Doe v. Craig County Board of County Commissioners et al

Filing 70

OPINION AND ORDER by Chief Judge Claire V Eagan ; denying 38 Motion to Dismiss Party (Re: 30 Amended Complaint ) (RGG, Chambers)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

JOHN DOE,
Plaintiff,
v.
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS
OF CRAIG COUNTY, JIMMY SOOTER,
SHEILA FLOYD WILLIAMS, CHISHOLM
STANDLEE, and JOHN DOES # 1-10,

Defendants.

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Case No. 11-CV-0298-CVE-PJC

OPINION AND ORDER
Now before the Court is Defendant Board of County Commissioners of Craig County’s
Motion and Brief to Dismiss Amended Complaint (Dkt. # 38). Defendant Board of County
Commissioners of Craig County (Board) seeks dismissal of plaintiff’s claim for violation of Title
II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12131 et seq. (ADA), because the Board
alleges that it is not the proper party in this case. Plaintiff, John Doe,1 has filed a response in
opposition to the motion (Dkt. # 46) and the Board has filed a reply (Dkt. # 50).
I.
On June 18, 2009, plaintiff was arrested in Craig County, Oklahoma, and transported to the
Craig County Jail (CCJ). Plaintiff remained incarcerated at the CCJ until his release on February
26, 2010. Plaintiff is HIV positive, and alleges in the Amended Complaint that he informed the CCJ
staff of his HIV status upon his arrival. Plaintiff alleges that, while residing at the CCJ, he was

1

Plaintiff has previously been granted permission to prosecute this case under the pseudonym
of John Doe. Dkt. # 23.

repeatedly denied his prescribed HIV medication and that his HIV status was disclosed to other
inmates without his permission. Plaintiff further alleges that he was treated differently than other
inmates based on his HIV positive status, including, inter alia, being confined to isolation, being
prohibited from earning money toward payment of his bond, being prevented from taking showers
without permission or at regular intervals, being prevented from making telephone calls without
permission, being denied outdoor recreation, and being denied regular television privileges. Plaintiff
alleges that this treatment caused him stress, anxiety, frustration, outrage, and sleeplessness, and had
an adverse affect on his medical condition and/or prognosis.
Plaintiff’s amended complaint alleges the following claims for relief: (1) deliberate
indifference, violation of due process, and negligence in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution, actionable through 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (2) invasion
of privacy in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and
Oklahoma common law; and (3) violation of Title II of the ADA. Plaintiff requests declaratory and
injunctive relief, nominal and compensatory damages against all defendants, and punitive damages
against three individual defendants. Only the third claim for relief, violation of Title II of the ADA,
is against the Board.
II.
In considering a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), a court must determine whether the claimant
has stated a claim upon which relief may be granted. A motion to dismiss is properly granted when
a complaint provides no “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). A complaint
must contain enough “facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face” and the factual

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allegations “must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id. (citations
omitted). “Once a claim has been stated adequately, it may be supported by showing any set of facts
consistent with the allegations in the complaint.” Id. at 562. Although decided within an antitrust
context, Twombly stated the pleadings standard for all civil actions. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662 (2009). For the purpose of making the dismissal determination, a court must accept all the
well-pleaded allegations of the complaint as true, even if doubtful in fact, and must construe the
allegations in the light most favorable to claimant. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; Alvarado v.
KOB–TV, L.L.C., 493 F.3d 1210, 1215 (10th Cir.2007); Moffett v. Halliburton Energy Servs., Inc.,
291 F.3d 1227, 1231 (10th Cir.2002). However, a court need not accept as true those allegations
that are conclusory in nature. Erikson v. Pawnee Cnty. Bd. Of Cnty. Com’rs, 263 F.3d 1151, 115455 (10th Cir.2001). “[C]onclusory allegations without supporting factual averments are insufficient
to state a claim upon which relief can be based.” Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.3d 1106, 1109-10 (10th
Cir.1991).
III.
Title II of the ADA provides in part that “no qualified individual with a disability shall, by
reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services,
programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.” 42
U.S.C. § 12132. This provision extends to discrimination against inmates detained in a county jail.
See Penn. Dep’t of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 210 (1998) (holding that “[s]tate prisons fall
squarely within the statutory definition of ‘public entity,’ which includes ‘any department, agency,
special purpose district, or other instrumentality of a State or States or local government’”) (quoting
42 U.S.C. § 12131(1)(B)). To state a claim under Title II, the plaintiff must allege that (1) he is a

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qualified individual with a disability, (2) who was excluded from participation in or denied the
benefits of a public entity’s services, programs, or activities, and (3) such exclusion, denial of
benefits, or discrimination was by reason of a disability. See Robertson v. Las Animas Cnty.
Sheriff’s Dep’t, 500 F.3d 1185, 1193 (10th Cir. 2007). The Supreme Court has held that being HIV
positive is a disability under the ADA. See Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1998); see also
Hardeman v. Sanders, No. 08-CV-086-RAW-SPS, 2009 WL 590738, at *9 (E.D. Okla. March 5,
2009).
While the Tenth Circuit has not explicitly addressed the issue of respondeat superior liability
under Title II of the ADA, other circuits that have considered the question have unanimously held
that a municipal employer is vicariously liable for the acts of its employees who violate Title II of
the ADA. See Rosen v. Montgomery Cnty., 121 F.3d 154, 157 n.3 (4th Cir. 1997) (“Under the ADA
and similar statutes, liability may be imposed on a principal for the statutory violations of its
agent.”); Delano-Pyle v. Victoria Cnty., 302 F.3d 567, 574-75 (5th Cir. 2002) (“when a plaintiff
asserts a cause of action against an employer-municipality, under either the ADA or the RA, the
public entity is liable for the vicarious acts of any of its employees as specifically provided by the
ADA.”); DeVito v. Chicago Park Dist., 83 F.3d 878, 881 (7th Cir. 1996) (“the ADA imposes
respondeat superior liability on an employer for the acts of its agents”); Duvall v. Cnty. of Kitsap,
260 F.3d 1124, 1141 (9th Cir. 2001) (“When a plaintiff brings a direct suit under . . . Title II of the
ADA against a municipality (including a county), the public entity is liable for the vicarious acts of
its employees.”); Mason v. Stallings, 82 F.3d 1007, 1009 (11th Cir. 1996) (“the ‘agent’ language
was included [in the ADA] to ensure respondeat superior liability of the employer for the acts of its
agents”); see also Guynup v. Lancaster Cnty., No. 06-4315, 2008 WL 4771852, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Oct.

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29, 2008) (“Title II of the ADA . . . provide[s] for vicarious liability . . . .”); Cardona Roman v.
Univ. of P.R., No. 10-CV-1363(DRD), 2011 WL 3204837, at *5 (D.P.R. July 27, 2011) (“the ADA
does not provide for individual liability, but only for employer liability”).
The amended complaint alleges that plaintiff was excluded from participation in and denied
benefits of the CCJ’s services, programs, and activities on the basis of his HIV status. The amended
complaint further alleges that, in addition to the Sheriff, the CCJ employees who violated the ADA
were employees of Craig County (County), and, thus, the Board is liable for their actions under a
theory of respondeat superior.2 The Board does not dispute that plaintiff has adequately pleaded that
he is a qualified individual with a disability who was excluded from participation in or denied
benefits of a public entity’s services, programs, or activities, and that such exclusion, denial or
discrimination was by reason of a disability. Further, the Board does not dispute that the CCJ is a
public entity under the ADA. Finally, the Board admits that the employees of the CCJ are
employees of the County. See Dkt. # 50 at 2.
The Board contends that the claim against it must be dismissed because it is not the proper
party defendant. The Board argues that, under Oklahoma law, it has no authority or control over the
CCJ personnel and, therefore, it cannot be held liable for their actions under the ADA. In support
of this proposition, the Board relies on Bristol v. Board of County Commissioners of the County of
Clear Creek, 312 F.3d 1213 (10th Cir. 2002). However, Bristol is not on point. In Bristol, the
plaintiff sued under Title I of the ADA, which requires a covered entity to provide reasonable
accommodations to an employee with a disability. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112. The plaintiff in Bristol
claimed that he was an employee of both the Sheriff’s office and the Board of County
2

Pursuant to Oklahoma law, any suit brought against a county must be filed against the board
of county commissioners of the relevant county. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 19, § 4.
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Commissioners. The Tenth Circuit granted en banc rehearing to determine “whether the Board can
be considered an employer of Bristol so as to trigger the accommodation requirements of the ADA.”
Bristol, F.3d at 1216 n.2.
In conducting this analysis, the Tenth Circuit applied the “joint-employer test” and the
“single-employer test,” both of which consider the amount of authority and control the alleged
employer had over the individual’s employment, and determined that the board was not Bristol’s
employer under either test. Id. at 1218-21. The Tenth Circuit noted that the joint-employer test is
applicable where “a plaintiff who is the employee of one entity [seeks] to hold another entity liable
by claiming that the two entities are joint employers.” Id. at 1218. The single-employer test is
applicable where “a plaintiff who is the employee of one entity may seek to hold another entity
liable by arguing that the two entities effectively constitute a single employer.” Id. Neither of these
factual scenarios is present in this case. The plaintiff here does not argue that an entity that is not
technically his employer was obligated to provide accommodation under Title I of the ADA. The
question presented here is whether an entity, that is the admitted employer of certain individuals,
can be held vicariously liable for those individuals’ alleged violations of Title II of the ADA. The
Board has not cited any legal authority to support the proposition that either the joint-employer test
or single-employer test is used in this factual or statutory context. Nor has the Board cited any legal
authority showing that the level of authority or control of the employer is relevant in this context.
It is undisputed that the CCJ employees are employees of the County. It is further
undisputed that an employer can be liable for the acts of its employees under Title II of the ADA.
The Board has failed to make any showing that it cannot be held vicariously liable for the acts of
its employees under Title II of the ADA.

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IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendant Board of County Commissioners of Craig
County’s Motion and Brief to Dismiss Amended Complaint (Dkt. # 38) is denied.
DATED this 22nd day of December, 2011.

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