Burlington Northern & Sante Fe Railway Company v. Han
Filing
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OPINION AND ORDER by Judge Claire V Eagan ; denying 71 Motion for Summary Judgment (Re: 18 Amended Complaint ) (RGG, Chambers)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
BURLINGTON NORTHERN & SANTA FE
RAILWAY COMPANY,
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Plaintiff,
v.
PATRICK PILGYUN HAN, M.D.,
Defendant.
Case No. 14-CV-0069-CVE-PJC
OPINION AND ORDER
Now before the Court is Defendant Han’s Motion for Summary Judgment and Supporting
Brief (Dkt. # 71). Defendant Patrick Pilgyun Han, M.D., argues that he cannot be held liable for
contribution to plaintiff Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Company (BNSF), because the
release executed by BNSF did not release Dr. Han from all potential liability to the underlying tort
claimant and BNSF has no evidence that it is a joint tortfeasor with Dr. Han. Dkt. # 71. BNSF
responds that the release executed with the underlying tort claimant was sufficient to give rise to a
right of contribution for BNSF, and it argues that it has admitted that it had some role in the accident
that it alleges caused the tort claimant to seek medical treatment from Dr. Han. Dkt. # 73.
I.
On September 1, 2004, Jamie Kay Detre was injured when her vehicle collided with a train
operated by BNSF. Dkt. # 18-1, at 2. Detre filed a lawsuit against BNSF in Creek County District
Court seeking actual and punitive damages in excess of $10,000. Id. at 3. On August 26, 2006,
Detre sought treatment from Dr. Han for a direct traumatic carotid cavernous fistula (CCF). She
died two days after she visited Dr. Han. The Estate of Jamie Kay Detre (the Estate) amended the
complaint in the state court lawsuit to include a wrongful death claim against BNSF. Dkt. # 18-2.
The Estate did not add Dr. Han as a party in the state court lawsuit. However, he was deposed as
part of the state court lawsuit, and he testified that the train accident caused Detre’s CCF. Dkt. # 711, at 32. Dr. Han stated “with very strong medical certainty that this [CCF] was caused by the train
accident. Id. BNSF retained a medical expert, David Fell, M.D., to testify as to the cause of Detre’s
death, and Dr. Fell believed that the CCF occurred spontaneously and he thought it was
“preposterous” that the train accident could have caused Detre’s CCF. Id. at 37. BNSF also retained
an expert radiologist, Matt Powers, M.D., and Dr. Powers stated the following opinions:
8.
Dr. Han’s opinion that the train accident caused the cavernous fistula
suffered by Jamie Detre is completely unsupported by the medical literature
and is contrary to the scientific principals [sic] supporting the study of human
physiology.
9.
The medical evidence is clear that Jamie Detre did not suffer the type of
facial injury, especially fracture of facial bones or other types of trauma to
the face that would cause a cavernous fistula. Moreover, the cavernous
fistula suffered by Jamie Detre did not occur for more than one year after the
accident. It is medically and scientifically improbable that a cavernous
fistula would be asymptomatic or delay manifestation for a period of several
months and certainly more than a year.
10.
Jamie Detre’s collision with the train in this case occurred on September 1,
2004. Dr. Han treated Ms. Detre’s carotic cavernous fistula from August 26,
2006 until her death on August 28, 2006, was wholly unrelated to her train
accident. Dr. Han’s surgical intervention on August 25, 2006 was not
necessitated by, or related to, the September 1, 2004 train collision.
Dkt. # 71-1, at 40.
The Estate and BNSF signed a mediation agreement on September 9, 2010. Id. at 43. The
Estate agreed to dismiss with prejudice its claims against BNSF in exchange for the payment of
$1,000,000. Id. Dr. Han was not mentioned in the mediation agreement. The Estate and BNSF
subsequently executed a release in which the Estate:
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hereby release[d] and forever discharge[d] . . . . [BNSF] . . . from any and all claims
and liabilities of every kind and nature whatsoever resulting from a collision between
a train and vehicle which occurred in Creek County, Oklahoma, on or about the 1st
day of September 2004 in which Jamie Kay Detre was the driver of the vehicle. This
Agreement includes all damages, past, present or future, resulting from said accident.
. . . Claimants understand that this release covers all incidents and damages,
expenses and future consequences of this accident.
Claimants further covenant and agree that they will never institute any further suit,
action at law or otherwise against . . . [BNSF] . . . nor institute or prosecute or in any
way aid in the institution or prosecution of any claim, demand, action or cause of
action for whatever kind, arising from the aforesaid collision.
In this Release, Claimants also fully and specifically release Patrick Han, M.D.,
Jamie Kay Detre’s treating physician, from any and all claims and liabilities of any
kind or nature, whether or not heretofore asserted or otherwise known, to the same
extent that Defendants are released in this document.
Dkt. # 71-1, at 45-46. The release states that it is a “FULL AND FINAL RELEASE OF ALL
CLAIMS . . . between Claimants and the parties released . . . .” Id. at 50. However, the final
paragraph of the Release states that the claimants “UNDERSTAND THAT THIS RELEASE
EXTINGUISHES ALL OF THE CLAIMS RELATING TO THE SEPTEMBER 1, 2004
ACCIDENT, WHETHER OR NOT MADE IN THE PETITION FILED ON DECEMBER 20,
2005.” Id. at 51.
BNSF filed a lawsuit in Tulsa County District Court seeking indemnification and
contribution from Dr. Han. Id. at 54-57. BNSF alleged that Detre’s “death was not caused by the
collision with BNSF’s train,” and it claimed that Detre’s death was caused solely by Dr. Han’s
negligent medical treatment of Detre. Id. at 55-56. BNSF made no allegations that it was a joint
tortfeasor with Dr. Han, and it denied any responsibility for Detre’s death. Id. at 56. The parties
appeared before the state court for a hearing on a discovery matter, and BNSF acknowledged that
it sought to withdraw its contribution claim against Dr. Han. Id. at 70-71. BNSF expressly
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disclaimed any argument that was a joint tortfeasor with Dr. Han and, instead, it took the position
that Dr. Han was solely responsible for Detre’ death. Id. at 71-72. Counsel for BNSF clearly stated
his client’s position as follows:
I mean, we are not joint tortfeasors; okay? So it doesn’t matter, as the court has
pointed out several times, why that wreck happened or when it happened. Frankly,
it doesn’t even matter what the amount of the settlement was. This jury is going to
have to arrive at what the valuation is for Dr. Han’s own conduct in bringing out this
successive and unrelated tort. We’re only entitled to be paid back what we, as an
indemnitor, paid, but it’s not a “you paid X and we should pay Y, because together
we brought about this injury.”
Id. at 96-97. Dr. Han took the position that the train accident gave rise to Detre’s CCF and that the
railroad’s negligence was the reason Detre came to him for treatment. Id. at 74. Based on the
parties’ arguments, it appears that BNSF dropped the contribution aspect of its case in an attempt
to keep out evidence about the train accident, because BNSF argued that Detre had fully healed from
any injuries caused by the accident and that the relevant issue was whether Detre’s CCF was related
to the accident. Id. at 81-83. Under this theory, BNSF argued that it was an indemnitor for Dr. Han,
because it bore no liability for Detre’s wrongful death claim and it should be able to receive
indemnification as a fault-free party as to the wrongful death claim. Id. at 99.
BNSF voluntarily dismissed its claims against Dr. Han in state court and, on February 18,
2014, it filed this case alleging a contribution claim against Dr. Han. BNSF stated that Detre died
as a result of Dr. Han’s grossly negligent medical treatment and that Detre’s “death was not caused
by the collision with BNSF’s train.” Dkt. # 2, at 2. BNSF acknowledged that it “played some part
in bringing about personal injury to [Detre], but alleges that her death was caused by the negligence
of [Dr. Han.]” Id. at 3. Dr. Han filed a motion to dismiss the complaint and argued, inter alia, that
the contribution claim should be dismissed because BNSF failed to allege that it was a joint
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tortfeasor with Dr. Han. Dkt. # 11, at 6-9. The Court granted the motion to dismiss and found that
it was “apparent that [BNSF] is attempting to completely distance itself from any liability for Detre’s
death.” Dkt. # 17, at 4. The claim alleged in BNSF’s complaint was essentially a claim for
indemnification and, to state a contribution claim, BNSF would be “required to affirmatively allege
that its actions played some role in Detre’s alleged wrongful death.” Id. BNSF filed an amended
complaint making the following allegations:
15. Plaintiff BNSF alleges the crossing collision played some part in bring about the
personal injury to Jamie Kay Detre.
16. BNSF’s conduct thus played a role in [Detre’s] death.
17. BNSF’s role was limited.
18. [Detre] was injured in a crossing collision incident.
19. Dr. Han’s negligent medical treatment aggravated or enhanced the initial
personal injuries to [Detre]. Dr. Han’s negligent medical treatment resulted in
[Detre’s] death approximately two years after the crossing collision.
20. BNSF alleges that the crossing collision was causally related, to some degree,
to the condition for which Dr. Han treated [Detre].
21. More importantly, it was reasonably likely that a jury in the Detre action could
have concluded that the crossing collision resulted and/or contributed to the personal
injuries that eventually led and/or contributed to [Detre] being treated by Dr. Han.
Such was alleged by the Detre estate in the Detre action.
Dkt. # 18, at 3-4. In the parties’ joint status report (Dkt. # 28), Dr. Han summarized his defenses
and stated that Detre sought treatment from Dr. Han for the CCF, a condition that was directly
caused by the Crossing accident.” Dkt. # 28, at 2.
II.
Summary judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 is appropriate where there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
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Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242, 250 (1986); Kendall v. Watkins, 998 F.2d 848, 850 (10th Cir. 1993). The plain language of
Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon
motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an
element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 317. “Summary judgment procedure is properly regarded not as a disfavored
procedural shortcut, but rather as an integral part of the Federal Rules as a whole, which are
designed ‘to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action.’” Id. at 327.
“When the moving party has carried its burden under Rule 56(c), its opponent must do more
than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. . . . Where the
record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there
is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,
586-87 (1986) (citations omitted). “The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the
plaintiff’s position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the [trier of fact] could
reasonably find for the plaintiff.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. In essence, the inquiry for the Court
is “whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or
whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” Id. at 250. In its review,
the Court construes the record in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment.
Garratt v. Walker, 164 F.3d 1249, 1251 (10th Cir. 1998).
III.
Defendant argues that BNSF cannot recover for contribution, because BNSF has taken the
position that its actions did not cause or contribute to Detre’s death. Dkt. # 71, at 7-10. Defendant
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also argues that BNSF has no right to contribution, because the release executed by the Estate failed
to extinguish all potential liability that Dr. Han might have to the Estate. Id. at 11-16.
A.
Dr. Han argues that BNSF has failed to admit that it has common liability with Dr. Han for
Detre’s death, and it is prohibited from seeking contribution from Dr. Han as a matter of law. Dkt.
# 71, at 7. BNSF responds that Dr. Han testified in a deposition that the condition for which he
treated plaintiff was caused by the train accident and there is a genuine dispute as to whether Dr.
Han and BNSF can be treated as joint tortfeasors for the purpose of a contribution claim. Dkt. # 73,
at 22-28.
Oklahoma has adopted the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act and it is codified
at OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 832. Under § 832.A., “[w]hen two or more persons become jointly or
severally liable in tort for the same injury to person or property for the same wrongful death, there
is a right of contribution among them even though judgment has not been recovered against all or
any of them . . . .” The purpose of the statute is to provide “judicial control over the distribution of
damages in tort claims in which there is more than one tortfeasor.” Barringer v. Baptist Healthcare
of Oklahoma, 22 P.3d 695, 698 (Okla. 2001). A tortfeasor is entitled to contribution only when it
has paid more than its pro-rata share of a common liability. Berry v. Empire Indem. Ins. Co., 634
P.2d 718, 719-20 (Okla. 1981).
A tortfeasor’s pro-rata share is determined based on its
proportionate degree of fault for the common liability. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. A.A.R. Western
Skyways, Inc., 784 P.2d 52, 57 (Okla. 1989). On the other hand, a right to indemnification may
“exist[] when one who is only constructively liable to the injured party and is no manner responsible
for the harm is compelled to pay for the tortious act of another.” Caterpillar Inc. v. Trinity Indus.,
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Inc., 134 P.3d 881, 886 (Okla. Civ. App. 2005). Oklahoma does not recognize a right to
indemnification among joint tortfeasors. Id.
The evidence presented by the parties concerning Dr. Han’s treatment of Detre is not
substantial. Dr. Han testified in a deposition during the underlying tort case that he believed with
“strong medical certainty that [Detre’s CCF] was caused by that train accident.” Dkt. # 71-1, at 32.
BNSF’s experts in that case opined that plaintiff’s CCF was entirely unrelated to the train accident.
Id. at 37 (Dr. Fell testified that it was extremely unlikely that plaintiff’s CCF had any causal relation
to the train accident); Id. at 40 (Dr. Powers stated that Dr. Han’s opinion was “unsupported by the
medical literature and is contrary to the scientific principals [sic] supporting the study of human
physiology”).
The arguments of both parties miss the mark in terms of the issue of common liability,
because the parties are focused on BNSF’s willingness to admit that it had some role in Detre’s
death. The issue is much more straightforward than the parties’ briefing would suggest. The Court
is ruling on a motion for summary judgment, and the BNSF’s allegations are relevant only to the
extent that the allegations frame the issues that should be adjudicated by the Court. In order to show
that it is entitled to contribution, BNSF must come forward with evidence establishing two essential
points: (1) BNSF’s conduct caused the condition for which Dr. Han treated Detre; and (2) Dr. Han’s
treatment was below the applicable standard of care and enhanced or aggravated the injuries suffered
by Detre. Dr. Han’s own deposition testimony in a prior case is sufficient to establish a genuine
dispute as to whether plaintiff’s CCF was caused by the train collision. He stated with “strong
medical certainty” that he treated Detre for CCF as a result of the train accident. Id. at 32. Dr.
Han’s deposition testimony conflicts with the expert opinions offered by BNSF in the underlying
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tort case, and there is evidence that Detre’s CCF is entirely unrelated to the collision. The Court
cannot resolve this factual dispute when ruling on a motion for summary judgment, and the cause
of Detre’s CCF is material fact that must be determined by the jury. Due to this genuine dispute as
to a material fact, the Court finds that defendant’s motion for summary judgment should be denied.
B.
Defendant argues that the release executed by BNSF and the Estate failed to extinguish all
potential liability that Dr. Han might have to the Estate, because the release was limited to liability
stemming from the train accident and it would not prevent the Estate from bringing a wrongful death
claim against Dr. Han for wrongful death unrelated to the train accident. Dkt. # 71, at 2. Plaintiff
responds that Dr. Han was named in the release and the settlement extinguished any common
liability he would have for claims arising out of the train accident, and the release was sufficient
under Oklahoma law to allow BNSF to bring a contribution claim against Dr. Han.
“A settlement document is a contract and is construed using ordinary principles of contract
interpretation.” Anthony v. United States, 987 F.2d 670, 673 (10th Cir. 1993); see also Corbett v.
Combined Commc’ns Corp. of Okla., Inc., 654 P.2d 616, 617 (Okla. 1982) (“A release is a
contract.”). Under Oklahoma law, “[t]he language of a contract is to govern its interpretation, if the
language is clear and explicit, and does not involve an absurdity.” OKLA. STAT. tit. 15, § 154. “A
contract must be considered as a whole so as to give effect to all its provisions without narrowly
concentrating upon some clause or language taken out of context.” Lewis v. Sac & Fox Tribe of
Okla. Housing Auth., 896 P.2d 503, 514 (Okla. 1994). “The terms of the parties’ contract, if
unambiguous, clear, and consistent, are accepted in their plain and ordinary sense, and the contract
will be enforced to carry out the intention of the parties as it existed at the time the contract was
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negotiated.” Dodson v. St. Paul Ins. Co., 812 P.2d 372, 376 (Okla. 1991); see also OKLA. STAT. tit.
15, § 160. “When a contract is reduced to writing, the intention of the parties is to be ascertained
from the writing alone, if possible . . . .” OKLA. STAT. tit. 15, § 155. “Interpretation of contracts, and
whether they are ambiguous, are matters of law for the court to determine.” Livesay v. Shoreline,
L.L.C., 31 P.3d 1067, 1070 (Okla. Civ. App. 2001) (citing Osprey L.L.C. v. Kelly Moore Paint Co.,
984 P.2d 194 (Okla. 1999)).
In this case, the parties dispute whether the language of the release was sufficient to give rise
to a right of contribution against Dr. Han. Oklahoma follows the “specific identity rule,” which
provides that an agreement to release a party from liability applies only to the parties “designated
by name or otherwise specifically identified.” McKissick v. Yuen, 618 F.3d 1177, 1193 (10th Cir.
2010) (quoting Moss v. City of Oklahoma City, 897 P.2d 280, 288 (Okla. 1995)). Section 832 has
been amended to incorporate this rule, and a release “does not discharge any other tort-feasor from
liability for the injury or wrongful death unless the other tort-feasor is specifically named.” OKLA.
STAT. tit. 12, § 832.H.1. In order for a settling tortfeasor to bring a contribution claim against
another non-settling tortfeasor, the release must extinguish the full amount of the plaintiff’s claims
against the non-settling tortfeasor. Barringer, 22 P.2d at 698.
There is no dispute that Dr. Han was specifically named in the release with the Estate and
that the release extinguishes any claim that the Estate might have against Dr. Han “to the same
extent that Defendants are released in this document.” Dkt. # 71-1, at 45. BNSF obtained a release
from the Estate for all “claims and liabilities of every kind and nature which have arisen or which
may hereafter arise, together with all other damages of any nature whatsoever resulting from a
collision between a train and vehicle which occurred in Creek County, Oklahoma, on or about the
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1st day of September 2004 . . . .” Id. at 1. The Release later states that it is intended to constitute
a “FULL AND FINAL RELEASE OF ALL CLAIMS” against the parties named in the release. Id.
at 6. Construing the document as a whole, the Court finds no merit in defendant’s argument that the
Estate maintained a right to sue him for negligence arising out of his treatment of Detre. Dr. Han
was released to the same extent as BNSF, and the settlement constituted a complete release of the
Estate’s wrongful death claim against BNSF. In other words, the Estate gave up its right to sue Dr.
Han and BNSF for the alleged wrongful death of Detre by accepting the terms of the settlement.
Defendant argues that the release is valid only as to claims arising out of the train collision and the
Estate could have brought a claim against Dr. Han on the theory that Detre’s death was not caused
by the collision. Dkt. # 71. Even if the Estate had a theoretical right to sue Dr. Han, no such claim
was filed and the statute of limitations has long since expired. The Court finds that the release
constituted a full release of the Estate’s claims against Dr. Han, and the release was sufficient under
§ 832 to allow BNSF to bring a contribution claim against Dr. Han.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendant Han’s Motion for Summary Judgment and
Supporting Brief (Dkt. # 71) is denied.
DATED this 24th day of August, 2015.
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