Barrios v. Haskell County Public Facilities Authority et al
Filing
59
ORDER from Supreme Court of Oklahoma (Re: 54 Order Certifying Questions of State Law to the Supreme Court of Oklahoma). (Attachments: # 1 Opinion, # 2 Envelope) (ndd, Deputy Clerk)
DEC
2018 OK 90
4 2018
OHd D. ADDEN
CU.:.hK
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OKL~
.
.
JERED BARRIOS, as the Personal
Representative of the ESTATE OF
RANDALL BARRIOS, deceased,
Plaintiff,
V.
.
HASKELL COUNTY PUBLIC
FACILITIES AUTHORJTY; BRJAN
HALE, individually; KATRINA
CHRJSTY, individually and in her official
capacity; SHERlFF TIM TURNER, in his
official capacity; and DOES I through V,
Defendants.
KELLY L. FOUTCH, administrator of the
ESTATE OF RUSSELL TED FOUTCH,
deceased,
Plaintiff,
V.
TURN KEY HEAL TH, LLC, d/b/a
TURN KEY i\1EDICAL and TURN KEY;
CREEK COUNTY PUBLIC FACILITIES
AUTHORJTY; JANE DOE NURSE I;
JANE DOE NURSE II; and JOHN/JANE
1
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DEC - 6 2018
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Rl'S,A,I,~l~~:~:u~
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Deputy Clerk
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17- w - 3;;L!:J- SP5
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No. 117,103
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(comp. w/ No. 117,107
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(cons. w/No. 117,154))
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) FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION
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No. 117,107
(cons. w/ No. 117,154 &
comp. w/ No. 117,103)
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DOES III-X,
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Defendants.
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CERTIFIED QUESTIONS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT
COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA AND FROM
THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN
DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
,10 The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma and
the United States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma certified
several questions of state law to this Court pursuant to the Revised Uniform
Certification of Questions of Law Act, 20 O.S.2011 §§ 1601-1611.
CERTIFIED QUESTIONS ANSWERED
Andrew M. Casey, FOSHEE & YAFFE, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Plaintiffs,
J ered Barrios ex rel. Estate of Randall Barrios, deceased, and Kelly L. Foutch ex rel.
Estate of Russell Ted Foutch, deceased.
Jamison C. Whitson, COLLINS, ZORN & WAGNER, P.C., Oklahoma City,
Oklahoma, for Defendants Haskell County Public Facilities Authority, Katrina
Christy, Sheriff Tim Turner, and Creek County Public Facilities Authority.
Randall J. Wood and Jeffrey C. Hendrickson, PIERCE COUCH HENDRICKSON
BAYSINGER & GREEN, L.L.P., Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Defendant Brian
Hale.
Anthony C. Winter, JOHNSON HANAN & VOSLER, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma,
for Defendant Tum Key Health, LLC d/b/a Tum Key Medical and Tum Key.
Devan A. Pederson, OKLAHOMA OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Amicus Curiae, State of Oklahoma.
2
Wyrick, J.:
,r 1 Two federal courts have certified to us the following questions:
1. The Governmental Tort Claims Act renders the State
immune from any tort suit arising out of the "[p ]rovision,
equipping, operation or maintenance of any prison, jail or
correctional facility." Do Sections 7 and 9 of Article II of
the Oklahoma Constitution nonetheless allow an inmate to
bring a tort claim for denial of medical care?
2. If so, is the private cause of action to be recognized
retrospectively?
,r 2 Answering these
questions requires us to determine whether we should
extend our holding in Bosh v. Cherokee County Governmental Building Authority,
2013 OK 9, 305 P.3d 994, to include tort claims brought by inmates alleging
violations of their rights to due process and to be free from cruel or unusual
punishments. Because the Legislature responded to our decision in Bosh by
amending the Governmental Tort Claims Act ("GTCA"), 51 O.S. §§ 151 et seq., to
clarify that the State's immunity from suit extended even to so-called
"constitutional" torts, 1 we answer the first question "no." Accordingly, we do not
reach the second question.
1
See Act of April 21, 2014, ch. 77, §§ 1-2, 2014 O.S.L. 245, 249-50 (codified at 51 O.S.Supp.2014
§§ 152(14), 153(B)).
3
I
,r 3 Russell Foutch and Randall Barrios died while incarcerated in county jails,
Barrios by his own hand, 2 Foutch from complications related to pneumonia. 3 Their
estates sued the respective jails, one sheriff, and various employees and healthcare
contractors of those jails'. Their claims included ( 1) federal civil rights claims under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging violations of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of
the federal constitution, (2) negligence and wrongful death claims, (3) negligent
conduct, training, hiring, and supervision claims, and (4) tort claims alleging
violations of rights guaranteed by Sections 7 and 9 of Article II of the Oklahoma
Constitution. 4
,r 4 In Foutch's case, the healthcare contractor filed a Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6)
motion to dismiss Foutch' s negligence, state constitutional, and § 1983 claims, while
the jail filed a partial motion to dismiss all of Foutch's negligence and state
constitutional claims. Both the healthcare contractor and the jail argued they were
2
Order Certifying Questions of State Law to Sup. Ct. of Okla. [Doc. 54] at 2, Barrios ex rel. Estate
of Barrios v. Haskell Cty. Pub. Facilities Auth., No. 6:17-cv-00325-SPS (E.D. Okla. June 13,
2018). The underlying facts in this matter are set out in the certification orders from the federal
courts. In answering a certified question, this Court does not presume facts outside those offered
by the certification order. Odom v. Penske Truck Leasing Co., 2018 OK 23,, 1, 415 P.3d 521,
524. Although this Court will neither add nor delete such facts, we may consider uncontested facts
supported by the record. Id , l, 415 P .3d at 524.
3
Compl. [Doc. 2], 9, at 3, Foutch ex rel. Estate of Foutch v. Turn Key Health, LLC, No. 4: 17-cv00431-GKF-JFJ (N.D. Okla. filed July 20, 2017).
4
Compl. [Doc. 2] ,, 24-73, at 6-17, Barrios, No. 6:17-cv-00325-SPS (E.D. Okla. filed Aug. 30,
2017); Order Certifying Questions of Law to the Sup. Ct. of Okla. [Doc. 49] at 2, Foutch, No 4:17cv-00431-GKF-JFJ (N.D. Okla. June 27, 2018).
4
immune from suit under the Oklahoma GTCA and that Foutch had failed to raise a .
plausible claim for denial of medical care under Article II, Section 7 or 9 of the
Oklahoma Constitution. 5 The trial court granted the jail's partial motion to dismiss
and the healthcare contractor's motion to dismiss Foutch's state constitutional
claims, but allowed Foutch's § 1983 claim to proceed. Both dismissals were
premised on the district court's conclusion that this Court had never recognized a
cause of action for denial of inmate medical care under Article II, Section 7 or 9 of
the Oklahoma Constitution. Foutch subsequently filed a motion to reconsider and
asked the district court to certify questions to this Court for guidance on whether
such a cause of action exists. The trial court denied Foutch's motion to reconsider,
but granted Foutch's motion to certify the questions.
,r 5 In Barrios's case, the jail and its employees filed a Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)
motion to dismiss Barrios's negligent training/hiring/supervision and state
5
Generally speaking, the staff of a healthcare contractor at a jail are "employees" who are entitled
to tort immunity under the GTCA by virtue of sections l 52(7)(b ), l 53(A), and 155(25). See 51
O.S.Supp.2015 § 152(7)(b) ("As used in The Governmental Tort Claims Act: ... 7. 'Employee'
means any person who is authorized to act in behalf of a political subdivision or the state whether
that person is acting on a permanent or temporary basis, with or without being compensated or on
a full-time basis .... b. For the purpose of The Governmental Tort Claims Act, the following are
employees of this state, regardless of the place in this state where duties as employees are
performed: ... (5) physicians who provide medical care to inmates pursuant to a contract with the
Department of Corrections, [and] ... (7) licensed medical professionals under contract with city,
county, or state entities who provide medical care to inmates or detainees in the custody or control
oflaw enforcement agencies .... "); id. §§ 153(A), 155(25). We have not been asked whether Turn
Key Health, LLC or its staff are "employees" under section 152(7)(b), but have assumed they are
for purposes of answering the questions certified to us.
5
constitutional claims. The former sheriff also filed a partial motion to dismiss the
same claims, as well as Barrios' s negligence and wrongful death claims. The trial
court ordered the parties to show cause why the state immunity questions should not
be certified to the Oklahoma Supreme Court. Barrios wanted the questions ·certified;
the defendants did not. The trial court certified the questions.
,r 6 Due to
the commonality of the questions presented, we made the cases
companion cases and now answer the certified questions in this single opinion. 6
6
This Court has the power to answer these certified questions of law. Such power exists so long
as the certified questions are presented in accordance with the provisions of the Revised Uniform
Certification of Questions of Law Act, 20 O.S.2011 §§ 1601-1611. Odom, 2018 OK 23 , 17,415
P.3d at 525. This Court's discretionary power to answer is set out in section 1602, which provides:
The Supreme Court and the Court of Criminal Appeals may answer a question of
law certified to it by a court of the United States, or by an appellate court of another
state, or of a federally recognized Indian tribal government, or of Canada, a
Canadian province or territory, Mexico, or a Mexican state, if the answer may be
determinative of an issue in pending litigation in the certifying court and there is no
controlling decision of the Supreme Court or Court of Criminal Appeals,
constitutional provision, or statute of this state.
Accordingly, in assessing whether a certified federal question of law should be answered by this
Court, both factors mentioned by section 1602 should be addressed: ( 1) Would the answer be
dispositive of an issue in pending litigation in the certifying court? (2) Is there established and
controlling law on the subject matter?
In this matter, there is no controlling Oklahoma precedent. In Barrios, the questions certified
would be dispositive of Barrios's "constitutional" tort claims in the underlying federal action. In
Foutch, however, the federal district court has already dismissed the relevant claims and has denied
a motion to reconsider that ruling, which raises doubt about whether the questions from the Foutch
case are certifiable. See Cray v. Deloitte Haskins & Sells, 1996 OK 102, ,r,r 6, 8, 925 P.2d 60, 62
(declining to answer a certified federal question where, much like Foutch, the federal court had
granted a dispositive motion, denied a motion to reconsider, and granted a motion to certify,
because such actions indicated "the trial court [had] finalized its determination on the question"
and because this Court did not wish "to afford appellate review of a ruling made by a federal judge
under the guise of a certified question oflaw"). But even if the questions in Foutch are not properly
presented, we will nonetheless answer the substantively similar questions in the Barrios case.
Thus, we see no need to quibble with the certifiability of the Foutch questions . .
6
II
A
,r 7 We have long recognized that the Legislature has the final say in defining
the scope of the State's sovereign immunity from suit. 7 Indeed, when the Court
eliminated the State's judicially-created common law immunity from tort suits in
Vanderpool v. State, 1983 OK 82, 672 P.2d 1153, we were careful to note our lack
of power to withdraw immunity granted by legislative act. 8 A decision as to whether
to allow tort suits is, after all, a decision as to whether the People's tax dollars should
be used to pay money damages to those who successfully sue the state; so this
recognition is consonant with our longstanding recognition of the Legislature's
exclusive power to set the State's fiscal policy. 9
7
Vanderpool v. State, 1983 OK 82,124, 672 P.2d 1153, 1157 ("[T]his Court is mindful of the oftexpressed view of this Court that if the doctrine of governmental immunity is to be totally
abrogated, such should be done by the Legislature and not by the courts of this State." (citing Rub.le
v. Dep 't of Transp., 1983 OK 24, 660 P .2d 1049; Spaulding v. State ex rel. Dep 't of Transp., 1980
OK 145, 618 P.2d 397)); see also Perry v. City ofNorman, 2014 OK 119,113, 341 P.3d 689,692
("[T]he Court, in Vanderpool v. State, 1983 OK 82, 672 P.2d 1153, abrogated the doctrine [of
governmental immunity] and acknowledged the Legislature's right to enact sovereign immunity
by statute." (emphasis added)); Schmidt v. Grady County, 1997 OK 92, 16, 943 P.2d 595, 597
(same).
8
1983 OK 82, 1 25 , 672 P.2d at 1157 ("Our decision is limited in its effect to the heretofore
judicially created and recognized doctrine of governmental immunity and is not to be taken as in
any way rendering ineffective any act of the Legislature in the area of governmental immunity
whether presently in effect or hereafter passed.").
9
See, e.g., In re Application of Okla. Capitol Improvement Auth., 1998 OK 25, 15, 958 P.2d 759,
762 ("As a matter of fundamental law, the fiscal policy of this state is determined by the legislative
department of government."); Calvey v. Daxon, 2000 OK 17, 121, 997 P.2d 164, 171 ("Except
where it encounters a specific constitutional prohibition, the Legislature has the right and the
responsibility to declare the fiscal policy of Oklahoma. This Court has no authority to consider the
desirability, wisdom, or practicability of fiscal legislation.... Wh~ther an act is wise or unwise,
7
,r
8 The Legislature has oft exercised its power to define the scope of the
State's immunity from suit. After Vanderpool, the Legislature enacted the GTCA
and unequivocally abrogated Vanderpool's common law decision with a statute
declaring that "[t]he State of Oklahoma does hereby adopt the doctrine of sovereign
immunity" from tort suits, while simultaneously waiving that immunity for certain
tort claims. 10 Accordingly, in cases including tort claims against the State and state
actors, the Court begins with the understanding that the State is statutorily immune
from tort suit unless the Legislature has expressly waived that immunity. We thus
look next to the text of the GTCA to determine whether its limited waivers of
sovereign immunity from tort suit encompass the particular tort suit at issue. 11
,r 9 Analyzing a prior version of the GTCA, this Court did just that in Bosh,
holding that the GTCA did not bar a tort claim alleging that excessive force was used
against a pre-trial detainee in violation of the detainee's Article II, Section 30 right
not to be umeasonably seized. We read the GTCA as stopping short of "immunizing
whether it is based on sound economic theory or whether it is the best means to achieve the desired
result are matters for legislative determination." (footnote omitted)).
10
The Governmental Tort Claims Act, ch. 226, § 3, 1984 O.S.L. 811, 813 (codified at 51
O.S.Supp.1984 § 152.1).
See, e.g., Tuffy 's, Inc. v. City of Oklahoma City, 2009 OK 4, ,r,r 16-20, 212 P.3d 1158, 1166-67
(analyzing 51 O.S. § 155(4) to determine whether a municipality may be held liable for the alleged
negligence of its police officer); Schmidt, 1997 OK 92, ,r,r 7-15, 943 P.2d at 597-98 (analyzing 51
O.S. § 155(6) to determine whether the county may be held liable for the alleged negligence of its
deputy sheriff); Nguyen v. State, 1990 OK 21, ,r,r 3-5, 8-9, 788 P.2d 962, 964-66 (analyzing 51
O.S. § 155(5) and (28) to determine whether the State may be held liable for injuries resulting from
a state institution's release of a mental patient).
11
8
the state completely from all liability for violations of the constitutional rights of its
citizens." 12 The text of the GTCA certainly didn't expressly include tort claims
arising from alleged deprivations of constitutional rights-and we have always said
that "[i]mrnunity cannot be read into a legislative text that is silent, doubtful or
ambiguous." 13 Accordingly, we recognized a common law tort remedy for claims
arising from alleged violations of Article II, Section 30 rights. 14
,r 10 As it did after Vanderpool, the Legislature in 2014 responded to Bosh by
amending the GTCA to specify that the State's immunity from suit extended even
to torts arising from alleged deprivations of constitutional rights. 15 The Legislature
first amended the definition of "tort" to include tort claims arising from alleged
violations of constitutional duties:
12
Bosh, 2013 OK 9, ,r 23,305 P.3d at 1001.
Gunn v. Consol. Rural Water & Sewer Dist. No. 1, Jefferson Cty., 1992 OK 131, ,r 7, 839 P.2d
1345, 1349 (citing Nguyen, 1990 OK 21, ,r 1, 788 P.2d at 966-67 (Opala, V.C.J., concurring);
Ingram v. State, 1990 OK 2, if 9, 786 P.2d 77, 80; Huffv. State, 1988 OK 118, ,r 6 n.19, 764 P.2d
183, 186 n.19; Jarvis v. City ofStillwater, 1983 OK 88, ,r 10,669 P.2d 1108, 1111). Additionally,
by operation of the Supremacy Clause, the GTCA couldn't eliminate a state actor's liability under
federal laws like 42 U.S.C. § 1983, see Tiemann v. Tul-Ctr. , Inc., 18 F.3d 851, 853 (10th Cir.
1994), nor did it affect claims that fail to implicate the state's sovereign immunity, such as those
against state officials in their individual capacity and those seeking only prospective injunctive
relief. See, e.g., Frew ex rel. Frew v. Hawkins, 540 U.S. 431, 436-37 (2004).
13
14
Aiiicle II, Section 30 of the Oklahoma Constitution does not itself create a cause of action. Thus,
the cause of action we recognized was not one created by the Oklahoma Constitution, but rather
by the Court through its common law power to create a cause of action for the alleged deprivation
of a constitutional right. See Bosh, 2013 OK 9, ,r 8,305 P.3d at 997 (citing Ohio Casualty Insurance
Co. v. Todd, 1991 OK 54, 813 P.2d 508, for the proposition that "a court may recognize private
causes of action").
15
Act of April 21, 2014, ch. 77, §§ 1-2, 2014 O.S.L. 245, 249-50 (codified at 51 O.S.Supp.2015
§§ 152-153).
9
"Tort" means a legal wrong, independent of contract, involving
violation of a duty imposed by general law, statute, the Constitution of
the State of Oklahoma, or otherwise, resulting in a loss to any person,
association or corporation as the proximate result of an act or omission
of a political subdivision or the state or an employee acting within the
scope of employment. 16
It next made a similar addition to the section describing the scope of the State's tort
liability:
The liability of the state or political subdivision under this act The
Governmental Tort Claims Act shall be exclusive and in place of all
other shall constitute the extent of tort liability of the state, a political
subdivision or employee at-arising from common law, statute, the
Oklahoma Constitution, or otherwise. 17
And then lastly, it mandated that even if a court nonetheless recognized a
constitutional tort, such a tort claim is subject to the GTCA's liability limits. 18
B
,r
11 We must now determine whether, in spite of the legislative response
described above, Bosh's holding can be extended to allow inmates alleging
violations of their Article II, Sections 7 and 9 rights to bring suit against the State
for money damages.
16
Id. sec. 1, § 152(14), 2014 O.S.L. at 249 (codified at 51 O.S.Supp.2015 § 152(14)).
17
Id. sec. 2, § 153(B), 2014 O.S.L. at 250 (codified at 51 O.S.Supp.2015 § 153(B)).
18
Id. In 2015, the Legislature again amended section 153 of the GTCA to specify that tort claims
arising under the Oklahoma Constitution cannot name any state employee as a defendant unless
the employee is alleged to have been acting outside the scope of their employment. Act of May
12, 2015, ch. 308, sec. 1, § 153(C), 2015 O.S.L. 1134, 1135 (codified at 51 O.S.Supp.2016 §
153(C)).
- 10
,r 12 It cannot. The Legislature's amendment of the GTCA to specify that the
GTCA applies even to tort suits alleging violations of constitutional rights was an
exercise of the Legislature's long-recognized power to define the scope of the State's
sovereign immunity, which forecloses our ability to expand the common law in a
manner that would conflict with statutory law. 19 Thus, because these "constitutional"
torts are now clearly "torts" governed by the GTCA, the GTCA' s specific
prohibition against tort suits arising out of the "operation or maintenance of any
prison, jail or correctional facility" bars the claims at issue here.20
,r
13 Even if not barred by sovereign immunity, however, it is doubtful that
such claims would exist in the Oklahoma common law. Certainly nothing in the text
of Article II, Sections 7 and 9 creates a tort cause of action for money damages as a
remedy to vindicate violations of those rights, nor do these plaintiffs point to any
common law tradition of the State paying money damages to the families of inmates
See Fuller v. Odom, 1987OK 64, ,r,r 4-5, 741 P.2d 449, 451-52 ("The plain language of the Act
expresses the Legislature's intent to abrogate any common law theories of recovery if a
governmental tortfeasor may be liable. The Legislature has specifically abrogated any previously
existing common law or statutory right of recovery for torts committed by a governmental entity
or its employees while acting within the scope of their employment. In Oklahoma, statutes in
derogation of the common law are to be liberally construed in order to promote their object....
The determination of legislative intent controls judicial statutory interpretation .... "); cf Lee v.
Bueno, 2016 OK 97, ,r 51, 381 P.3d 736, 752 (discussing "the power of the Legislature to modify
or abrogate the common law by statute" within the context of the interplay between 12 O.S. §
3009.1 and the Collateral Source Rule).
19
20
51 O.S.Supp.2015 § 155(25).
11
who take their own lives or succumb to illness while in prison. 21 These plaintiffs
instead rely primarily on our decision in Washington v. Barry, 2002 OK 45, 55 P.3d
103 6, where we assumed for purposes of our decision that Article II, Section 9
creates a cause of action for an inmate to bring a tort claim alleging violations of his
or her right to be free from cruel or unusual punishments. 22 We resolved that case,
however, on the basis that the inmate failed to adequately plead such a claim; so we
have never squarely held that such a claim exists. 23
21
It also worth remembering that "a prisoner has a significantly greater burden to bear in
establishing his right to a cause of action than does a person who is not incarcerated." Washington
v. Barry, 2002 OK 45, ,r 10, 55 P.3d 1036, 1039 (citing Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312 (1986)).
Additionally, we have previously declined to create a new tort cause of action for an alleged
constitutional violation where an alternative remedy existed to vindicate the alleged wrong. See
Perry, 2014 OK 119, ,r 19, 341 P.3d at 693. Here, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides citizens a private
cause of action for the deprivation of their federal constitutional rights by a state actor. Since
Article II, Sections 7 and 9 of the Oklahoma Constitution mirror the Fourteenth and Eighth
Amendments to the United States Constitution, respectively, a violation of these Oklahoma state
constitutional rights necessarily gives rise to a § 1983 claim. See Phillips v. Wiseman, 1993 OK
100, ,r 9, 857 P.2d 50, 53; Duckett v. Oklahoma ex rel. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 986 F.
Supp. 2d 1249, 1258 (W.D. Okla. 2013) ("It is well settled that '[a]§ 1983 claim may be available,
even though a state remedy is foreclosed by the Oklahoma Governmental Tort Claims Act."'
(alteration in original) (quoting Tiemann, 18 F.3d at 853)). Furthermore, an action against a state
actor in their individual capacity seeking prospective injunctive relief could be maintained to
prevent a continuing constitutional violation. See Frew, 540 U.S. at 436-37 (recognizing such an
action for alleged violations of federal constitutional rights); Gay Activists Alliance v. Bd. of
Regents of Univ. of Okla., 1981 OK 162, if 30,638 P.2d 1116, 1123 ("It is important to note at this
point that for the purpose of the injunction, the Board of Regents, as a body corporate, can be
enjoined. Gay Student Services v. Texas A & M University, 612 F.2d 160 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 1034, 101 S.Ct. 608, 66 L.Ed.2d 495 (1980). The Fifth Circuit, citing Edelman v. Jordan,
415 U.S . 651, 94 S.Ct. 1347, 39 L.Ed.2d 662 (1974), stated that 'prospective injunctive relief is
clearly allowed against state officials in their official capacities.' 612 F .2d at 165. ").
22
2002 OK 45, ,r 10, 55 P.3d at 1039.
Id. ,r 18, 55 P.3d at 1041-42; see also Bosh, 2013 OK 9, ,r 21, 305 P.3d at 1001 (describing
Washington as merely recognizing a "potential" cause of action).
23
12
,r
14 The best support for the notion that violations of Article II, Section 9
rights should be vindicated through tort suits comes from the United States Supreme
Court's decision in Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980), where that Court held that
Eighth Amendment rights could be vindicated through tort suits. In the very recent
decision of Ziglar v. Abbasi, 13 7 S. Ct. 1843 (2017), however, the United States
Supreme Court declined to recognize a tort claim brought by detainees who alleged
they were abused in violation of their Due Process Rights. In so doing, the Ziglar
Court called the continuing validity of Carlson into grave doubt, 24 saying that it
might decide the case differently today because "the arguments for recognizing
implied causes of action for damages" had "los[t] their force." 25
24
Ziglar, 137 S. Ct. at 1856 (" [I]n light of the changes to the Cowi's general approach to
recognizing implied damages remedies, it is possible that the analysis in the Court's three Bivens
cases might have been different if they were decided today."). Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal
Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), is the federal precursor and analog to Bosh, where the
United States Supreme Court recognized a money-damages claim against federal officers for
violations of the Fourth Amendment. In the decade after Bivens, that Court recognized an implied
cause of action in only two other cases involving other constitutional violations. Davis v. Passman,
442 U.S. 228 (1979) (holding that the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause provides a damages
remedy claim of gender discrimination); Carlson, 446 U.S . .14 (holding that the Eighth
Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause provides a damages remedy for failure to
provide adequate medical treatment). Those three cases-Bivens, Davis, and Carlson-are the
lone instances in which the United States Supreme Court has approved of an implied damages
remedy for constitutional violations. Ziglar, 137 S. Ct. at 1855. In the 47 years since Bivens, the
Supreme Court has "consistently refused to extend Bivens to any new context or new category of
defendants." Id at 1857 (quoting Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 68 (2001)). More
tellingly, the Supreme Court has suggested that the continuing validity of Bivens, Davis, and
Carlson turns in part on the lack of congressional disapproval of the decisions. Id. at 1856 (noting
that "no congressional enactment has disapproved of these decisions").
25
Ziglar, 137 S. Ct. at 1856.
13
,r 15 "[W]hen the question is whether to recognize an implied cause of action
to enforce a provision of the Constitution itself," 26 the Ziglar Court said, "it is a
significant step under separation-of-powers principles for a court to determine that
it has the authority, under the judicial power, to create and enforce a cause of action
for damages against [government] officials in order to remedy a constitutional
violation." 27 Because "claims against [government] officials often create substantial
costs," including "the time and administrative costs attendant upon intrusions
resulting from the discovery and trial process," it is the Legislative Branch that has
"substantial responsibility to determine whether, and the extent to which, monetary
and other liabilities should be imposed upon individual officers and employees of
the [State] Government. " 28 The Court noted that Congress had in a similar context
specified that the Federal Tort Claims Act did not authorize any claim against a
federal employee "which is brought for a violation of the Constitution," 29 leading it
to conclude that there, "Congress [had] ... weighed those concerns in deciding not
to substitute the Government as defendant in suits seeking damages for
constitutional violations. " 30
26
Id. at 1855.
27
Id. at 1856.
2s Id.
29
Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(2)(A) (2012)).
30
Id.
14
,r 16 For all those reasons, the Ziglar Court "made clear" that expanding tort
remedies for constitutional violations is now a "disfavored judicial activity." 31
Accordingly, "[ w]hen a party seeks to assert an implied cause of action under the
Constitution itself, just as when a party seeks to assert an implied cause of action
under a ... statute, separation-of-powers principles are or should be central to the
analysis. The question is 'who should decide' whether to provide for a damages
remedy, [the Legislature] or the courts?" 32
,r 17 We agree that "[t]he answer most often will be" the Legislature, because
"[w]hen an issue 'involves a host of considerations that must be weighed and
appraised,' it should be committed to 'those who write the laws' rather than 'those
who interpret them. "' 33 Thus, because the Legislature amended the GTCA after our
decision in Bosh to specify that the GTCA applies even to tort suits ·alleging
violations of constitutional rights, 34 we conclude that the GTCA's specific
prohibition against tort suits arising out of the "operation or maintenance of any
prison, jail or correctional facility" is a legislative determination to which we must
now defer.
31
Id. at 1857 (internal quotation marks omitted).
32
Id. (quoting Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 380 (1983)).
33
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Bush, 462 U.S. at 380).
34
51 O.S.Supp.2015 §§ 152(14), 153(B).
15
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,r
*
*
18 In answer to the certified questions, we declare that ( 1) because the
Legislature invoked the State's sovereign immunity as to constitutional torts via the
GTCA, Sections 7 and 9 of Article II of the Oklahoma Constitution do not allow an
inmate to bring a tort claim for denial of medical care, and (2) accordingly, the
second question is moot.
CERTIFIED QUESTIONS ANSWERED
Combs, CJ., and Kauger, Winchester, Reif, and Wyrick, JJ., concur.
Gurich, V.C.J., and Edmondson (by separate writing) and Darby, JJ., concur in
result.
Colbert, J ., dissents.
16
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