Daniels et al v. Fort Gibson Housing Authority

Filing 20

OPINION AND ORDER by District Judge James H. Payne: granting 14 Motion to Dismiss (cjt, Deputy Clerk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
MARY J. DANIELS and
VICK A. DANIELS,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
FORT GIBSON HOUSING
AUTHORITY,
Defendant.

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Case No. 17-CV-254-JHP

OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court is Defendant Fort Gibson Housing Authority’s
(“Defendant”) Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. 14). Plaintiffs Mary J. Daniels and Vick
A. Daniels (“Plaintiffs”) have filed a Response (Dkt. 18) and a Supplemental
Response (Dkt. 19). Plaintiffs are proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis. After
consideration of the briefs, and for the reasons stated below, Defendant’s Motion
to Dismiss is GRANTED.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs bring this action to recover against Defendants for alleged
violation of the Fair Housing Act (“FHA”), 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq., breach of
contract, fraud, embezzlement, and threatening and intimidating tenants. (Dkt. 2).
Plaintiffs’ factual allegations are as follows:

Peggy? Sharon Fyte who work for Fort Gibson Housing Have stolen
our funds provided by Hud also have violated fair Housing acts,
intimidating tenants refusing services (maintenance) for unit which we
live in? stole Hud payments for our allowances.
(Id. at 2). Plaintiffs request relief in the form of “funds that were stolen and never
returned reimbersed [sic] for loss of furniture, medical bills do [sic] to visits for
stress, pain, suffering.” (Id. at 3).
Defendant has filed a motion to dismiss the allegations against it pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which
any relief can be granted as a matter of law.1 (Dkt. 14). Defendant argues
Plaintiff’s allegations are almost entirely conclusory and provide no information
regarding dates or places. Defendant contends these allegations fail to allege a
plausible claim for relief under any theory of federal or state law, and Defendant
cannot determine from Plaintiff’s allegations whether the Complaint is timely or
barred by the applicable statute of limitations.
Plaintiffs filed two short responses to Defendant’s motion (Dkt. 18; Dkt. 19).
In the first response, Plaintiffs assert, “[w]e do have all the paper work and dates
we need to back our claims,” and they claim Defendant made two different offers
to them to leave the property, one for $8,500 and a second one for $11,500 as a

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Defendant also asserts the Complaint is subject to dismissal pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1)
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, but it does not develop any specific arguments in this
regard, relying instead on Rule 12(b)(6) in the “Arguments” section of its brief. Accordingly, the
Court will consider Defendant’s arguments only pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).

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“nuisance settlement.” (Dkt. 18). In the supplemental response, Plaintiffs state
they are “throwing themselves at the mercy of this court,” and they request an
opportunity for more time to obtain an attorney or an opportunity to meet with the
Court to produce “all of the evidence we have documented through the previous
court and our previous attorney before possibly dismissing this case due to my
mistake?” (Dkt. 19). Plaintiffs further ask the Court whether Defendant’s counsel
has a conflict in litigating this case, because Plaintiffs had previously sought to hire
him as counsel in this case. (Dkt. 19). Defendant did not file a reply.
DISCUSSION
I.

Standard of Review
In considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court must accept all well-

pleaded allegations of the complaint as true, and must construe them in the light
most favorable to the plaintiff. See Anderson v. Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner &
Smith, Inc., 521 F.3d 1278, 1284 (10th Cir. 2008). To withstand a motion to
dismiss, a complaint must contain enough allegations of fact “to state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
570 (2007). The plaintiff bears the burden to frame “a complaint with enough
factual matter (taken as true) to suggest” that he or she is entitled to relief.
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556. “A pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’ Nor does a
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complaint suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual
enhancement.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly,
550 U.S. at 555, 557).
The Court further notes that, while pro se pleadings must be liberally
construed and must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings
drafted by lawyers, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), a district court
should not assume the role of advocate. Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110
(10th Cir. 1991). Moreover, even pro se plaintiffs are required to comply with the
fundamental requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and the liberal
construction to be afforded does not transform “vague and conclusory arguments”
into valid claims for relief. Ogden v. San Juan County, 32 F.3d 452, 455 (10th Cir.
1994). The Court “will not supply additional factual allegations to round out a
plaintiff’s complaint or construct a legal theory on a plaintiff’s behalf.” Whitney v.
N.M., 113 F.3d 1170, 1173-74 (10th Cir. 1997).
II.

Analysis
Defendant seeks to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Complaint for failure to allege or

support with factual allegations any plausible claim for relief. Plaintiffs allege
violations of the FHA, breach of contract, fraud, embezzlement, and intimidation.
However, Plaintiffs do not specify sufficient facts on which to base any of those
claims.

Plaintiffs allege that “Peggy?” and “Sharon Fyte,” who work for
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Defendant, stole their HUD funds, and Defendant intimidated tenants and refused
services (maintenance) for Plaintiffs’ unit. (Dkt. 2, at 2). These facts are alleged
without any context, and they do not provide sufficient notice to enable Defendant
to defend itself in this case. Plaintiffs do not indicate which section(s) of the FHA
were allegedly violated, and they fail to tie any facts to their conclusory allegations
that Defendant violated the FHA, breached a contract, or committed fraud,
embezzlement, or intimidation. In short, Plaintiff’s pleading fails to satisfy the
requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)
(“A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain . . . a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief”); Fed. R. Civ.
P. 9(b) (“In alleging fraud . . . a party must state with particularity the
circumstances constituting fraud”)
Moreover, Plaintiffs do not allege any dates in the Complaint, which renders
it impossible to determine whether the statute of limitations may have expired on
any of their claims. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(f) (“An allegation of time or place is
material when testing the sufficiency of a pleading); Aldrich v. McCulloch Props.,
Inc., 627 F.2d 1036, 1041 n.4 (10th Cir. 1980) (noting that statute of limitations
questions may be appropriately resolved on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion). Plaintiffs’
pleading is deficient as a matter of law.

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Plaintiffs’ responses to the Motion to Dismiss do not persuade the Court that
dismissal is improper.

Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ Complaint must be dismissed

without prejudice pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons detailed above, Defendant Fort Gibson Housing Authority’s
Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. 14) is GRANTED. Plaintiffs’ Complaint is DISMISSED
WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 4th day of June, 2018.

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