Dollison v. American National Insurance Company et al

Filing 38

OPINION AND ORDER by Judge Claire V Eagan that plaintiff Judy Dollison's Motion for Rule 54(b) Certification (Dkt. # 37) is denied ; denying 37 Motion for Miscellaneous Relief (Re: 33 Opinion and Order, Adding/Terminating Party(ies), Ruling on Motion to Remand, Ruling on Motion to Dismiss, Ruling on Motion to Strike ) (RGG, Chambers)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

JUDY DOLLISON,

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Plaintiff,
v.

AMERICAN NATIONAL INSURANCE
COMPANY,
Defendant.

Case No. 13-CV-0100-CVE-FHM

OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court is plaintiff Judy Dollison’s Motion for Rule 54(b) Certification. Dkt. # 37.
Plaintiff asks that the Court certify its Opinion and Order (Dkt. # 33) as a final decision on the
claims dismissed therein. In the Opinion and Order, the Court granted defendant American National
Insurance Company (ANICO)’s motion to dismiss (Dkt. # 9), and denied plaintiff’s motion to
remand (Dkt. # 27). The only remaining claims are for breach of contract and bad faith denial
against ANICO. Plaintiff asserts that her dismissed claims are entirely separate from the remaining
claims and there is no just reason to delay appellate review of the Court’s order.
I.
The underlying facts were recited in the Court’s Opinion and Order. Dkt. # 33. Plaintiff,
individually and as personal representative of the estate of Dollison, as well as on behalf of all others
similarly situated, filed suit in Mayes County, Oklahoma and named ANICO and Keystone
Chevrolet, Inc. (Keystone) as defendants. Dkt. # 2-2. Plaintiff alleged seven claims. All seven of
plaintiff’s claims were asserted in her individual capacity and on behalf of Dollison’s estate

(individual/estate), and counts three through seven were asserted on behalf of all others similarly
situated (class). Plaintiff’s claims were as follows:
Count One

Bad Faith Denial

Individual/Estate

ANICO

Count Two

Breach of Contract

Individual/Estate

ANICO

Count Three Violation of Statute

Individual/Estate and Class

ANICO and Keystone

Count Four

Breach of Contract/
Breach of Covenant
of Good Faith/Fair
Dealing

Individual/Estate and Class

ANICO and Keystone

Count Five

Restitution

Individual/Estate and Class

ANICO and Keystone

Count Six

Unjust Enrichment/
Constructive Trust

Individual/Estate and Class

ANICO and Keystone

Individual/Estate and Class

ANICO and Keystone

Count Seven Injunctive Relief

ANICO removed the case on the basis of diversity jurisdiction and the Class Action Fairness
Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) (CAFA). Dkt. # 2. Keystone consented to removal. Id. Thereafter,
ANICO filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim and to strike class allegations. Dkt. #
9. Plaintiff filed a motion to remand (Dkt. # 27) and responded to ANICO’s motion to dismiss and
motion to strike class allegations (Dkt. # 28). ANICO and Keystone both filed responses to
plaintiff’s motion to remand. Dkt. ## 30, 31. The Court entered an Opinion and Order on May 9,
2013, granting ANICO’s motion to dismiss and strike class allegations and denying plaintiff’s
motion to remand. Dkt. # 33. The Court found that: Keystone should be dismissed as a party;
claims brought on behalf of plaintiff individually as to counts one and two should be dismissed with
prejudice; counts three through seven, brought in plaintiff’s individual capacity and on behalf of the
estate of Dollison, should be dismissed; and plaintiff’s class allegations should be stricken. Id. The

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only remaining claims are those brought on behalf of the estate against ANICO for breach of
contract and bad faith denial. Thereafter, plaintiff filed her motion for Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b)
certification. Dkt. # 37.
II.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) provides that
[w]hen an action presents more than one claim for relief[,] . . . the court may direct
entry of a final judgment as to one or more, but fewer than all, claims or parties only
if the court expressly determines that there is no just reason for delay.
“The purpose of Rule 54(b) ‘is to avoid the possible injustice of a delay in entering judgment on a
distinctly separate claim or as to fewer than all of the parties until the final adjudication of the entire
case by making an immediate appeal available.’” Oklahoma Turnpike Auth. v. Bruner, 259 F.3d
1236, 1241 (10th Cir. 2001) (quoting 10 Charles A. Wright et. al., Federal Practice and Procedure:
Civil 2d § 2654 at 33 (1982)). “However, Rule 54(b) ‘preserves the historic federal policy against
piecemeal appeals[.]’” Id. (quoting Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Mackey, 351 U.S. 427, 438 (1956)).
The rule helps to “promote[ ] judicial efficiency, expedites the ultimate termination of an action and
relieves appellate courts of the need to repeatedly familiarize themselves with the facts of a case.”
Id. “Thus, ‘[t]he rule attempts to strike a balance between the undesirability of more than one appeal
in a single action and the need for making review available in multiple-party or multiple-claim
situations at a time that best serves the needs of the litigants.’” Id. (quoting 10 Charles A. Wright
et. al., Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 2d § 2654 at 35 (1982)).
Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) motions should not be granted “routinely.” Id. “Indeed, ‘trial courts
should be reluctant to enter Rule 54(b) orders since the purpose of this rule is a limited one: to
provide a recourse for litigants when dismissal of less than all their claims will create undue

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hardships.’” Id. (quoting Gas-A-Car, Inc. v. Am. Petrofina, Inc., 484 F.2d 1102, 1105 (10th Cir.
1973)). “Thus, a certification under Rule 54(b) is only appropriate when a district court adheres
strictly to the rule’s requirement that a court make two express determinations.” Id.
“In making the determination required by Rule 54(b), the district court must first ascertain
whether the judgment is final.” Wheeler Mach. Co. v. Mountain States Enters., Inc., 696 F.2d 787,
789 (10th Cir. 1983) (citing Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. General Electric Co., 446 U.S. 1, 7 (1980)).
“To be final, the judgment must be ‘an ultimate disposition of an individual claim entered in the
course of a multiple claims action.’” Id. (citing Curtiss-Wright, 446 U.S. at 7) (internal quotation
marks omitted). “[A] ‘claim’ is generally understood to include all factually or legally connected
elements of a case.” Oklahoma Turnpike Auth., 259 F.3d at 1242. In other words, “a judgment is
not final for the purposes of Rule 54(b) unless the claims resolved are distinct and separate from the
claims left unresolved.” Id. at 1243. As to the second required determination, “the district court
must determine that there is no just reason to delay review of the final order until it has conclusively
ruled on all claims presented by the parties to the case.” Id. at 1242. In making this determination,
the district court should weigh the policies surrounding Rule 54(b), including the need to avoid
piecemeal appeals, and the “district court must take into account judicial administrative interest as
well as the equities involved.” McKissick v. Gemstar-TV Guide Intern., Inc., 2007 WL 2436299
(N.D. Okla. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted).
In this case, plaintiff asserts that the remaining claims are separate and distinct from those
dismissed by the Court’s Opinion and Order and that the Court should therefore certify plaintiff’s
dismissed claims as final. The Court’s Opinion and Order was primarily based upon Liberty Bank
& Trust Co. of Oklahoma City, N.A. v. Splane, 959 P.2d 600 (Okla. Civ. App. 1998), wherein the

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the Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals found that a credit life insurance policy written in the amount
of the total of payments, including the amount of finance charges over the loan period, was valid and
did not violate Okla. Stat. tit. 24, § 13(A). Plaintiff’s dismissed claims all relied upon the allegation
that the credit life insurance policy at issue in this case was issued for an amount exceeding the
unpaid balance of the loan, which violated Okla. Stat. tit. 24, § 13(A), and the Court found that
plaintiff’s allegation failed as a matter of law under Liberty Bank.
The remaining claims, in contrast, are based upon breach of contract and bad faith denial and
were asserted against ANICO only. These claims are based upon the denial of coverage after
plaintiff’s husband, the insured, died. Unlike the dismissed claims, the focus of the remaining
claims is entirely on whether the insured was truthful on his application for credit life insurance as
well as ANICO’s actions after the insured’s death. Therefore, the remaining claims are entirely
“separable from the others remaining to be adjudicated.” Curtiss-Wright, 446 U.S. at 8. The Court
finds that judgment, as to the claims that were dismissed, is final because the remaining claims are
distinct and separate from those that were dismissed.
However, the Court must also determine whether “there is no just reason to delay review of
the final order until [the Court] has conclusively ruled on all claims presented by the parties to the
case.” Oklahoma Turnpike Auth., 259 F.3d at 1242. Plaintiff asserts that “the terminated claims
relating to whether [ ] [d]efendants properly calculated the amount of credit life insurance coverage
. . . are completely distinct from [the] remaining claims.” Dkt. # 37, at 6. Plaintiff states that “[t]he
facts from which each claim arises do not overlap with one another; furthermore, the legal issues
surrounding each claim are completely unrelated to one another.” Id. Further, plaintiff argues that
it would be a waste of court time and resources to force ANICO and plaintiff to continue to litigate

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the remaining claims before allowing plaintiff to appeal the dismissed claims because plaintiff would
“potentially” be forced to “start over and litigate the terminated class claims” rather than to first
appeal the dismissed claims and thereafter “litigate all viable claims at once.” Id.
Plaintiff states only that “delaying appeal would merely allow ANICO to continue its
practice of utilizing the ‘total of payments’ method when calculating credit life insurance limits,
which would result in putative class members continuing to incur damages by paying inflated and
potentially unlawful premiums.” Dkt. # 37, at 6. Plaintiff’s arguments, therefore, are that she would
have to “start over” and litigate the dismissed claims separately, after litigating her claims for breach
of contract and bad faith denial, rather than litigating both at the same time, and that ANICO will
continue what plaintiff argues is an unlawful practice.
As noted by plaintiff, the remaining claims are entirely factually and legally separate from
the dismissed claims. However, contrary to plaintiff’s assertions, requiring plaintiff to fully litigate
all her claims before appealing any of them will not waste judicial resources. Instead, it will
promote “the historic federal policy against piecemeal appeals.” Oklahoma Turnpike Auth., 259
F.3d at 1241 (internal quotation marks omitted). Because the two sets of claims are entirely
separate, allowing plaintiff to take a piecemeal approach to her appeals would not “expedite[ ] the
ultimate termination of [this] action,” id., but would instead require the Tenth Circuit to “repeatedly
familiarize [itself] with the facts of [this] case.” Id. There are no uncertain questions of law that, if
resolved on appeal, would allow this Court to better adjudicate plaintiff’s remaining claims.
Similarly, requiring plaintiff to appeal only after a final adjudication on all claims will not create
undue hardship because the only hardship that plaintiff stated exists is that ANICO will continue to
use a method for calculating the amount of credit life insurance that this Court has already found is

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solidly supported and correct under Oklahoma law. Because federal courts prefer “one appeal in
a single action” and because requiring plaintiff to wait for a final judgment on all claims creates no
undue hardship in this case, the Court finds that there is reason to delay review until adjudication
of all claims is final and plaintiff’s motion should be denied.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that plaintiff Judy Dollison’s Motion for Rule 54(b)
Certification (Dkt. # 37) is denied.
DATED this 10th day of June, 2013.

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