impairment
or
impairments are of such severity that he is not only unable to do
his previous work but cannot, considering his age, education, and
work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful
work
which
exists
§423(d)(2)(A).
in
the
national
economy.
.
.”
42
U.S.C.
Social Security regulations implement a five-step
sequential process to evaluate a disability claim.
See, 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1520, 416.920.1
Judicial review of the Commissioner’s determination is limited
in scope by 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
two inquiries:
This Court’s review is limited to
first, whether the decision was supported by
1
Step one requires the claimant to establish that he is not
engaged in substantial gainful activity, as defined by 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1510, 416.910. Step two requires that the claimant establish that
he has a medically severe impairment or combination of impairments that
significantly limit his ability to do basic work activities. 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1521, 416.921. If the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful
activity (step one) or if the claimant’s impairment is not medically
severe (step two), disability benefits are denied. At step three, the
claimant’s impairment is compared with certain impairments listed in 20
C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1. A claimant suffering from a listed
impairment or impairments “medically equivalent” to a listed impairment
is determined to be disabled without further inquiry.
If not, the
evaluation proceeds to step four, where claimant must establish that he
does not retain the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform his
past relevant work.
If the claimant’s step four burden is met, the
burden shifts to the Commissioner to establish at step five that work
exists in significant numbers in the national economy which the claimant
– taking into account his age, education, work experience, and RFC – can
perform. Disability benefits are denied if the Commissioner shows that
the impairment which precluded the performance of past relevant work does
not preclude alternative work. See generally, Williams v. Bowen, 844
F.2d 748, 750-51 (10th Cir. 1988).
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substantial
evidence;
and,
standards were applied.
second,
whether
the
correct
legal
Hawkins v. Chater, 113 F.3d 1162, 1164
(10th Cir. 1997)(citation omitted). The term “substantial evidence”
has been interpreted by the United States Supreme Court to require
“more than a mere scintilla.
It means such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”
Richardson
v.
Perales,
402
U.S.
389,
401
(1971)
(quoting
Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)).
The
court may not re-weigh the evidence nor substitute its discretion
for that of the agency.
Casias v. Secretary of Health & Human
Servs., 933 F.2d 799, 800 (10th Cir. 1991). Nevertheless, the court
must review the record as a whole, and the “substantiality of the
evidence must take into account whatever in the record fairly
detracts from its weight.” Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S.
474, 488 (1951); see also, Casias, 933 F.2d at 800-01.
Claimant’s Background
Claimant was 57 years old at the time of the ALJ’s decision.
Claimant obtained her GED and completed truck driving school.
Claimant has worked in the past as a truck driver, shipping
supervisor, and palletizer operator. Claimant alleges an inability
to work beginning April 10, 2010 due to limitations resulting from
migraine headaches, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (“COPD”),
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arthritis, depression, and suicidal thoughts.
Procedural History
On
November
12,
2013,
Claimant
protectively
filed
for
disability insurance benefits under Title II (42 U.S.C. § 401, et
seq.) and for supplemental security income pursuant to Title XVI
(42 U.S.C. § 1381, et seq.) of the Social Security Act.
Claimant’s
applications were denied initially and upon reconsideration.
On
February 19, 2015, an administrative hearing was held before
Administrative
Oklahoma.
Law
Judge
(“ALJ”)
Richard
in
Tulsa,
By decision dated April 16, 2015, the ALJ denied
Claimant’s requests for benefits.
review on July 8, 2016.
represents
Kallsnick
the
further appeal.
The Appeals Council denied
As a result, the decision of the ALJ
Commissioner’s
final
decision
for
purposes
of
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.981, 416.1481.
Decision of the Administrative Law Judge
The ALJ made his decision at step four of the sequential
evaluation.
He determined that while Claimant suffered from severe
impairments, she did not meet a listing and retained the residual
functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform her past relevant work. The
ALJ also found Claimant could perform work at a medium exertional
level.
Errors Alleged for Review
4
Claimant
asserts
the
ALJ
committed
error
in
improperly
rejecting the opinion of a consultative examiner.
Consideration of the Opinion Evidence
In his decision, the ALJ found Claimant suffered from the
severe impairments of migraine headaches and COPD by history. (Tr.
12).
The ALJ determined Claimant retained the RFC to perform
medium work.
He noted Claimant takes medication for relief of
migraine headaches but that most of the medication is over the
counter
with
no
limitations
or
restrictions
as
far
as
the
medications go with Claimant being able to remain reasonably alert
to perform the required functions presented in the work setting.
(Tr. 15).
After consultation with a vocational expert, the ALJ found
Claimant could perform her past relevant work as a truck driver,
shipping supervisor, and palletizer.
(Tr. 19).
Alternatively, the
ALJ found Claimant retained the RFC to perform the representative
jobs of hand packager, laundry worker, mailroom clerk, and laundry
sorter, all of which were found by the ALJ to exist in sufficient
numbers in both the national and regional economies. (Tr. 21). As
a result, the ALJ determined Claimant was not disabled from April
10, 2010 through the date of the decision.
Id.
Claimant contends the ALJ failed to properly evaluate the
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opinion of Dr. Kenny Paris, a consultative examining licensed
psychologist. Dr. Paris examined Claimant on January 15, 2014. He
noted that her vocabulary was “low average” and her comprehension
was “below average.” (Tr. 360). Dr. Paris diagnosed Claimant with
major
depressive
disorder,
recurrent,
mild
to
moderate.
He
estimated her GAF at 50. Psychologically, Dr. Paris concluded that
based upon Claimant’s symptoms, history, and performance on the
examination,
“her
ability
to
perform
adequately
in
most
job
situations, handle the stress of a work setting and deal with
supervisors or co-workers is estimated to be below average.”
(Tr.
361).
The ALJ cited Dr. Paris’ findings, including the limitation
upon her ability to handle stress in the workplace.
He concluded
that Dr. Paris’ opinions were “given considerable weight as they do
not
indicate
any
significant
psychological
or
cognitive
abnormalities and are consistent with a finding of a non-severe
mental impairment.”
(Tr. 13).
Claimant first contends that the limitation found by Dr. Paris
met the criteria of a severe mental impairment at step two.
At
step two, Claimant bears the burden of showing the existence of an
impairment or combination of impairments which “significantly limits
[his] physical or mental ability to do basic work activities.”
6
20
C.F.R. § 416.920(c).
An impairment which warrants disability
benefits is one that “results from anatomical, physiological, or
psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically
acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques.”
U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(1)(D).
42
The severity determination for an alleged
impairment is based on medical evidence alone and “does not include
consideration
of
such
factors
as
age,
education,
and
work
experience.” Williams v. Bowen, 844 F.2d 748, 750 (10th Cir. 1988).
The burden of showing a severe impairment is “de minimis,” yet
the presence of a medical condition alone is not sufficient at step
two.
Hinkle v. Apfel, 132 F.3d 1349, 1352 (10th Cir. 1997); Soc.
Sec. R. 85-28.
A claimant must demonstrate he has a severe
impairment
“results
that
from
anatomical,
physiological,
or
psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically
acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques.”
U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(1)(D).
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The functional limitations must be marked
and severe that can be expected to result in death or to last for
a continuous period of not less than 12 months.
42 U.S.C. §
1382c(a)(1)(C)(i); 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(a)(1).
The inconsistency in the ALJ giving considerable weight to
Dr. Paris’ opinion while not accepting the limitation he found is
apparent. He should have explained the basis for not including the
inability to handle stress at step two.
7
Even if the impairment is
ultimately found to not be severe, the ALJ should explain why he
failed to include any restriction for this circumstance in the RFC.
“[R]esidual functional capacity consists of those activities
that a claimant can still perform on a regular and continuing basis
despite his or her physical limitations.”
White v. Barnhart, 287
F.3d 903, 906 n. 2 (10th Cir. 2001).
A residual functional
capacity assessment “must include a narrative discussion describing
how the evidence supports each conclusion, citing specific medical
facts ... and nonmedical evidence.” Soc. Sec. R. 96–8p.
The ALJ
must also discuss the individual's ability to perform sustained
work activities in an ordinary work setting on a “regular and
continuing basis” and describe the maximum amount of work related
activity the individual can perform based on evidence contained in
the case record. Id.
The ALJ must “explain how any material
inconsistencies or ambiguities in the evidence in the case record
were considered and resolved.” Id. The acceptance of a portion of
Dr. Paris’ opinion which supported a finding of non-disability
while failing to explain the basis for effectively rejecting the
portion that did not support such a finding creates the type of
ambiguity which must be resolved on remand.
Conclusion
The
decision
of
the
Commissioner
is
not
supported
by
substantial evidence and the correct legal standards were not
applied. Therefore, this Court finds, in accordance with the fourth
8
sentence of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), the ruling of the Commissioner of
Social Security Administration should be and is
REVERSED and the
matter REMANDED to Defendant for further proceedings.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 22nd day of September, 2017.
______________________________
KIMBERLY E. WEST
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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