Blackwell v. Sparkman et al

Filing 13

OPINION AND ORDER by Chief Judge Gregory K Frizzell ; dismissing/terminating case ; finding as moot 4 Motion for Miscellaneous Relief; finding as moot 6 Motion for Preliminary Injunction; finding as moot 8 Motion for Miscellaneous Relief; finding as moot 9 Motion for Miscellaneous Relief; finding as moot 10 Sealed Motion; finding as moot 11 Sealed Motion; finding as moot 12 Motion for Leave to Proceed in Forma Pauperis (hbo, Dpty Clk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

MALCOLM M. BLACKWELL,
Plaintiff,
v.
JUDGE RODNEY B. SPARKMAN,
Tulsa District Courthouse, SHERRI D.
BLACKWELL, MICHAEL J. BEARD,
BRENDA COLDWELL, Oklahoma
Certified Shorthand Reporter, and
CLERK OF COURT, Tulsa District
Courthouse,
Defendants.

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Case No. 13-CV-260-GKF-FHM

OPINION AND ORDER
This matter comes before the court, sua sponte, on the Complaint [Dkt. #2], filed on May
2, 2013.
This lawsuit arises from a divorce action in Tulsa County District Court, In re Marriage
of: Sherri D. Blackwell and Malcolm M. Blackwell, Case No. FD-2010-239. Plaintiff Malcolm
M. Blackwell, appearing pro se, contends the defendants violated his constitutional right of due
process during divorce proceedings. The defendants who allegedly violated his constitutional
rights are: his ex-wife, Sherri D. Blackwell; the judge who presided in the divorce case, Special
District Judge Rodney B. Sparkman; his ex-wife’s counsel in the divorce case, Michael J. Beard;
a court reporter, Brenda Coldwell; and the Tulsa District Court Clerk.

Plaintiff’s ex-wife filed her Petition for Dissolution of Marriage in the state court case on
August 20, 2010. [Dkt. #2, Ex. 1]. A Decree of Dissolution of Marriage was entered in the case
on July 1, 2011. [Dkt. #2, Ex. 24].1
The Complaint alleges a plethora of due process violations and other legal missteps
during the divorce proceedings, including that:


The Tulsa District Court Clerk failed to obtain the parties’ consent to proceed before a
“Magistrate Judge” as required under 28 U.S.C. § 636 and Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 73, 72 and 59.



Service of the initial divorce papers, as well as subsequent pleadings and court orders
was improper.



Plaintiff’s “Contort” to the initial Temporary Order Agreement (“TOA”) was “secured
under threat duress and coercion” by his ex-wife’s attorney.



The judge later entered a new TOA without plaintiff’s consent.



His ex-wife’s attorney unlawfully entered into a legal agreement with the ex-wife and
the Tulsa County District Court without plaintiff’s consent “pursuant to the common
law.”



He did not waive his right to a jury trial in the divorce case.



His ex-wife and family members could not testify against him in the divorce action
without his consent, which he never gave.



The judge wrongfully joined the divorce proceeding with a contempt proceeding.



The Tulsa County District Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the case.



The court reporter omitted testimony of his witnesses from the transcript of a contempt
hearing.



He never consented to the divorce decree.

1

During its pendency, plaintiff twice removed the divorce action to federal court. See In re Marriage of Sherri D.
Blackwell v. Malcolm L. Blackwell, Case No. 11-CV-328-TCK-PJC, and Sherri D. Blackwell v. Malcolm M.
Blackwell, Case No. 11-CV-477-CVE-TLW. Both cases were remanded, sua sponte, based on lack of subject
matter jurisdiction.

2

Plaintiff seeks a determination that the judgment in the divorce case is void. [Complaint
at 3]. Contemporaneously with the filing of the Complaint, he has also filed a Motion for
Restraining Order [Dkt. #4], Motion for Preliminary Injunction [Dkt. #6], Motion for Marshal
Delivery of Summons [Dkt. #8], “Motion of Notice for A Order to Show Cause” [Dkt. #9],
Motion for Writ of Habeas Corpus [Dkt. #10], Application for Writ of Habeas Corpus and
Emergency Motion for Return of Offspring Affidavit [Dkt. #11], and Motion for Leave to
Proceed in Forma Pauperis [Dkt. No. 12].
Because Blackwell is proceeding pro se, the court, consistent with Supreme Court and
Tenth Circuit precedent, will construe his pro se pleadings liberally. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S.
519, 520 (1972); Gaines v. Stenseng, 292 F.3d 1222, 1224 (10th Cir. 2002).
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, and there is a presumption against the
exercise of federal jurisdiction. Merida Delgado v. Gonzales, 428 F.3d 916, 919 (10th Cir.
2005); Penteco Corp. Ltd. Partnership—1985A v. Union Gas System, Inc., 929 F.2d 1519, 1521
(10th Cir. 1991). The party invoking federal jurisdiction has the burden to allege jurisdictional
facts demonstrating the presence of federal subject matter jurisdiction. McNutt v. General
Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 182 (1936) (“It is incumbent upon the plaintiff properly
to allege the jurisdictional facts, according to the nature of the case.”); Montoya v. Chao, 296
F.3d 952, 955 (10th Cir. 2002) (“The burden of establishing subject-matter jurisdiction is on the
party asserting jurisdiction.”). The Tenth Circuit has stated that “[f]ederal courts ‘have an
independent obligation to determine whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists, even in the
absence of a challenge from any party,’ and thus a court may sua sponte raise the question of
whether there is subject matter jurisdiction ‘at any stage of the litigation.’” 1mage Software, Inc.
v. Reynolds & Reynolds Co., 459 F.3d 1044, 1048 (10th Cir. 2006).

3

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a), “[f]inal judgments or decrees rendered by the highest
court of a State in which a decision could be had may be reviewed by the [United States]
Supreme Court by writ of certiorari.” Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which is based on
the statute, only the United States Supreme Court has jurisdiction to hear appeals from final state
court judgments. See Guttman v. Khalsa, 446 F.3d 1027, 1031 (10th Cir. 2006). The RookerFeldman doctrine applies “to cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused
by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting
district court review and rejection of those judgments.” Id. at 1032, quoting Exxon Mobil Corp.
v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005).
This case is precisely the type of proceeding described in Exxon Mobil and Guttman.
Plaintiff asks this court to declare state court divorce judgment void based on alleged due process
violations. However, “a district court [can]not entertain constitutional claims attacking a statecourt judgment, even if the state court [did] not pass directly on those claims, when the
constitutional attack [is] ‘inextricably intertwined’ with the state court’s judgment.” Mann v.
Boatright, 477 F.3d 1140, 1147 (10th Cir. 2007), quoting Exxon Mobil at 286, n.1. A claim is
inextricably intertwined “if the relief requested in the federal action would effectively reverse the
state court decision or void its ruling.” Charchenko v. City of Stillwater, 47 F.3d 981, 983 (8th
Cir. 1995).
Plaintiffs’ claims in this case are “inextricably intertwined” with the state courts’ decision
because the relief requested—declaratory judgment that the divorce decree is void—would
effectively reverse the state court’s decision. Therefore, this action is barred by the RookerFeldman doctrine.

4

This case is dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Motion for Restraining
Order [Dkt. #4], Motion for Preliminary Injunction [Dkt. #6], Motion for Marshal Delivery of
Summons [Dkt. #8], “Motion of Notice for A Order to Show Cause” [Dkt. #9], Motion for Writ
of Habeas Corpus [Dkt. #10], Application for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Emergency Motion for
Return of Offspring Affidavit [Dkt. #11] and Motion for Leave to Proceed in Forma Pauperis
[Dkt. No. 12] are moot.
ENTERED this 3rd day of May, 2013.

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