Griffin et al v. Mortgageit, Inc. et al
Filing
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OPINION AND ORDER by Judge Claire V Eagan ; granting 26 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim; granting 33 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim; finding as moot 9 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim; finding as moot 9 Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction; granting 22 Motion to Dismiss (Re: 6 Amended Complaint ) (RGG, Chambers)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
THESSALLY GRANT GRIFFIN, SR. and
STAR GRIFFIN,
Plaintiffs,
v.
MORTGAGEIT, INC.,
MIDWEST MORTGAGEIT 2006
CORPORATE PASS THROUGH
CERTIFICATE SERIES 2006, REAL HOME
SERVICES & SOLUTIONS, INC.,
ALTISOURCE RESIDENTIAL
CORPORATION, KIVELL RAYMENT
& FRANCIS, MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC
REGISTRATION SYSTEMS, INC., a/k/a
MERS, previously names as Mortgage
Electronic Systems, Inc., and JOHN DOE,
Defendants.
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Case No. 14-CV-0023-CVE-FHM
OPINION AND ORDER
Now before the Court are the following motions: the Motion to Dismiss by Altisource
Residential Corporation, Real Home Services & Solutions, Inc., and Midwest Mortgageit 2006,
Corporate Pass Through Certificate Series 2006 (Dkt. # 9);1 Defendant Mortgageit, Inc.’s Motion
to Dismiss and Brief in Support (Dkt. # 22); Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint and Brief in
Support Thereof by Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (Dkt. # 26), and the Motion to
Dismiss Amended Complaint and Brief in Support Thereof by Altisource Residential Corporation,
1
Defendant Altisource Residential Corporation (Altisource) and other defendants filed a
motion to dismiss (Dkt. # 9) the original complaint, but that motion is moot due to the filing
of an amended complaint. Altisource has filed a motion to dismiss the amended complaint
(Dkt. # 33).
Real Home Services & Solutions, Inc., Indymac Mortgage Service, Inc., Kivell, Rayment & Francis,
P.C., and Midwest Mortgageit 2006, Corporate Pass Through Certificate Series 2006 (Dkt. # 33).
Defendants argue that the Court lacks jurisdiction over this case, because plaintiffs are attacking the
validity of a state court judgment and plaintiffs’ claims are barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
Dkt. # 22, at 3-4; Dkt. # 33-7. Plaintiffs have filed responses (Dkt. ## 34, 35) to the motions to
dismiss, and they argue that the defendants committed fraud on the court in a state court foreclosure
action and the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is inapplicable. Dkt. # 34, at 9.
I.
Plaintiffs Thessally Grant Griffin, Sr. and Star Griffin claim that they owned mortgaged real
property located at 14228 South Toledo Avenue, Bixby, Oklahoma, and that the lender for the
mortgage was Mortgageit, Inc. (Mortgageit). Dkt. # 2, at 1, 4. Plaintiffs allege that Mortgageit sold
their loan to another lender and they claim that the purchaser of the loan failed to take the necessary
steps to perfect a security interest in the real property owned by plaintiffs. Id. at 4, 9. On August 10,
2010, Onewest Bank FSB (Onewest) filed a foreclosure action against the Griffins in Tulsa County
District Court.2 Dkt. # 9-1, at 1. Onewest also named other parties, including Victor and Chiku
Griffin, who could have an interest in the property. Thessally Grant Griffin, Sr. filed a motion for
summary judgment against Onewest, but the motion was stricken. Id. at 6. On June 21, 2011, the
state court entered judgment in favor of Onewest and stated that:
2
The parties have attached to their motions and responses copies of state court dockets sheets
and records. The Court may take judicial notice of public records under Fed. R. Evid. 201
and this includes pleadings, docket sheets, and orders in this case and other related cases.
Luis v. Argent Mortg. Co., LLC, 2013 WL 4483503 (N.D. Okla. Aug. 19, 2013); Marlin Oil
Corp. v. Colorado Interstate Gas Co., 700 F. Supp. 1076, 1081 n.5 (W.D. Okla. 1988).
2
The Court further finds that the Defendants, Thessaly Grant Griffin, Sr. and Star
Griffin, have made default in the performance of the terms and conditions of said
Note and Mortgage as alleged in Plaintiff’s Petition and that Plaintiff is entitled to
the foreclosure of the Mortgage sued upon in this cause as against all of the
Defendants in and to this cause, and each of them.
Dkt. # 9-2, at 4. The Griffins did not appeal the judgment of foreclosure and the property was sold
by the Tulsa County Sheriff. However, before the sale could be confirmed, Victor Griffin filed a
bankruptcy petition and the state court took no action to confirm the sheriff’s sale. Dkt. 9-1, at 10.
The bankruptcy case was later dismissed and the state court entered an order confirming the sheriff’s
sale. Dkt. # 22-1, at 28.
After the sale was confirmed, Chiku Griffin filed a bankruptcy petition in the United States
Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma, and he filed a notice of bankruptcy in the
foreclosure action.3 Id. at 136-37. Onewest sought a writ of assistance to prevent further
interference with sale of the property, and the state court issued a writ of assistance. Id. at 13. On
July 30, 2012, Thessaly and Star Griffin filed a quiet title action in Tulsa County District Court and,
in a rambling 43 page petition, sought to have the ruling in the foreclosure action set aside and
demanded that Onewest be prohibited from seeking to foreclose on the subject real property. Id. at
28-71. The quiet title action was dismissed. Id. at 140. Following the dismissal of the quiet title
action, Star Griffin filed a bankruptcy petition and filed a notice of bankruptcy in the foreclosure
action. Id. at 16. The bankruptcy petition was dismissed. Id. at 17. Thessaly and Star Griffin
attempted to remove the foreclosure action to federal court. Onewest Bank, FSB v. Thessaly Grant
3
The state court docket sheet and the records submitted by the parties do not show what
happened in the bankruptcy case filed by Chiku Griffin.
3
Griffin, Sr. et al., 13-CV-322-TCK-PJC (N.D. Okla.). The case was remanded for the following
reasons:
(1) a final judgment was entered against these Defendants on June 21, 2011; (2) there
are no pending claims to remove to this Court; (3) the Notice of Removal is
untimely, as it was filed years after the entry of judgment and well outside the time
limit for removal in 28 U.S.C. 1446(b); and (4) Defendants may not collaterally
attack the state court judgment by “removing” the case to this Court.
Onewest Bank, FSB v. Thessaly Grant Griffin, Sr. et al., 13-CV-322-TCK-PJC (N.D. Okla. August
6, 2013).
Plaintiffs filed this case seeking a “judicial determination and declaration of its rights with
regard to the Property and the corresponding Promissory Note and Mortgage.” Dkt. # 6, at 9-10.
Plaintiffs allege claims for wrongful foreclosure and civil conspiracy, and they allege that defendants
have violated the Racketeering and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), the Hobbs Act, and the Fair
Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA). Each of plaintiffs’ claims is based on their assertion that
Onewest had no right to foreclose on plaintiffs’ home and they allege that defendants engaged in a
conspiracy to commit fraud on the state court. Plaintiffs seek monetary damages and they ask the
Court to declare that the judgment of foreclosure is invalid. Id. at 28-29.
II.
Defendants asks the Court to dismiss plaintiffs’ claims for lack of jurisdiction. When
considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1), the Court must determine whether the
defendant is facially attacking the complaint or challenging the jurisdictional facts alleged by the
plaintiff. In Holt v. United States, 46 F.3d 1000 (10th Cir. 1995), the Tenth Circuit stated:
Generally, Rule 12(b)(1) motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
take two forms. First, a facial attack on the complaint’s allegations as to subject
matter jurisdiction questions the sufficiency of the complaint. In reviewing a facial
4
attack on the complaint, a district court must accept the allegations in the complaint
as true.
Second, a party may go beyond allegations contained in the complaint and challenge
the facts upon which subject matter jurisdiction depends. When reviewing a factual
attack on subject matter jurisdiction, a district court may not presume the truthfulness
of the complaint’s factual allegations. . . . In such instances, a court’s reference to
evidence outside the pleadings does not convert the motion to a Rule 56 motion.
Id. at 1002-03. Defendants rely on evidence outside the pleadings and the Court will construe their
motions as a factual attack on the jurisdictional facts alleged by plaintiffs. When ruling on a factual
attack on subject matter jurisdiction, a court “has wide discretion to allow affidavits, other
documents, and a limited evidentiary hearing to resolve disputed jurisdictional facts” without
converting the motion into a motion for summary judgment. Stuart v. Colorado Interstate Gas Co.,
271 F.3d 1221, 1225 (10th Cir. 2001) (quoting Holt, 46 F.3d at 1003); see also Davis ex rel. Davis
v. United States, 343 F.3d 1282, 1295-96 (10th Cir. 2003) (district court had authority to review
evidence outside the pleadings without converting defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction into a motion for summary judgment). To defeat the defendants’ Rule 12(b)(1)
motion, “plaintiff[s] must present affidavits or other evidence sufficient to establish the court’s
subject matter jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence.” Southway v. Central Bank of
Nigeria, 328 F.3d 1267, 1274 (10th Cir. 2003).
III.
Defendants argue that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this case, because
plaintiffs are attempting to challenge the validity of a state court judgment and this type of claim can
be raised only to a state appellate court. Plaintiffs respond that defendants committed fraud in the
foreclosure action and the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is inapplicable.
5
In Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923), and District of Columbia Court of
Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983), the Supreme Court held that a state court litigant must
appeal an adverse ruling to a state court of appeals and a federal district court lacks jurisdiction to
review a state court ruling. This limitation on the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts is known
as the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. “The Rooker-Feldman doctrine prevents the lower federal courts
from exercising jurisdiction over cases brought by ‘state-court losers’ challenging ‘state-court
judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced.’” Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S.
459, 460 (2006) (quoting Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284
(2005)). Federal courts are also prohibited from hearing any claim “inextricably intertwined” with
a state court judgment. Tal v. Hogan, 453 F.3d 1244, 1256 (10th Cir. 2006). However, “[w]hen the
state-court judgment is not itself at issue, the doctrine does not prohibit federal suits regarding the
same subject matter, or even the same claims, as those presented in the state court action.” Bolden
v. City of Topeka, 441 F.3d 1129 (10th Cir. 2006). A federal district court must distinguish between
claims that truly challenge the validity of a state court judgment and claims that attempt to relitigate
an issue decided by a state court that is subject to issue or claim preclusion. In re Miller, 666 F.3d
1255, 1261-62 (10th Cir. 2012).
Plaintiffs have alleged claims for relief under theories of wrongful foreclosure, RICO
conspiracy, Hobbs Act conspiracy, civil conspiracy, and alleged violations of the FDCPA, and
plaintiffs seek monetary damages, injunctive relief, and declaratory relief. The Tenth Circuit has
found that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars claims challenging a judgment in a state court
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foreclosure action. Castro v. Kondaur Capital Corp., 541 F. App’x 833 (10th Cir. Sep. 25, 2013);4
Dillard v. Bank of New York, 476 F. App’x, 690, 692 (10th Cir. Apr. 3, 2012). Other federal courts
have also applied the Rooker-Feldman doctrine to prevent a losing party from raising federal claims
that are more properly treated as an appeal of an adverse decision in a state court foreclosure action.
Russo v. GMAC Mortg., LLC, 549 F. App’x 8 (2d Cir. Dec. 6, 2013); Crawford v. Countrywide
Home Loans, Inc., 647 F.3d 642 (7th Cir. 2011). Plaintiffs argue that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine
does not apply because defendants procured a judgment in the foreclosure action through fraudulent
conduct. Dkt. # 35, at 9. However, plaintiffs have already made the same allegations of fraud in
the foreclosure and quiet title actions in state court, and these allegations were rejected by the state
court. See Dkt. # 22-1, at 32, 95-96. Plaintiffs could have sought relief from the state appellate
courts based on these allegations of fraud, but plaintiffs’ belief that the judgment of foreclosure was
obtained by means of fraud does not bar application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See Tal, 453
F.3d at 1256-57 (allegations of fraud do not prevent application of Rooker-Feldman doctrine when
the same allegations were raised in state court).
The Court has reviewed plaintiffs’ amended complaint (Dkt. # 6) and it is clear that
plaintiffs’ claims for wrongful foreclosure (first cause of action), RICO conspiracy (second cause
of action), violation of the Hobbs Act (third cause of action), civil conspiracy (fourth cause of action,
and their claim for declaratory relief (sixth cause of action) are barred under the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine. These claims directly challenge the validity of the state court judgment and are based on
plaintiffs’ assertions that Onewest had no legal right to foreclose on the subject real property.
4
Unpublished decisions are not precedential, but may be cited for their persuasive value. See
Fed. R. App. P. 32.1; 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
7
Plaintiffs cannot challenge the validity of the judgment of foreclosure in this Court, and plaintiffs
must raise such claims to the state appellate courts. As to plaintiffs’ claim alleging violations of the
FDCPA, it is possible that plaintiffs could have stated a claim that does not attempt to impugn the
validity of the judgment of foreclosure if the claim were limited to unfair debt collections practices,
and this type of claim would not necessarily be barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Castro, 541
F. App’x at 837-38. However, plaintiffs are asserting an FDCPA claim based on defendants’ alleged
lack of standing or right to foreclose on the subject real property, and this issue is inextricably
intertwined with the judgment entered by the state court. Plaintiffs are essentially using the FDCPA
as another means to assert a wrongful foreclosure claim against defendants, and this is properly
treated as an attack on the judgment of foreclosure. The Court finds that all of plaintiffs’ claims
directly challenge the validity of the judgment entered in the foreclosure action, and this Court lacks
jurisdiction to review a final judgment entered by a state court. Thus, plaintiffs’ claims should be
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendant Mortgageit, Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss and
Brief in Support (Dkt. # 22); Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint and Brief in Support Thereof
by Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (Dkt. # 26), and the Motion to Dismiss Amended
Complaint and Brief in Support Thereof by Altisource Residential Corporation, Real Home Services
& Solutions, Inc., Indymac Mortgage Service, Inc., Kivell, Rayment & Francis, P.C., and Midwest
Mortgageit 2006, Corporate Pass Through Certificate Series 2006 (Dkt. # 33) are granted. A
separate judgment of dismissal is entered herewith.
8
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Motion to Dismiss by Altisource Residential
Corporation, Real Home Services & Solutions, Inc., and Midwest Mortgageit 2006, Corporate Pass
Through Certificate Series 2006 (Dkt. # 9) is moot.
DATED this 22nd day of May, 2014.
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