Poore v. Glanz et al
Filing
17
OPINION AND ORDER by Chief Judge Claire V Eagan ; denying 4 Motion to Dismiss Party (Re: 2 Complaint ) (RGG, Chambers)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
LADONA A. POORE,
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
Plaintiff,
v.
STANLEY GLANZ, Sheriff of Tulsa
County, in his individual and official
capacities, and SETH BOWERS,
Defendant.
Case No. 11-CV-0797-CVE-TLW
OPINION AND ORDER
Now before the Court is Defendant Stanley Glanz’s Motion to Dismiss Complaint (Dkt. #
4). Defendant Stanley Glanz asks the Court to dismiss plaintiff’s claims against him for failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted, because the complaint fails to allege sufficient facts
to show that he acted with deliberate indifference to plaintiff’s safety while she was in the custody
of the David L. Moss Criminal Justice Center (Tulsa County Jail). Plaintiff objects to Glanz’s
motion and argues that she has stated a claim against Glanz under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in his individual
and official capacities.
I.
Ladona A. Poore alleges that she was incarcerated at the Tulsa County Jail from January to
April, 2010, and she spent the entire duration of her incarceration in the medical unit. Dkt. # 2, at
1. Poore was seventeen years old during the relevant time period, and she alleges that all white
female juvenile inmates are housed in the north wing of the medical unit. Id. at 4. Poore was under
the supervision of male detention officers, including Seth Bowers. She alleges that the north wing
of the medical unit is a known “blind spot” in the Tulsa County Jail’s video surveillance system, and
jail personnel and inmates conduct illegal activity in this blind spot to avoid detection. Id. Poore
claims that she was forced to shower alone and Bowers would watch her through a window while
she showered. Id. at 5. Bowers allegedly raped and sexually assaulted plaintiff and used the blind
spot and general lack of staffing in the medical unit to avoid detection. Id. at 5-6. Another inmate
saw Bowers rape Poore, and Bowers allegedly used his authority as a detention officer to silence this
witness. Id. at 6.
Poore alleges that Glanz learned of Bowers’ conduct, and that he declined to discipline
Bowers or refer the matter to the Tulsa County District Attorney. Id. at 6. She also claims that
Glanz was aware of improper sexual conduct between jail personnel and inmates. Id. at 5. Even if
these acts were consensual, Poore states that it is a felony under Oklahoma law for a prison
employee to have sex with an inmate. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1111(A)(7). Poore claims that
Glanz violated the Oklahoma Jail Standards by failing to have at least one female detention officer
in the north wing of the medical unit while female prisoners were housed in that area. Id. at 5. She
also claims that Glanz was aware of the blind spots in the Tulsa County Jail and the uses made of
these blind spots by jail personnel and inmates, but that he took no measures to monitor the blind
spots or prevent harm to inmates. Id. at 8. She alleges that Glanz promulgated or implemented (or
failed to promulgate or implement) at least four polices showing a deliberate indifference to the
health and safety of female inmates of the Tulsa County Jail:
29.
“Glanz failed to promulgate and implement adequate housing and
supervision policies responsive to the special needs of the female juvenile
prisoners in his care . . . .”
30
“Glanz has instituted a policy, practice and/or custom of maintaining
inadequate supervision and safety precautions with respect to known areas
that are not monitored via surveillance equipment, or ‘blind spots,’ within the
Jail . . . .”
2
31.
“Glanz has maintained a policy, practice and/or custom of understaffing the
medical unit. . . .”
32.
“Glanz has failed to adequately train Jail personnel and staff, particularly
male personnel, concerning the supervision of female juvenile inmates in
order to protect the female juvenile inmates from inappropriate sexual
conduct and activity. . . .”
Id. at 7-9.
On December 23, 2011, Poore filed this case alleging that Glanz and Bowers subjected her
to cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
United States Constitution. She seeks relief against Glanz in his individual and official capacities
under § 1983, and she requests actual and punitive damages in excess of $75,000. Id. at 12.
II.
In considering a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), a court must determine
whether the claimant has stated a claim upon which relief may be granted. A motion to dismiss is
properly granted when a complaint provides no “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555
(2007). A complaint must contain enough “facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face”and the factual allegations “must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative
level.” Id. (citations omitted). “Once a claim has been stated adequately, it may be supported by
showing any set of facts consistent with the allegations in the complaint.” Id. at 562. Although
decided within an antitrust context, Twombly “expounded the pleading standard for all civil
actions.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1953 (2009). For the purpose of making the dismissal
determination, a court must accept all the well-pleaded allegations of the complaint as true, even if
doubtful in fact, and must construe the allegations in the light most favorable to claimant. Twombly,
3
550 U.S. at 555; Alvarado v. KOB-TV, L.L.C., 493 F.3d 1210, 1215 (10th Cir. 2007); Moffett v.
Halliburton Energy Servs., Inc., 291 F.3d 1227, 1231 (10th Cir. 2002). However, a court need not
accept as true those allegations that are conclusory in nature. Erikson v. Pawnee County Bd. Of
County Comm’rs, 263 F.3d 1151, 1154-55 (10th Cir. 2001). “[C]onclusory allegations without
supporting factual averments are insufficient to state a claim upon which relief can be based.” Hall
v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1109-10 (10th Cir. 1991).
III.
Glanz states that “[w]hen the inflammatory and conclusory language of the complaint is
stripped away, [p]laintiff has failed to state a claim against [Glanz] . . . ,” and he asks the Court to
dismiss plaintiff’s complaint under Rule 12(b)(6). Dkt. # 4, at 1-2. Plaintiff responds that she has
adequately alleged a § 1983 claim against Glanz based on supervisory liability, because she has
identified specific unconstitutional policies implemented or promulgated by Glanz and has alleged
that Glanz acted with the requisite state of mind. Dkt. # 9, at 8.
Section 1983 provides a claim for relief against state actors for violation of a plaintiff’s
federal rights. Becker v. Kroll, 494 F.3d 904, 914 (10th Cir. 2007). To state a claim under § 1983,
a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of
the United States was violated and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting
under color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Anderson v. Suiters, 499 F.3d
1228, 1232-33 (10th Cir. 2007). Plaintiff alleges that Glanz violated her Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendment rights to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. The Eighth Amendment “imposes
a duty on prison officials to provide humane conditions of confinement, including adequate food,
clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care, and reasonable safety from serious bodily harm.” Tafoya
4
v. Salazar, 516 F.3d 912, 916 (10th Cir. 2008). To establish an Eighth Amendment violation, a
plaintiff must show that a prison official acted with deliberate indifference.
“Deliberate
indifference” is defined as knowing and disregarding an excessive risk to an inmate’s health or
safety. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 827 (1994); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104-05
(1976). In Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294 (1991), the Supreme Court clarified that deliberate
indifference has two components: (1) an objective requirement that the pain or deprivation be
sufficiently serious; and (2) a subjective requirement that the offending officials act with a
sufficiently culpable state of mind. Wilson, 501 U.S. at 298-99. Defendant has not disputed that
rape is a sufficiently serious injury to satisfy the objective component of a deliberate indifference
claim. “To prevail on the subjective component, the prisoner must show that the defendant[] knew
[she] faced a substantial risk of harm and disregarded that risk, by failing to take reasonable
measures to abate it.” Martinez v. Beggs, 563 F.3d 1082, 1089 (10th Cir. 2009). However, “[t]he
official’s knowledge of the risk need not be knowledge of a substantial risk to a particular inmate,
or knowledge of the particular manner in which injury might occur.” Tafoya , 516 F.3d at 916 (10th
Cir. 2008) (emphasis in original).
Plaintiff’s claim against Glanz in his individual capacity is based on supervisory liability.
Tenth Circuit precedent is clear that, for the purpose of a § 1983 claim, “a sheriff is responsible for
the proper management of the jail in his county and the conduct of his deputies.” Meade v. Grubbs,
841 F.2d 1512, 1528 (10th Cir. 1988). However, “mere negligence is insufficient to establish
supervisory liability.” Johnson v. Martin, 195 F.3d 1208, 1219 (10th Cir. 1999). To establish a
claim of supervisory liability under § 1983, a plaintiff must plead and prove that “(1) the defendant
promulgated, created, implemented or possessed responsibility for the continued operation of a
5
policy that (2) caused the complained of constitutional harm, and (3) acted with the state of mind
required to establish the alleged constitutional deprivation.” Dodds v. Richardson, 614 F.3d 1185,
1199 (10th Cir. 2010). In Dodds, the Tenth Circuit cited the Supreme Court’s decision in Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), and explained that a plaintiff must allege that the defendant’s
“individual actions cause a constitutional deprivation.” 614 F.3d at 1200. For a § 1983 claim based
on supervisory liability, a plaintiff may establish the necessary individual action by showing an
affirmative link between the unconstitutional acts of a subordinate and the adoption of a policy
authorizing or approving of the misconduct. Id. at 1201.
The Court finds that plaintiff has stated a claim against Glanz in his individual capacity.
Plaintiff alleges that she was repeatedly raped by Bowers while she was detained in the medical unit
of the Tulsa County Jail, and this is a sufficiently serious injury to satisfy the objective component
of a deliberate indifference claim. Plaintiff also claims that Glanz was aware of blind spots in the
Tulsa County Jail, and that he knew that jail personnel and inmates were engaging in illegal conduct
in these blind spots. In particular, she claims that Glanz knew that jail personnel were engaging in
sexual acts with inmates and used the blind spots to avoid detection. Dkt. # 2, at 7. When Glanz
learned of Bowers’ conduct, plaintiff alleges that Glanz failed to take any disciplinary action against
Bowers or refer Bowers to the Tulsa County District Attorney for possible criminal charges. Id. at
6. She claims that Glanz showed deliberate indifference to the needs of female inmates by failing
to take steps to monitor the blind spots and properly staff the north wing of the medical unit with
at least one female detention officer. These allegations are sufficient to support an inference that
Glanz was aware of a substantial risk of harm to female inmates and that he acted with deliberate
indifference by failing to abate the risk. Glanz argues that plaintiff’s factual allegations do not
6
specifically and conclusively show that he acted with deliberate indifference, but he disregards the
well-pleaded allegations of the complaint and his arguments are more appropriate for consideration
on a motion for summary judgment.
Glanz also argues that plaintiff has not stated a claim against him in his official capacity. A
claim against a state actor in his official capacity “is essentially another way of pleading an action
against the county or municipality” he represents, and is considered under the standard applicable
to § 1983 claims against municipalities or counties. Porro v. Barnes, 624 F.3d 1322, 1328 (10th Cir.
2010). In the case of a municipal entity, the “under color of state law” element requires that the
constitutional deprivation occurred pursuant to official policy or custom. See Monell v. Dep’t of
Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). A municipal entity may be held liable
for an act it has officially sanctioned, or for the actions of an official with final policymaking
authority. Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 480, 482-83 (1986); see also City of St.
Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 127-28 (1988). A plaintiff “must show that the municipal action
was taken with the requisite degree of culpability and must demonstrate a direct causal link between
the municipal action and the deprivation of federal rights.” Barney v. Pulsipher, 143 F.3d 1299,
1307 (10th Cir. 1998) (quoting Board of County Comm’rs of Bryan County, Oklahoma v. Brown,
520 U.S. 397, 404 (1997)).
Plaintiff has identified several policies allegedly promulgated by Glanz and has stated
sufficient facts to support an inference that the policies caused a violation of her constitutional
rights. As the Tulsa County Sheriff, Glanz has final policymaking authority over the Tulsa County
Jail and he may be sued in his official capacity for allegedly unconstitutional policies enforced at
the Tulsa County Jail. Meade, 841 F.2d at 1530. Plaintiff alleges that Glanz was aware of blind
7
spots in the surveillance system, and he was allegedly aware that jail personnel were taking inmates
to the blind spots and engaging in illegal sexual activity. Dkt. # 2, at 7. Plaintiff claims that Glanz
maintained a policy of understaffing areas of the Tulsa County Jail known to be blind spots, and she
claims that Glanz promulgated a policy or custom of inadequately supervising and training personnel
working in the medical unit. Id. at 8. She also claims that Glanz was aware of Bowers’ repeated
rapes of plaintiff and other illegal sexual acts between jail personnel and inmates, and that he still
refused to take any action to monitor the blind spots or punish the alleged wrongdoers. Id. at 7-8.
These allegations are sufficient to give Glanz notice of the allegedly unconstitutional policies
promulgated and maintained at the Tulsa County Jail, and plaintiff has alleged that these policies
resulted in a deprivation of her Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to be free from cruel and
unusual punishment. Considering all of the well-pleaded allegations of the complaint, the Court
finds that plaintiff has stated a § 1983 claim against Glanz in his official capacity.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendant Stanley Glanz’s Motion to Dismiss
Complaint (Dkt. # 4) is denied.
DATED this 6th day of March, 2012.
8
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?