Greenlee v. Social Security Administration
Filing
28
OPINION AND ORDER Awarding Attorney's Fees to Plaintiff Under the EAJA by Magistrate Judge Steven P. Shreder GRANTING 24 Motion for Attorney Fees and GRANTING 27 Supplemental Motion for Attorney Fees by Teresa C. Greenlee. (tls, Deputy Clerk)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
TERESA C. GREENLEE,
Plaintiff,
v.
COMMISSIONER of the Social
Security Administration,
Defendant.
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
Case No. CIV-16-461-SPS
OPINION AND ORDER AWARDING
ATTORNEYS’ FEES TO THE PLAINTIFF UNDER THE EAJA
The Plaintiff was the prevailing party in this appeal of the Commissioner of the
Social Security Administration’s decision denying benefits under the Social Security Act.
She seeks attorney’s fees in the total amount of $4,608.40, under the Equal Access to
Justice Act (the “EAJA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2412. See Plaintiff’s Application for Award of
Attorney’s Fees Pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act 28 U.S.C. § 2412 [Docket No.
24] and Plaintiff’s Supplemental Application for Award of Attorney’s Fees Pursuant to the
Equal Access to Justice Act 28 U.S.C. § 2412 [Docket No. 27]. The Commissioner objects
to the award of fees and urges the Court to deny the request. For the reasons set forth
below, the Court concludes that the Plaintiff should be awarded the requested fees under
the EAJA as the prevailing party herein.
On appeal, the Plaintiff’s raised arguments that the ALJ failed to properly assess her
back impairment, failed to properly support his step two findings, and failed to properly
assess her credibility. This Court determined that the ALJ erred in assessing the claimant’s
back impairment at step four. The Commissioner’s response to the EAJA fees motion
asserts that her position on appeal was substantially justified because the arguments made
before this Court were plausible and reasonable in fact and law, and the duty to weigh
evidence is the sole province of the ALJ. See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (“[A] court shall
award to a prevailing party . . . fees and other expenses . . . unless the court finds that the
position of the United States was substantially justified or that special circumstances make
an award unjust.”). “The test for substantial justification under the EAJA, the Supreme
Court has added, is simply one of reasonableness.” Madron v. Astrue, 646 F.3d 1255,
1257-1258 (10th Cir. 2011), citing Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 563-564 (1988).
In order to establish substantial justification, the Commissioner must show that there was
a reasonable basis for the position she took not only on appeal but also in the administrative
proceedings below. See, e. g., Gutierrez v. Sullivan, 953 F.2d 579, 585 (10th Cir. 1992)
(“We consider the reasonableness of the position the Secretary took both in the
administrative proceedings and in the civil action Plaintiff commenced to obtain
benefits.”), citing Fulton v. Heckler, 784 F.2d 348, 349 (10th Cir. 1986). See also Marquez
v. Colvin, 2014 WL 2050754, at *2 (D. Colo. May 16, 2014) (“For purposes of this
litigation, the Commissioner’s position is both the position it took in the underlying
administrative proceeding and in subsequent litigation defending that position.”). “In other
words, it does not necessarily follow from our decision vacating an administrative decision
that the government’s efforts to defend that decision lacked substantial justification.”
Madron, 646 F.3d at 1258. In this case, the Court found that the ALJ’s decision was not
supported by substantial evidence because the ALJ connected no evidence in the record
-2-
related to the claimant’s back impairment (or all her impairments in combination) to his
findings regarding the claimant’s RFC. The Court thus concluded that a consultative
examination would have been helpful in light of this lack of connection from evidence to
conclusion, and that the ALJ’s discretion to order a CE was not boundless.
The
Commissioner nevertheless asserts that her position was substantially justified because this
record was not undeveloped or unclear, and the need was not clearly established in this
case. The Commissioner thus challenges an award of attorney’s fees, despite this Court’s
finding to the contrary that the decision was not based on substantial evidence in light of
all of the evidence in the record. Inasmuch as it was the ALJ’s obligation to provide a
reasonable basis in the first instance, it is difficult to see how anything said on appeal could
justify the ALJ’s failures at the administrative level in this case. See, e. g., Clifton v.
Chater, 79 F.3d 1007, 1009 (10th Cir. 1996) (“In the absence of ALJ findings supported
by specific weighing of the evidence, we cannot assess whether relevant evidence
adequately supports the ALJ’s conclusion[.]”). See also Hackett v. Barnhart, 475 F.3d
1166, 1174 (10th Cir. 2007) (“[W]e hold that EAJA ‘fees generally should be awarded
where the government’s underlying action was unreasonable even if the government
advanced a reasonable litigation position.’”), quoting United States v. Marolf, 277 F.3d
1156, 1159 (9th Cir. 2002); Drapeau v. Massanari, 255 F.3d 1211, 1214 (10th Cir. 2001)
(“Although we review the ALJ’s decision for substantial evidence, ‘we are not in a position
to draw factual conclusions on behalf of the ALJ.’”), quoting Prince v. Sullivan, 933 F.2d
598, 603 (7th Cir. 1991).
-3-
The Court therefore concludes that the Plaintiff should be awarded attorney’s fees
as the prevailing party under the EAJA. See, e. g., Gibson-Jones v. Apfel, 995 F. Supp.
825, 826-27 n.3 (N.D. Ill. 1998) (holding that the Commissioner’s position was not
substantially justified where the ALJ provided an inadequate basis for denying benefits and
adding: “It would be unfair to require Ms. Gibson-Jones to appeal her denial of benefits
and then not award her attorney’s fees because the ALJ is given a second chance to support
his position.”).
Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that the Plaintiff’s Application for Award of
Attorney’s Fees Pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act 28 U.S.C. § 2412 [Docket No.
24] and Plaintiff’s Supplemental Application for Award of Attorney’s Fees Pursuant to the
Equal Access to Justice Act 28 U.S.C. § 2412 [Docket No. 27] are hereby granted to the
extent that the Government is ordered to pay attorney’s fees in the amount of $4,608.40 to
the Plaintiff as the prevailing party herein. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that if the
Plaintiff’s attorney is subsequently awarded any fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1),
said attorney shall refund the smaller amount of such fees to the Plaintiff pursuant to
Weakley v. Bowen, 803 F.2d 575, 580 (10th Cir. 1986).
IT IS SO ORDERED this 23rd day of April, 2018.
-4-
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?