Yates v. Social Security Administration
Filing
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OPINION AND ORDER by Magistrate Judge Frank H McCarthy ; granting 31 Motion for Attorney Fees (jcm, Dpty Clk)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
LISA K. YATES,
Plaintiff,
vs.
Case No. 09-CV-519-FHM
MICHAEL J. ASTRUE,
Commissioner, Social Security
Administration,
Defendant.
OPINION AND ORDER
The motion of Plaintiff’s counsel for an award of attorney fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 406(b) is before the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge for decision. [Dkt. 32].
Counsel’s request, as amended by his Reply brief is for approval of an an attorney
fee award of $11,426.48 pursuant to the terms of 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) and the contingency
fee contract between Plaintiff and counsel. Counsel has certified that Plaintiff has been
advised of the fee request, and Plaintiff has expressed she does not object to the
requested fee award. [Dkt. 31].
Plaintiff appealed the Administrative denial of her application for Social Security
benefits to this Court. The Court reversed the administrative denial of Plaintiff’s application
for benefits and remanded the case to the Commissioner for further proceedings. The
Court granted Plaintiff's application for an award of $ 5,402.70 in fees under the Equal
Access to Justice Act (EAJA), 28 U.S.C. § 2412, for the work counsel performed before
the Court. [Dkt. 27]. The EAJA award was paid by the Social Security Administration, at
no cost to Plaintiff.
On remand the Commissioner determined that Plaintiff was entitled to disability
benefits, including an award of past due benefits. The letter from the Social Security
Administration that was provided with the motion for fees reflects that Plaintiff’s past dues
benefits were $45,705.90. [Dkt. 31-1, p. 3].
Section 406(b)(1) allows an award of attorney fees, payable from the past due
benefits when the district court has remanded a Social Security disability case for further
proceedings and benefits are awarded on remand. McGraw v. Barnhart, 450 F.3d 493
(10th Cir. 2006). 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)(A) provides that a court may award “a reasonable
fee . . . not in excess of 25 percent of the . . . past due benefits” awarded to the claimant.
The fee is payable “out of, and not in addition to, the amount of the [the] past-due benefits.”
Section 406(b)(1)(A) does not replace contingency fee agreements between Social
Security claimants and their counsel. Instead, that section requires the district court to
review contingency fee agreements as an “independent check” to assure that the
agreement yields a reasonable result. Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 807, 122 S.Ct.
1817, 1828, 152 L.Ed.2d 996 (2002). Section 406(b) provides a boundary that agreements
are unenforceable to the extent that they provide for fees exceeding 25 percent of the pastdue benefits. Id.
In determining whether a fee resulting from a contingency fee contract is
reasonable, it is appropriate to adjust the attorney’s recovery based on the character of the
representation and the results the representation achieved. A reduction is in order if the
attorney is responsible for delay, so the attorney will not profit from the accumulation of
past-due benefits while the case is pending in court. In addition, if the benefits are large
in comparison to the amount of time counsel spent on the case, the fee award may be
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adjusted. Id. 535 U.S. at 808, 122 S.Ct. at 1828. Further, the burden to prove the fee is
reasonable is placed upon the attorney seeking the fee. Id. at n.17.
Plaintiff and counsel entered into a contract ,[Dkt. 24-2], which is a contingency fee
arrangement that provides if the attorney prevails before the federal court on Plaintiff’s
behalf, and Plaintiff is awarded benefits by the Social Security Administration, Plaintiff
agrees to pay counsel a fee for federal court work equal to 25% of the past due benefits.
The undersigned concludes that the requested fee award of $11,426.48 which is
25% of Plaintiff’s past due benefit award as reflected in the record submitted is reasonable.
That award comports with the contract between counsel and Plaintiff and is within the
statutory limits of §406(b). The fee yields an hourly rate of approximately $ 369.79 per
hour for 30.9 hours of work performed before the district court, which does not amount to
a windfall. Often a fee recovery in a percentage-based contingency fee contract will be
higher than the fee produced by a straight hourly rate agreement. That circumstance
serves to induce attorneys to risk providing legal services in cases where they may not be
paid. And finally, when the amount of the EAJA fee award, $5,402.70, is returned to
Plaintiff in accordance with Weakley v. Brown, 803 F.2d 575, 580 (10th Cir. 1986), the net
result is an out-of-pocket payment from Plaintiff of $ 6,023.78 which is roughly 13% percent
of her past due benefits.
Plaintiff’s Attorney’s Motion for an Award of Attorney Fees, as amended [Dkt.32, 34],
is GRANTED under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b), as follows:
Counsel is awarded $11,426.48 to be paid from Plaintiff’s past due benefits being
withheld by the Commissioner for attorney fees. In accordance with Weakley v. Brown,
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803 F.2d 575, 580 (10th Cir. 1986), upon receipt of payment, counsel is required to refund
$5,402.70 to Plaintiff, which is the amount of the EAJA award.
SO ORDERED this 20th day of December, 2011.
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