Byers v. Social Security Administration

Filing 18

OPINION AND ORDER by Magistrate Judge Kimberly E. West affirming the decision of the ALJ. (sjr, Chambers)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
EASTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
EDDIE I. BYERS,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff,
v.
COMMISSIONER OF THE SOCIAL
SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,
Defendant.

Case No. CIV-17-117-KEW

OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Eddie I. Byers (the “Claimant”) requests judicial
review of the decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security
Administration (the “Commissioner”) denying Claimant’s application
for disability benefits under the Social Security Act.

Claimant

appeals the decision of the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) and
asserts that the Commissioner erred because the ALJ incorrectly
determined

that

discussed

below,

Claimant
it

is

was
the

not

disabled.

finding

of

this

For

the

Court

reasons

that

the

Commissioner’s decision should be and is AFFIRMED.
Social Security Law and Standard of Review
Disability under the Social Security Act is defined as the
“inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason
of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment. . .”
42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A).
Security

Act

“only

if

A claimant is disabled under the Social
his

physical

or

mental

impairment

or

impairments are of such severity that he is not only unable to do
his previous work but cannot, considering his age, education, and
work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful
work

which

exists

§423(d)(2)(A).

in

the

national

economy.

.

.”

42

U.S.C.

Social Security regulations implement a five-step

sequential process to evaluate a disability claim.

See, 20 C.F.R.

§§ 404.1520, 416.920.1
Judicial review of the Commissioner’s determination is limited
in scope by 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
two inquiries:
substantial

This Court’s review is limited to

first, whether the decision was supported by

evidence;

standards were applied.

and,

second,

whether

the

correct

legal

Hawkins v. Chater, 113 F.3d 1162, 1164

1

Step one requires the claimant to establish that he is not
engaged in substantial gainful activity, as defined by 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1510, 416.910. Step two requires that the claimant establish that
he has a medically severe impairment or combination of impairments that
significantly limit his ability to do basic work activities. 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1521, 416.921. If the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful
activity (step one) or if the claimant’s impairment is not medically
severe (step two), disability benefits are denied. At step three, the
claimant’s impairment is compared with certain impairments listed in 20
C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1. A claimant suffering from a listed
impairment or impairments “medically equivalent” to a listed impairment
is determined to be disabled without further inquiry.
If not, the
evaluation proceeds to step four, where claimant must establish that he
does not retain the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform his
past relevant work.
If the claimant’s step four burden is met, the
burden shifts to the Commissioner to establish at step five that work
exists in significant numbers in the national economy which the claimant
– taking into account his age, education, work experience, and RFC – can
perform. Disability benefits are denied if the Commissioner shows that
the impairment which precluded the performance of past relevant work does
not preclude alternative work. See generally, Williams v. Bowen, 844
F.2d 748, 750-51 (10th Cir. 1988).

2

(10th Cir. 1997)(citation omitted). The term “substantial evidence”
has been interpreted by the United States Supreme Court to require
“more than a mere scintilla.

It means such relevant evidence as a

reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”
Richardson

v.

Perales,

402

U.S.

389,

401

(1971)

(quoting

Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)).

The

court may not re-weigh the evidence nor substitute its discretion
for that of the agency.

Casias v. Secretary of Health & Human

Servs., 933 F.2d 799, 800 (10th Cir. 1991). Nevertheless, the court
must review the record as a whole, and the “substantiality of the
evidence must take into account whatever in the record fairly
detracts from its weight.” Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S.
474, 488 (1951); see also, Casias, 933 F.2d at 800-01.
Claimant’s Background
Claimant was 48 years old at the time of the ALJ’s decision.
Claimant completed his high school education.

Claimant has worked

in the past as a maintenance worker at a race track and assistant
supervisor.

Claimant alleges an inability to work beginning June

11, 2013 due to limitations resulting from arthritis pain, neck and

back pain, diabetes, left leg and knee problems, and anger issues.
Procedural History
On

October

21,

2013,

Claimant

3

protectively

filed

for

disability insurance benefits under Title II (42 U.S.C. § 401, et
seq.) and for supplemental security income pursuant to Title XVI
(42 U.S.C. § 1381, et seq.) of the Social Security Act.

Claimant’s

applications were denied initially and upon reconsideration.

On

June 16, 2015, Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) B. D. Crutchfield
conducted

an

administrative

hearing

by

video

with

Claimant

appearing in Poteau, Oklahoma and the ALJ presiding from Tulsa,
Oklahoma.
decision.

On October 26, 2015, the ALJ entered an unfavorable
The Appeals Council denied review on March 1, 2017.

As

a result, the decision of the ALJ represents the Commissioner’s
final decision for purposes of further appeal.

20 C.F.R. §§

404.981, 416.1481.
Decision of the Administrative Law Judge
The ALJ made her decision at step five of the sequential
evaluation. She determined that while Claimant suffered from severe
impairments, he did not meet a listing and retained the residual
functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform a range of sedentary work.
Errors Alleged for Review
Claimant asserts the ALJ committed error in (1) reaching an
improper RFC determination for the period from June 11, 2013 to
January 21, 2014, and (2) failing to demonstrate that there are
other jobs that Claimant could perform at step five.

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RFC Determination
In her decision, the ALJ found Claimant suffered from the
severe impairments of history of obesity, depressive disorder, NOS,
and anti-social personality disorder. (Tr. 13). The ALJ determined
that prior to January 21, 2014 - the date Claimant became disabled Claimant could perform less than a full range of light work.

In so

doing, the ALJ found Claimant could lift/carry up to 20 pounds
occasionally and up to ten pounds frequently; could sit for up to
six hours in an eight hour workday; could stand/walk for up to six
hours in an eight hour workday with normal breaks; could push/pull
up to 20 pounds occasionally and up to ten pounds frequently; could
occasionally climb ladders/ropes/scaffolds; was limited to simple
tasks with routine supervision; could relate to supervisors and
peers on a superficial work basis and adapt to a routine work
situation; and could not relate to the public.

(Tr. 14).

After

January 21, 2014, the ALJ determined that while Claimant could
perform sedentary work (Tr. 16-17), considering his age, education,
work experience, and RFC, no jobs existed in significant numbers in
the national economy that Claimant could perform.

(Tr. 20).

After consultation with a vocational expert, the ALJ determined
that during the period from June 11, 2013 to January 21, 2014,
Claimant could perform the representative jobs of poultry processor,

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small product assembler, and agriculture produce sorter, all of
which the ALJ concluded existed in sufficient numbers in both the
regional and national economies. (Tr. 19-20). As a result, the ALJ
concluded that Claimant was not under a disability from June 11,
2013 to January 21, 2014 but was disabled thereafter.

(Tr. 20).

Claimant contends the ALJ’s RFC for the limited period was not
supported by substantial evidence since the ALJ did not consider the
medical records from Good Samaritan Clinic.

The ALJ cited to the

report of Dr. Wojciech Dulowski, a consultative examiner in this
case.

Dr. Dulowski examined Claimant on November 28, 2011.

He

found Claimant to be morbidly obese with good coordination, equal
strength in the upper and lower extremities, and good reflexes.

He

noted Claimant walked slowly with bilateral limping and used a cane.
However, his gait was good, safe, and stable.

Dr. Dulowski opined

that Claimant’s difficulty was probably because of his weight and
back pain to walk on his tiptoes and heels.

Claimant’s grip

strength was 5/5 with good gross and fine manipulation.

(Tr. 292).

Claimant’s cervical, thoracic, and lumbar spine alignment was
normal.

He was very tender in the cervical and thoracolumbar spine

in midline with spasms of the

paravertebral muscles.

All passive

movements of the joints in the upper and lower extremities were
normal.

Dr. Dulowski assessed Claimant with a history of morbid

obesity, sleep apnea (on c-pap), diabetes mellitus, hypertension

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(not very well controlled), history of osteoarthritis, history of
mechanical

back

pain,

but

neurologically

intact,

history

of

pneumonia with pleural effusion after throacocentesis, history of
a motor vehicle accident in 1994 or 1998 with multiple fractures of
the scapula and both ankle joints.

(Tr. 293).

Claimant was also underwent a mental status examination by Dr.
Diane Brandmiller on March 6, 2012.

Claimant reported a history of

20-50 suicide attempts, most recently about ten years prior to the
examination by driving a motorcycle off of a cliff.
obtain

medical

treatment

after

this

action.

He

He did not
experienced

hallucinations around age 8 or 9 and had them most recently about
two years prior.

Claimant was prescribed and takes Prozac which he

indicated helped him take his mind off of things people say.
Claimant lived with his mother, eats one or two meals a day,
does not cook, washes dishes, does laundry, and feeds and waters a
dog and a horse.

He does not do other household chores because of

leg and back problems.

He watches television for ten hours a day.

He grocery shops once or twice a month and stays in the store for
60-90 minutes. Claimant has a driver’s license and is able to drive
alone on unfamiliar routes.
to friends or relatives.

He can read a map.

He does not take

He rises at 10:00 a.m. or 11:00 a.m. and

goes to bed around 10:00 p.m.

(Tr. 297).

Dr. Brandmiller diagnosed Claimant with Depressive Disorder,

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NOS, Alcohol Dependence, sustained, full remission, and Antisocial
Personality Disorder. She concluded Claimant’s long term memory and
short term memory and abstract thinking were intact.

Concentration

was mildly impaired and performance on a reverse counting task
improved with a simple as opposed to complex task.
receptive language skills appeared intact.

Expressive and

He appeared able to

understand and carry out simple instructions.

He described a

history of difficulty with authority figures including teachers and
some supervisors.

His mother handled his finances, as while he can

do basic arithmetic, he could not write a check.
believed he could handle funds.

Dr. Brandmiller

(Tr. 299-300).

The ALJ gave these opinions “great weight” as being supported
by the medical record. She also recognized the third party function
report of Claimant’s wife which she gave “partial weight.”
16).

(Tr.

Based upon these findings, the ALJ formulated the RFC for the

restricted period.
Claimant contends the Good Samaritan Clinic records supports
further restrictions.

The record indicated Claimant had been out

of medication for three months, walked with a cane and appeared to
have difficulty getting up and down off of the examination table.
(Tr. 306).

While Claimant makes much of the notation regarding a

cane, the note was not a prescription but merely an observation that
Claimant had a cane with which he walked.

8

His difficulty getting

on and off the table is consistent with the medical findings of Dr.
Dulowski and adds no further restrictions not covered by the RFC.
While Claimant seeks to equate getting on and off of a table with
the ability to walk and stand, nothing in the record indicates a
correlation between these actions.
With regard to the mental restrictions, Claimant engages in a
recharacterization of each of the ALJ’s findings in the RFC on
mental abilities to insinuate a different conclusion on Claimant’s
ability to engage in basic work activities.

Neither Claimant nor

this Court may reweigh the evidence, only determine its sufficiency.
See Lax v. Astrue, 489 F.3d 1080, 1084 (10th Cir. 2007).

“[R]esidual functional capacity consists of those activities
that a claimant can still perform on a regular and continuing basis
despite his or her physical limitations.”

White v. Barnhart, 287

F.3d 903, 906 n. 2 (10th Cir. 2001).

A residual functional

capacity assessment “must include a narrative discussion describing
how the evidence supports each conclusion, citing specific medical
facts ... and nonmedical evidence.” Soc. Sec. R. 96–8p.

The ALJ

must also discuss the individual's ability to perform sustained
work activities in an ordinary work setting on a “regular and
continuing basis” and describe the maximum amount of work related
activity the individual can perform based on evidence contained in

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the case record. Id.

The ALJ must “explain how any material

inconsistencies or ambiguities in the evidence in the case record
were

considered

and

resolved.”

Id.

However,

there

is

“no

requirement in the regulations for a direct correspondence between
an RFC finding and a specific medical opinion on the functional
capacity in question.”
Cir. 2012).

Chapo v. Astrue, 682 F.3d 1285, 1288 (10th

The ALJ’s RFC assessment was supported by substantial

evidence.
Claimant also contends the ALJ failed to properly evaluate his
credibility.
However,

the

The ALJ’s credibility findings are somewhat sparse.
opinion

evidence

cited

by

the

ALJ

contradicts

Claimant’s subjective statements made at the hearing such that the
ALJ’s finding of reduced credibility is supported.

Step Five Questioning of the Vocational Expert
Claimant also challenges the thoroughness of the hypothetical
questions posed to the vocational expert in light of the challenges
to the RFC.

Since this Court found the RFC was supported by

substantial evidence and the questioning of the vocational expert
posed by the ALJ mirrored the RFC findings, no error is found at
step five.
Conclusion
The decision of the Commissioner is supported by substantial

10

evidence and the correct legal standards were applied.

Therefore,

this Court finds, in accordance with the fourth sentence of 42
U.S.C. § 405(g), the ruling of the Commissioner of Social Security
Administration should be and is AFFIRMED.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 25th day of September, 2018.

______________________________
KIMBERLY E. WEST
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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