Blagg v. Line et al

Filing 247

OPINION AND ORDER by Judge Claire V Eagan ; denying 246 Motion to Reopen Case (Re: 226 Order, Administratively Closing Case, ) (RGG, Chambers)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

BRENT BLAGG as personal representative
for the Estate of Amy Blagg, BRENT BLAGG
as guardian and next friend of K.B. and
personal representative for the Estate of K.B.,
BRENT BLAGG as guardian and next
friend of T.B.,

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Plaintiffs,
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and
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ANNA MARIE HOBBS, as surviving spouse
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and personal representative of the Estate of
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Alfred Eugene Hobbs; ANNA MARIE HOBBS, )
in her individual capacity; and
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HAROLD TEDFORD,
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Consolidated Plaintiffs.
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v.
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JERRY LINE, an individual and as
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principal/employer, and CHARLIE DAVIS
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STRONG, JR., an individual and
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agent/employee, WP OIL AND GAS, LLP,
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as principal/employer, and PETRON
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ENERGY, INC., as principal/employer,
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Defendants /
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Consolidated Defendants. )

Case No. 09-CV-0703-CVE-FHM
BASE FILE
Consolidated with:
Case No. 09-CV-0708-CVE-FHM
(consolidated with 11-CV-0271-CVE-FHM)
and
Case No. 10-CV-0502-CVE-FHM

OPINION AND ORDER
Now before the Court is Plaintiffs’ Blagg Application to Reopen Case for Status Conference
re: Collateral Declaratory Action (Dkt. # 246). Plaintiffs Brent Blagg, Anna Marie Hobbs, and
Harold Tedford filed separate cases alleging that defendant Charlie Davis Strong, Jr. was intoxicated
and caused a traffic accident that resulted in three fatalities and other serious injuries. Plaintiffs
Blagg and Hobbs further alleged that Strong was serving as an employee or agent of defendant

Petron Energy, Inc. (Petron) at the time of the accident. The cases were initially consolidated for
discovery only, but the Court later consolidated the cases for all purposes. Dkt. # 168. While these
cases were pending, Petron’s liability insurer, Admiral Insurance Company (Admiral), filed a
declaratory judgment action in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas
seeking a declaration that it has no duty to defend or indemnify Petron against Blagg’s and Hobbs’
claims. After this Court denied defendants’ motions for summary judgment, the parties reached a
settlement as to many of the plaintiffs’ claims. Plaintiffs dismissed with prejudice their claims
against Strong, Jerry Line, and WP Oil and Gas, LLC. Dkt. # 225. Plaintiffs Blagg and Hobbs have
not dismissed their claims against Petron, but they have agreed to share any amount paid by Admiral
to Petron under the liability insurance policy. Dkt. # 196, at 2. The parties, including Petron, filed
a joint motion requesting “a stay of this matter pending resolution of the declaratory judgment
action.” Dkt. # 194, at 1. On August 20, 2012, the Court administratively closed this case “until the
conclusion of the declaratory judgment action in the Northern District of Texas,” and the parties
were directed to file a status report within 30 days of the “resolution of the declaratory judgment
action . . . .” Dkt. # 226.
Blagg asks the Court to reopen this case and hold a status conference, because Admiral has
stated in a filing in the declaratory judgment action that Petron has taken the “position that a ruling
on Admiral’s duty to indemnify would be premature before the resolution of the Oklahoma
Litigation.” Dkt. # 246, at 2. Based on Blagg’s motion, there is no indication that the judge in the
declaratory judgment action has made any ruling concerning whether that case should be stayed, and

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Blagg has not shown that Petron’s argument has actually delayed the declaratory judgment action.1
In any event, under Texas and Oklahoma law it is appropriate for a court to hear a declaratory
judgment action and determine whether the insurer has a duty to defend before the underlying
litigation is resolved. English v. BGP Int’l, Inc., 174 S.W.3d 366 (Tex. App. 2005); United
Specialty Ins. Co. v. Conner Roofing & Guttering, LLC, 2012 WL 208104, *5 (N.D. Okla. Jan. 24,
2012).

In addition, Texas law allows a court to resolve a declaratory judgment action as to an

insurer’s duty to indemnify when “the insurer has no duty to defend and the same reasons that negate
the duty to defend likewise negate any possibility the insurer will ever have a duty to indemnify.”
Farmers Texas County Mut. Ins. Co. v. Griffin, 955 S.W.2d 81, 83 (Tex. 1997). Oklahoma courts
are also permitted to hear a declaratory judgment action concerning insurance coverage and resolve
the issue of indemnification before the underlying litigation is resolved. Equity Ins. Co. v. Garrett,
178 P.3d 201 (Okla. Civ. App. 2008). Of course, the presiding judge in the declaratory judgment
action has the discretion to stay that case if it is appropriate, but the mere fact that Petron may be
arguing the resolution of the indemnification issue is premature does not suggest that any action
taken by this Court would expedite the resolution of the declaratory judgment action. The
administrative closing order (Dkt. # 226) plainly states that this case is to remain administratively
closed “until the conclusion of the declaratory judgment action,” and Blagg has not shown good
cause for reopening this case.

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If Petron has raised an argument that this case should be resolved before the declaratory
judgment action, Petron would be asserting inconsistent arguments in different courts.
Petron asked the Court to administratively close this case “pending resolution of the
declaratory judgment action.” Dkt. # 194, at 1. The Court relied on this representation when
it entered an order administratively closing the case, and Petron may not change its position
that the declaratory judgment action should be resolved before this case is reopened merely
to obtain a perceived advantage in the declaratory judgment action.
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IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ Blagg Application to Reopen Case for
Status Conference re: Collateral Declaratory Action (Dkt. # 246) is denied.
DATED this 27th day of March, 2013.

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